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An Abstract of the Thesis 
Purpose: This study aims to achieve two objectives. First, to explore the main 
concerns of corporate governance stakeholders in Nigeria, focusing on three broad 
fields of institutionalisation: political, social and economic. Second, to examine the 
coverage accorded to the main institutional influences in the primary code of 
corporate governance in Nigeria. 
Design/methodology/approach: Employing an intrepretivist research philosophy, 
the study adopts a qualitative research strategy. Data was collected using semi-
structured, face-to-face interviews from three groups of stakeholders (executives, 
regulators and corporate governance consultants). Their responses and views were 
analysed using a qualitative content analysis (QCA) technique.  
Findings: In highlighting the main institutional elements driving corporate 
governance in Nigeria, this study revealed that individuals wield the power to 
influence existing institutions in developing countries. This contradicts the position 
in developed economies where the robustness of institutional frameworks acts as a 
constraint on the behaviour of economic agents. This thesis also show that the 
recognition accorded to the main institutional frames in the primary code of 
corporate governance is inadequate. Based on these findings, a bottom-up approach 
to corporate governance is proposed where the concerns of economic agents are 
prioritised, as a strategy for building sustainable institutional frameworks.  
Originality/value: The study reinforced the need to re-examine the basis of agency 
and institutional theories in the context of developing economies. The study also 
made a case for the re-evaluation of the significance of executives in agency theory 
literature regarding developing economies, relying on the level of economic 
sophistication and the general lack of knowledge by shareholders with respect to 
their rights. This observation will enrich the scholarship on agency and institutional 
theories as this study draws attention to alternative strategies for understanding 
agency (human institutionalism) and institutional (bottom-up approach) theories. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Background and Rationale for Research 
In November 2008, Richard Fuld was called to testify before a US 
congressional committee investigating the sudden collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, the investment bank he had headed for many years. Its deep 
involvement in the markets for asset-backed securities… had brought the 
bank to a crisis two months before. When the US government refused to bail 
it out, credit markets around the world seized up, accelerating the growing 
slump of the world economy (Extract from Nordberg, 2011, p. 1). 
Across the globe, incidences of corporate scandals as witnessed with the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers (McDonald & Robinson, 2010), amongst several other 
organisations, have reiterated the value of good governance practices in corporations 
(Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013).  Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, and Lien (2007) also 
noted that good corporate governance is a prerequisite for attracting foreign 
investments. The preceding views are reinforced by findings in the literature 
(Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008) which suggests that good 
governance contributes to superior corporate performance. Following these 
evidences, corporate governance discourse has emerged as a major area for scholarly 
engagement, particularly since the turn of the 1990s. 
The concept of corporate governance, according to Tricker (2015), is not new. 
Around three centuries ago, Smith (1776) identified the central corporate governance 
challenge, indicating that agents managing other people’s funds may not be expected 
to manage such funds as efficiently as they would manage their own. Accordingly, 
governance issues arise when a principal has to rely on an agent to manage their 
(principal) business. This is the basis of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
which has been identified as the supra-national lens for evaluating all corporate 
governance issues (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Indeed, Hart (1995) argues that 
corporate governance is irrelevant in the absence of agency concerns. Consequently, 
Huse (2005) informed that there is an increased focus towards exploring how 
shareholders can monitor and control potential managerial misbehaviour.  
However, despite a variety of innovations aimed at addressing agency concerns, 
recent incidents in Tesco (see Warner, 2014) and Volkswagen (see Milne, 2015) 
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continue to indicate that cases of governance abuses are still evident. Similar 
incidents have been widely reported in both developed (Enriques & Volpin, 2007) 
and developing (Berglöf & Claessens, 2006) economies. These concerns have 
ensured the emergence of a body of literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005; 
Letza, Kirkbride, Sun, & Smallman, 2008) questioning the relevance of agency 
theory. For example, Dharwadkar, George, and Brandes (2000) and Young, Peng, 
Ahlstrom, Bruton, and Jiang (2008) argue that the unique agency problems in less-
developed economies result from principal-principal goal incongruence, i.e. the 
expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Thus, in acknowledging that agency 
theory lacks the robustness to independently explain corporate governance 
challenges, Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, and Very (2007) noted that this development has 
contributed to the growth of other theoretical perspectives, such as institutional 
theory.  
Scott (1987) explained that institutional theory examines the institutional 
environment and its influence on societal beliefs and practices which, in turn, 
influence societal ‘actors.’ As Scott (1987) indicates, the institutional environment 
provides the basis for institutional theorising, promoting an understanding of the 
influence of non-economic elements on corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003). Judge, Douglas, and Kutan (2008) argue that variations in institutional 
environments across countries account for the differences in global corporate 
governance practice. Consequently, attempts at corporate governance convergence 
are affected by the peculiarities evident in different institutional environments. This 
understanding has become the dominant perspective central to institutional 
theorising.  
Another school of thought has however questioned the relevance of institutions in 
the accomplishment of economic objectives (Sachs, 2003; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004; Przeworski, 2004). While some opponents of 
institutional relevance argue that institutions are not relevant in an absolute sense, 
others posit that there is a need to understand the functionality of an institution by 
examining the conditions that embed such institutions. In other words, the latter 
scholars are particular about which element (institutions or conditions) should take 
priority in the economic policy ladder. An observation from literature indicates that 
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the diversity in the context of studies may have contributed to variations in findings. 
For instance, the majority of the studies associated with institutional relevance are 
often substantially based on developed economies whereas opponents of institutional 
relevance tend to focus considerably on developing countries. 
The desire to examine these concerns with a view to contributing to the debate, 
drawing from a theoretical perspective, is fundamental to embarking on this research. 
The achievement of this objective would be enhanced by defining a context for this 
study. Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) observed that the majority of corporate 
governance research has focused on US firms. While La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, 
and Shleifer (1999) attempted to expand corporate governance scholarship, these 
studies nonetheless focused on developed economies such as those of the UK and the 
US, amongst others (Goergen, Martynova, & Renneboog, 2005). As a result, 
corporate governance literature in developing economies remains limited (Berglöf & 
Claessens, 2006; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007; Adegbite, Amaeshi, & Nakajima, 
2013).  
Despite the scholarly overlook, Fan, Wei, and Xu (2011) note that the world is 
dominated by less-developed economies in terms of population and geographic size, 
but these economies have historically trailed behind their developed counterparts in 
terms of economic significance. Whilst Allen (2005) suggested that the problem 
could be due to the imperfect and incomplete nature of markets in less-developed 
economies, increasing globalisation means that governance issues in developing 
markets is beginning to attract some increased interest. This has led to the emergence 
of corporate governance scholarship in less-developed economies such as Brazil 
(Black, De Carvalho, & Gorga, 2010), Russia (McCarthy & Puffer, 2003), India 
(Chakrabarti, Megginson, & Yadav, 2008), China (Morck & Yeung, 2014) and 
South Africa (Rossouw, Van der Watt, & Rossouw, 2002), amongst many other 
similar economies.  
Nonetheless, various issues continue to challenge corporate governance in 
developing economies (Berglöf & Claessens, 2006) which includes weak 
institutional frameworks (Aguilera, 2005; Adegbite & Nakajima, 2012), wide 
variations in firm-level governance (Klapper & Love, 2004; Okike, 2007), inefficient 
imitation of the Anglo-American model (West, 2006) and principal-principal 
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concerns (Young et al., 2008), amongst others. Okpara (2011) posited that the 
quality of the institutional environment in these economies could explain the 
development of governance challenges. This reinforces Rwegasira’s  (2000) 
conclusions that differences in the institutional environment must be accounted for 
prior to and during the establishment of corporate governance systems in developing 
economies. Findings in Mangena, Tauringana, and Chamisa (2012) also demonstrate 
that the effectiveness of a board is dependent on the firm’s institutional environment. 
Thus, in the context of developing economies, governance theories may require 
enhancements or modifications to support the achievement of a robust corporate 
governance system. 
These concerns, notwithstanding, a World Bank (2013) report suggests that 
developing market firms are becoming a potent force in reshaping the global 
industrialisation process. As a result, it has become crucial to establish effective 
mechanisms for corporate governance in these economies, as weak governance 
systems in these regions could have global implications. This study therefore 
specifically contributes to the corporate governance literature in developing 
economies, drawing substantially on institutional theory (Zucker, 1987; North, 1990; 
Scott, 2014). Indeed, the usefulness of institutional theory in explaining corporate 
governance in Nigeria has become evident from the leading literature on the subject 
in the country (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2012; Adegbite, 2015). Therefore, as this 
study engages with the Nigerian corporate governance environment, it is appropriate 
to highlight the theoretical rationale for a Nigerian corporate governance research. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Implication of a Nigerian Corporate Governance Case 
What theoretical value does this thesis offer? To address this question, it is 
appropriate to highlight some information about Nigeria. Nigeria, located on the 
west coast, is the largest economy in Africa (Adegbite, 2015). This substantiation 
followed a rebasing exercise, with the country surpassing South Africa. The rebasing 
process also meant that Nigeria is ranked as the 24th largest economy in the world 
(Provost, 2014). Its economic potential is enhanced by its vast natural resources. 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2013) concurred that Nigeria is one of the most 
richly endowed countries in the world. Furthermore, with a population of 
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approximately 173.6 million as at 2013 (World Bank, 2014), Nigeria is ranked 
among the top 10 most populated countries in the world. From this evidence, it is the 
most populated country in Africa and widely acclaimed as one of the world’s most 
ethnically-diverse countries (Ukiwo, 2005) with about 374 ethnic groups (Mustapha, 
2006). 
Before its emergence as the largest economy in Africa, Nigeria’s rising economic 
profile had been recognised. In a research by Goldman Sachs (2007), Nigeria was 
identified as a ‘Next 11’1 (or N-11) country. These countries, which are deemed to 
be the next set of economically buoyant countries after BRICs,2 are considered to 
have a high potential of becoming the world’s largest economies of the 21st century. 
Furthermore, new evidence of the growing economic status of the country was 
reinforced when Jim O’Neill (who popularised the term ‘BRICs’) presented new 
potential investment destinations, which he termed the ‘MINT’3 countries (O'Neill, 
2013). In recognition of its increasing economic potential, PwC Economics (2013) 
also estimates that Nigeria will rank among the top 20 economies of the world, based 
on GDP, by 2050. The effect of the rising economic profile of the country is that, 
following increasing economic globalisation, existing weak corporate governance 
practices in Nigeria might manifest in other economies, with implications for global 
economic health. 
In view of the aforementioned, it is crucial that the establishment of a credible 
corporate governance framework is pursued by stakeholders. UNCTAD 4  (2014) 
reports that Nigeria has remained a major attraction in Africa for Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) over recent years. Its ability to continually attract these foreign 
investments could be weakened by the state of its corporate governance. A survey by 
Khanna and Zyla (2012) reveals that while investors are willing to pay a premium 
for better-governed firms in less-developed markets, these investors are often not 
interested in investing in firms in environments with poor governance systems.  
Following from the foregoing, there is little doubt that corporate governance in 
Nigeria enables an exploration of the relevance, robustness and applicability of 
                                                 
1
 Other N-11 countries are Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Turkey, South 
Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines.  
2
 An acronym for emerging economies namely Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
3
 The MINT countries are Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey. 
4
 UNCTAD is an acronym for United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.  
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theories underpinning corporate governance. For instance, convergence proponents 
(Goergen et al., 2005; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009) have examined the possibility 
of some form of globalisation dictating whether countries will ultimately adopt a 
similar corporate governance system (Khanna & Palepu, 2004). Aguilera, 
Filatotchev, Gospel, and Jackson (2008) explains that evaluating corporate 
governance in one country, drawing upon the practices of another country, is the 
basis of comparative corporate governance. Nigeria offers a strong case to examine 
external influences on its institutional and regulatory environment, to enhance the 
understanding of the evolution, practice and expression of corporate governance 
(Adegbite et al., 2013).  
In addition, the institutional environment in Nigeria presents a good case to examine 
the challenges of corporate governance, especially amongst the Anglophone 
countries of Africa in view of their economic and political power which informs why 
it is, in some quarters, regarded as the ‘Giant of Africa.’ Most Anglophone countries 
share similarities in respect of their institutional environment (Tsamenyi & Uddin, 
2009), therefore the study’s findings can be engaged to tackle governance concerns 
in these countries. These discussions entail considerable scholarly exploration, not 
only of the dominant Anglo-American paradigm, but also the domain of institutional 
theory and comparative corporate governance research.  
This research challenges the dominance and applicability of the Anglo-American 
model in Nigeria, highlighting concerns that could undermine its application, not 
only in the country, but also amongst developing countries. It also offers further 
insights regarding the relevance of institutions as key components of institutional 
theory. For instance, whereas it might be difficult to define institutions in Nigeria in 
the same context as institutions in the UK, it is appropriate to question whether it is 
only the differences in the institutional environment that informs the variations in the 
application of the Anglo-American governance model. Further insights emerged 
from an appraisal of institutional isomorphism with respect to the role of government 
in building a robust institutional environment. As the Nigerian economy (and those 
of many developing countries) is driven by government interventions, institutional 
theory can benefit from an investigation of government involvement in the 
institutional environment. The concerns identified in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 is central 
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to the development of the research objectives (Section 1.3) and the research question 
(Section 1.4) of this study. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The homogeneity and convergence prospects of corporate governance regulations 
and codes has been subjected to constant scrutiny (Khanna & Palepu, 2004; 
Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009).  Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) reported that 
corporate governance research has shown that data sourced with respect to a country 
tend to influence governance practice much more than firm or industry level data. 
This statement corresponds with the outcome in Davis (2005) which contend that the 
most relevant and promising corporate governance research are those which aim to 
evaluate the institutional contexts in which it occurs. This contradicts the 
disproportionate focus on traditional agency or transaction cost theory (Judge et al., 
2008). Concisely, the preceding views advocate that the functionality of corporate 
governance may be influenced by country fundamentals, integrating elements of the 
dominant shareholder (Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000) and stakeholder (Letza, Sun, & 
Kirkbride, 2004; Jackson, 2005) models of corporate governance. 
Therefore, in acknowledging peculiarities in institutional environments, the 
objectives of this study are designed to engage the Nigerian institutional 
environment in generating additional insights to extant corporate governance 
literature. Thus, as indicated in Table 1, the main research objective of this study is 
to determine the main institutional factors that shape corporate governance in 
Nigeria. Various strands of institutional factors have continued to emerge in the 
corporate governance literature but, in view of the peculiarity of its institutional 
environment, it is posited that the establishment of a sound corporate governance 
system will be enhanced by the identification of relevant institutional frames. This 
view was alluded to in Adegbite and Nakajima (2012). 
In relation to the main research objective identified above, generating knowledge 
regarding the secondary research objective of this study will complement the 
attainment of the main research objective. Consequently, the secondary research 
objective of this study, as shown in Table 1, is ‘to review corporate governance 
regulations in Nigeria with a view to examining the coverage accorded to 
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institutional influences in the SEC (2011) code.’ While these objectives drive this 
research, there are other areas of understanding which support the realisation of these 
objectives. These include an understanding of evidences of institutional isomorphism 
in the Nigerian business environment, and the crafting of a reform strategy for good 
corporate governance, relying on key institutional factors identified with respect to 
the main research objective. 
Table 1 - Research Objectives5 
No Research Objectives Key Literature Relevant Theory 
1 To determine the main 
institutional factors that shape 
corporate governance in Nigeria 
(RO1).  
Judge et al. (2008); 
Aguilera and Jackson 
(2003); Adegbite and 
Nakajima (2011b). 
Institutional 
Theory 
2 To review corporate governance 
regulations in Nigeria with a view 
to examining the coverage 
accorded to institutional influences 
in the SEC (2011) Code (RO2). 
Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997); Adegbite 
(2012); Ellis (2003); 
Polinsky and Shavell 
(2000). 
Institutional 
Theory and 
Economic Theory 
of Regulation 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
Following the objectives presented above, the focus of this research is to generate 
knowledge to address some of the concerns which have restricted the effectiveness 
of corporate governance and its regulation in Nigeria. Although it is imperative to 
state that the country presently operates a multiple-code regime (see Osemeke & 
Adegbite, 2016), the impact of these codes on corporate governance practices cannot 
be deemed satisfactory (Okpara, 2011).  
Many of the challenges impeding good governance have been traced to ineffective 
regulatory systems (Adegbite, 2012). Okike (2007), Inyang (2009) and Adekoya 
(2011) proposed that several challenges have contrived to ensure that the regulatory 
machinery of corporate governance remains ineffective. To expand this proposition, 
Adegbite and Nakajima (2011b) argued that the majority of governance challenges 
in Nigeria are inspired by deficiencies in both the macro and micro institutional 
environments. Further evidence of the undesirable effects of a weak institutional 
environment was noted in Adegbite et al. (2013). In the study, the local institutional 
                                                 
5
 The source of all tables in this thesis is the researcher, unless otherwise stated. 
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arrangement was identified as one of three key agents militating against good 
corporate governance.6 These concerns call for an examination of the relationship 
between corporate governance regulation and the institutional environment to offer 
insights into the present state of corporate governance in Nigeria.  
Solomon (2013) clarifies why an examination of the relationship is necessary. She 
argues that, from an institutional theory perspective, compliance with a code could 
be resisted, especially where the code originates from a foreign country with a 
different culture and environment. This resistance can result in ‘decoupling.’7 A code 
may not necessarily lack the robustness to address corporate governance concerns 
but institutional factors such as culture could undermine the functionality of the code. 
Thus, the main premise of this research is to address the question; 
Whilst acknowledging institutional influences, how should corporate 
governance be regulated in Nigeria to promote good practices? 
In view of the focus on regulation, it is necessary to state that corporate governance 
regulation has been implemented globally using two regulatory approaches, namely 
rules-based and principles-based systems. However, as noted in Sama and Shoaf 
(2005), variations in institutional environments could produce different outcomes for 
these regulatory approaches. Therefore, in addressing the above question, it is 
necessary to examine which of the rules-based or principles-based regulatory 
systems will promote the emergence of a robust corporate governance system in 
Nigeria, taking into account the peculiarities of its institutional environment. 
While research questions and objectives help to focus a study, the attainment of the 
goals earmarked is enhanced by the ability to identify an appropriate methodology 
for the research. It is therefore deemed necessary to briefly summarise the 
methodology for this research. 
 
                                                 
6
 The two other agents are international organisations and rating agencies. 
7
 Where actual behaviour of members of an organisation frequently does not reflect official accounts 
(Scott, 2014). There is apparent compliance with codes, but there is no genuine organisational change 
in practice (Solomon, 2013). A participant described this development as ‘technical compliance’.   
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1.5 Methodological Outline for Addressing Research Objectives 
The appropriate methodology for research is significantly influenced by the research 
objectives (Holden & Lynch, 2004) and the researcher’s ontological and 
epistemological stance (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011). Engagement with these 
two research influences (discussed extensively in Chapter Three) guided the 
researcher’s preference in employing a qualitative research methodology. However, 
the varieties of qualitative research techniques (see Creswell, 2013a) demand that the 
features of these techniques are evaluated to identify a suitable qualitative research 
tool. Consequently, upon a review of alternative qualitative research philosophies, 
the social constructionism qualitative methodology was adopted to address the 
research objectives. The adoption of this methodology was considerably informed by 
its underlying argument which states that bodies of knowledge are ‘socially 
constructed’ (Burr, 2003). Whereas the position is broadly examined in Chapter 
Three, it is imperative to appreciate that the actions of stakeholders towards concepts 
such as governance could be influenced by how the term has been ‘socially 
constructed.’ This connects with the institutional focus of this study, hence its 
appropriateness. 
It is also necessary to state how data were sourced and analysed. Social 
constructionism accommodates various data collection and analysis techniques. 
Following philosophical considerations, data were sourced using semi-structured 
interviews. The interview transcripts were analysed using qualitative content analysis 
(QCA), in view of its extensive use in social constructionist studies, and its 
usefulness for data reduction. Additionally, the QCA technique allows for flexibility 
in dealing with data which was vital in consideration of the unstructured nature of 
the data collected. 
It is apparent that the decision to engage a social constructionist philosophy in this 
thesis represents an acknowledgement of its linkage with sociological and, in 
particular, institutional scholarship. An evaluation of the research objectives and the 
preferred methodology highlights the centrality of institutional theory and the 
institutional environment in theorising corporate governance. This is important in the 
context of developing economies, and pertinent to the main institutional factors 
influencing corporate governance practices in Nigeria. A summary of findings 
informed by key institutional variables in Nigeria, is presented in the next section.  
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1.6 A Summary of Thesis Outcomes       
The concept of corporate governance has benefitted from the increasing awareness 
of stakeholders regarding the impact of institutional frameworks (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003). However, this development has created a stream of themes and 
categories (see Giddens, 1984; Hall & Taylor, 1996) aimed at addressing 
fundamental institutional concerns. Having identified a methodological platform for 
this study, it became essential to analyse information generated from participants. 
Whilst these responses are extensively analysed in Chapter Four, the coding frame 
used in this study (see Elo & Kyngäs, 2008) generated three distinct institutional 
perspectives which could sufficiently explain the current state of corporate 
governance in Nigeria.  
These institutional elements (political, social and economic), which are consistent 
with Aron’s (1998) institutional classification, reflect the institutional environment 
for corporate governance in Nigeria. Some elements of these classifications featured 
as part of the institutional framework employed in Adegbite and Nakajima (2011b) 
to identify the institutional determinants of corporate governance in Nigeria. It must 
however be noted that this thesis represents the first attempt where sub categories 
such as political immunity, exit via protection and connection, ethnicity and federal 
character, and religious herding have been engaged to examine the institutional 
environment for corporate governance in Nigeria. Indeed, this study reveals that 
corporate governance in Nigeria responds significantly to influences bordering on 
religion, culture, ethnicity and politics.   
In addition to the above, this study also reflects upon the role of institutions in 
creating an institutional environment conducive for good corporate governance 
practices. Contrary to the generality of literature (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; Filatotchev, Jackson, & Nakajima, 2013) 
which argue that corporate governance thrives on the robustness of institutions in an 
environment, there is a paucity of literature addressing the role of institutions in 
weak institutional environments with respect to corporate governance practice. This 
study, whilst acknowledging the weakness of institutions in controlling the rent-
seeking behaviour of economic agents, shows that individual economic actors, rather 
than existing institutions, influence the present direction of corporate governance in 
Nigeria. Jizi, Salama, Dixon, and Stratling (2014) highlight the danger posed by a 
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powerful CEO, suggesting that they (powerful CEOs) may provide higher degrees of 
CSR disclosure and promote transparency of an organisation’s CSR activities, with 
the objective of enhancing their private benefits. As a consequence, this study, while 
contending that addressing concerns emanating from the behaviour of individual 
economic agents must take priority over attempts to improve existing institutions, 
employed ‘human institutionalism’ to explain the interventions of economic elites 
(key stakeholders) in the institutional environment for corporate governance in 
Nigeria. 
In addition to the foregoing, this thesis offers insights to the institutional and agency 
theory. Owing to factors such as institutional sophistication, literacy levels, weak 
market structure, and information asymmetry issues, which have remained a concern 
amongst developing economies, a principal-principal mechanism for managing the 
relationship between shareholders and management was proposed. Similarly, 
arguments were also expounded to enhance institutional isomorphism scholarship. 
Whereas, the literature on institutional isomorphism has suggested that the 
transmission and exchange of isomorphic tendencies is mainly provoked by private 
organisations in business environments, the possibility of governments and their 
agencies acting as drivers of isomorphism has not attracted due attention. In 
addressing this neglect, this thesis extends the scholarship of institutional 
isomorphism by making a case for the recognition of governments as agents of 
institutional isomorphism.  
 
1.7 Structure of Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows; 
In Chapter Two, the researcher engages in a review of the corporate governance 
literature. This chapter is structured in three sections. The first section explores 
corporate governance issues globally. Whereas the generality of the issues examined 
in this section is peculiar to developed economies, the second section examines the 
‘emerging model of corporate governance.’ The third section focuses on corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Issues relating to the challenges and regulation of corporate 
governance and the implications of weak governance structures are discussed. To 
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conclude this chapter, the author situates the perspective of this thesis with regard to 
relevant literature by acknowledging gaps in the literature. The need to address this 
gap was crucial to the identification of the methodology adopted in this research.  
Undertaking a research activity requires a rigorous methodological procedure to 
enhance its success (Bryman, 2015). This is the focus of Chapter Three. An outline 
of the research methodology employed in this study and the justifications for the 
chosen strategy is presented. This is necessary to facilitate the operationalisation of 
the theoretical constructs discussed in Chapter Two. Chapter Three also presents the 
rationale for the ontology, epistemology and methodology adopted in the study. This 
subsequently informed the use of the social constructionist philosophy to underpin 
the qualitative research approach adopted in this study. The chapter also presents the 
data collection and analysis techniques engaged. The chapter concludes by outlining 
the ethical issues inherent in the study with an explanation of how these ethical 
issues are mitigated.  
In Chapter Four, the analyses of interview findings are undertaken. The QCA 
technique is deployed to examine relationships and linkages evident in the responses 
offered by participants. The analysis indicates that the problems besetting corporate 
governance in Nigeria can be codified into three institutional strands, namely 
political, social and economic institutions. Thus, it is posited that any reform 
measure must possess the necessary robustness to acknowledge and address the 
identified institutional concerns.  
Chapter Five discusses the main institutional categories emerging from the analysis 
in the previous chapter. The discussion also addressed the extent of the recognition 
accorded identified institutional influences on Nigeria’s main corporate governance 
regulation, i.e. the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter referred to as 
SEC) Code (2011). The chapter also highlighted the contribution of the thesis to the 
scholarship of institutional theory and agency theory. It extends knowledge 
regarding institutional theory, relying on governance practices in the Nigerian 
business environment, and also contributes to the debate calling for a principal-
principal alternative to agency theory. The chapter concludes by presenting a 
proposal for reforming corporate governance in Nigeria. These reforms are presented 
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in two categories, namely awareness-related reforms (AR) and regulation-related 
(RR) reforms.   
Chapter Six summarises and concludes the thesis. This chapter commences by 
providing a summary of the main thrust of the thesis and proceeds to present the 
contributions of the thesis to the body of literature. Contributions are made to theory, 
practice, methodology and empirical literature. The chapter thereafter offers some 
recommendations for good corporate governance in Nigeria. The limitations of the 
thesis are discussed and, finally, directions for future research are noted. 
With the structure of the entire thesis explained, the thesis proceeds by reviewing the 
relevant literature in the field of corporate governance. This is the focus of the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the research questions and research objectives offered as the 
motivations for embarking on this study were presented. However, in addressing the 
study objectives, it is necessary to build upon credible evidence, drawing from a 
review of previous relevant research. This is the focus of this chapter.     
The review is split into three parts. Part A (Sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5) presents a 
review of relevant issues in corporate governance across the globe. Part B (Sections 
2.6, 2.7 and 2.8) focuses on corporate governance in developing economies, while 
Part C (Sections 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11) narrows the review to key corporate governance 
issues in Nigeria. In each part, relevant conceptual and empirical literature is 
considered. Issues emerging from the aforementioned reviews provided the basis for 
identifying gaps in the literature (Section 2.12). This thesis seeks to address these 
gaps in conjunction with the study objectives. 
 
Part A: Global Corporate Governance 
Figure 1 reveals the structure used in undertaking the review of global corporate 
governance. The review commences by examining the theory of the firm, 
highlighting the relevance of corporate governance in the functionality of the theory. 
It proceeds by reviewing various definitions and perspectives of corporate 
governance. This is intended to aid the emergence of a working definition of 
corporate governance for this thesis. The review then concludes with a discussion of 
corporate governance theories deemed relevant to this study, with significant 
attention devoted to institutional theory (hence shown in bold in Figure 1), in 
acknowledgement of its engagement as the core theoretical perspective of this thesis.   
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Figure 1 - Structure for Reviewing Global Corporate Governance8 
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2.2 Theory of the Firm 
Coase (1937) informs that a firm offers a system of relationships where an 
entrepreneur assumes responsibility for the control of resources. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) posit that firms serve as a nexus for a set of contracting 
relationships amongst individuals. These views suggest that firms offer a platform 
where economic actors seeking different objectives are brought together for the 
primary purpose of achieving predetermined (firm and individual) objectives. 
Therefore, it is crucial that the relationships are formalised, via contracts, to 
minimise possible agency complications.  
                                                 
8
 The source of all figures in this thesis is the researcher, unless otherwise stated. 
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A firm facilitates the production of goods and services (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). 
The emergence of the ‘firm’ concept was driven by the rise of the industrial age at 
the beginning of the 20th century, which placed emphasis on manufacturing 
capabilities. Despite this development, the unfolding industrial era brought about 
issues requiring attention and resolution. As a result, corporate literature became 
overwhelmed with studies (Berle & Means, 1932; Coase, 1937; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Spulber, 2009) focusing on theory of the firm. These 
efforts gave rise to various economic theories aimed at expressing the nature, 
behaviour and structure of firms. For instance, the transaction cost theory (Coase, 
1937), reinforced in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Williamson (1979, 1981), was 
established on the premise that the transaction cost involved in coordinating 
manufacturing through market exchange is greater than organised productive 
activities within a firm. This suggests that the ‘firm’ notion can offer a viable cost 
management strategy.  
To extend knowledge regarding theory of the firm, Kantarelis (2010) observed that 
the theory is built on various economic concepts, aimed at supporting the description, 
explanation and prediction of the nature of the firm. The theory explores how firms 
are able to combine labour and capital in order to minimise the average cost of 
output (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1998). Thus, the main theme motivating studies on 
theory of the firm is that firms exist and make decisions for profit maximisation 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). Some of the definitions 
and views identified above tend to offer credence to the latter proposition as terms 
such as resources, profit and wealth creation, ownership, management, contractual 
relationships, and production mechanism often dominate discourse on theory of the 
firm (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001).  
Following the aforementioned, theory of the firm revolves around the pursuance of 
effective control of resources available to an organisation (Coase, 1937). This is 
aimed at enhancing the attainment of set objectives which ensures the availability of 
resources in the first place. This is the construct upon which Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1991) reasoned that theory of the firm is essentially an incentive system, 
that compensation systems dictate the function of risk allocation and reward for 
productive work. This view is consistent with Kantarelis (2010) wherein a firm is 
described as a need-satisfying mechanism. While theory of the firm has attracted its 
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own share of criticism (see Granovetter, 1985; Foss & Klein, 2005), ‘one’ actor is 
predominantly considered as the main beneficiary at the conclusion of a firm’s 
operations, i.e. shareholders, who provide the resources (Ireland, 2005).  
However, evidence has shown that there is a tendency for another actor 
(management) to undermine the expectations of shareholders by engaging in 
activities which maximise their (management) utility and reward (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Unfortunately, despite the attention drawn to this concern by Adam Smith, 
(Arun & Turner, 2004), this problem has intensified, particularly in Anglo-American 
economies, stimulated by the emergence of the modern firm concept. The need to 
address this challenge, widely termed as an agency problem (see Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), has provoked the development of corporate governance.  
Nonetheless, whilst the concept of corporate governance continues to attract 
attention, incidences of corporate misgovernance are still reported. It has been 
suggested that the failure to acknowledge peculiarities in the institutional 
environment accounts for the state of corporate governance worldwide (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003; Judge et al., 2008). Furthermore, this position has been relevant to 
corporate governance discourse in developing economies. Therefore, whilst it is 
expected that examining the literature will enable an understanding of the key issues 
involved, it is important to understand the concept of corporate governance.  
 
2.3 What is Corporate Governance? 
The preceding discussion indicates that it is crucial that the expectations of 
shareholders and the activities of the Board and management are managed in a 
manner that enhances the potential of firms to achieve their corporate objective, i.e. 
shareholder wealth maximisation (Friedman, 1970). Despite the criticisms against 
this objective (see McSweeney, 2008; Jones & Felps, 2013), maximising shareholder 
wealth nonetheless require the creation of appropriate processes, structures and 
relationships through which the board of directors can effectively oversee and 
monitor executive action. Therefore, firms are expected to develop a system that 
ensures that managers execute their functions within a framework of accountability 
and transparency. This informs the need for corporate governance. 
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Corporate governance represents a fundamental prerequisite underlying the operation 
and eventual success (or failure) of businesses. Most conceptions of corporate 
governance tend to focus on shareholders, management and board members as the 
key players (see Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), whilst neglecting or paying little attention 
to other stakeholders (Davis, 2005; Huse, 2005). 9  In view of Huse’s (2005) 
observation, this study opines that a robust review of corporate governance should 
embrace a wider stakeholder standpoint. 
Following the above, corporate governance can be explained from two distinct 
perspectives; the narrow view and the broad view (Solomon, 2013). The narrow 
view focuses on corporate accountability to shareholders. Arun and Turner (2004) 
added that this approach to corporate governance examines the concept as a 
mechanism by which shareholders are assured that managers will act in their 
(shareholders’) interests. Summarily, the narrow view focuses on management and 
shareholders. The broader view, according to Letza et al. (2004), emphasises 
accountability in meeting the interests of various stakeholders. The broader view 
reflects a pluralistic approach, indicating that corporate governance is not limited in 
economic rationality and efficiency, but is influenced by ideologies, philosophies, 
legal systems, social bonds and cultures, amongst others. It is also worth noting that 
the broader view challenges shareholder wealth maximisation as the main objective 
of organisations.  
A chronological review of corporate governance definitions could also explain the 
emergence of the narrow and the broad views of the concept. Table 2 provides some 
corporate governance definitions. In the table (Table 2), the first four definitions 
appear to focus on shareholders and management (the narrow view). For instance, 
whilst the boundary between management and shareholders is blurred in Cadbury’s 
(1992) definition, it is apparent that the Shleifer and Vishny (1997) adopts the 
narrow view. However, subsequent definitions recognised more stakeholder groups. 
Thus, it could be suggested that initial descriptions of corporate governance were 
fundamentally informed by the need to address agency conflicts which existed 
between managers and shareholders. However, the increasing incidences of 
                                                 
9
 Remarkably, the crises in Enron, WorldCom and Tyco served to show the significance of 
stakeholders other than the shareholders. In the aftermath of the crises which engulfed these 
companies, employees, customers, suppliers and local societies suffered substantial losses due to the 
management of these organisations (Davis, 2005). 
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corporate complications and their impact on a wider set of stakeholder groups 
informed a rethinking of corporate governance, particularly from 1999 onwards, with 
the original OECD10 (OECD, 1999) definition (similar to its 2004 version). These 
definitions (from 1999) integrated other stakeholders, thereby establishing the 
broader conceptualisation of corporate governance. 
Table 2 - Compendium of Corporate Governance Definitions 
S/N Author/Source Corporate Governance Definitions 
1 Cadbury (1992) A system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. 
2 Blair (1995) A set of legal, cultural and institutional activities which 
influences the actions of companies, how control is 
exercised and how operational risks and return are 
allocated. 
3 Turnbull (1997, p. 
181) 
"describes all the influences affecting the institutional 
processes, including those for appointing the controllers 
and/or organizing the production and sale of goods and 
services" 
4 Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997, p. 737)  
"deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investments" 
5 Gillan and Starks 
(1998) 
A system of laws, rules and factors that control 
operations at a company. 
6 Berglof and von 
Thadden (1999)  
A set of mechanisms that translate signals from product 
markets and input markets into firm behaviour. 
7 Becht, Bolton, and 
Röell (2003) 
It is concerned with the resolution of collective action 
problems among dispersed investors and the 
reconciliation of conflicts of interests between various 
corporate claimholders. 
8 OECD Principles of 
Corporate 
Governance (2004) 
It involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company 
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined. 
9 Davis (2005, p. 143)  "describes the structures, processes and institutions 
within and around organisations that allocate power and 
resource control among participants" 
10 Solomon (2013, p. 7) "is the system of checks and balances, both internal and 
external to companies, which ensure that companies 
discharge their accountability to all stakeholders and act 
in a socially responsible way in all areas of their 
business activity" 
 
                                                 
10
 OECD is an acronym for The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
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The descriptions which inform the narrow and broad perspectives have ensured the 
lack of a single, globally accepted definition of corporate governance (Solomon, 
2013). This challenge is buttressed by Tricker’s (2015) proposal of five perspectives 
of corporate governance definitions (Figure 2), aimed at facilitating an understanding 
of the boundaries, levels and processes of corporate governance. These perspectives, 
developed from and based upon the works of various stakeholders, identify the 
fundamental variables that should feature in any description of corporate governance. 
These variables include business ethics, strategic and corporate goals, principal-
agent relationships, recognition of stakeholder activity, societal influences and lastly, 
compliance with regulations.  
Figure 2 - Perspectives of Corporate Governance Definitions 
Perspectives of Corporate 
Governance Definitions
Operational Perspective
Relationship Perspective
Stakeholder perspective
Financial Economics Perspective
Societal Perspective
Cadbury (1992)
Monks and Minow (1995)
OECD (2004); Solomon 
(2013)
Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
Blair (1995)
Perspectives Examples
 
Source: Adapted from Tricker (2015) 
These perspectives can be influenced by dominant practices or objectives of a firm 
or country. It is therefore necessary that, considering the focus of this research, an 
appropriate perspective is identified. From the research question noted in Chapter 
One, it is envisaged that the institutional environment is critical to the emergence of 
a robust corporate governance regulatory framework that promotes good practices. 
By its nature, the institutional environment compels an expansion of the boundaries 
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of corporate governance to acknowledge the influence of key institutional elements 
and more stakeholder groups (Doidge et al., 2007). Whilst this position is consistent 
with the broad view, perspectives such as operational, relationship and financial 
economics are consistent with the narrow understanding of corporate governance 
(Arun & Turner, 2004; Allen, 2005).  
Consequently, whilst recognising that corporate governance is informed by the 
nature of the relationship between companies and key corporate constituencies 
(Okpara, 2011), this study accommodates the societal and stakeholder view in 
framing a definition of corporate governance. As a result, corporate governance, in 
the context of this study, is defined as a framework which seeks the attainment of 
corporate objectives by efficient direction and control, taking into account the needs 
of a wider stakeholder group. This links with the corporate governance goal noted in 
Cadbury (1992) which is to align the interests of individuals, corporations and 
society. The definition, informed by the research context, is consistent with the 
views in Rwegasira (2000) and Okpara (2011), which focused on corporate 
governance in Africa. 
However, it is apparent from the definitions examined that management and 
shareholder issues remain the most dominant concerns in corporate governance 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Indeed, this challenge has been acknowledged amongst 
scholars, provoking the emergence of a variety of theoretical perspectives designed 
to address the principal-agency concern. But in view of the objectives of this study 
noted in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, agency, stakeholder, economic and institutional 
theories are reviewed to provide the theoretical foundation for this research.  
 
2.4 Discussion of Relevant Theoretical Perspectives 
Corporate governance has been influenced by the emergence of theories seeking to 
extend its understanding. In line with the research questions and objectives of this 
study, the following subsections (2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3) examine some corporate 
governance theories relevant to this research. 
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2.4.1 Agency Theory 
To proceed with the evaluation, it is essential to explain why agency theory is 
examined in this study. Hart (1995) theorised that corporate governance concerns 
develop when two conditions exist. The first condition is the existence of an agency 
problem.11 Indeed, Hart (1995) remarked that corporate governance is irrelevant in 
the absence of agency concerns. It could therefore be rationalised that the existence 
of agency problems provides the platform for corporate governance scholarship. On 
this basis, this research engages in a brief discussion of agency theory.   
Agency theory, exposited by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), has attracted considerable 
awareness and recognition of its capability to illuminate shareholder-manager 
problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and its subsequent impact on firm performance 
(Fama, 1980). Whilst Jensen (1983) identifies two branches of agency theory,12 
Eisenhardt (1989) provided an insight into the extensive application of the theory.13 
Relying on Eisenhardt’s (1989) account, agency theory has provided the supra-
national lens for assessing all corporate governance issues (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The theory assumes that the ability of a firm to maximise 
its wealth is advanced by minimising possible conflicts between its main actors 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
Figure 3 shows the relationship between shareholders and managers in achieving 
corporate objectives. While shareholders desire to maximise their wealth, 
management also has a fiduciary duty (La Porta et al., 2000) to support the 
achievement of that objective. The challenge, however, as noted in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), is the divergences in what constitutes the ‘firm objective’ for both 
parties. Figure 3 suggests that management tends to pursue objectives different to 
those of its shareholders. Incidences of corporate scandals reinforce the view that 
what constitutes the ‘firm objective’ for agents may be inconsistent with that of their 
principals (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
                                                 
11
 The second concern is activated when transaction costs are such that the agency problem cannot be 
resolved using the contract mechanism. 
12
 The analysis of contracting problems between self-interested parties with conflicting interests and; 
the minimisation of the costs created by the contracting problems. 
13
 In the field of Accounting (Demski & Feltham, 1978); Economics (Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971); 
Finance (Fama, 1980); Marketing (Basu, Lal, Srinivasan, & Staelin, 1985); Political Science (Mitnick, 
1992), Organisational Behaviour (Ross, 1973; Eisenhardt, 1985) and Sociology (Shapiro, 2005).  
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Figure 3 - Agency Framework 
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Source: Adapted from Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Eisenhardt (1989). 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that this challenge is heightened as both parties 
are utility maximisers, aiming to maximise their individual objectives (Figure 3). 
Against this backdrop, shareholders seek to implement measures which align their 
objectives with those of their managers. These measures are often examined in the 
context of agency costs. 14  However, with agency costs, the shareholder wealth 
objective is impacted. Despite the volume of literature evaluating this challenge, 
instances of management infractions persist. This reinforces the debate surrounding 
the notion that while agency theory remains the supra-national lens for evaluating 
corporate governance issues (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), it still lacks the robustness to 
comprehensively address governance problems. Thus, Eisenhardt (1989) posits that 
agency theory is an empirically valid proposition, as long as it is supported by 
complementary perspectives.  
Eisenhardt’s (1989) preceding view serves as the basis of criticism against agency 
theory. In addition, the conflicting opinions from the literature appear to undermine 
the presumed overriding influence and practical relevance of the theory (Letza et al., 
                                                 
14
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) defines agency costs as the sum of three costs: monitoring 
expenditures by the principal; bonding expenditures by the agent; and residual loss. 
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2008). For instance, while Ross (1973) advocates that agency applications are 
universal, Hirsch and Friedman (1986) disagree, suggesting that the theory is narrow 
with a restrictive lens. Further contribution by Perrow (1986) indicates that agency 
theory does not actually address any well-defined problem. These views have 
elicited opinions regarding its vagueness (Shapiro, 2005), thereby raising doubts 
around its practical relevance (Padilla, 2002).  
Recognising the preceding criticisms, Letza et al. (2008) propose a move away from 
the duality viewpoint, which focuses on shareholders and stakeholders, to a 
pluralistic perspective. Letza et al. (2008) argue that changes in internal processes 
and the external environment invalidate conventional dualistic approaches, and 
called for the integration of social and other non-economic factors (power, 
legislation, culture, social relations) into corporate governance theorising, thus 
making a case for integrating other theories in this study. 
The observations in Letza et al. (2008) indicate that, whereas some concerns underlie 
agency theory, its application in developing economies calls for a broader evaluation. 
In particular, concerns bordering on information asymmetry (see Eisenhardt, 1989) 
and the principal-principal conceptualisation (see Young et al., 2008) demand 
attention. Eisenhardt (1989) suggested that agency theory offers unique insight into 
information systems, with information distributed asymmetrically throughout an 
organisation. However, the challenges relating to information in developing 
economies are well noted (see Ernst & Lundvall, 2004; Avgerou, 2008). This 
concern restricts the engagement of agency theory in addressing principal-agency 
issues in developing economies where the degree of information asymmetry is weak 
(Levine, 1997; Healy & Palepu, 2001). This challenge provides the basis for 
principal-principal conception noted in Dharwadkar et al. (2000) and Young et al. 
(2008). Therefore, rather than adopting the dominant agency theory, the weaknesses 
in an institutional environment (occasioned by illiteracy, increasing moral decadence 
and corruption) necessitate a reassessment of the continued engagement of agency 
principles in developing economies.  
To conclude the discussion on agency theory, it is pertinent to note that while the 
theory provides the basis for corporate governance discourse, Hart (1995) reiterates 
that concerns created by suboptimal agency relationships do not alone provide a 
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rationale for corporate governance scholarship. Furthermore, Lubatkin et al. (2007) 
posit that agency theory is built upon assumptions, which reduces the complexities 
associated with the governance phenomenon. These assumptions have subsequently 
developed as alternative theories. For instance, taking into account the multi-
stakeholder nature of this study, agency theory lacks the comprehensiveness to 
integrate the concerns of a wider stakeholder group.  
 
2.4.2 Stakeholder Theory 
As opposed to shareholder theory, stakeholder theory is established on the principle 
that wealth is created, captured and distributed by various stakeholders (Johnson, 
Whittington, Angwin, Regner, & Scholes, 2014). Agency theory identifies two core 
elements upon which the firm concept is established, i.e. the shareholders and 
management. However, other literature (Freeman & Evan, 1990; Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995) sought to offer a rationale for expanding the frontiers of the firm 
concept. As a result, Mallin (2013) explains that stakeholder theory takes into 
context a wider group of constituents rather than focusing on shareholders. The 
theory seeks to develop the shareholder view by recognising other parties whose 
actions or inactions can affect a firm (Freeman, 2010; Solomon, 2013).  
The challenge for firms adopting a stakeholder agenda is that both shareholders and 
other stakeholders may favour different corporate governance models, hence firms 
must establish an agreed strategy if conflicts are to be minimised. To facilitate this, 
Mendelow (1991) proposed a framework for analysing stakeholders based on power 
and level of interest (Figure 4). This analysis identified ways in which stakeholders 
may influence an organisation’s activities and vice versa  (Freeman, 2010). This 
analysis generated four sets of stakeholders.  
Figure 4 identifies four quadrants of stakeholders based on a mix of interest and 
power. At the extreme ends of the quadrant there are key players and those who 
require minimal effort. The key players are deemed to be the most important 
stakeholders in view of the strong influence and power they wield e.g. institutional 
investors. Epstein (1986) stated that failure to satisfy these shareholders in favour of 
the entire stakeholders may force these key players to sell their shares and ‘vote with 
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their feet’ (see Hirschman, 1970) 15 . Furthermore, in the Mendelow (1991) 
framework, there are stakeholders that must either be kept informed (e.g. 
government), in view of their high interest, or kept satisfied (e.g. management), in 
recognition of their high power. In effect, stakeholder theory seeks to align the 
interests of critical stakeholders with the interests of external, passive stakeholders 
(Blair, 1995). 
Figure 4 - Stakeholder Mapping (Mendelow Matrix) 
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       Source: Adapted from Johnson et al. (2014, p. 142) 
Notwithstanding its relevance, stakeholder theory has been exposed to varying levels 
of criticism. Key (1999) suggests that there is an incomplete linkage between the 
theory’s internal and external variables, as an actor can be a member of various 
stakeholder groups. Whereas Freeman (2010) contends that stakeholder groups can 
be clearly identified as separable entities, this view can also be contested on the basis 
that stakeholder groups cannot be clearly identified but the interests that groups 
represent (internal v external) can be recognised. For instance, shareholders and 
managers can be deemed as key players in an organisation for corporate governance 
purposes. However, in an environment where government is the major player, the 
                                                 
15Hirschman (1970) explained that ‘exit,’ which represents impersonation of economics, can occur in 
different ways such as customers deciding against buying goods, resignation of employees, suppliers 
refusing to provide goods and shareholders selling their shares, while ‘voice,’ which represents 
impersonation of politics, is the active expression of dissatisfaction, either individually or collectively 
or, as described by Konstant (1999), any attempt to change rather than escape from an unsatisfactory 
situation. 
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role of government can change from being ‘kept informed’ to being a ‘key player.’ 
Thus, the focus should not be necessarily centred on stakeholder groups, but, as 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) proposed, stakeholders should be identified by the 
‘interests’ that they represent.  
Corporate governance thrives on the concept of accountability i.e. accountability to 
all parties connected to an organisation (see Rossouw et al., 2002; Solomon, 2013). 
This expectation is likely to result in multiple accountability, which is possible when 
the purpose of an organisation is unambiguous to every stakeholder connected to the 
firm (see Sternberg, 1997). According to the accounts of the King Report (2002), 
when a company seeks to be accountable to all parties it is ultimately not 
accountable to any stakeholder. This undermines the notion of accountability, which 
is a core prerequisite for stakeholder theory.  
Another major criticism of stakeholder theory lies in the view that the theory is 
incompatible with the concept of business (Sternberg, 1997; Letza et al., 2004). The 
theory stipulates that organisations must aim to achieve fairness in the distribution of 
corporate benefits to different stakeholders (Jensen, 2001). This position, however, 
does not link with the main ideology of business which involves an investment of 
funds with a view to maximising investment or returns in the future (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Letza et al., 2004). Where a corporation neglects the maximisation of 
its owner’s wealth there could be implications for the continued long term survival 
of the business (Jensen, 2001). 
Drawing from the above criticisms, Jensen (2001) identifies the difficulty of 
establishing ‘trade-offs’ among the interests of each stakeholder group, hence 
managers become unaccountable for their actions as there are usually no defined 
measurable objectives for all stakeholders. The Mendelow (1991) matrix (Figure 4) 
highlights that Jensen’s (2001) position, as the basis for classifying stakeholders, is 
weak. For instance, should management be considered a ‘key player’ or should it be 
‘kept satisfied?’ It is relatively difficult to appropriately contextualise management’s 
level of interest or power at all times. Consequently, acknowledging the divergences 
amongst stakeholders would be crucial to addressing the objectives of this study. 
This motivated the decision to engage various stakeholder groups in this study. 
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However, in addition, it is necessary that stakeholder theory be examined in the 
context of developing economies. Reed (2002) concludes that two sets of influences 
converge to increase the responsibilities of companies operating in developing 
economies to a full range of stakeholder groups. The first is the circumstances (such 
as economic, political and sociocultural) under which companies operate in 
developing countries, whilst the second factor relates to the existence of several 
important normative principles, which are often neglected in developing economies. 
These influences have brought implications for stakeholder theorising in developing 
economies, evident in challenges such as weak shareholder activism (Adegbite, 
Amaeshi, & Amao, 2012), incompatibility with the concept of business (Letza et al., 
2004) and challenges around accountability (Sternberg, 1997).        
In view of the above criticisms and notwithstanding probable inconsistencies 
amongst stakeholders, an assessment of the influences motivating stakeholders’ 
behavioural patterns could help clarify the differences observed or, as Monks and 
Minow (2004) posit; balance the interests of stakeholders. While this informs the 
desire to engage stakeholders from different backgrounds in this study, it also 
provides an opportunity to consider what effect concepts such as regulation, rational 
choice and motivation, and deterrence have had on economic actors.  
 
2.4.3 Economic Theories 
Following on from the previous section, the decisions of stakeholders are typically 
influenced by their economic preferences. Varian (1990) explained that economic 
theory is helpful in understanding economic policies and agents’ choices, and 
necessary for effective policy-making. While the field of economic theories is broad, 
this review focuses on three economic theories which are crucial to the emergence of 
a good corporate governance system. 
The first theory is the economic theory of regulation. Despite the increasing global 
trend encouraging minimal government intervention in the marketplace, Sutinen and 
Kuperan (1999) state that the regulation of economic activities remains a fact of life. 
Polinsky and Shavell (2000) examined regulation in the context of public 
enforcement of law i.e. the use of public agents to detect and sanction violators of 
legal rules. Whilst regulation levels differ across industries and countries, factors 
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such as public safety and security and economic impact, amongst others, necessitate 
regulatory interventions.   
Two economic theories of regulation are identified by den Hertog (2010): First, 
public interest theory which assumes that regulators have sufficient information and 
enforcement powers to promote public interest. An example is the formation of an 
anti-corruption agency to minimise corruption in an economy. Second, private 
interest theory, which assumes that regulators do not have sufficient information in 
relation to cost, demand and other dimensions of firm behaviour. Thus, the ability to 
promote public interest depends upon how regulators are able to manage other 
economic agents who are desirous of pursuing their own interests (possibly at the 
expense of public interest). 
However, these two propositions did not sufficiently account for institutional 
effectiveness. Where institutions are effective, both public and private interest 
theories can yield good outcomes. For instance, the market can react to the problem 
created by private interest theory. Indeed, where institutions are ineffective, both 
theories can be ineffectual. In many developing countries, the possession of 
sufficient information does not guarantee effective enforcement (Adegbite, 2012).  
For both public and private interest theories, the main issues emphasise violations 
(crime) and appropriate punishment. While Becker (1974) suggests that the 
effectiveness of regulations could be aided by accompanying sanction (in terms of 
size and form), factors such as environment and history do influence sanction 
regimes. An example is the rules-based and the principles-based systems in the US 
and the UK respectively. Despite positives advanced for both, there are still reported 
incidences of governance abuses in the US and the UK. This raises two concerns: 
Are the measures not punitive enough to discourage continued infraction (cost-
benefit) (Brown, 2004) or does the responsible institution lack the capacity to 
enforce punishment (certainty of enforcement) (see Polinsky and Shavell (2000)?16 
With the former, individuals can seek to rationalise their actions, but with the latter, 
could find motivation for engaging in illegal acts.  
                                                 
16
 An individual will commit an illegal act if, and only if, his expected utility from doing so, taking 
into consideration the benefit to him and the possibility of being caught and punished, exceeds his 
utility if he does the act (assuming no value is attached to his or her moral compass). 
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The second economic theory discussed in this section is the economic theory of 
rational choice and motivation. Rationality describes a state of being reasonable, 
based on facts or reason. Max Weber was one of the earliest rationality researchers, 
identifying increasing rationalisation and citing bureaucracy as an example. Human 
beings are expected to be rational in their actions because there is an expectation that 
their decisions will be the outcome of available facts or reason. It may therefore be 
assumed that, as Marxian analysis suggests, human beings are motivated by 
selfishness or material gain (Becker, 1974). Indeed, Vriend (1996) notes that it is 
universally presumed that the principal characteristic of any individual is his 
rationality.  
Rationality is also referred to in Smith’s (1776) postulations regarding economic 
agents. Smith’s argument focused on the fact that economic agents will act based on 
facts and reason, as reflected in his view on owner-manager complications. Vriend 
(1996) views this as ‘self-interest.’ As seen in the theories of regulation, both public 
and private agents aim to satisfy their self-interest. For instance, the desire of the 
government to compensate the public for their allegiance and support could explain 
public interest. Similarly, private interest theories are also driven by the desires of 
other economic agents (firms, individuals) to maximise their self-interest. 
However, do ‘fact’ and ‘reason’ offer sufficient justification for rational-choice? 
Does ‘reason’ explain the connection between action and consequence, as noted in 
Gans (1996)? Reason could be influenced by ethics, environment, culture and 
ambition etc. For instance, when a manager engages in activities that do not 
maximise shareholder wealth, can ‘reason’ explain the motivation for such behaviour? 
Gans (1996) demonstrates that when restrictions (in terms of information) are 
imposed on an agent’s knowledge of possible decision environments, a rational 
ordering over actions does not exist. This insight highlights the effect of incomplete 
information on rationality, which is consistent with Simon’s (1972) bounded 
rationality concept. 
Bounded rationality argues that when individuals make decisions, their rationality is 
restricted by the information they possess (Simon, 1972). However, Case (2012) 
informed that whilst possession of quality information could stimulate informed 
rational behaviour, the reverse could be the case where information is scant. In 
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developing economies, the availability of sufficient information has continually 
constituted challenges (Akpan-Obong, 2009). As a result, decision-makers only seek 
a satisfactory solution as they lack the information (which could be knowledge, 
ability and resources) to arrive at an optimal alternative. Corporate governance is 
significantly an information mechanism (Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010), thus 
questioning its usefulness in a system of poor quality information. 
To conclude this section, it is also important to examine deterrence theory and its 
link with corporate governance practice. Akers (1990, p. 654) explains that 
deterrence theory seeks to suggest that the “rational calculus of the pain of legal 
punishment offsets the motivation for the crime thereby deterring criminal activity.” 
In other words, individuals tend to choose either to obey or violate a particular 
legislation after considering the gains and likely consequences of that activity. Thus, 
individuals choose crime when it ‘pays.’ It might then be reasoned that the 
consequences of engaging in an activity must be greater than the associated gains if 
individuals are to be deterred from engaging in that activity.  The solution, according 
to deterrence theorists, is that crime can be made less attractive by implementing 
policies that increase the costs of illegal conduct i.e. laws and penalties implying that 
crime ‘does not pay’ (Nagin, 1998). The theory thus explains the relationship 
between formal sanctions (and their effectiveness) and crime (Piliavin, Gartner, 
Thornton, & Matsueda, 1986). In summary, as noted in Ellis (2003), deterrence 
theory indicates that offenders could be punished to deter potential offenders. This 
view connects deterrence theory with rational choice theory as individuals will 
typically pursue that which would enhance their wealth (Piliavin et al., 1986; Akers, 
1990).   
However, as Ellis (2003) observed, the foregoing notion has been rejected for two 
reasons. First, to what extent does punishing one person actually deter others? A 
study by Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson (2002) shows insensitivity to factors 
associated with deterrence. Second, the theory also fails to determine limits for 
punishment. In addition to the above reasons, it is necessary to assess whether the 
excess of gain over consequences offers the sole motivation for engaging in illegal 
activities. For instance, in some cases individuals engage in activities not because of 
the gain, but for other reasons such as satisfying personal curiosity (Akers, 1990). 
An example was noted in Ahunwan (2002) which indicated that the typical Nigerian 
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economic agent possesses a certain inbuilt stubbornness which manifests in a 
propensity to circumvent defined rules of economic behaviour and to resist control, 
aimed at maximising their economic gain.  
In the foregoing case, it is apparent that the excess of gain over consequences is not 
the only factor motivating the actions of the typical Nigerian economic agent. It may 
be critical to comprehend other motivations. This has implications for corporate 
governance regulation, particularly in a country such as Nigeria where institutional 
weaknesses have been exploited to ensure ineffective regulation. In such 
environments, will a rules-based and/or a principles-based system warrant a 
reorientation towards regulatory issues? It is therefore necessary to explore 
alternative deterrence strategies rather than solely focusing on punishing offenders, 
as it is possible that the environmental and institutional factors could influence the 
perception of deterrence in a society.     
To conclude discussions regarding the three strands of economic theories reviewed 
in this section, it is important to examine their extent of relevance in the context of 
developing economies. It is evident that economic theories of regulation, rational 
choice and deterrence are stimulated by certain characteristics. Included in these 
characteristics are the degree of awareness and education, the robustness of 
institutions, the level of economic development and the dominant culture, amongst 
others. Therefore it can be argued that, where there are challenges regarding the 
aforementioned characteristics, the usefulness of the economic theories discussed in 
this section is hampered. Consequently, this development would have implications 
for governance practices, especially when corporate governance is largely viewed as 
a regulatory mechanism (see La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002; Levine, 
2004). In developing economies, the features of economic theories noted above have 
remained a concern (see North, 1994; Braithwaite, 2006; Estache & Wren-Lewis, 
2009). Thus, in light of the focus of this study, the emergence of a good corporate 
governance system in developing economies must be preceded by a framework 
clarifying the need for improvements in the essential features of economic theories. 
Nonetheless, it is apparent that the institutional environment is crucial to the 
emergence of good corporate governance in developing economies (Estache & 
Wren-Lewis, 2009). This informs why institutional theory is identified as the main 
theoretical perspective of this thesis.    
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2.5 Core Theoretical Perspective – Institutional Theory 
Whilst agency theory advocates that firms can be viewed as a nexus of contracts 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) posit that 
culture,17 as a key determinant of economic exchange, is generally omitted when 
arranging contracts. Coase (1937) argues that economic theories (e.g. agency theory) 
have not yielded desired outcomes in view of the isolation of the underlying 
foundations of the theory. Institutional theory contributes to the understanding of the 
basic foundations of economic theories (Lubatkin et al., 2007).  
According to Suddaby (2010), institutional theory aims to understand why and how 
organisations attend to their institutional environments. Thus, it could be inferred 
that it is the task of institutional theory to strengthen knowledge and the application 
of other theoretical approaches. For instance, Judge et al. (2008) linked institutional 
theory with agency theory, proposing that institutional theory promotes 
understanding of agency issues, as it analyses the institutional contexts in which 
agency issues develop. Mitnick (2006) is also consistent with Judge et al.’s (2008) 
view, informing that institutional theory of corporate governance was necessitated by 
the lack of a framework to address underlying institutional elements of the agency 
model, hence its evolution as a reaction to the imperfections of the agency model.  
Bearing in mind the growing concerns over agency theory, studies relating to 
institutions have attracted substantial discourse over the last few decades. For 
example, Adegbite and Nakajima (2011a) note that not only has the concern become 
topical among businesses, regulators and political leaders, but a body of academic 
literature (see Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1987) has emerged around it. Accordingly, significant academic 
efforts have been channelled towards assessing the relevance of institutions as a way 
of examining the behaviour and performance of firms and their agents. This course 
has been charted in view of its capacity to facilitate a rich and complex view of 
organisations (Zucker, 1987).  
However, institutional theorising has been enriched by the positions pursued by 
proponents of deinstitutionalisation (Oliver, 1992; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). 
                                                 
17
 Scott (1987) observes that the resurgence of interest in culture benefited and contributed to the 
development of institutional theory. 
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Whereas institutional theory is fundamentally driven by suggestions that institutions 
are enduring entities (Maguire & Hardy, 2009) maintained over long periods of time 
and are highly resistant to change (see Zucker, 1987), deinstitutionalisation 
necessitates a review of the proposition underlying institutional theory. 
Deinstitutionalisation, according to Oliver (1992), refers to the erosion or 
discontinuation of an institutionalised organisational activity or practice. It entails 
the process wherein institutions become weak and subsequently disappear (Scott, 
2004). The increasing attention towards deinstitutionalisation is evident in the 
variety of application of the concept: the electricity supply industry (Henisz, Holburn, 
& Zelner, 2005); the case of asbestos in France (Blanc & Peton, 2009); and the use 
of insecticide - DDT (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  
Contrary to views presenting institutions as enduring structures, 
deinstitutionalisation argues that widespread, taken-for-granted norms and practices 
can be eventually rejected and thereafter abandoned (Oliver, 1992; Dacin & Dacin, 
2008). This possibility highlights the importance of acknowledging the broader 
context of institutional change, as the weakening and subsequent disappearance of a 
set of beliefs is likely to stimulate the arrival of new ones (Gilmore & Sillince, 2014). 
The foregoing issues raise a variety of questions. First, can and do economic agents 
determine or influence the process of institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation in 
a society? Second, is the robustness of institutionalisation or deinstitutionalisation 
processes influenced by the peculiarities of an institutional environment? These 
questions demand that the dominant positions of institutional theorists regarding 
institutions and institutional theory are reconsidered. This necessitates an 
understanding of some elements of institutional theory.   
 
2.5.1 What is an Institution? 
An institution represents a structure of social order and cooperation which governs 
the behaviour of individuals in a community (Hodgson, 2006). As enduring features 
of social life (Giddens, 1984), institutions describe any collectively-accepted system 
of rules by which societies establish institutional beliefs (Searle, 2005). As a 
consequence, institutions can either constrain or enable behaviour (North, 1990). 
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Hodgson (2006) reasoned that institutions enable ordered thought, expectation and 
action by ensuring consistency in human actions and interactions within a society.  
Various influences inform the emergence of institutions, but Hodgson (2006) 
contends that the role of individuals is crucial to the development of institutions. 
Hodgson’s (2006) stance, however, contradicts Clemens and Cook’s (1999) position. 
Clemens and Cook (1999, p. 442) argue that institutional elements are not driven by 
aggregation of individual actions, neither are they based on standardised interactions 
between individuals, but rather on “institutions that structure action.” This suggests 
that institutions have the capacity to shape behaviour and actions, not vice-versa.  
Clemens and Cook’s (1999) view appears to focus on environments that possess a 
high level of institutional sophistication. But what happens in an institutional 
environment that lacks the requisite sophistication? In many developing countries, 
for instance, the power and interest wielded by certain individuals might permit a 
reassessment of institutional structures. The power and influence wielded by certain 
persons ensure that such individuals are able to influence institutional elements in 
order to optimise their personal objectives. The management of this concern is 
critical to the development of knowledge to improve corporate governance, 
particularly in developing countries. This was demonstrated in research by Mangena 
et al. (2012) which suggested that the nature of an institutional environment does 
influence board and ownership structures. Similar observations were noted in 
Filatotchev et al. (2013).  
To extend the ‘institution’ review, it is appropriate to integrate the variants of 
institutions in this study. The vastness of types of ‘institution’ could create a 
misunderstanding in institutional theory scholarship, as there is a preponderance of 
literature evaluating the many façades of institutional theory. For instance, whilst 
Giddens (1984) identified political, economic and legal forms of institutions, 
Amenta and Ramsey (2010)18 and Hall and Taylor (1996)19 offered similar variants 
of institutionalism but distinct from Giddens (1984). Thus, it is necessary to examine 
these types of institutions with a view to identifying appropriate forms for this study. 
 
                                                 
18
 Historical Institutionalism, Political Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism. 
19
 Historical Institutionalism, Rational Choice Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism. 
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Table 3 - Pillars of Institutions 
  Pillars 
  Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Basis of 
Compliance 
Expedience Social Obligation Taken-for-
Grantedness Shared 
Understanding  
Basis of Order Regulative Rules Binding 
Expectations 
Constitutive Schema 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules                       
Laws                 
Sanctions 
Certification             
Accreditation 
Common Beliefs     
Shared Logics of 
Action Isomorphism 
Affect Fear 
Guilt/Innocence 
Shame/Honour Certainty/Confusion 
Basis of 
Legitimacy 
Legally 
Sanctioned 
Morally Governed Comprehensible 
Recognisable       
Culturally 
Supportive 
Source: Scott (2014, p. 60) 
Scott (2014) proposed three pillars of institutions, namely the regulative, the 
normative and the cultural-cognitive (Table 3). Whereas the regulative pillar focuses 
on regulations and associated processes (North, 1990), the normative pillar places 
emphasis on the prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimensions of social life 
(Scott, 2014). The cultural-cognitive system suggests that the shared conceptions 
which constitute the nature of social reality create the frames through which meaning 
is generated (Scott, 2014). These three pillars were conceptualised along three 
dimensions – obligation (the extent to which actors are bound to obey), precision 
(the degree to which rules specify required conduct) and delegation (the extent to 
which third parties have been granted authority to apply rules). The regulatory 
system is expected to exhibit high values in these dimensions while normative 
systems exhibit low values.  
The engagement of regulatory and normative systems is consistent with the 
application of rules-based and principles-based approaches respectively. Thus it can 
be argued that adopting the regulatory or normative system is dependent on the 
effectiveness of institutional elements. This suggests that in weak institutional 
environments, applying either system could be challenging. This led to the 
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conceptualisation of the cultural-cognitive system, which emphasises the role of 
culture in shaping cognitions related to institutions (Posthuma, 2009). This system 
recognises that institutions operate within different contexts in countries with diverse 
cultures. As a result, national culture could dictate how economic actors perceive and 
respond to institutions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). While studies (Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002; Li & Harrison, 2008) have shown that there is a relationship between culture 
and corporate governance, Rafiee and Sarabdeen (2012) show that the prevailing 
culture in less-developed markets contributes to weak corporate governance 
practices in those countries. This suggests that the adoption of a cultural-cognitive 
system, which harmonises key elements of regulatory and normative systems, may 
produce good governance in developing economies. This is because, as Scott (2014) 
posits, cultural-cognitive elements of institutions denote the shared conceptions that 
define the nature of social reality and creates the frameworks through which 
meanings are generated. However, the impact of culture on corporate governance 
institutions can be determined by the extent of legitimacy which that culture enjoys.    
 
2.5.2 Institutional Legitimacy and Isomorphism 
To survive, companies must understand and negotiate the many environmental 
influences (e.g. culture, politics) on their operations (Patel & Xavier, 2005). In other 
words, an organisation’s legitimacy is critical to its survival.  Gibson (1989) agrees 
that institutions thrive on legitimacy. Powell and DiMaggio (2012) explained that 
institutional theory accepts that corporate survival does not only depend on material 
resources and technical information but also on the organisation’s perceived 
legitimacy. A comprehensive description was offered by Suchman (1995, p. 574) 
enlightening that “legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” 
Thus the legitimacy of a firm reflects its relationship with its environment. Pfeffer 
and Salancik (2003) note that organisational legitimacy is controlled by outside 
elements, relying on the firm maintaining a coalition of stakeholders who possess 
legitimacy-defining power. In countries where corporate governance has achieved 
relative success, institutional legitimacy (or macro-theory of legitimation) (see 
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Tilling, 2004) appears to be evident in such environments. In these contexts, 
Suchman (1995) suggests that institutions and legitimacy are almost identical, hence 
they are able to empower corporate activities as they appear natural and meaningful. 
Consequently, the political and social institutions are well-established in such a way 
that they are able to regulate the economic objectives of agents. 
This indicates that, as corporations seek legitimacy, it is implied they equally aim to 
improve their governance practices. Sun, Salama, Hussainey, and Habbash (2010) 
explained that organisational legitimacy is reinforced by the strategic mechanism of 
corporate governance, therefore reinforcing the view of institutional theorists 
regarding the influence of society on corporate governance performance. This 
development, according to Coglianese (2007) has meant that corporations are 
moving their governance towards similar institutional arrangements exhibited by 
liberal, democratic governments.  
However, it can be argued that the differences in institutional environment could 
have implications for institutional legitimacy. Where the power of institutions as a 
control mechanism is weak, economic actors have greater opportunity to allow their 
rational-choice to influence their perception of legitimacy. For instance, Suchman 
(1995) identified pragmatic legitimacy as a form of legitimacy wherein legitimacy 
assessments are made through direct exchanges. Pragmatic legitimacy is often based 
on self-interest of the actors involved and determination of practical consequences.  
Thus, the dominant normative worldview of actors could manifest such that the 
impact of institutional legitimacy is undermined. This was the basis of Patel and 
Xavier’s (2005) criticisms. This concern can also influence the manifestation of 
isomorphic tendencies in an institutional environment. 
Isomorphism is an institutional concept suggesting that firms are similar in a variety 
of areas such as structure and processes, among others (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Literally, a firm could replicate the operations or activities of another firm or firms 
such that all the firms in a particular environment become increasingly similar 
(Dacin, 1997). As firms become inherently similar, there are opportunities for 
competitors to identify unique characteristics of other firms and incorporate these 
features into their operations.  
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DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explained that institutional isomorphism can manifest 
in three forms: Mimetic, normative and coercive. Mimetic isomorphism entails a 
deliberate and planned attempt by an organisation to copy or imitate the practices of 
established competitors in highly uncertain markets for survival. Mimetic 
isomorphism differs from normative isomorphism in that in normative isomorphism, 
there is no initial, deliberate attempt to imitate competitors. Normative isomorphism 
develops, for instance, as an organisation engages managers and other operatives 
from its competitors. Steadily, isomorphic tendencies emerge as these new 
employees begin to exhibit attitudes and behaviours which were learned in their 
previous work environment. Over time, the new company begins to appear similar to 
its competitors. This will manifest as levels of professionalism increase the similarity 
across organisations.  
Coercive isomorphism demands change occasioned by pressure from other 
organisations and societal culture. This strand of isomorphism emerges from both 
formal and informal pressures brought to bear on an organisation by other 
organisations upon which they depend (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The pressure 
exerted by these exogenous influences potentially provokes a systemic change in 
institutional frames. It is safe to conclude that the outcome generated in coercive 
isomorphism is determined by the extent of institutional effectiveness demonstrated 
by exogenous organisations.    
Therefore, the centrality of institutional environment to corporate governance is 
acknowledged. Indeed, Knack and Keefer (1995) used the robustness of institutional 
environments to delineate countries as developed or emerging. Thus, countries such 
as the US with a relatively sound institutional framework should logically display 
strong corporate governance. However, Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) document 
evidences which highlight some concerns for corporate governance in the US. A 
good example is Enron. As the largest energy firm in the US at the time it collapsed, 
it could use coercive pressures to infiltrate other firms in its sector, leading to 
isomorphic tendencies. This suggests that whilst the institutional environment is 
critical to governance discourse, key players in an industry could equally influence 
the emergence of (negative) isomorphic tendencies in a business environment. 
 41 
 
In developing countries such as Nigeria, the various manifestations of isomorphism 
are worth evaluating. Specifically, the role of government as isomorphic agent and 
second, isomorphic tendencies compelled by exogenous elements necessitate some 
examination. In most developing countries, the government is a major player in those 
economies. For instance, with respect to government ownership of banks, La Porta et 
al. (2002) show that such ownership is large and higher in countries with low levels 
of per capita income, weak financial systems, inefficient governments and poor 
property rights protection. These are features of developing economies. The 
government in many of these countries is challenged by incompetence. Therefore, as 
corporations are forced to establish business relationships with the government for 
survival, the possibility to become increasingly similar to government agencies 
escalates. This is consistent with DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 155) Hypothesis B-
1 which states that “the greater the extent to which an organisational field is 
dependent upon a single (or several similar) source of support for vital resources, 
the higher the level of isomorphism.”  
The second concern deals with the external pressures for good corporate governance. 
Khanna and Zyla’s (2012) survey indicates that corporations from developed 
economies will at all times prefer to do business in countries and firms with good 
governance structures. As a result, there is evidence of coercive isomorphism. This 
form of isomorphism is also intensified by the pressure exerted on local firms when 
they (local firms) seek to attract capital from foreign investors or from international 
lenders such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where some conditions are 
stipulated before such funding can be accessed. In such a context, it can be argued 
that corporate governance is being imposed upon developing countries, regardless of 
whether the institutional environment in these economies can accommodate the 
dynamics of the dominant Anglo-American corporate governance system. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis A-3 in DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Whereas this 
demonstrates the relationship between isomorphism and legitimacy, the concern with 
the aforementioned development is that it undermines the legitimacy of the corporate 
governance concept which could lead to low compliance levels. 
These concerns form the basis of criticisms directed at institutional isomorphism. 
Isomorphism implies that institutional change occurs over the long term. However, 
Dacin (1997) confirmed that the power with which institutional norms influence 
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organisations can vary over time and rapidly. Isomorphism is also generally assumed 
to emerge from a single or few sources, but Lodge (2000) suggests that isomorphism 
has multiple sources and cannot be understood as a uniform process. The implication 
of this is that while organisational or societal culture has been identified as the driver 
of isomorphism, other factors could account for the emergence of isomorphic 
tendencies in an institutional environment. For instance, a study examining the 
managerial behaviour of Korean Chaebols 20  posited that isomorphism alone is 
insufficient to explain managerial behaviour. The study recommended that it is better 
to engage a combination of factors beyond culture to generate a robust explanation 
for isomorphic developments. 
The foregoing reasonably serves as a base from which to expand the scholarship in 
relation to agents of isomorphism. Views examining the drivers of isomorphism in 
an institutional context tend to deliberately restrict their lens to corporations (see 
Dacin, 1997). This may be informed by the capitalist nature of many developed 
economies where market decisions are informed by the forces of demand and supply. 
In many developing economies, this is certainly not the case as other agents have 
considerable input into how isomorphism develops in the system (see Siddiqui, 
2010).   
The preceding discussion highlights the importance of building a sound institutional 
environment for corporate governance to thrive. However, questions remain as to the 
relevance of institutional mechanisms. Some factors have been identified which 
should be examined to appropriately contextualise the significance of institutions. It 
is therefore necessary to evaluate whether institutions actually matter. 
 
2.5.3 Institutional Influence on Corporate Governance 
It is important to commence this discussion by probing ‘what is the most important 
factor ensuring the occurrence of diverse corporate governance systems across the 
globe?’ Filatotchev et al. (2013), for instance, argue that understanding how 
corporate governance differ worldwide demands a rich and comparative insight into 
                                                 
20
 According to Kim, Lyn, Park, and Zychowicz (2005), the Korean economy is dominated by 
Chaebols, described as a business group of conglomerates which are owned and managed by a single 
family.  
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institutions. Findings in Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003) 
equally suggest that institutional differences are crucial to classifying rich and poor 
countries. To deepen the understanding of the foregoing, it is imperative to review 
prior studies and theoretical frameworks relating to institutional influences on 
corporate governance. According to proponents of institutionalism in corporate 
governance (see Table 4), institutional features provide the rationale for explaining 
the differences in corporate governance systems worldwide. As indicated in Table 4, 
these studies have identified and examined varying institutional elements of 
corporate governance. 
Table 4 - Prior Studies on Institutional Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Relevant Literature Focus/Contributions 
Cuervo (2002) Legal institutions 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003) ‘Actor-centred’ institutional factor 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) Efficiency needs and legitimation 
pressures 
Doidge et al. (2007) Legal protections for minority investors 
and, the level of economic and financial 
development 
Judge et al. (2008) Extent of law and order, culture and 
corruption 
Filatotchev et al. (2013) Differences in nature and extent of 
Agency relationships 
 
In Cuervo (2002) for example, the use of codes of governance was engaged in 
examining the deficiencies in shareholder protection in the legal structure of market-
oriented (Anglo-Saxon) and shareholder-oriented (continental European) systems of 
corporate governance. It was however acknowledged that enforceability issues in 
continental Europe restrict the use of codes. The expansion of market control 
mechanism was therefore proposed to promote maximisation of firm value. This 
study suffers from two issues. First, the focus on legal institutions represents a 
narrow lens for examining the effectiveness of codes. There are evidences which 
demonstrate that prevailing culture (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) and dominant religion 
(Coşgel & Miceli, 2009; Grullon, Kanatas, & Weston, 2009), for instance, are 
essential to code effectiveness. The legal institution can also be challenged by 
legitimacy concerns which may further undermine its effectiveness. Second, as 
shown in Judge et al. (2008), global corporate governance systems cannot be 
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confined to the market-oriented or stakeholder-oriented (continental European) 
models. Thus, the outcomes in Cuervo (2002) may be inconsistent with studies 
examining the emerging models of corporate governance in other varieties of 
capitalism.  
On their part, Aguilera and Jackson (2003) employed an ‘actor-centred’ model to 
identify social relations and institutional arrangements that determines who controls 
firms, who governs the allocation of rights and responsibilities among corporate 
stakeholders, and whose interests corporations serve. While the study only focused 
on advanced capitalist economies, the use of ‘actor-centred’ is ambiguous as no 
particular stakeholder was identified. The key actors in market-oriented and 
stakeholder-oriented institutional environments are different, ranging from 
shareholders to stakeholders (such as banks). The scholarship of corporate 
governance will be enriched when the preferences of clearly-identified drivers of the 
system are addressed. 
Doidge et al. (2007) expanded the scope of institutional factors to include the level 
of economic and financial development, in addition to legal institutions previously 
acknowledged in Cuervo (2002). This study highlights the robustness of utilising 
country characteristics as an explanatory variable for variations in governance 
ratings, compared to the use of firm characteristics. While data used in the study 
(sourced from three agencies) purportedly include information from developing 
economies, the study outcome cannot be engaged in the African context as only data 
from South Africa featured in the analysis. Notably, the largest economy in Africa 
(Nigeria) is excluded from the study. In view of the widely-reported issues regarding 
legal protection for minority shareholders in many emerging and developing 
countries (La Porta et al., 2000; Klapper & Love, 2004) which raises questions with 
regard to role of institutions (legal), there are sufficient grounds to argue that the 
outcome in Doidge et al. (2007) does not reflect developments in Africa. 
The elements of culture, legal institutions and notably, corruption were specifically 
identified as the three pillars of institutionalisation influencing the perceptions of 
corporate governance at the country level in Judge et al. (2008). The study which 
involved 50 countries (identified as either developed or emerging) classified all the 
countries using three governance systems namely Anglo-American, communitarian 
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and emerging. Every country classed as developed embraces either the Anglo-
American or the communitarian governance system, whereas every country labelled 
as emerging engages the emerging governance model. In addressing hypothesis 3,21 
the study demonstrated that the less the prevalence of corruption in an institutional 
environment, the higher the legitimacy associated to corporate governance in such 
environments. However, relying on the insights provided in Pfeffer and Salancik 
(2003) and Patel and Xavier (2005), organisational legitimacy is shaped by external 
elements. In many weak institutional contexts, where corruption is significantly 
associated with societal elites, an organisation’s survival is often linked to its ability 
to understand and negotiate with these elites. Furthermore, there are reported 
incidences of institutionalised corruption which may suggests that attempts by 
organisations to isolate themselves from that ‘institution’ may hamper their survival. 
Notwithstanding the preceding criticisms, the relevance of institutional elements in 
corporate governance scholarship has continued to attract substantial scholarly 
followership. The generality of these studies have reported the influence of various 
strands of institutionalism on corporate systems. But despite the positive perception 
regarding the importance of institutional frameworks, a growing body of literature 
(Sachs, 2003; Przeworski, 2004; Fukuyama, 2006) have questioned the validity of 
the assumed applicability and significance of institutional frameworks in creating a 
robust corporate governance system. Przeworski (2004) identified two contrasting 
themes that have stimulated increased focus on institutional discourse. The first is 
that institution matters. This is because it influences norms, beliefs and actions, and 
consequently shapes actions. This connects with the definition of economic 
institutions provided in North (1990) and Acemoglu et al. (2005). The second 
argument proposes that institutions are endogenous (see Besley & Case, 2000), with 
their form and functionality dependent on the conditions under which they emerge 
and endure.  
The first proposition links with the widely-held position postulated by proponents of 
institutionalism such as Acemoglu et al. (2005), Knack and Keefer (1995) and 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009), and those identified in Table 4. 
Nevertheless, the second proposition portrays institutions as an endogenous variable. 
                                                 
21
 Hypothesis 3 in Judge et al. (2008) states that ‘the extent to which corruption is embraced within a 
nation will be negatively associated with corporate governance legitimacy.’ 
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Variables are deemed to be endogenous when they are influenced by certain 
conditions. Thus, the second proposition presumes that existing conditions can 
influence the functionality of an institution (Przeworski, 2004). This, in turn, 
suggests that institutions will manifest only the causal effects of these existing 
conditions.  
Przeworski’s (2004) propositions were also noted in Glaeser et al. (2004). They 
(Glaeser et al., 2004) also identified two approaches to economic development, 
informed considerably by institutions and conditions. The salient feature of these 
approaches lies in their prioritisation. Glaeser et al. (2004) informs that the first 
approach emphasises the need to initially engage institutions as a mechanism for 
securing property rights, whilst the second approach emphasises the need for human 
and physical accumulation of capital (possible conditionalities) to initiate the process. 
Therefore, as indicated in Przeworski’s (2004) second proposition, Glaeser et al.’s 
(2004) second approach suggests that institutional improvements, particularly in the 
context of poor countries, could be the consequences of increased education and 
wealth, but not the cause.   
In view of the second propositions offered by Przeworski (2004) and Glaeser et al. 
(2004), Sachs (2003) argued that institutions may matter, but they do not matter 
absolutely. Indeed, determining whether institutions matter must require the isolation 
of their (institution) effect from those of the condition under which they function. 
Whilst this represents a difficulty faced by scholars (Przeworski, 2004), the 
preceding view by Sachs (2003) compels an examination of circumstances, 
particularly in contexts where institutions are weak. Assuming that institutions are 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, North (1990) suggests 
that institutions have the capacity to prevent individuals taking certain actions or, 
alternatively, to induce them to act in a way they would otherwise not. But as 
Przeworski (2004) queries, how could what people would or would not do be 
determined if institutions are not present? Thus, it is probably difficult to relate the 
behaviour of economic agents to the existence of institutions.  
As noted earlier, the widely-held consensus indicates that institutions determine 
behaviour, virtually in an absolute sense. To demonstrate the depth of this perception, 
it can be advocated that when an institution is replicated in another economic 
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environment, it is literally assumed that it will function in the same way as it has 
functioned elsewhere (Przeworski, 2004). In contrast, Johanson and Østergren (2010) 
demonstrate that a global norm would be misplaced and dysfunctional if applied 
universally. Findings in Adu-Amoah, Tsamenyi, and Onumah (2009) also affirm 
Johanson and Østergren’s (2010) position. Adu-Amoah et al. (2009) suggest that an 
attempt to design corporate governance systems without taking local social and 
political factors into account is likely to lead to failure.   
This view connects with the endogenous claim, which indicates that institutions can 
function but only under certain conditions; or that the impact of particular 
institutions is dependent on certain underlying conditions (Przeworski, 2004). To 
offer an example, institutions, represented by concepts such as property rights, 
credible enforcement of contracts and the rule of law, among others (Fukuyama, 
2006), may have achieved relative success in developed countries, but many 
developing countries, who have certainly established their institutions on similar 
models, have not achieved comparable outcomes. This presupposes that perhaps 
existing conditions in a particular domain bear more influence on economic activities 
such as corporate governance performance than existing institutions. 
To corroborate this, an example was cited in Gilson (1996) reiterating the 
importance of conditions. Gilson (1996) reported that at a meeting on comparative 
corporate governance, a non-Japanese speaker emphasised the importance of 
Keiretsu22 to Japan’s economic development. However, after listening to the speaker, 
a Japanese economist disagreed with the notion that Japan’s competitiveness was 
based on a corporate governance strategy. Instead, the Japanese economist argued 
that Japan’s economic revival resulted from both the character of the Japanese 
people and the situation in which Japan found itself. The character of the Japanese 
people and the situation of the country connote conditionalities, which helped 
reinforce Japanese institutional structures. 
The preceding issues have raised concerns about the validity of the widely-held view 
that institutions matter. Given these perceptions, it is appropriate to contemplate that 
‘good’ institutions, as noted in Sachs (2003), certainly matter, but their significance 
                                                 
22
 Keiretsu is a form of institution incorporating a set of companies with interlocking business 
relationships and shareholdings. 
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is determined by existing conditionalities. This is consistent with the positions 
expressed in Sachs (2003), Gilson (1996), Glaeser et al. (2004) and Przeworski 
(2004) which agree that institutions do not matter exclusively. Therefore, the 
consideration of institutional frameworks as a single-factor explanation (Sachs, 2003) 
for entrenching good corporate governance practices may be flawed. This view of 
institutional theorists such as Acemoglu et al. (2005) demands a reassessment 
especially when institutions are examined in the context of developing economies. 
 
Part B: Corporate Governance in Developing Economies   
In this part, corporate governance issues relating to developing economies are 
reviewed. The review commences by examining institutional relevance in 
developing economies. This facilitated the evaluation of the emerging model of 
corporate governance, which has been used to describe corporate governance in less-
developed economies. The section concludes by considering key corporate 
governance concerns in developing economies. 
 
2.6 Institutional Significance in Developing Economies 
Gilson (1996) explained that the institutional characteristics of national corporate 
governance systems are path-dependent,23 which are defined by the historical and 
political contingencies of particular national systems. North (1993) also agrees that 
institutions are often predetermined or given by history. This suggests that 
institutional characteristics could be shaped by distinct national systems. Thus, as 
Gilson (1996) observes, economic success is dependent upon how governance 
institutions, created by history and politics, ‘fit’ with the particular economy in 
which its firms are expected to compete. While this view is appropriate, there is little 
doubt that the institutional elements in developed and developing countries show 
varying levels of efficiency. Indeed, it can be debated that existing conditionalities 
rather than institutions account for these differences. Some studies have illustrated 
this view. In Sorour and Howell (2012) for example, it was observed that powerful 
                                                 
23
 The idea that events occurring at an earlier point in time will affect events occurring at a later point 
in time (Djelic & Quack, 2007). 
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agents (such as regulators) drive the political process of corporate governance 
amongst Egyptian banks. Similarly, in Jizi et al. (2014), it was suggested that a 
powerful CEO enjoys some liberty in taking decisions which may or may not 
maximise corporate objectives. In both studies, it could be suggested that economic 
actors rather than institutional elements appear to bear more influence on the 
direction of corporate governance. 
Taking into context North’s (1990) definition of institutions as a constraint on 
individual behaviour, Glaeser et al. (2004) note that these constraints must be 
reasonably permanent or durable. This was the basis of the American institutional 
structure which as Gilson (1996) informs, is thought to represent the evolutionary 
pinnacle of corporate governance. The American model and other similar variants 
are widely engaged in the western world. However, Fukuyama (2006) examined the 
permanency or durability of institutions in Latin America (which can be regarded 
mostly as developing economies) and concluded that even formal institutions can be 
established, abolished or changed literally ‘with the stroke of a pen.’  
Fukuyama (2006) suggests that a lack of institutional permanency is enabled by 
conditions driving institutions in those countries. Furthermore, work by Hall and 
Jones (1999) revealed three proximate causes for the differences in prosperity across 
countries. These differences include physical capital differences (poor countries do 
not save enough), human capital differences (poor countries do not invest enough in 
education) and technology differences (poor countries do not invest enough in 
research and development).  
Linking with the above, Glaeser et al. (2004) examined the effect of low education 
on political institutions. They suggest that low-education countries are never stable 
democracies while high-education countries generally produce stable democracies. 
They note that this is consistent with Lipset (1960) who agreed that political 
institutions are more relevant in well-educated countries than in poorly-educated 
countries. They extend the scope of their study by attempting to understand the 
timing regarding whether education or institutional outcomes should take priority. 
Similar research was undertaken by Barro (1999). Glaeser et al. (2004) results 
indicate that education produces a large and positive effect in developing economic 
institutions, whilst there is no effect on human capital growth when political 
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institutions are engaged first. Barro (1999) reported similar outcomes, thus affirming 
that conditions, rather than institutions, should be prioritised. 
Another condition reported in Przeworski (2004) is the effect of income levels on 
political institutions. In the study, Przeworski (2004) demonstrated that the 
acceptance of election results varies among countries in view of the income gap 
which exists in those countries. Whilst Glaeser et al. (2004) used the term ‘poverty’ 
to communicate similar views, Przeworski (2004) concluded by stating that the 
institution of choosing governments by election is endogenous with regards to 
underlying conditions.   
In a study on institutional relevance, Acemoglu et al. (2005) identified an approach 
to institutional differences which rests on three premises. The first can be linked to 
history, which suggests that different forms of colonisation policies created different 
sets of institutions. For example, they explained that these gave rise to ‘extractive 
states’ such as Congo and Nigeria, and the Neo-Europes such as the US and New 
Zealand etc. They report that while the extractive states are characterised by a lack of 
protection of private property and an absence of checks and balances against the 
government, the Neo-Europes provide protection of private property and efficient 
law and order systems. The second factor relates to the feasibility of settlements 
which affected the probability of a different set of institutions. The third, which 
relates to path dependence, is the view that early institutions affect current 
institutions.  
In summary, it can be argued that institutions play a significant role in establishing 
good corporate governance but that this is determined by the degree of institutional 
sophistication. Institutional sophistication could however be shaped by 
conditionalities inherent in a particular system. The criticality of these conditions is, 
in turn, affected by the level of economic development. For instance, in developed 
countries, these conditions are overwhelmed by the robustness of existing 
institutions, whereas this is not the case in developing economies. Indeed, whilst 
conditions determine how institutions function in developing economies, existing 
institutions and underlying conditionalities could influence the model of corporate 
governance adopted in a system.        
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2.7 The Emerging Model of Corporate Governance 
Whilst a discussion of corporate governance theories was undertaken in the last two 
sections, concerns regarding corporate governance cannot be narrowed entirely to 
theoretical imbalances. Indeed, issues surrounding corporate governance 
convergence have played a significant part in the present state of corporate 
governance globally. Since the early 1990s, when consciousness towards corporate 
governance intensified, countries have sought to implement corporate governance 
systems to address corporate malfeasance. However, Roe (2003) observes that the 
structure and implementation of corporate governance vary across countries. In fact, 
Filatotchev and Nakajima (2010) contend that interdependences between 
organisations and their diverse environments account for variations in the 
effectiveness of different corporate governance systems. 
Whilst convergence theorists (Coffee Jr, 1999; Guillén, 2000) have examined the 
possibilities and implications of corporate governance convergence, factors such as 
political forces (Roe, 2003) and institutional elements (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) 
inform the diversity in corporate governance approaches. The country-specific nature 
of this study obliges the examination of the dominant corporate governance models 
in developing economies. Judge et al. (2008) identified three main models of 
corporate governance across the globe: The Anglo-American; the Communitarian; 
and, particularly, the Emerging model, adopted in most developing economies.  
The Anglo-American model is arguably the most popular model of corporate 
governance globally. Tricker (2015) agreed that the model is the foundation for 
many governance structures worldwide. This is traceable to the use of the model in 
many developed economies such as the US and the UK amongst others. The model 
is established on the principle of separation of ownership from control, with a 
dispersed shareholding structure (Demb & Neubauer, 1992). On the other hand, the 
Communitarian model appears as the leading model in continental European 
countries, especially in countries such as Germany and France. This model, often 
characterised by a high concentration of ownership equity with dominant family 
shareholdings (Tricker, 2015), focuses on addressing the expectations of a wider 
spectrum of interests, hence Aguilera (2005) described it as a stakeholder-oriented 
system.  
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Whilst the two models described above tend to inform corporate governance models 
in developed economies, the increasing rate of globalisation, coupled with the focus 
of this study, prompts an examination of governance concerns in other countries i.e. 
the emerging and developing world. This is the basis of the Emerging model of 
corporate governance.  
Emerging economies, according to Judge et al. (2008), are relatively poor economies 
that have shown rapid development potential, such as China. These economies are 
often characterised by a low economic wealth per capita, a civil law legal structure, 
weak and restricted institutions, but with a rapidly-growing economy driven by a 
vast population and entrepreneurial competences (Judge et al., 2008). Judge et al. 
(2008) also demonstrate a correlation between economic development and 
governance systems, as 21 countries, whose stage of economic development was 
classed as ‘emerging,’ all embrace the emerging corporate governance model.  
Considering the economic concerns in emerging economies, an efficient governance 
system is critical to these economies. Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) demonstrate 
that a good corporate governance structure will benefit firms in emerging markets by 
ensuring greater access to financing, lower cost of capital, better performance and 
equitable treatment of all stakeholders.  
However, in view of the challenges in these economies, the development and 
practice of corporate governance has been severely weakened. For instance, many of 
these countries lack a convincing regulatory mechanism for implementing corporate 
governance, with some embracing both the principles-based and the rules-based 
mechanism (see Berglof & von Thadden, 1999). The level of economic development 
has also meant that the engagement of corporate governance to deal with infractions 
has remained unpopular. Governance has been further hampered in these economies 
by the lack of a sound institutional framework. In a study involving 14 emerging 
markets, Klapper and Love (2004) note that firm-level governance is lower in 
economies with weak legal institutions. These concerns have hindered the general 
endorsement of corporate governance ideals.   
It is also deemed necessary to examine the main issues in developing economies to 
facilitate a rigorous comprehension of the problems undermining the practice of 
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corporate governance in these environments. Three main issues are examined in the 
next section.   
 
2.8 Corporate Governance in Developing Economies: Matters Arising            
Corporate governance scholarship has predominantly evolved in the context of 
developed economies. Significant interest has nonetheless intensified in developing 
economies (Denis & McConnell, 2003). Whilst there are apparent variations in the 
extent of growth and diffusion of corporate governance ideals, there continues to be 
a growing desire amongst developing economies to embrace good governance 
principles (Arun & Turner, 2004; Claessens, 2006).  
Despite Denis and McConnell’s (2003) observation noted above, the economic and 
social structures in many developing economies appear to have converged, and 
consequently influence the corporate governance practices in these economies. For 
example, Vasilescu (2008) observed that corporate governance in developing 
economies is constantly challenged by issues such as lack of property rights, abuse 
of minority rights and contract violations, among many others. This development 
tends to create concerns which have influenced governance practices amongst 
corporations in these economies. As a result, attempts to enhance governance 
practices in these economies necessitate that relevant matters be reviewed. Thus, the 
focus of this section is to discuss three concerns deemed central to corporate 
governance in developing economies. These issues are summarised from relevant 
literature (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Arun & Turner, 2004; Mangena et al., 2012; 
Sorour, 2014).     
 
2.8.1 Economic Development: A Determinant of Governance Practice? 
Evidently, a country’s degree of economic development poses considerable 
implications for its corporate governance practice (see Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; La 
Porta et al., 2000; Claessens, 2006). It is essential to note that countries that have 
recorded relative success with regard to the implementation of corporate governance 
principles are mostly developed economies. Judge et al. (2008), in a survey 
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involving 50 countries, categorised all the countries either as developed or emerging. 
From the survey’s outcome, corporate governance in the developed countries was 
deemed to be ‘developed’ whilst in the emerging economies, corporate governance 
was classed as ‘emerging.’ This survey potentially suggests that there could be a 
relationship between economic development and corporate governance practice (see 
Paredes, 2005). It also reinforces the view that poor countries tend to manifest weak 
governance regimes.    
Whilst a variety of reasons has been offered to explain the variation between 
corporate governance practices in developed and developing economies, the 
difference in institutional frameworks is central to poor governance practices in 
developing economies (Berglof & von Thadden, 1999; Adegbite & Nakajima, 
2011b). Aguilera and Jackson (2003) and Filatotchev et al. (2013) agree that 
disparities in the effectiveness of institutional elements inform the unpredictable 
level of corporate governance practices and its effectiveness across the globe. 
Therefore, in view of the institutional disposition of this study, there is no doubt that 
entrenching robust institutional frameworks is critical to good corporate governance 
practices in developing economies.    
The development of institutional frameworks, in addition to the benefits inherent in 
good corporate governance, compels every country, be it developed, emerging or 
developing, to embrace good governance principles in view of its impact on 
economic growth. To foster economic growth, Paredes (2005) recommends that 
developing countries should adopt more stringent mandatory law regimes to enhance 
shareholder rights. The desire to protect shareholder rights will encourage 
investment, the development of the capital markets and, ultimately, will stimulate 
economic growth. This process reaffirms the relationship between corporate 
governance and economic growth.  
 
2.8.2 Corporate Governance Regulation: By Rule or By Principle? 
As a predominantly regulatory mechanism, the success of corporate governance is 
enhanced by levels of compliance, which is influenced by the effectiveness of its 
enforcement strategy. To enforce corporate governance, countries engage the 
principles-based or the rules-based approach. Some countries embrace both. The 
 55 
 
rules-based approach, which provides the operating basis for Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) 
in the US, directs that compliance is mandatory for operators. Thus, stakeholders are 
expected to obey the legal requirements or risk a penalty (Tricker, 2015). 
Alternatively, the principles-based approach assumes that compliance is voluntary. 
While the principles-based approach can be likened to a code of ethics, practitioners 
are still expected to justify the basis for actions taken to avoid a reaction from the 
market. As noted in Shrives and Brennan (2015), companies that fail to comply with 
the UK corporate governance code are expected to provide reasons for non-
compliance. Whilst this represents the capstone of the ‘comply-or-explain’ system, 
the problem for shareholders is that explanations are not good enough as too much 
emphasis is placed on compliance with the requirement, thus requiring stakeholders 
to ascertain their appropriateness. Furthermore, Sun et al. (2010) reported that 
corporate managers in the UK are engaging disclosure techniques to reduce the 
probability that public policy actions will be taken against their organisations.  
Figure 5 - Origin of Principles-Based and Rules-Based Governance Systems    
Anglo-American Model
Common Law
Principles-Based (UK) Rules-Based (US)
 
The application of rules-based or principles-based governance systems presents two 
fundamental concerns for developing economies. The first concern is illustrated in 
Figure 5. As cited in Judge et al.’s (2008) proposition, both approaches are features 
of common law 24  ideologies of the Anglo-American mechanism. This raises a 
                                                 
24
 ‘Common law’ refers to laws that are derived from custom and judicial precedent rather than 
statutes. 
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pertinent question: Can both principles of corporate governance, which are 
significantly different, be applied in other law contexts? Addressing this question, 
particularly in the context of developing economies where there exists a preference 
for civil law regimes, could provide an interesting proposition. Even in common law 
environments which are based on case laws defined by precedents, can these case 
laws be relied upon in a weak legal environment? Alternatively, can the use of both 
systems, if possible, compensate for the shortcomings of a weak legal institution?  
The preceding statement informs the second concern. What are the challenges in 
embracing both approaches to take advantage of the benefits inherent in these 
models? For instance, Ofo (2011) and Adegbite (2012) highlighted the confusion 
created by the disguised use of both approaches in corporate governance regulation 
in Nigeria. Providing answers to these questions is expected to enhance knowledge 
regarding how corporate governance practices could be improved. However, 
addressing the foregoing question one must take into account the role of culture 
which underpins economic transactions in many developing economies (Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2005).  
 
2.8.3 Culture and Corporate Governance 
Whilst it is appropriate to suggest that corporate governance has been influenced by 
a variety of elements, the non-recognition of cultural specifics of developing 
countries has been identified as a significant challenge for corporate governance 
implementation in these countries (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011b). One of the most 
important factors shaping corporate governance practices in developing economies is 
culture (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). As a result, Licht (2014) posited that 
understanding the role of culture in corporate governance has become an issue of 
increasing importance. Whereas evidence of the relationship between culture and 
corporate governance was noted in Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Li and Harrison (2008) 
empirically demonstrated that national culture has a dominant influence on the 
practice of corporate governance.  
Culture, as defined by the pioneering scholar Geert Hofstede, is “the collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of 
people from others” (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010, p. 6). In the view of Kar 
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(2011), the structures, institutions and legal frameworks of corporate governance are 
developed and managed by people whose behaviours are determined and influenced 
by cultural and social ethos. Accordingly, the effectiveness of corporate governance 
can be substantially determined by an individual managing the corporate governance 
responsibility. These individuals are, however, expected to behave in response to 
their individual cultural affiliations.  
This therefore indicates that how a particular culture deals with concepts such as 
ambition, greed, fear and uncertainty may determine how an individual perceives 
and responds to corporate governance matters. This could also be reinforced by how 
the dominant culture in an environment has evolved. Importantly, these culture-
related concepts could also determine the extent of compliance with the regulatory 
prescriptions of corporate governance.  
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that the dominant perspectives in the 
cultural domain of a society could have significant implications for corporate 
governance. A curious development emerging from the review of literature is the 
variations in the degree of cultural impact on corporate governance between 
developed and developing countries. These studies have employed various 
frameworks, in particular the Hofstede model, to present their outcomes. Studies 
such as Griffin, Guedhami, Kwok, Li, and Shao (2014) sought to investigate the 
country-level factors that explain the cross-country variation in firm-level corporate 
governance. Relying on the individualism element of Hofstede (1980), they find that 
national culture explains the cross-country diversity in firm-level corporate 
governance better than traditionally identified factors.  
Furthermore, an interesting outcome of Griffin et al.’s (2014) study is the view that 
individualism could effectively act as a proxy for the type of corporate governance 
system in a society. This view links with the outcome of an earlier study by Ringov 
and Zollo (2007). The study suggests that firms located in economies manifesting 
high levels of power distance, individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance 
tend to display lower levels of social and environmental performance. Whilst a 
variety of reasons for this problem have been adduced, the failure to identify the core 
elements of a local institution and integrate these into corporate governance 
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structures still appears to offer a plausible rationale for the challenges undermining 
corporate governance in the developing world (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011b).  
In light of the institutions-based reasoning of this research, Licht (2014) posits that 
no institutional analysis of corporate governance systems will be complete without 
examining the cultural environment in which such systems are embedded. This 
informs as to why this study examined the cultural concerns (as a subset of social 
institutions). 
 The three issues examined above represent some elements that have shaped the 
practice of corporate governance worldwide but, more profoundly, developing 
economies. In view of the review undertaken so far, it is necessary to examine 
corporate governance practices in the study context i.e. Nigeria, acknowledging the 
effects of the three issues examined previously. Primarily, challenges and 
implications of weak governance and corporate governance regulation in Nigeria are 
reviewed in the next section. 
 
Part C: Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
In Chapter One, the growing economic profile of Nigeria and the theoretical 
implications of corporate governance scholarship in Nigeria were discussed. To 
enrich that discourse, this section focuses on three main areas of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. These are the challenges hindering corporate governance, the 
implications of identified challenges, and the regulatory mechanism for establishing 
good corporate governance. 
 
2.9 Corporate Governance Challenges in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, the effectiveness of corporate governance has been restricted by various 
challenges (Yakasai, 2001; Okike, 2007). A review of these challenges however 
indicates that many of these concerns are context-specific, created by the economic 
and social systems dominant in the country. From a review of the literature on 
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corporate governance in Nigeria, seven problems, discussed subsequently, are 
considered central to corporate governance discourse in Nigeria.  
Weak Corporate Regulation: The success of corporate governance is hinged upon 
the effectiveness of the regulation(s) established to induce compliance. Berglöf and 
Claessens (2006) contend that enforcement, more than regulations or voluntary 
codes, is fundamental to creating an effective business environment and good 
corporate governance in developing economies. However, with regard to Nigeria, 
Nmehielle and Nwauche (2004) posit that the principal problem of corporate 
governance is the gulf between the precepts of the law and its implementation.  
Nigeria has not lacked the codes to entrench good corporate governance but 
criticisms have hampered their effectiveness. Yakasai (2001) and Adekoya (2011) 
bemoaned the enforcement and compliance mechanisms established by the existing 
codes. Okpara (2011) agrees that enforcement of existing laws constitutes a major 
challenge to corporate governance in Nigeria. The laws of the land (including 
corporate governance codes) are constantly contravened by the ruling political elites 
and their cronies in the corporate world with no serious consequences. These 
individuals are treated as ‘untouchables’ and ‘above the law’ (Adekoya, 2011). Thus, 
evidence of abuse of laws is rampant in firms, creating a situation where disregard 
for regulations is not frowned upon but treated with indifference (Oyejide & Soyibo, 
2001).  
Thus it can be argued that regulatory enforcement is the primary concern of 
corporate regulation. The inability to enforce is an indication of the disequilibrium 
that exists between the authority of regulators and the power of operators. Weak 
enforcement suggests that the power of operators overwhelms the authority of 
regulators. Indeed, Okaro and Tauringana (2012) affirmed that Nigerian regulators 
lack the requisite capacity to perform their assigned responsibilities. Thus, 
addressing this problem requires that the authority of regulators be strengthened, 
albeit by the political leadership. But, as demonstrated in Ahunwan (2002), the 
political leadership, sometimes via proxies, substantially controls Nigerian 
corporations, hence they (political leaders) could be viewed as the operators. 
Resolving corporate governance concerns in Nigeria therefore demands an 
enforcement framework wherein the power of operators is subject to the regulator’s 
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authority. This is critical to addressing the problem of corporate governance in 
Nigeria.  
Corporate Corruption: Previous literature emphasises a negative relationship 
between governance and corruption (Jain, 2001). Evidence indicates that in countries 
with high levels of corruption, good corporate governance practices are affected in 
firms resident in those countries (Caron, Ficici, & Richter, 2012).   
Even as corruption remains a global concern, it has been severally identified as the 
bane of the Nigerian economy (Akindele, 2005; Lawal, 2007). It is endemic (Okike, 
2007) and has literally seeped into every facet of the country’s economic horizon. It 
has become rooted in the sociocultural, political and economic domains of the 
country (Shehu, 2005). As a consequence, the practice of corporate governance has 
not been spared the destructive effects of corruption. Adekoya (2011) opined that, as 
corporations cannot be isolated from the corruption that exists in their operational 
domain, corruption has infiltrated every stratum of Nigerian corporations. This 
concern, as noted by Ahunwan (2002), has severely restricted the capacity of 
Nigerian entrepreneurs to entrench sound ethical practices. In view of the extent of 
corruption, some literature (Aluko, 2002; Lawal, 2007) posits that corporate 
governance will continually be exposed to challenges until corruption is managed to 
the barest minimum possible.  
In view of the negative effects of corruption, attempts have been made to examine 
the motivations underpinning it. Relying on a definition of corruption provided in 
Jain (2001),25 Aidt (2003) acknowledged three conditions which must be present for 
corruption to arise and persist. These conditions are the possession of discretionary 
power, the extraction of economic rents and the existence of weak institutions. In 
Nigeria, these conditions, in cooperation, explain the magnitude of corruption in the 
country. Ogbeidi (2012) (Discretionary power), Tignor (1993) and Osoba (1996) 
(Economic rents) and Adegbite and Nakajima (2011a) (Weak institutions) have 
demonstrated that these conditions are the core drivers of corruption in Nigeria. 
These elements combine to strengthen each other. Regrettably, these conditions tend 
                                                 
25
 Corruption is an act in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that 
contravenes the rules of the game i.e. where public resources are illegally applied, deviating from 
standard procedures. 
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to undermine good corporate governance. It is appropriate to suggest that the pursuit 
of good corporate governance demands an efficient management of these conditions.   
Passive Attitude of the Political Leadership: Following the preceding concern, 
Aidt (2003) recognised the effect of discretionary power on corruption. Ogbeidi 
(2012) suggested that this power is often exercised by members of the political class. 
However, as Osoba (1996) observed, the exercise of this power has often been 
channelled towards achieving personal gain. These actions connote severe negative 
implications for corporate governance. 
The success of any corporate governance system is built upon the support offered by 
key stakeholders. In many parts of the world where corporate governance has 
recorded relative success, Albareda, Tencati, Lozano, and Perrini (2006) stated that 
the intervention of government has been crucial to those achievements. The role of 
government is particularly visible in the two most important stages of corporate 
governance regulation, i.e. the development and the enforcement of relevant codes.  
In Nigeria, the government has been moderately involved in corporate governance. 
Inyang (2009) outlined some roles played by the government. However, Okike (2007) 
noted that the government’s intervention has, at best, been passive. In fact, Ogbeidi 
(2012) argues that the political leadership class cannot exonerate itself from the 
current travails in many sectors of the country’s economy. Corporate governance has 
suffered from government indifference and failure to act decisively. In addition, 
given that the economy of the country is substantially public-sector dominated, 
government unresponsiveness to corporate governance issues has further exposed 
economic activities to corporate governance abuses, which often go unpunished or 
unreported. 
Weak Institutional Arrangements: Aidt (2003) also identified weak institutions as 
another key driver of corruption. Substantial attention has been paid in the literature 
to the importance of institutional arrangements for effective corporate governance 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Judge et al., 2008). However, the legitimacy accorded to 
these institutions has proven to be the basis for sound governance practices. This 
therefore suggests that governance can be enhanced when institutions are robust and 
resilient enough to stimulate good governance.  
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With respect to Nigeria, Adegbite and Nakajima (2011a) remarked that the 
institutionalisation frameworks are weak. They note that the ‘regulative’26 pillar of 
institutionalisation (see Scott, 2014) is weak, hence the basis of its legitimacy is 
challenged. Furthermore, Adegbite (2012) argues that a country’s institutional 
arrangement influences its model of corporate governance regulation. Thus it could 
be articulated that the weak institutional structures in the country have contributed to 
its governance challenges and legitimacy concerns. This problem provides the 
foundation for the emergence of the next corporate governance concern. 
Resistance to Control and Regulation: Given that instituting corporate governance 
is reliant on the establishment of appropriate regulations and the level of compliance 
towards that regulation, it can be assumed that adherence to rules and laws is central 
to effective corporate governance. Wilson (2006) explained that, in Nigeria, as in 
many other countries, the observance of the principles of corporate governance has 
been secured through a combination of voluntary and mandatory legal machineries.  
However, Nigeria presents an interesting case. Ahunwan (2002), citing Ahmed 
(1996), stated that the typical Nigerian displays a strong propensity to circumvent 
defined rules of economic behaviour whilst exhibiting strong resistance to control 
and regulation. The disregard for regulation was also alluded to in Adegbite and 
Nakajima (2011a). Adekoya (2011) suggested that these behaviours manifest 
themselves in areas such as lack of transparency and accountability and disregard for 
the law. These behaviours are compounded by the collapse of societal values, 
widespread poverty, falling standards of education and, most importantly, the weak 
regulatory institution which lacks the capacity to punish offenders. These 
institutional deficiencies have therefore given rise to a growing number of Nigerians 
who are able to ignore the provisions of the country’s laws to achieve their personal 
inordinate ambitions (Adeyeri, 2013). 
While the foregoing perception suggests that Nigerians display apathy to regulations, 
Adegbite (2012) contends that the weaknesses in regulatory institutions have been 
exploited to create this attitude. Okpara (2011) agreed that a strict enforcement 
regime is likely to force compliance. Thus, whilst the use of regulations has appeared 
                                                 
26
 Scott (2014) describes the regulative pillar of institution as the explicit regulatory processes – rule-
setting, monitoring and sanctioning activities. 
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ineffective, it is possible that a robust regulatory regime, strengthened with 
commensurate enforcement strategies, could change the attitude of Nigerians 
towards regulatory policies.  
Multiplicity of Corporate Governance Codes: In Nigeria, corporate governance is 
regulated using various legislations (Osemeke & Adegbite, 2016). This has been 
identified as posing a challenge to the practice of the concept in the country (Wilson, 
2006; Inyang, 2009). In nations such as the UK and the US, the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2014) and the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) respectively represent 
the main legislation for entrenching good governance. However, whilst in Nigeria 
there is the SEC code (2011) which represents the main legislation for publicly-listed 
companies, there is also, for instance, the Central Bank of Nigeria (hereafter referred 
to as CBN) code (2006) with some of its provisions taking priority over similar 
provisions in the SEC code (Ofo, 2011). Furthermore, the operating mechanisms of 
the codes are different. For instance, whilst the SEC code (2011) considerably 
reflects the features of a principles-based approach (see Section 1.3 of the code), the 
CBN code (2006) is wholly rules-based.  
This development tends to create confusion for stakeholders (especially regulators) 
as efforts to manage these differences potentially allow scope for manipulation. Ofo 
(2011) noted that this problem has allowed operators to seek to avoid tougher legal 
provisions by embracing the relatively lenient provision. Multiple codes also 
facilitate a variety of interpretations which result in variations in implementation. 
Osemeke and Adegbite (2016) further observed that the presence of conflicting 
provisions among the various codes potentially accounts for two concerns; reduced 
compliance by firms and ineffective enforceability by regulators.  
It must, however, be noted that the Nigerian government has taken steps to address 
this concern by establishing a committee which has been given the responsibility to 
harmonise the existing governance codes with a view to producing a single code for 
Nigerian organisations. It is, however, crucial that the development of a single code 
must sufficiently address problems relating to ‘one size fits all’ (see Filatotchev, 
Jackson, Gospel, & Allcock, 2007) to enhance its effectiveness during 
implementation.   
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Weak Shareholder Democracy and Activism: A major feature of a sound 
corporate governance system is the involvement of a majority of the shareholders in 
the organisation’s decision-making process. Shareholder activism describes a 
situation whereby shareholders, as activist owners, can halt managerial opportunistic 
tendencies in order to promote good governance (Adegbite et al., 2012). Shareholder 
activism has become a force for good corporate governance worldwide.  
However, Amao and Amaeshi (2008) suggest that the case in Nigeria is different. 
They identified several factors which impact shareholder activism in Nigeria. First, 
they explained that problems in reaching many shareholders restrict their 
participation in the corporation’s decision-making process. These problems include 
the weak postal system, which ensures that notices of meetings are not delivered 
when due and, consequently, eligible voters are unable to vote. It is however 
interesting to note that some of these challenges are ‘created’ by key figures in the 
firm. There have been instances where Annual General Meetings (AGMs) are held in 
remote locations which inevitably restrict the involvement of shareholders in 
decision-making.  
The low literacy level is also an issue as many shareholders are generally ignorant of 
their rights and would prefer to remain passive (Adegbite et al., 2012). Nmehielle 
and Nwauche (2004) also explained that many organisations in Nigeria are 
characterised by the concentrated form of shareholding rather than the dispersed 
form canvassed in Berle and Means (1932). This particularly manifests in family-
owned businesses (Ahunwan, 2002) and foreign businesses (Amao & Amaeshi, 2008) 
where the views of the minority shareholders are usually insignificant. This ensures 
that decision-making is vested in the hands of a minority of shareholders but with 
significant shareholding. Nonetheless, Adegbite (2015) informed that Nigeria is 
witnessing the rise of two types of shareholder activists termed as ‘sophisticated 
shareholders’ (comprising the emerging middle class) and ‘reputable shareholders’ 
(high-calibre individuals with a track record of excellent behaviour). This 
development is necessary for the emergence of genuine shareholder activism in the 
country.   
The preceding view is crucial considering that the country, by most accounts, reflects 
an Anglo-American disposition (Okike, 2007). The consequence of this development 
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was noted in Klapper and Love (2004) who noted that block shareholders are more 
likely to exploit minority shareholders, particularly in societies where protection for 
minority shareholders is weak. The establishment of a robust and sound governance 
structure therefore necessitates the effective management of any framework which 
isolates minority shareholders from organisational decision-making.  
Following the review of challenges hindering corporate governance in Nigeria it is 
essential that in achieving the objectives of this study, the implications of the above 
challenges are documented. These implications are presented in the next section.  
 
2.10 Implications of Weak Governance Systems 
The essence of pursuing good governance is to ensure that an organisation is 
properly managed and controlled (Cadbury, 1992) to enhance the value-creation and 
wealth maximisation objectives of the firm. This, in turn, will enhance the possibility 
of investors earning commensurate returns on their investments (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). In addition, studies (Gompers et al., 2003; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008) have 
demonstrated that good corporate governance can positively impact organisational 
performance. In view of this underlying argument, it could be acknowledged that 
failure to establish good governance practices can result in dire consequences for 
firms in particular, and even an entire economy. 
Considering the variety of concerns facing corporate governance in Nigeria it is 
critical that the implications of such challenges be examined to facilitate the 
development of appropriate reform strategies. Joseph Sanusi,27 a former governor of 
the CBN, stated that “economic performance of any country is shaped by the quality 
and effectiveness of the nation’s corporate governance.” Furthermore, a cross-
country study by Kaufmann et al. (2009) demonstrates that the quality of governance 
and per capita incomes are strongly positively consistent across countries. Thus it 
can be assumed that poor governance quality can prohibit positive growth in income 
per head.  
                                                 
27
 Joseph Sanusi served as the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) between May 1999 
and May 2004. 
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The implications of weak corporate governance are widespread; this review focused 
on the contribution of poor governance to corporate failures, especially in the 
banking sector, low foreign direct investments (FDI) and increasing rates of 
corruption. In an effort to rejuvenate the Nigerian banking sector, Soludo (2004) 
noted that the systemic weak governance structure made its restructure inevitable. 
This exercise, however generated consequences for the banks and the economy, 
considering that the economic development of any country is directly linked to its 
banking sector (Oghojafor, Olayemi, Okonji, & Okolie, 2010). For example, the 
reduction in the number of banks in the sector from 89 to 25 at the conclusion of the 
exercise, occasioned by their inability to fulfil requirements for the new banking 
licence, meant that there was a severe job loss thus worsening the unemployment 
issue in the economy (Okafor, 2009).  
However, despite the CBN’s attempt to sanitise the banking system, the system 
witnessed another round of intervention in 2009. Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, a former 
governor of the CBN (between 2009 and 2014), announced the dismissal of the 
CEOs and Board Directors of five banks. Precisely 48 days later, on October 2, 2009, 
he announced the additional dismissal of three bank CEOs and their Board members, 
thus bringing the total number of banks whose CEOs and Board Directors were fired 
to eight.28 Sanusi Lamido Sanusi stated that it had become necessary to resort to this 
action in view of the high level of non-performing loans in these banks, which were 
attributed to poor corporate governance practices, among others (Vanguard, 2009a). 
This challenge is not only prevalent in the banking sector but features prominently 
across many other sectors in the country. 
Furthermore, Nigeria, as a developing country, requires a healthy inflow of FDI to 
revitalise its economy. UNCTAD (2013) informed that developing economies 
account for more than 50% of global FDI. The report further noted that a significant 
proportion of these investments originate from three major developed-economy 
investor blocks i.e. the European Union, North America and Japan, where having 
good corporate governance practices is a prerequisite for corporate behaviour and 
decision-making. However, Khanna and Zyla (2012) reveal that while investors are 
willing to pay a premium for better-governed firms in emerging markets, these 
                                                 
28
 The affected banks were Afribank, Bank PHB, Equatorial Trust Bank, Finbank, Intercontinental 
Bank, Oceanic bank, Spring Bank and Union Bank (Vanguard, 2009a, 2009b).  
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investors do not often seek investments in markets with poor governance. An earlier 
study by Mangena and Tauringana (2007) also suggested that foreign investors have 
a preference for firms with effective corporate governance structures. (Mangena & 
Tauringana, 2007) explained that foreign firms avoid companies in developing 
countries due to weak corporate governance structures and low disclosure. This 
indicates that a country with a perceived weak governance mechanism may be 
unattractive to foreign investment inflow thus impacting economic development of 
such countries.  
The literature has further examined the effects of weak corporate governance 
structures in organisations to uncover disagreements between board and management 
giving rise to board squabbles (Wilson, 2006; Inyang, 2009), fraudulent and self-
serving practices among board members, management and staff (Okeahalam & 
Akinboade, 2003), an overbearing influence of the chairman or MD/CEO, especially 
in family-controlled firms (Oyejide & Soyibo, 2001; Ahunwan, 2002), weak internal 
controls and poor risk management practices (Nmehielle & Nwauche, 2004; Okike, 
2007), unethical collusion between board members/management and their 
accomplices to defraud the company (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011b), ignorance of 
and non-compliance with rules, laws and regulations (Adekoya, 2011; Adegbite, 
2012) and unhealthy and misplaced interference by the government/public sector 
(Somoye, 2008) among many others. The need to control the manifestations of weak 
corporate governance has led to governments in various countries, including Nigeria, 
engaging regulatory and legal instruments, hence the need to review the regulatory 
framework for corporate governance in Nigeria.   
 
2.11 The Regulatory Framework for Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
The need to address the challenges identified in Section 2.8.1 have been identified as 
the force driving the codification of corporate regulations in Nigeria (Adegbite, 
2012). This development facilitated the enactment of the first companies statute in 
Nigeria; the Companies Ordinance of 1912, which was fundamentally a Nigerian 
adaptation of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 of England. The Act was 
subsequently subjected to several amendments to update and align it with emerging 
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developments. However despite the introduction of these regulations, the 
fundamental corporate governance problem i.e. principal-agency conflicts was still 
rampant in the system (Amao & Amaeshi, 2008). These problems persisted until 
1990 when there was a renewed drive to minimise corporate infractions.  
The year 1990 witnessed the commencement of a new regulatory regime which 
recognised the increasing value of corporate governance. The year (1990) is 
considered to be the period when the need to critically address governance 
challenges among Nigerian firms was genuinely recognised. Inyang (2009) notes 
that the desire to check the growing unwholesome practices among corporations 
obliged the enactment of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990, 
followed by the SEC code in 2003 (updated in 2011). However, between 2003 and 
2011, three industry-specific codes of corporate governance were launched. They are 
the CBN Code (2006); the code for licensed pension operators (PenCom Code, 2008) 
and the National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) Code (2009).  
Inyang (2009) reflected that the introduction of CAMA (1990) was born out of the 
desire to create a competitive business environment in the country, in reaction to 
developments on the international horizon. CAMA (1990) represents a 
comprehensive attempt at addressing various critical areas of corporate management 
in the country. It is divided into four parts, however Part A accounts for a 
considerable amount of the regulation, addressing issues such as company directors, 
protection of minority interests, incorporation and company meetings. It should be 
noted that, during this period, no regulation was dedicated to corporate governance, 
hence CAMA was considered as the basic regulation for corporate governance in 
Nigeria (Ogbuozobe, 2009). However, despite its comprehensiveness, CAMA (1990) 
has been criticised for its weak enforcement mechanism (Okpala, 2012) which has 
ensured that corporate infractions remain widespread.  
These issues, amongst others, accounted for the unprecedented incidences of 
corporate failures in the banking sector (Nworji, Olagunju, & Adeyanju, 2011). This 
problem, coupled with global developments, in particular the collapse of corporate 
entities such as Barings Bank, Enron and WorldCom etc. heightened calls for a 
dedicated corporate governance regulation. Realising the importance of corporate 
governance as a positive link to national growth and development (SEC, 2003), the 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in conjunction with the Corporate 
Affairs Commission (CAC) created a 17-member committee headed by Atedo 
Peterside in June 2000 to identify weaknesses in existing corporate governance 
practices in the country and to formulate necessary interventions to improve these 
practices. The committee, at the end of its assignment, produced the SEC Code of 
Corporate Governance (2003).  
The SEC Code (2003), which is the first code solely dedicated to corporate 
governance in Nigeria, was grouped in five parts. Parts A (The Board of Directors), 
B (The Shareholders) and C (The Audit Committee) were devoted to addressing core 
corporate governance matters whereas Parts D (Interpretation) and E (Schedules) are 
basic requirements for such policy documents. Primarily, the SEC Code recognised 
the fundamental roles of directors and shareholders in establishing a sound corporate 
governance structure, hence a significant part of the code was devoted to addressing 
issues relating to these key players. It is worthy of note that the code was the first 
attempt by any corporate regulation in Nigeria to recognise the crucial roles of non-
executive directors. In addition, the code provided for an audit committee explaining 
its composition, qualifications and experience of members and terms of reference. 
The committee is specifically expected to raise the standard of corporate reporting. 
However, despite the positives established by the Code, the implementation and 
enforcement, in particular, of the provisions were not sufficiently provided for (Ofo, 
2010). Adegbite (2012) also observed that the Code relied on numerous inputs from 
the codes of other countries. As Okike (2007) argued, adopting corporate governance 
guidelines which are best suited to western and less ‘corrupt’ countries can constitute 
significant challenges during implementation. This probably explains why 
businesses continue to experience failures as a result of the ineffectiveness of the 
implementation mechanism for the code (Soludo, 2006). 
The concern noted above coupled with global developments and issues encountered 
with the SEC Code (2003) resulted in calls for a review of the code. A revised 
version of the code was released in 2011. However, in the intervening period 
(between 2003 and 2011), some sectors, notably the banking sector, had developed 
codes which sought to address the peculiarities of that industry. The first of such 
codes was the CBN Code (2006). The code ushered in a new era of banking 
 70 
 
regulation following a consolidation programme in the financial sector. A key 
feature of the code was that compliance with its provisions was mandatory. This was 
not the case with the SEC Code (2003). The departure from the voluntary 
mechanism of the SEC Code (2003) to the mandatory approach adopted in the CBN 
Code (2006) signals the potentiality of a voluntary code in Nigeria.  
Following the CBN Code (2006), another industry-specific code is the Code of 
Corporate Governance for licensed pension operators, introduced by the National 
Pension Commission (PenCom) in 2008. The code sets out the rules to guide 
Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs) and Pension Fund Custodians (PFCs) regarding 
the structures and processes to be adopted in achieving optimal governance systems. 
The code also aims to promote transparent and efficient implementation of pension 
schemes by all operators. It is intended to encourage self-regulation by offering a 
common values system among the operators (PenCom Code, 2008). 
The third and final industry-specific code of corporate governance is the National 
Insurance Commission (NAICOM) Code introduced in 2009. The code, which 
applies to all insurance and re-insurance companies operating in Nigeria, was 
expected to motivate companies in the Nigerian insurance industry to operate within 
a sound corporate governance framework. This is intended to promote transparent 
and efficient markets, which articulates the division of responsibilities among 
different stakeholders in the industry (NAICOM, 2009). NAICOM opines that low 
public confidence and trust in the industry necessitated a regulatory mechanism to 
improve practices across the industry.  
The emergence of industry-specific codes notwithstanding, it is still important to 
have a code which deals with corporate governance issues in all industries, similar to 
developed nations such as the UK and Australia. While this was the basis for the 
SEC Code (2003), the development of the SEC Code (2011) was informed by the 
necessity to address the weaknesses in the enforcement mechanism of the SEC Code 
(2003). In addition, regulators were concerned about addressing the constraints to 
good corporate governance, and identifying techniques for ensuring greater 
compliance.  
Moreover, as Okike (2007) reiterates, the government’s effort towards attracting 
foreign investors further necessitated calls for an improved governance structure, 
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especially in view of the country’s poor corruption perception index (CPI) rating by 
Transparency International (2014) (Appendix 1). These developments, amidst 
several calls for a review of the 2003 SEC Code, was the basis for the introduction of 
the updated version of the SEC Code (2003) i.e. the SEC Code (2011). The updated 
code, which has been rated as the most comprehensive regulation on corporate 
governance in Nigeria (Ofo, 2011), expanded the frontiers of issues not sufficiently 
addressed in the SEC Code (2003). Indeed, a comparison with globally acclaimed 
corporate governance codes such as the UK code (2012) show that the SEC code 
(2011) addresses as many issues as the UK code. The code (SEC Code, 2011) has 
nine parts addressing issues concerning application of the code: (Part A), Board of 
Directors; (Part B), relationship with shareholders; (Part C), relationship with other 
stakeholders; (Part D), risk management and audit; (Part E), accountability and 
reporting; (Part F), accountability and reporting; (Part G), communication; (Part H), 
code of ethics; and (Part I), interpretation.  
However, despite the comprehensiveness of the code, there has been mounting 
criticism against some of its provisions. Adegbite (2012), for instance, noted that 
there is no clarity as to whether the code should be enforced as a rules-based or a 
principles-based code. He also highlighted the issue of multiple directorships, 
arguing that it is unclear whether an independent director in one company can act as 
an independent director in another company, especially if both companies share a 
link with each other. Ofo (2011) also identified several shortcomings regarding the 
code, agreeing with Adegbite (2012) that the enforcement mechanism (rules-based 
or principles-based) is ambiguous, thereby leading to some confusion.  
Ofo (2011) also explained that the resolution of conflicts mechanism is weak. The 
code states that where there is a conflict between the SEC code and other corporate 
governance codes, the “code that makes a stricter provision shall apply” (SEC Code, 
2011; Section 1.3G). This can be susceptible to misinterpretation as the meaning of 
‘stricter’ can be context-defined. The code also fused the roles of nomination and 
remuneration committees, replacing them with one governance/remuneration 
committee (Section 11). The probability that the discharge of the functions of either 
the remuneration committee or the nominations committee or both will be stifled is 
high. These issues, among others, have dominated public discourse regarding the 
worth and value of the SEC (2011) code. 
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Regardless of these issues, it can be argued that the proliferation of corporate 
governance codes has served to increase awareness of the concept. Adegbite (2012) 
indicated that the development of these codes has served to awaken stakeholders’ 
consciousness to adopt good governance practices. Following this intervention, a 
CBN (2012) report indicates that corporate governance practices in the sector are 
experiencing some improvement. Nonetheless, Adegbite et al. (2013) report that 
corporate abuses are still evident in the system. This raises a variety of problems, 
which were crucial to the study objectives. For instance, it can be argued that the 
Nigerian regulatory authorities are still experimenting in their bid to implement a 
feasible regulatory regime for corporate governance. It is also assumed that 
recommending an appropriate regulatory approach may not sufficiently address 
identified corporate governance challenges in Nigeria as it may lack the necessary 
comprehensiveness. Therefore, the development of a robust governance structure 
demands that other suitable reform strategies are identified and implemented towards 
building a sustainable corporate governance framework for Nigeria.   
To conclude this discussion, it is worthwhile to note that this section has identified 
and stated the main corporate governance codes in the country and their salient 
features. But the multiplicity of these codes has been continuously acknowledged as 
contributing to the weak governance practices among Nigerian corporations (Wilson, 
2006; Osemeke & Adegbite, 2016). It was therefore perhaps a step in the right 
direction when the Federal Government, in 2012, commissioned the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) 29  to develop a harmonised code to regulate corporate 
governance in the country. It is hoped that the harmonisation of these codes will 
facilitate the establishment of a robust system of corporate governance in Nigeria. 
 
2.12 Gaps in the Literature 
From the review undertaken in this chapter, there are two specific areas which 
deserve more attention in corporate governance scholarship. The first deals with the 
relevance of institutions whereas the second relates to the institutional isomorphism 
                                                 
29
 On April 15, 2015, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) exposed a draft of the new harmonised 
code for corporate governance in Nigeria (FRC, 2015). The release is intended to enable stakeholders 
to review the document and offer comments as deemed necessary. The new code is yet to be officially 
released at the time of writing.  
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discourse of DiMaggio and Powell (1983). The majority of the studies in Table 4 
which support the relevance of institutions have focused considerably on developed 
economies. This point was noted in Salama (2009), Okpara (2011) and Adegbite and 
Nakajima (2011b). In contrast, there is also a body of literature which questioned the 
relevance of institutional elements (Glaeser et al., 2004; Przeworski, 2004; 
Fukuyama, 2006). Proponents of the latter position (institutional relevance) have 
sought to clarify that conditions which embed institutions, rather than the institutions 
themselves, could offer richer insights into corporate governance practices in 
developing regions. Whilst empathising with the opponents of the institutional 
relevance, this study takes a different perspective regarding the conditions which 
impact corporate governance in Nigeria. Are conditions such as income levels 
(Przeworski, 2004) and poverty levels (Glaeser et al., 2004) the main influences on 
the effectiveness of institutional artefacts in Nigeria? Notably, the literature 
examining the contributions of some institutional artefacts such as religion, ethnicity, 
among others is very limited.  
With respect to the second gap, DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) isomorphic 
framework reveals the impact an existing key player in an industry can have on new 
entrants in the same industry, both in the short and long term. As a result, the 
diffusion of a particular corporate behaviour in an environment is aided by 
isomorphic processes. Issues relating to agents of isomorphism have been attracting 
attention. These agents act to expedite the emergence of a particular trait or 
behaviour in a business environment. These agents are themselves inherently 
influenced by dominant cultural tendencies within a society. The horizon of 
isomorphic agents has, however, been restricted to corporations (see Kwok & 
Tadesse, 2006). In free trade economies which possess a sophisticated market 
infrastructure, corporate organisations are empowered to dictate the economic 
direction of a country, hence they are viewed as key players in that economy. The 
foregoing applies largely to developed economies, whereas DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) noted that highly structured organisational fields provide a context wherein 
individual efforts to rationally deal with uncertainty and constraints often result in 
homogeneity in structure, culture and output. Whilst these traits are not necessarily 
restricted to developed economies, scholarship regarding the agents of isomorphism 
in developing economies is restricted.  
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In many developing economies such as Nigeria, the role of corporations in economic 
development is important, but the increasing intervention of government overwhelms 
those of corporations (Nurudeen & Usman, 2010). Indeed, it can be argued that in 
most developing countries, organisations tend to reflect the practices observed in 
government organisations. Yet institutional isomorphism scholarship has 
consistently isolated governments as key isomorphic agents. Consequently, this 
study also examines this under-investigated phenomenon and provides insights into 
the role of government as agents of isomorphism.  
 
2.13 Chapter Summary 
In contemporary global business environments, the need for good governance 
systems among corporations cannot be overemphasised. In many countries, 
particularly in developing economies like Nigeria, poor governance structures have 
accounted for the demise of many corporations. Therefore, it is crucial to continually 
explore how good governance could be implemented in these developing economies 
to act as a basis for its economic development. In view of this objective, this chapter 
reviewed relevant studies regarding the research area. The concept of corporate 
governance was clearly defined to remove any ambiguity regarding the research 
focus.  
The field of corporate governance has also been enriched by the development of 
various theoretical constructs to enhance understanding of the concept. In view of 
the nature of the research objectives, this review is self-limited to four theories 
(agency, stakeholder, institutional and economic) deemed essential to this study. 
Some objectives of this study also dictated that dominant models of corporate 
governance (Anglo-American, Communitarian and Emerging) be reviewed. 
Whereas corporate governance has been extensively studied in the context of 
developed countries, there is a growing interest regarding the practice of corporate 
governance in developing economies.  Consequently, a discussion focusing on three 
key concerns of corporate governance in developing economies was presented. 
These concerns, which include the degree of economic development, the use of a 
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principles-based or rules-based regulatory approach, and the relationship between 
culture and corporate governance, were identified as crucial to the study.    
The review also examined the concept of corporate governance in Nigeria. In this 
section, a review of the main challenges of corporate governance and the 
implications of these challenges on firms and the Nigerian economy were evaluated. 
This was followed by a description of the regulatory environment highlighting the 
main corporate governance regulations existing in Nigeria. A review of this nature 
also requires the identification of the gap(s) which a study is designed to address. 
Section 2.11 discussed observed shortcomings from a theoretical perspective in 
relation to this study. 
Finally, in order to effectively address the identified gaps in research, it is important 
that an appropriate methodology for undertaking the study is identified and 
implemented such that it maximises the researcher’s potential to undertake the study 
(Holden & Lynch, 2004). Thus, in the next chapter, the methodology adopted for this 
study is presented. 
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Chapter Three 
Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined corporate governance literature. It identified the 
main theoretical frameworks underpinning this study and offered some insights into 
the practice of corporate governance across the globe and, in particular, Nigeria. 
From the review, gaps in the literature were identified. The analysis of the gap 
requires a robust and well-defined research procedure. 
This chapter, therefore, presents and justifies the research philosophy and 
methodology employed in this study to address the research gaps. Figure 6 shows the 
methodological framework employed in this study. The chapter commences by 
presenting the philosophy underpinning this research (Section 3.2). Sections 3.3 and 
3.4 are complementary in that the technique for collecting data (Section 3.3) and the 
procedure for analysing the data (Section 3.4) are explained. A reflection discussing 
the strengths and limitations of the methodology adopted is noted in Section 3.5, 
whilst issues relating to ethical concerns and the mechanisms for addressing these 
concerns are specified in Section 3.6. 
Figure 6: Methodological Framework 
Ontology
Subjectivism
Epistemology
Interpretivism
Methodology
Qualitative
Research Philosophy
Social Constructionism
Data Collection
Semi-Structured Interviews 
involving 24 Participants
Data Analysis
Qualitative Content Analysis 
(QCA)
Philosophical Considerations Research Objectives
Main Research Objective
To determine the main institutional 
factors influencing corporate 
governance practices in Nigeria
Secondary Research Objective
To analyse corporate governance 
regulations in Nigeria with a view to 
finding out the coverage accorded 
key institutional elements
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3.2 Philosophy Underpinning Research 
The need to establish an appropriate research agenda necessitates that researchers are 
expected to identify an appropriate paradigm which not only connects with the 
researcher’s beliefs, but also enhances the attainment of research objectives (Holden 
& Lynch, 2004). Holden and Lynch (2004) posit that research should not be 
methodologically led, but the ideal methodology should be informed by the 
researcher’s philosophical stance and the phenomenon being investigated (research 
objectives).  Whereas the research objectives have been presented in Chapter One, 
this section aims to clarify the researcher’s philosophical position. The following 
sessions describes the influences on selection of appropriate philosophy (Section 
3.2.1) and the engagement of social constructionism as the study philosophy (Section 
3.2.2). 
 
3.2.1 Influences on Selection of Appropriate Philosophy 
Guba and Lincoln (1994), reaffirmed in Lincoln et al. (2011), offered a three-
pronged axiomatic structure to provide researchers with a methodological framework 
for undertaking research activity. These axioms are ontology, epistemology and 
methodology. These three axioms were also noted in Kuhn’s (1970) description of 
‘paradigm.’ Kuhn (1970) views paradigm as a theoretical perspective that directs 
research through the specification and choice of what to study (ontology), the 
formulation of hypothesis to explain the phenomenon observed (epistemology) and 
the identification of the most suitable empirical research techniques (methodology). 
These axioms are also evident in Grix (2010, p. 67) which insists that research is best 
undertaken by “setting out clearly the interrelationship between what a researcher 
thinks can be researched (her ontological position), linking it to what we can know 
about it (her epistemological position) and how to go about acquiring it (her 
methodological approach).” It is therefore necessary to examine these axioms, 
taking into account the researcher’s philosophical preferences (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
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Ontology 
Ontology is the science or theory of being; offering a framework for addressing 
issues relating to reality. According to Creswell (2013a), ontology relates to the 
nature of reality and its characteristics; concerned with assessing questions regarding 
how the world is ‘built.’ Ontology questions whether the world of social phenomena 
is real and objective, endowed with an autonomous existence outside the human 
mind and independent from the interpretation given to it by the subject (Corbetta, 
2003). It asks whether social phenomena are ‘things in their own right’ or 
‘representations of things.’ ‘Things in their own right’ implies a single reality whilst 
‘representations of things’ infer multiple realities.  
The distinction between single reality (objectivism) and multiple reality 
(subjectivism) is crucial to ontological discourse. Ontology raises two fundamental 
views for a researcher i.e. the belief in fundamental truths waiting to be discovered 
and the belief that all knowledge is created in multiple interactions (Bryman, 2015). 
In relation to the main research objective of this study, addressing corporate 
governance concerns require that data is created from multiple interactions with 
stakeholders. Whereas the foregoing is inconsistent  with the assertion that social 
phenomena and their meanings exist independent of social actors (Bryman, 2015) 
(which implies single reality), subjectivism (or constructionism) takes the view that 
social phenomena and ‘things’ do not exist independently, rather human beings 
construct the meanings (Bryman, 2015). While the foregoing links with the study 
objectives, it implies that social phenomena are not only produced through social 
interaction but that they are in a constant state of revision. Thus, in subjectivism, it is 
impossible to have single reality, as changes in the social environment create a 
different ‘reality’ i.e. multiple realities.  
 
Epistemology 
Epistemology entails the process of thinking and examines the relationship between 
what we know and what we see (Lincoln et al., 2011). It refers to the theory of 
knowledge (Bryman, 2015), and how we can come to know things (Thomas, 2013). 
A well-defined epistemology promotes the researcher’s ability to identify linkages 
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between the research’s epistemological underpinning and the methods employed in 
conducting the research (Darlaston-Jones, 2007). This view compels researchers to 
set out the philosophical foundation for determining what types of knowledge are 
possible, and thereafter identify a process which ensures that knowledge acquired is 
both adequate and legitimate (Golafshani, 2003). 
From Lincoln et al. (2011) and Creswell (2013b), it can be argued that there are two 
main epistemological positions namely positivism and interpretivism 
(constructivism). The selection of an appropriate epistemology must not only be 
consistent with the preferred ontological position, but must also enhance the 
attainment of research goals (Lincoln et al., 2011). Therefore, having identified 
subjectivism as the researcher’s ontological preference, Lincoln et al. (2011) agrees 
that interpretivism is the dominant epistemology amongst researchers adopting a 
subjective ontological stance. While this contributes to the use of interpretivism in 
this study, Interpretivism accepts that the world is constantly changing and that 
meanings are shifting and contested depending on the social actor involved (Bryman 
& Bell, 2015). The preceding view is consistent with the multi-stakeholder approach 
of this study.  
 
Methodology 
Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) explain that methodology provides the rationale for 
research by outlining how the research is approached and guided. Methodology, 
according to Schwandt (2007), describes the process of how new knowledge is 
sought, defining the principles of inquiry and how the inquiry should be undertaken. 
It emphasises how research should proceed and, according to Gale (1998), is 
influenced by the researcher’s worldview. Creswell (2013a) posits that methodology 
must emerge from the researcher’s ontological and epistemological positions. 
Therefore, based on this background, this study adopts a qualitative methodology, 
which is consistent with the subjective ontology and interpretive epistemology 
preferred by the researcher.  
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3.2.2 Research Philosophy: Social Constructionism 
A review of the objectives of this study (see Chapter One) and the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological position of the researcher indicate sufficient 
linkage with the fundamentals of social constructionism. Regarding the study 
objectives, it is essential to consider how social phenomena or objects of 
consciousness develop in social contexts. Indeed, employing social constructionism 
principles enables the researcher to ‘see the world through the eyes of’ the research 
participants as a mechanism for generating knowledge. Social constructionism 
maintains that people construct knowledge between themselves, through daily 
interactions in the course of social life (Burr, 2003).  
According to Gergen (1985), social constructionism represents a perspective which 
assumes that a great deal of human life exists as a reaction to social and interpersonal 
influences. It represents an ontological position which asserts that social phenomena 
and their meanings are continually accomplished by social actors (Bryman, 2015). 
The fundamental principle of social constructionism advocates that all knowledge is 
contingent upon human practices, constructed during interactions between human 
beings (subjects) and their world (objects) within a social context (Crotty, 1998). In 
the search for understanding, social constructionism has been engaged as a vital 
conceptual tool in various academic disciplines such as social science, politics, 
identity, and geography, amongst others. As a result, social constructionism offers a 
‘good fit’ for undertaking studies which explore issues in corporate governance. This 
is consistent with Chandler (2007) which noted that the main contention of social 
constructionism is that any phenomenon emanating from human interactions does 
not occur naturally, but is defined by social, historical and cultural contexts. Thus 
reality is not fixed, but could be influenced by these (social, historical and cultural) 
elements.       
In relation to corporate governance in Nigeria, it is appropriate to suggest that key 
societal elements have influenced the ways in which stakeholders engage with the 
corporate governance concept. From this view, two elements which are central to 
this research i.e. stakeholders (individuals) and society (the institutional environment) 
are identified. To extend the preceding view, Owen (1995) explained that social 
constructionism addresses two subjects; anthropology (culture) and sociology 
(society) and regards human beings as central to cultural, political and historical 
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evolution. This view is critical to this study. In considering the particular institutions 
embedding corporate governance in Nigeria and its regulatory processes, it is 
necessary to analyse the knowledge of stakeholders as constructed or influenced by 
social/societal circumstances. 
To generate knowledge regarding how good corporate governance practice can be 
advanced, it is important to acknowledge that there is no one reality. Reality emerges 
as a mediated phenomenon. In this context, individuals act simultaneously, as both 
the mediating subject and a part of the reality of things (objects) are mediated 
through them. Thus, as Pandey (1988) suggests, perspectives emerge and are 
subsequently altered, as there are changes in human activities and social 
circumstances. The variations in human behaviour and social environments link with 
the institutional underpinning of this study, as reflected in the research objectives.  
Having clarified the basis for identifying an appropriate philosophy for this research, 
It must however be noted that in selecting a philosophical position which facilitates 
the attainment of research objectives, it is equally crucial to engage a data collection 
strategy which is consistent with social constructionist philosophy. This is presented 
in the next section. 
 
3.3 Data Collection   
An important element in the methodology process is that which Crotty (1998) 
referred to as ‘methods.’ Crotty (1998, p. 3) defined methods as “the techniques or 
procedures used to gather or analyse data related to some research question or 
hypothesis.” It is necessary to identify possible data collection instruments which 
maximise the benefits associated with the selected approach and philosophy. In 
ascertaining a suitable data collection technique, effort was undertaken to identify 
the instrument prevalent among interpretivists and, particularly, social 
constructionists. Onwuegbuzie, Leech, and Collins (2010) and Bryman (2015) noted 
that interviews, focus groups and observations and documents are the main sources 
of data collection for qualitative studies. Similar data collection techniques are 
engaged in selected social construction studies (Tywoniak & Bartlett, 2008; Othman 
& Rahman, 2011). 
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The plethora of data collection techniques for qualitative research notwithstanding, 
Bryman (2015) indicated that interviews are probably the most widely-employed 
technique for sourcing data. Kvale (1996) and Gray (2013) affirm that the use of 
interviews is the main technique for collecting data in qualitative research. Equally, 
interviews have been widely-used by social constructionists (see Tywoniak & 
Bartlett, 2008; Othman & Rahman, 2011). Consequently, the prevalence of 
interviews as a data collection tool in social construction studies influenced the 
decision to employ a similar technique. In particular, the economic actor and 
institutionalism focus of this study concedes that the use of interviews will enhance 
the generation of rich data required to address the study objectives. The benefits and 
challenges of using interviews are discussed in the next section. 
 
3.3.1 Interviews         
Patton (2002, p. 89) observed that “there is a very practical side to qualitative 
(research) methods that simply involves asking open-ended questions of people …in 
real-world settings in order to solve problems.” This highlights the relationship 
between interpretive research and the use of interviews in data collection. Interviews 
involve asking research participants (Denscombe, 2010) a series of questions in 
order to generate in-depth qualitative data (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 
2012). This typifies a personal form of research (Creswell, 2013a) which is 
appropriate for the aims of this study. Kvale (1996) clarifies that an interview is 
literally an ‘Inter View’ i.e. an interchange of views between two persons conversing 
about a theme of mutual interest. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p. 1) further 
explained that, during this process, the researcher attempts to “understand the world 
from the subject’s point of view, to unfold meaning of peoples’ experiences.” 
Interviews can be conducted using a variety of media (Bryman, 2015) such as 
telephone, email and the internet or, most commonly, face-to-face.  
To enhance the attainment of research objectives, it is also important to identify an 
appropriate form of interview technique for a study. For qualitative studies, Bryman 
and Bell (2015) stated that interviews range from structured through semi-structured 
to unstructured. Edwards and Holland (2013) explained that the structured interview, 
usually based on a questionnaire, is at the quantitative end of the scale and frequently 
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employed in survey research. Semi-structured and unstructured interviews are those 
used by qualitative researchers and are often characterised by increasing levels of 
flexibility, but with a lack of structure. Thus, the permissible level of flexibility 
expected for a study influences the use of either semi-structured or unstructured 
interviews in a study. 
Gall, Gall, and Borg (2003) also discussed three qualitative research interview 
formats i.e. the informal conversational interview, the general interview guide 
approach and the standardised open-ended interview. The general interview guide 
approach presents the most feasible option for this study. This approach ensures that 
information relating to the same general areas is collected from each interviewee 
whilst allowing for a degree of freedom and adaptability in sourcing information 
from interviewees (Turner, 2010). The general interview guide approach is 
consistent with the description of the semi-structured interview in Edwards and 
Holland (2013), and also connects with the definition of semi-structured interviews 
in Bryman (2015). Therefore, the semi-structured interview is used to collect data for 
this study. 
The semi-structured interview, according to Bryman (2015), refers to a context 
wherein the interviewer has a series of questions that are in the general form of an 
‘interview guide,’ however the interviewer is able to vary the sequence of the 
questions. This approach, whilst encouraging two-way communication, offers the 
researcher latitude to ask further questions as a reaction to what is considered a 
significant response. Thus information generated from semi-structured interviews 
will not only provide answers, but also the reasons for those answers (Flick, 2014). 
To facilitate this process, an interview guide (see Appendix 2) was designed to 
enable the collection of data addressing the objectives of this study. 
Table 5 - Synchronous/Asynchronous Dimensions of Place and Time 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Opdenakker (2006) 
  Time Place 
Synchronous 
Communication 
Face-to-Face 
Messenger 
Telephone 
Face-to-Face 
Asynchronous 
Communication 
Email Email 
Telephone 
Messenger 
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In conducting the interviews, a number of advantages and issues were observed. For 
instance, the study relied solely on the face-to-face interview technique which is 
characterised by synchronous communication in time and place (see Opdenakker, 
2006), as shown in Table 5, hence providing opportunities to explore social cues 
such as voice, intonation and body language. Notably, the reactions of participants to 
some questions revealed the degree of sensitivity to particular questions. As a result, 
synchronous communications ensure instantaneous generation of different forms of 
data. This is crucial to studies aimed at exploring institutional influences on specific 
phenomena. Interviews also allow flexibility in the range and depth of questions 
asked. Thus clearer responses to questions were obtained. Another benefit of this 
exercise was the opportunity to digitally record a majority of the interviews which 
meant that the researcher was able to listen more actively during the interview and 
also had the opportunity to listen to and transcribe the interview. Consequently, the 
researcher was able to read the interview manuscripts as many times as necessary, 
thereby ensuring familiarity with data.  
However, despite the apparent benefits of conducting semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews, some challenges were encountered. For example, organising the 
interviews was time-consuming, though this could be traced to the need to engage 
appropriate interviewees. The nature of the study also demanded that participants 
could only be drawn from a defined pool of stakeholders. This meant that the 
exercise was costly hence some interviews were postponed more than once. Some 
were also cancelled. Another concern was that despite testing and reframing the 
interview questions after conducting a pilot, it was apparent that some participants 
interpreted the questions differently and thus offered different responses. This meant 
that the questions had to be explained to ensure that all interviewees provided their 
responses based on a similar understanding of the questions. Lastly, some issues 
were encountered during the post-interview stage. For instance, interview 
transcription was not possible using transcription software (Dragon) as the 
programme could not read or recognise participants accents (see Oliver, Serovich, & 
Mason, 2005). Consequently, the interviews were transcribed manually which 
required a considerable amount of time (see Appendix 3 for a sample of a manually-
transcribed interview).  
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3.3.2 Research Participants 
A key objective of research is to collect data from a sample which sufficiently 
represents a field of study (Bartlett, Kotrlik, & Higgins, 2001). Identifying suitable 
participants for research and the determination of an appropriate sample size 
enhances a study’s validity and reliability (Marshall, 1996). However, sample size 
issues in qualitative research have been influenced by ‘saturation’30 concerns. The 
literature in qualitative research suggests that ‘how many’ is not necessarily the issue. 
A researcher should satisfy himself that he has learned, and understands the 
phenomenon, enough to enable knowledge generation. This is the basis for 
determining sample size in, for example, grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
In determining appropriate number of research participants, Mason (2010) offered a 
definitive proposition, informing that a sample of 560 PhD studies which used 
qualitative approaches and interviews as data collection instrument, revealed a mean 
sample size of 31 participants. Nonetheless, there is no consensus regarding an 
appropriate number of participants. Baker and Edwards (2012) advised the use of a 
broad range of between 12 and 60 participants. A consensus theory developed by 
Romney, Weller, and Batchelder (1986) argues that experts tend to agree more with 
each other. They observe that small samples from experts can be sufficient in 
providing accurate information as long as they possess a high degree of expertise and 
competence in the domain of inquiry. This view was critical in determining a sample 
size for this study as it engaged various categories of governance experts. 
Consequently, albeit the sample size was agreed to range between 20 and 30 
participants, interviews were eventually held with 24 participants. The number of 
interviewees is consistent with related studies. For example, Adegbite et al. (2013) 
conducted 26 in-depth interviews, Ogbechie and Koufopoulos (2007) and Okpara 
(2011) interviewed 20 respondents, while Uys (2008) conducted 18 interviews to 
generate their findings. 
Having clarified the number of interviews, it was essential to consider the suitability 
of participants for this study, and define acceptable criteria for participants. Issues 
relating to corporate governance are usually vested amongst senior executives in 
                                                 
30
 Saturation is achieved when the collection of new data does not shed any further light on the object 
being studied (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Saturation is fundamentally a grounded theory construct, 
however Mason (2010) suggested it can be adopted as a guiding principle during data collection. 
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organisations. In addition, the definitions of corporate governance provided in 
Chapter Two31 indicate that shareholders and management are directly responsible 
for managing governance matters. Therefore, using the snowballing technique, the 
researcher established contacts with executives in organisations who were able and 
willing to comment on corporate governance issues not only in their organisations 
but also in their industry and country as a whole. In addition, some objectives of this 
study which relate to effective regulation of corporate governance necessitate that 
relevant regulators were integrated into the participants’ framework. Therefore, apart 
from previously identified participants (executives), the views of regulators, 
governance consultants and members of academia (who are active in corporate 
governance scholarship) provided the data for this study. These criteria were central 
to the selection of interviewees.  
Flick (2014) informed that in an interview study, sampling is connected to the 
decision regarding who to interview (case sampling) and from which group they 
should be selected (sampling groups of cases). As the study focused on corporate 
governance practices amongst public companies listed on the Main Board32 of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), interviewees were selected to considerably reflect 
firms (substantially based on industrial sectors) listed on the Exchange. This was the 
basis for selecting participants. Sampling was undertaken using the judgement 
technique (see Marshall, 1996). This procedure is based on pre-determined 
characteristics (Corbetta, 2003) discussed earlier in this section. However, the initial 
selection process relied on a stratified33  sampling technique (a probability-based 
technique) which facilitated the categorisation of the population using industrial 
sectors. Following this process, 12 participants are associated with the stock 
exchange. These interviewees were drawn from eight of the 12 industrial sectors34 on 
the exchange. These 12 interviewees are all executives (CEO, senior management or 
board members) in their respective organisations. Other interviewees (12) were 
drawn from governance regulators, governance consultants and academics, relevant 
within the industry. A breakdown of these participants is provided in Section 3.3.3. 
                                                 
31
 Cadbury (1992), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and OECD (1999). 
32
 This primarily features the equities of large, blue-chip companies. 
33
 This technique allows a sample to be randomly selected from a population that has been stratified 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
34
 Agriculture, Construction/Real Estate, Consumer Goods, Financial Services, Healthcare, Industrial 
Goods, Information and Communications Technology (ICT), Natural Resources, Oil and Gas, 
Services, Utilities and Conglomerates. 
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Enlisting identified suitable participants was initially challenging, hence it is vital to 
discuss how data access was negotiated.  
Prior to data collection, establishing contact with senior executives was challenging. 
This issue is prominent in countries like Nigeria, where cultural concerns such as 
power distance (see Hofstede et al., 2010) and other institutional influences define 
(and/or restrict) relationships. As a result, the achievement of the research objectives 
was significantly dependent on the author’s ability to access participants deemed 
suitable for this study. Mainly, the researcher used ‘personal contacts’ to reach 
participants. Nigeria, according to Hofstede et al. (2010), is a collectivist society. 
Collectivism describes a society that embodies a tightly-knit framework where 
individuals can expect their relatives or group members to provide for them in 
exchange for absolute loyalty. Thus the first set of participants identified, taking into 
account agreed selection criteria, emerged from the researcher’s personal contacts.  
As the researcher has around a decade of work experience in Nigeria, these 
participants were drawn from a pool of executives with whom the researcher has 
interacted previously.  
The second set of participants was engaged following recommendations from the 
researcher’s associates, and from the researcher’s networks of academic colleagues, 
including supervisors, to reach potential respondents. Furthermore, a significant 
number of these participants were identified using the snowballing technique. 
Snowballing, according to Denscombe (2010), is a procedure whereby participants 
refer the researcher to other potential participants whom they think fulfil the criteria 
defined by the researcher. This technique has proven to offer a useful data collection 
technique in research (Chang, Hung, & Hsieh, 2012; Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012). This 
technique increases efficiency, identification and inclusion of hidden populations, as 
members of the target population recruit other members (Kendall et al., 2008). This 
technique was applied to the first and second set of identified participants to access 
other participants. It must be noted that a vital part of engagement with participants 
involved approaching them by letter (see Appendix 4).  
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3.3.3 Profiling Research Participants   
The first category of participants in this study is the executives. As previously noted, 
compliance with corporate governance codes is a basic requirement for publicly-
listed companies in Nigeria. To ensure that individuals who possess the requisite 
knowledge to address questions in the interview schedule were engaged, the first 
categories of respondents were drawn from these publicly-listed firms. Table 6 
presents information regarding category ‘A’ participants that were interviewed 
during data collection. 
Table 6 - Category ‘A’ (Executives) Participants 
No Participants Sector 
1 A1 Oil and Gas 
2 A2 Construction 
3 A3 Financial Services 
4 A4 Financial Services 
5 A5 Utilities and Conglomerates 
6 A6 Consumer Goods 
7 A7 Industrial Goods 
8 A8 Financial Services 
9 A9 Healthcare 
10 A10 Oil and Gas 
11 A11 Financial Services 
12 A12 Information and Communication 
Technology 
 
To effectively address the research objectives, it was also necessary to engage with 
other stakeholder groups. Thus, the second category (Category B) of participants is 
the regulators. Eight regulators were interviewed. Table 7 provides their 
organisational affiliations.    
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Table 7 - Category ‘B’ (Regulators) Participants 
No Participants Regulatory Organisation 
1 B1 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
2 B2 Nigerian Deposit Insurance Commission 
(NDIC) 
3 B3 Nigerian Deposit Insurance Commission 
(NDIC) 
4 B4 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
5 B5 Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 
6 B6 Corporate Affairs Commission 
7 B7 Institute of Corporate Governance Nigeria 
8 B8 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
The final category of participants (Category C) is corporate governance consultants 
and academics. These participants were integrated into this study to enable the 
research to benefit from their knowledge and wealth of experience in consulting and 
research and teaching, towards promoting good corporate governance in the country. 
Table 8 identifies four participants who were interviewed during data collection 
process. 
Table 8 - Category ‘C’ (Consultants and Academics) Participants 
No Participants Expertise 
1 C1 Academic 
2 C2 Academic/Consultant 
3 C3 Academic 
4 C4 Academic/Consultant 
 
The professional backgrounds of participants were also taken into consideration. 
Table 9 provides their background and/or research field. This is relevant to further 
indicate their suitability to address the interview questions. 
Table 9 - Backgrounds of Participants  
No Career Background/Research Field Number of Experts 
1 Law 4 
2 Finance and Accounting 7 
3 Economics 3 
4 Business and Management 8 
5 Other Areas (Engineering, IT) 2 
  Total Participants 24 
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As shown in Table 9, approximately 63% of participants are from finance and 
accounting and business and management backgrounds. This is auspicious for the 
research considering the relationship between these research fields and corporate 
governance. It must also be noted that four participants are legal practitioners. 
Considering that addressing regulatory concerns represents an important objective of 
this study, their comments and suggestions were invaluable in proposing a reform 
strategy for good corporate governance. The other participants included three 
economists, an engineer and an IT professional. The engineer and IT professional are 
executives of publicly-listed companies. In total, twenty-four participants were 
involved in this study. All respondents play a significant role in corporate 
governance. 
 
3.4 Procedure for Analysing Data  
Unlike quantitative data, qualitative data consists of words and observations, hence 
its analysis and interpretation is necessary to bring order and generate understanding 
(Taylor-Powell & Renner, 2003). Boeije (2009) explains that, in the context of 
research, analysis describes the processing of data in order to answer the research 
questions. It involves an extensive array of procedures aimed at systematically 
addressing research questions. In social constructionism, the flexibility associated 
with the methodology permits the use of various data analysis techniques. For 
instance, whilst Dahlsrud (2008) engaged a content analysis technique to analyse 
data, White (2004) advocated the use of discourse analysis. Despite these choices, 
Hsieh and Shannon (2005), Elo and Kyngäs (2008) and Elo et al. (2014) opine that 
content analysis is one of the most commonly-used technique for analysing data in 
qualitative studies. Thus, content analysis is used in this study. 
Berelson (1952, p. 18) defined content analysis as “a research technique for the 
objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication.” However, Schreier (2012) observed that other versions of content 
analysis indicate a significant movement away from Berelson’s (1952) quantitative 
disposition. For instance, Neuman (2011) presented content analysis as a tool for 
gathering and analysing the content of a text. The ‘content’ refers to words, 
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meanings, pictures, ideas and themes etc. while the ‘text’ could be anything written, 
visual or spoken, serving as a communication medium. Evidently, there are 
fundamental differences between Berelson (1952) and Neuman’s (2011) accounts. 
This difference is the basis of the types of content analysis, discussed next two 
sections. It is however imperative to provide a rationale for engaging content 
analysis in relation to the study objectives.  
 
3.4.1 Why Content Analysis? 
The nature of study and a researcher’s paradigm disposition bear significant 
influence on the technique employed to analyse the data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Taking the researcher’s ontological and epistemological position into consideration, 
the study engages content analysis in view of its alignment with the researcher’s 
philosophical preference and study objectives. Elo and Kyngäs (2008) agreed that 
content analysis is particularly apt in analysing a phenomenon with multifaceted 
characteristics. This study posits that addressing corporate governance concerns 
requires an investigation into the various institutional elements affecting corporate 
governance. Content analysis, as engaged in Salama (2009) and Beck, Campbell, and 
Shrives (2010), provides a framework which seamlessly integrates these differing 
perspectives in a systematic manner.  
Content analysis is also acknowledged for its ability to manage large volumes of 
textual data from different textual sources (Stemler, 2001). Schreier (2012) noted 
that it facilitates data reduction thereby assisting the researcher to narrow the study 
to specifics. This is crucial in this study considering the large volume of themes and 
codes emerging from this research. This offers the most feasible strategy for 
analysing approximately 210 pages of transcribed data generated from the interviews. 
The ability to reduce data to specific factors, prompted by social and institutional 
elements, is consistent with the objectives of this study. It is also necessary to add 
that content analysis represents a well-established data analysis technique in social 
constructionist studies (Welch, Fenwick, & Roberts, 1997; Dahlsrud, 2008). As 
previously noted, social constructionism focuses on two key aspects i.e. individual 
interactions and social/societal interfaces (Owen, 1995). Thus data generated must 
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reflect these two elements which compel the collection of a large, but unstructured, 
amount of data.  
Furthermore, as data was collected via interviews, the analysis tool adopted must 
allow for flexibility in dealing with emerging themes. Cavanagh (1997) concurs that 
content analysis offers a flexible method for analysing textual data. Boyatzis (1998) 
indicates that this advantage enables researchers to tailor the coding frame to the 
research material, enabling the researcher to integrate new themes as they emerge. 
This benefit was crucial in the decision to adopt the directed content analysis 
strategy in this study.  
To further this discussion, it is necessary to acknowledge that there are two types of 
content analysis. Elo and Kyngäs (2008) inform that content analysis is a method 
that may be used with either quantitative or qualitative data. Whereas the origin of 
content analysis can be traced to Berelson (1952), his (Berelson, 1952) definition 
denotes quantitativeness. This view has served as the basis for a substantial volume 
of definitions of content analysis (see Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004; 
Krippendorff, 2012; Bryman, 2015).  
However, Kracauer (1952) contested Berelson’s (1952) description of content 
analysis on three grounds. Kracauer (1952) suggested that meaning is often complex, 
holistic and context-dependent; meaning is not always clear at first sight and the 
appearance of some meaning only once in a text does not necessarily suggest that 
such aspects are less important compared to aspects frequently mentioned. Berger 
and Luckmann (1966) also disputed the ‘objectivity’ proposition of Berelson (1952), 
pointing out that even the most scientific methods of social research cannot generate 
totally objective outcomes. These arguments are considered to provide a foundation 
for the development of qualitative content analysis (QCA).  
 
3.4.2 Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) 
QCA, as noted in Schreier (2012), emerged from quantitative content analysis. 
Fundamentally, Schreier (2012) suggested that there is no distinct difference 
between both forms of content analysis (see Table 10) except that QCA possesses 
some characteristics which feature in qualitative research. While Flick (2014) 
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identified some features of qualitative research to include interpretive, naturalistic, 
situational, reflexive, inductive and emergent flexibility, amongst others, Schreier 
(2012) contends that these features distinguish QCA from quantitative content 
analysis (Table 10).  
Table 10 - Differences between Quantitative Content Analysis and QCA 
  Content Analysis 
  Quantitative Qualitative 
1 Works deductively Works inductively 
2 Measures quantitatively Summarises and classifies 
elements 
3 Focuses on manifest meaning Focuses on latent meaning 
4 Little context needed Much context required 
5 At least partly concept-driven At least partly data-driven 
6 Strict sequence of steps More variability in sequence of 
steps 
7 Fewer inferences to context, 
author, recipients 
More inferences to context, 
author, recipients 
Source: Adapted from Mayring (2000) and Schreier (2012) 
Therefore, building on Kracauer’s (1952) suggestion, Hsieh and Shannon (2005) 
explained that QCA allows for the subjective interpretation of the content of text 
data through a systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or 
patterns. Unlike quantitative content analysis, Schreier (2012) explains that QCA is 
not restricted to frequency counts. Rather, as Mayring (2000) suggests, QCA 
provides a medium for exploring core themes. These features, in addition to its 
considerable link with interpretivist features (see Flick, 2014) and social 
constructionism informed its preference for this study. The use of content analysis, 
whether quantitative or qualitative, has also been aided by the availability of 
computer programmes to automate many of its procedures. This also offered an 
added incentive to employ QCA. 
 
3.4.3 QCA Process: NVivo as an Aid 
Undertaking analysis of qualitative data, irrespective of the strategy employed, could 
be done either manually or by utilising computer-assisted qualitative data analysis 
software (CAQDAS) programme. Mayring (2000) noted that the use of software in 
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data analysis has been extended into the qualitative research domain with the 
emergence of CADQAS. However in this study, CADQAS, as recommended by 
Mayring (2000), was used to support, and not replace, the stages of text 
interpretation. Accordingly, data analysis in this study was significantly informed by 
the researcher’s knowledge and ability to design a systematic analysis process.  
However, in view of the benefits of employing computer programmes for qualitative 
data analysis (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011), Bazeley and Jackson (2013) observe 
that there are numerous software packages which qualitative researchers can utilise 
to work with textual data. Some of the widely-used qualitative data analysis 
programmes include NVivo, ATLAS/ti and MAXQda. However, in view of the 
benefits inherent in the use of NVivo35 (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011; Bazeley & 
Jackson, 2013), this study used this particular software to support its data analysis 
process.    
Figure 6 - Stages in Data Analysis 
 
 
Preparation Phase
 
Organising Phase
 
Reporting Phase
 
Selecting Unit of Analysis
 
Making Sense of Data
 
Open Coding
 
Grouping
 
Categorization
 
Abstraction
 
Conceptual System
 
 
Source: Adapted from Elo and Kyngäs (2008) 
                                                 
35
 Benefits of using NVivo include facilitation of open coding, visual exploration of ideas, access to 
original transcribed data and the ability to attach memos to coded data and search key texts. 
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Following recommendations in Elo and Kyngäs (2008), analysis of the transcribed 
data involved three stages i.e. preparation, organising and reporting (Figure 6). In the 
preparation stage, units of analysis were identified to enable the researcher to make 
sense of the data. Unit of analysis, according to Zhang and Wildemuth (2009), refers 
to the basic unit of text to be classified during content analysis. This stage required 
data immersion (Polit & Beck, 2012); the interviews were listened to and transcribed 
materials were read several times. The use of NVivo was minimal at this stage.  
The second stage of analysis is the organising stage. This stage, relying on the 
recommendation in Elo and Kyngäs (2008), involved open coding, 36  grouping 
identified codes, creating categories from identified codes and engaging in 
abstraction. Abstraction involves articulating a general description of the research 
concerns by generating categories (Polit & Beck, 2012). Hsieh and Shannon (2005) 
suggested the use of one of three approaches i.e. conventional content analysis, 
directed content analysis and summative content analysis (Table 11) for interpreting 
meaning from text data. In this study, the directed approach was employed. As Hsieh 
and Shannon (2005) suggest, this approach was employed following Adegbite’s 
(2015) observation that available scholarship bordering on corporate governance in 
Nigeria is inadequate, hence the research area would benefit from further insights.   
Table 11 - Three Approaches to Content Analysis 
Type of Content 
Analysis 
Study Starts 
With: 
Timing of Defining 
Codes or Keywords 
Source of Codes or 
Keywords 
Conventional 
Content Analysis 
Observation Codes are defined 
during data analysis 
Codes are derived 
from data 
  
      
Directed Content 
Analysis 
Theory Codes are defined 
before and during 
data analysis 
Codes are derived 
from theory or 
relevant research 
findings 
  
      
Summative 
Content Analysis 
Keywords Keywords are 
identified before and 
during data analysis 
Keywords are derived 
from interest of 
researchers or review 
of literature 
Source: Hsieh and Shannon (2005) 
                                                 
36
 Open coding means that notes and headings are generated to describe all aspects of the interview 
transcript (Burnard, 1991). 
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The directed approach offered a structure which facilitated the identification of 
concepts as the initial coding categories from existing theory (Potter & Levine‐
Donnerstein, 1999) i.e. a priori code,37 and concurrently, assisted the identification 
of emerging themes from the data. This approach links with the flexibility often 
associated with QCA. From Figure 6, the first activity in the organising stage was 
coding. Miles and Huberman (1994) explained that coding represents the starting 
point in investigating patterns in the research material. Other activities undertaken 
with respect to the organising phase are explained in Section 3.7.5.  
The final stage i.e. reporting (see Figure 6) is based on an abstraction procedure 
whereby inferences were drawn by identifying subcategories with related 
characteristics, grouping them as generic categories and establishing a main category 
from these linkages. The outcomes of these grouping and categorisation processes 
are analysed and discussed in the next two chapters.       
To conclude this section, it is necessary to emphasise that the use of computer 
software offered a key support for analysing data. NVivo 10 was extensively used in 
the analysis process for this research. This aided in managing data and examining 
relationships between categories. The systematisation of this process is expected to 
enhance the validity of the research outcomes.  
 
3.4.4 Development of the Coding Frame 
Content analysis is typically undertaken with the use of a coding frame (Schreier, 
2012). As reflected in Figure 6, the organising stage describes the process of 
exploring data in order to eventually achieve abstraction from data collected. 
However, considering the large volume of data generated by the study, which 
enhances the possibility of “getting lost in the data” (Schreier, 2012, p. 58), it is 
crucial that the researcher maintains focus. 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Codes that are developed before engaging with data i.e. from literature (Stemler, 2001). 
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Figure 7 - Main Themes in Relevant Literature (NVivo Extract)  
 
Thus, the coding frame enables the researcher to identify and select certain key 
aspects of theory and transcribed material and consequently focus on those aspects. 
In line with the directed content analysis approach (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005), themes 
were initially generated from literature (a priori), and subsequently reinforced with 
additional themes from the data.  
 98 
 
Figure 8 - Main Themes from Data (NVivo Extract)  
 
The initial coding emerged from themes and concepts identified in the literature. In 
line with the study’s research questions and objectives, literature which examined 
issues relating to the research objectives was identified. These journal articles 
examining specific corporate governance issues found globally and in Nigeria were 
uploaded onto NVivo (as PDF files). The ‘query’ and ‘word frequency’ tools were 
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initially used to generate themes. This process produced a mass of themes (see 
Figure 7). The font size of these themes is an indication of their relevance in 
transcribed text. QCA uses individual themes as the unit of analysis, and these 
themes may be expressed as a single word, a phrase, a sentence, a paragraph or an 
entire document (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). However, whilst some of these terms 
were considered relevant, some were not. For instance, terms such as ‘want,’ ‘think,’ 
‘even,’ etc., which featured prominently, were deemed irrelevant. These terms were 
subsequently isolated using the ‘stop word’ function in NVivo. Figure 7 shows a 
word cloud of the most-commonly cited themes in literature relating to the study 
area.  
Figure 9 - Illustration of Abstraction Process (Coding Frame) 
Political Institution
Political System
Corruption
Legal Institution
Political Influence
Political Immunity
Motive
Opportunity
Compliance & Enforcement
Regulators
Sub-CategoryGeneric CategoryMain Category
Source: Adapted from Elo and Kyngäs (2008) 
The second stage of coding involved extracting themes from the data. Whilst a 
similar process employed in determining themes from the literature was adopted, 
some initial steps were taken. The interviews were transcribed manually and the 
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manuscripts uploaded onto NVivo. The main themes emerging from the data (Figure 
8) are Nigeria, people, culture, enforcement, corruption, institutions, government, 
codes, religion and SEC, amongst others.  
From the procedures performed on the literature and data, two coding strands 
emerged. First, some themes generated from the literature were reinforced with 
similar themes from the data, and secondly, the data produced several new sets of 
relevant themes. These themes were subsequently subjected to a process of 
successive sorting to generate the subcategories for the coding frame.  
The next stage was ‘grouping’ i.e. identifying similar or related themes and 
examining the variations and reasons for these variations. This procedure helped to 
condense the array of themes identified from Figures 7 and 8. Using the grouping 
approach proposed in Elo and Kyngäs (2008) (see Figure 9), 38  three levels of 
groupings emerged. The first grouping recognised similarities in themes and grouped 
them accordingly. These groups are the subcategories. It is important to note that 
there are instances where some themes were deemed good enough to be recognised 
as properties or elements of other themes. 
From this process, the next category of grouping emerged. These new, higher order 
groups (Burnard, 1991) represent the generic categories (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008) (see 
Figure 9). This process ensured further consolidation of subcategories and facilitated 
effective comparison of research outcomes across the generic categories. The 
grouping and categorisation of data embodies the abstraction stage of analysis. The 
abstraction stage, however, requires that another category is generated (see Figure 9). 
This category i.e. the main category, presents the basis of the formulation of a 
general description of the research concerns (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). 
The structure described in Figure 9 facilitated the development of a coding frame for 
this study. Consequently, the data analysis and discussion for this study, presented in 
the next two chapters, were structured based on this process. However, prior to 
presenting the analysis the next section attempts to proffer the strategy for addressing 
ethical concerns, particularly in view of the qualitative nature of this study.  
 
                                                 
38
 Figure 9 provides a hypothetical example of an abstraction process using data from this study. 
 101 
 
3.5 Issues during Data Collection 
Qualitative research demands much of the researcher (O'Dwyer, 2004). In essence, 
the researcher’s ability to effectively coordinate and manage all aspects of the 
research is critical to the attainment of the study objectives. Prior to data collection, 
approval from the Supervision team and the University’s Ethics Committee 
(Appendix 5) was obtained. Appointments were also initially arranged with seven 
participants. Participants for the study were strategically drawn from the cities of 
Lagos and Abuja. Lagos is the commercial centre of Nigeria, thus many corporations 
in the country are located in this city. As a result, there is a significant pool of CEOs, 
board members and governance consultants in Lagos. In addition, the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange is based in Lagos. Abuja is Nigeria’s administrative capital hence the 
majority of regulatory agencies are based in the city. 
An initial challenge was encountered during data collection as five of the previously-
confirmed participants postponed or cancelled their scheduled appointment. In fact, 
three potential participants postponed their appointment whilst the others cancelled, 
all stating that they were travelling outside the country for an extended length of time. 
As a result, interviews could not be conducted in the first two weeks scheduled for 
data collection. However, within this period, the researcher identified other 
participants mainly in Abuja, using the snowballing technique. Via snowballing the 
researcher realised it was easier for identified participants to enlist their friends and 
associates with similar profiles to participate in this study. A similar approach was 
employed in Adegbite et al. (2013).  
At the end of the period assigned for data collection, 24 interviews had been 
conducted with 21 digitally recorded. Three interviewees refused to be recorded. 
This is expected in a society such as Nigeria, where issues of power distance 
(Hofstede et al., 2010) pose a significant concern. Previous studies such as Adegbite 
(2012) also reported a lack of permission to tape-record some interviews. With 
respect to these three interviewees, detailed notes were taken during the interviews to 
ensure that key points were safely recorded.  
Various issues were evident whilst conducting the interviews. The first issue was the 
extent of ‘red-tape’ and corruption. Most executives usually have a Personal 
Assistant (PA) through whom appointments are booked. Gaining access to some PAs 
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required the use of a third party. These third parties often insist on being offered 
inducements before contact can be established with the PA, but the researcher did 
not offer any bribes to such PAs. In addition, cultural issues also affected contact 
with high net-worth individuals. Power distance is widely acknowledged in the 
Nigerian society hence considerable effort is required to gain access to these 
individuals.  
It was also observed that distrust was widespread in the Nigerian business 
environment. Despite informing potential participants of the interview purpose and 
presenting comprehensive documents they were unwilling to share information; 
unsure of the implications of the interview on their career. This indicates how 
corporate governance is perceived in the country. An encounter with a regulator 
typified this problem. After various attempts to secure a meeting by explaining the 
purpose of the interview, the regulator requested that the interview be conducted in 
his car in a car park rather than in his office. The regulator confided that this was the 
only way he could share information, as, in his words, “walls have ears.”  
Transparency concerns also link with the next challenge i.e. the use of recording 
equipment. Four potential participants withdrew from the process immediately the 
researcher requested permission to record the interview (Table 12). Appeals that 
handwritten notes could be taken if they (participants) were not comfortable with the 
recording of the interview did not persuade them. It is worth mentioning that these 
individuals were already conversing with the researcher on general matters, but 
cancelled the interview once the researcher requested their permission to record. This 
not only highlights how corporate governance is generally perceived in the country 
but indicates the fear and distrust regarding information sharing. However, three 
participants agreed to proceed with the interview, but with no recording (see Table 
12).  
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Table 12 - Reconciling the Number of Interviewees   
Participants Initially Contacted   35 
  
    
Postponed and Subsequently Cancelled   (7) 
Cancelled by Participants due to 
Recording 
  (4) 
  
  24 
  
    
Actual Interviewees Recorded 21 
  
Not Recorded 3 
  
  24 
 
3.5.1 Strengths of the Study Methodology 
Despite the issues identified above, some strengths are acknowledged in the 
methodology adopted for this research, particularly in view of its qualitative nature 
(Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). Notably, the methodological framework emerged as the 
outcome of a rigorous process. Koch (2006) maintained that trustworthiness or 
rigour may be ascertained when the reader is able to audit the events, influences and 
actions of the researcher. This is important given the context of this study as the 
generality of the limited literature on corporate governance in Nigeria lacks the 
necessary rigour. Hence, in addition to improving the corporate governance literature 
in Nigeria, the rigour engaged in generating its findings will contribute to better 
corporate governance discourse. Elo et al. (2014) added that in QCA, trustworthiness 
is enhanced when it is evident from the data collection phase to the reporting of 
results. This underpinned the procedures adopted in this study, beginning with a 
clear identification of the philosophical underpinning of the study methodology. This 
subsequently informed the identification of appropriate data collection and analysis 
techniques. Twenty-four interviews were conducted which is consistent with related 
studies. Participants were carefully identified to ensure data richness.  
The range of participants is consistent with the multi-stakeholder perspective of this 
study. An objective of this study is to propose a reform strategy for good governance 
in Nigeria (RO5). Restricting the selection of participants might not adequately 
support the framing of proposals that can address the broad challenges hindering 
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corporate governance in the Nigerian business environment, hence this research 
engaged with participants representing different industrial sectors, governance 
consultants and members of academia.     
Interviews were thoroughly analysed using QCA with the aid of NVivo. The use of 
NVivo as a software programme to support data analysis simplifies data 
interrogation (Lewins & Silver, 2007); facilitates an audit of the data analysis 
process as whole (Welsh, 2002), shortens analysis timeframes as well as enhancing 
data management  (Jones, 2007) and promotes the generation of evidence-based 
findings (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013).  
 
3.5.2 Limitations of the Study Methodology 
Notwithstanding the strengths noted above, Patton (2002) accepts that there are no 
perfect research designs. It is therefore necessary to discuss some limitations of the 
study methodology and how these limitations were managed. A major limitation, 
noted earlier, is the perceived level of distrust in Nigeria (see Diamond, 2007) which 
could indicate that data provided may not reflect actual practices. It was therefore 
important for the researcher to devise a method of eliminating or minimising this 
possibility. The use of semi-structured interviews enabled the inquirer to probe 
responses further. This yielded some valuable information. Furthermore, the 
researcher made substantial efforts to assure participants that they would suffer no 
harm as a result of partaking in the research.  
It is also worth noting that the volume of data generated made the transcription, 
analysis and interpretation of data time-consuming. The use of NVivo to organise the 
data helped in minimising the time taken to undertake these activities. Furthermore, 
as data was collected using interviews, research quality is dependent on the 
individual skills of the researcher (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). It must be admitted 
that this study was the researcher’s first attempt at conducting interviews. However, 
whilst some learning was gained during piloting, the researcher would like to impart 
that interviewing skills improved with every subsequent interview.  
The final limitation is consistent with Flick’s (2014) observation that qualitative 
studies can be influenced by the researcher’s personal biases and idiosyncrasies. This 
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could create situations whereby the interpretation of a participant’s data is ‘invented’ 
by the inquirer which consequently impedes confirmability of findings (Polit & Beck, 
2012). This concern is significant in view of the researcher’s professional 
background and knowledge. To address this concern the researcher embraced 
‘bracketing’ which involves setting aside prior knowledge and assumptions about a 
phenomenon, with the objective of examining participants’ responses with an ‘open 
mind’ (Gearing, 2004).       
 
3.6 Addressing Ethical Concerns 
‘Ethics’ refers to what should and should not be done. It observes the rules of 
conduct which dictate what is right and proper (Grix, 2010). Mullins (2011) relates 
ethics to the study of morality, focusing on practices that are right or wrong, in 
conjunction with the rules which govern those activities and the values to which 
those activities relate.  
Table 13 - Possible Ethical Challenges 
Source Ethical Issues/Principles 
Diener and Crandall 
(1978), Bryman (2015) 
Harm to Participants, Lack of Informed 
Consent, Invasion of Privacy and Deception 
Murphy and Dingwall 
(2001) 
Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, Autonomy 
and Justice 
Ryen (2011) Codes and Consent, Confidentiality and Trust. 
Halai (2006) Informed and Voluntary Consent, 
Confidentiality, Participants’ Anonymity, 
Beneficence (no harm) and Reciprocity  
Orb, Eisenhauer, and 
Wynaden (2001) 
Autonomy, Beneficence and Justice 
 
Rationally, the nature of research involves collecting data from people, about people 
(Punch, 2014). The ethical implications of research have meant that research 
processes are subjected to ethical considerations and reflections in recognition of its 
possible effects on participants (Blumberg, Cooper, & Schindler, 2014). This 
compels researchers to anticipate the ethical issues in their studies. In view of these 
concerns, it is crucial that mechanisms to deal with ethical issues are agreed.  
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However, to develop an ethics management strategy, possible ethical concerns must 
be identified. Literature has attempted to identify a variety of ethical issues to which 
a researcher may be vulnerable (Table 13). The potential for the identified issues to 
manifest during the course of data collection for this study was somewhat significant, 
considering the qualitative nature of the study and the use of interviews as the 
primary data collection tool. As a consequence, the researcher relied on proven 
strategies to minimise (or eliminate, where possible) the emergence of any ethical 
problems. These strategies, based on a procedure recommended in Flick (2014), are 
presented as follows;    
Informed Consent Prior to Data Collection: This was a precondition for 
participation in the research. Consent was sought from potential interviewees (see 
Appendix 6). In addition, the person giving the consent was adequately informed of 
the purpose of the interview (and the research), after which the researcher was 
satisfied that the consent was being given voluntarily. Participants were also 
informed as to how the data gathered from them would be analysed and the 
information disseminated. These consents were sought prior to the interview. This 
strategy guides against claims of uninformed consent (Diener & Crandall, 1978) or 
trust (Ryen, 2011). 
Avoid Harm to Interviewees during Data Collection: The collection of data was 
undertaken to ensure no harm was brought upon interviewees. Interview questions 
(Appendix 2) were sent to respondents before the actual interview to enable them to 
familiarise themselves with the questions. They (participants) were also informed of 
their right to discontinue the interview if they so wished, at any time. Participants 
were also advised of the risks and benefits relating to them (interviewees) and the 
willingness of the researcher to address any concerns they may have. This ensures 
beneficence (Murphy & Dingwall, 2001).  
Doing Justice to Participants during Data Analysis: Justice, according to Orb et al. 
(2001), implies equal share and fairness. There was a conscious effort to avoid 
exploitation and abuse of participants. The interpretations presented in subsequent 
chapters reflect data generated rather than the researcher’s personal judgements. This 
is crucial in a qualitative study. 
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Confidentiality in Writing the Research: There is a reasonable expectation by 
interviewees that information provided will be treated in a confidential manner 
(Halai, 2006). Since this study is aimed at evaluating governance practices amongst 
Nigerian firms, it is crucial to offer protection to participants. The calibre of 
participants in this study further obliges the researcher to ensure anonymity and 
confidentiality. Violation of this duty could lead to severe reputational damage to 
participants and their organisation. As a result, anonymity was maintained using 
pseudonyms to represent participants. 
Finally, it is important to state that Northumbria University has an ethics approval 
system with which students must comply. Necessary approvals (Appendix 5) were 
obtained from the University’s Research Committee prior to data collection. This 
rigorous requirement further ensured that potential ethical challenges were identified, 
and strategies for managing them were established. It is fair to inform that these 
measures served to encourage some participants to partake in the study. It is also 
necessary to state that prior to actual data collection, a pilot study was undertaken to 
test how potential ethical issues could be addressed. 
 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
Research entails the systematic process of obtaining information and interpreting it 
with the prospect of enriching knowledge and improving practice. However, the 
achievement of research goals is dependent on a clearly-defined methodology for 
conducting the research (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). This chapter was devoted to 
presenting the methodology for undertaking this research. It recognised the 
ontological and epistemological underpinning and proceeded to identify and justify 
the preferred methodological perspective. The ontological, epistemological and 
methodological considerations of the researcher facilitate the use of social 
constructionism as the study philosophy. The clarification of the researcher’s 
philosophical position subsequently informed adoption of semi-structured interviews 
as the data collection technique employed in this study.  
This chapter also defined the criteria used in selecting research participants and 
outlined the procedures employed in analysing data generated from the interviews. 
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Research of this nature is inevitably exposed to ethical concerns. These concerns 
were identified and the mechanisms for minimising their impact on the study were 
articulated.  
Having provided the methodology for undertaking this study, the next chapter 
presents the analysis of findings which emerged from the data collected and their 
implications/relevance for the extant literature. 
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Chapter Four 
Analysis of Interview Findings 
4.1 Introduction 
To address the research objectives, it is necessary to analyse the findings emerging 
from the data. Thus, this chapter analyses research findings, focusing on the 
concerns around the practice of corporate governance in Nigeria, from an 
institutional perspective. This analysis is undertaken relying on research participants’ 
responses. Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 identify the main institutional classifications 
which emerged from the data analysis process. These three sections examine the 
political, social and economic institutions of corporate governance in Nigeria. 
 
4.2 Political Institutions  
In defining political institutions, Moe (2005) identified two views. First, political 
institutions represent structures of voluntary cooperation aimed at resolving 
collective action problems. Second, political institutions are structures of power, thus 
potentially ‘good’ for some people and ‘bad’ for others, depending on who 
(politicians or the people) has the power to enforce their will on the other party. 
Goergen (2012) posits that these elements are features of modern government, 
therefore as a prime political institution, government is empowered to dictate 
economic activities.  
In many developing markets, Goergen (2012) notes that government ownership of 
large corporations is significant. In Nigeria, for example, the government commands 
significant shareholdings in many corporations. Figure 10 shows Ahunwan’s (2002) 
classification of ownership amongst Nigerian firms. In fact, in sectors such as energy 
and transport (rail), there are very limited opportunities for private investment. A 
consequence of this development is that the Nigerian economy is substantially 
government-driven. An interviewee (A8) suggested that “government is the biggest 
player in the (Nigerian) economy,” indicating that establishing good corporate 
governance requires government and its agencies to provide necessary leadership 
and structure (Roe, 2003).  
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Figure 10 - Ownership Classifications of Nigerian Businesses 
Categories of Ownership Structures
 
Category A
 
Corporations wholly owned by 
government
Category B
 
Joint Venture arrangements 
between the Federal 
Government and Foreign Oil-
Producing companies
Category C
 
 
Publicly listed Organisations
Category D
 
Privately owned companies 
not listed on the Stock 
market
 
Source: Adapted from Ahunwan (2002) 
As can be seen in Figure 10, government is actively involved in organisations 
identified in categories A, B and C. Zayyad (1991) informs that there are an 
estimated 1500 public enterprises in Nigeria, which account for between 30-40% of 
fixed capital investments in the country. However, Adeyemo (2005) explained that 
the poor performance of these enterprises has compelled the government to move 
away from ownership or control of these enterprises towards free enterprise, using 
the instrumentality of privatisation and commercialisation. As a result, some sectors, 
notably banking, telecommunications and energy (electricity), have been 
substantially privatised, whilst sectors such as oil and gas and transport (rail) are still 
largely controlled by the government (Adeyemo & Salami, 2008).      
The foregoing stresses the importance of modifying the role of government and its 
agencies in corporate governance and the system through which it is implemented. In 
addition, it is crucial that leadership must be supported with a consistent display of 
good corporate governance ethos in government establishments. The reality, 
however, as noted by participants, transcends beyond engagement, as the level of 
government commitment towards the establishment of sound corporate governance 
is questionable. B2 contended that; 
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…what corporate governance do you think we will have when those that 
produce the laws are not abiding by its requirements? Do you think … (name 
withheld) believes in corporate governance? Even the … (a major regulatory 
agency), what evidence of corporate governance do you see in their Board?  
 
Consistent with the above, Okpara (2010) identified the lack of government 
commitment as a major barrier hindering the implementation of effective corporate 
governance in the country. The entrenchment of corporate governance principles is 
enhanced when stakeholders are committed to its implementation. The negative 
effects could be amplified when the commitment from government is lacking. As 
observed during data collection, these issues were consistently noted by participants. 
The preceding challenges inform the emergence of ‘political institutions’ as a core 
category, accommodating three generic categories (political system, corruption and 
legal institutions) that emerged after a codification process (see Figure 11). These 
generic categories contain subcategories, which typify some of the concerns related 
to political institutions. Figure 11 reveals the subcategories which, after codification, 
produced generic categories and subsequently, the main category. To analyse these 
political institution-related concerns, the next three subsections are devoted to 
analysing the three generic categories identified in the coding frame. 
 
4.2.1 Political System      
The quality of a political system could have implications for the effectiveness of the 
political institution and, by extension, for corporate governance (Doidge et al., 2007). 
Indeed, some participants (A8, A6 and C3) contend that the present state of 
corporate governance in Nigeria is a reflection of its political system. This is 
consistent with Adegbite et al. (2013). Consequently, these participants suggested 
that there is a link between corporate governance and the political system. A6, for 
instance, suggested that the Nigerian political system had done more damage to the 
country, with implications for corporate governance. To explore this position, three 
subcategories (see Figure 11), which reflect concerns underpinning related generic 
categories, emerged from coding themes relevant to the political system. 
 
 112 
 
Figure 11 - Thematic Frameworks for Political Institutions 
Political Influence
Political Authority
Political Immunity
Exit via Protection and 
Connection
Motives and Opportunities
Fear of the Unknown
Systemic Moral Decadence
Compliance
Enforcement
Regulators
Outdated Regulations
Political System
Corruption
Regulatory & Legal 
System
Political Institutions
Main Category Generic Categories Sub Categories
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Political Influence 
Political influence processes, according to Aplin and Hegarty (1980), involve the 
interactions of various stakeholders possessing limited control over the rewards of 
political actors. Whilst this view indicates that political influence entails altering 
political decisions, it could be deduced from Adegbite (2012) that political influence 
could also manifest in a business environment. Remarks from the data support this 
assertion. For instance, A4 informed that; 
…from my experience in the industry, the sort of influence that political office 
holders display in publicly-listed companies is not healthy for the business or 
economic environment. Most times, these influences are used to the 
disadvantage of less privileged members of society.  
 
While A4’s view is consistent with the view that political influence is evident in the 
business environment, it is the discharge of the influence of the political class that 
has provided a source of concern. A11 note that; 
…our political system in this country is the driver of many of our problems. 
Take political office holders, for instance, how do you explain how they are 
able to claim so much power for themselves …these powers are usually 
manipulated to enhance their personal bottom-line.  
 
Evidence from the majority of respondents indicates that the concern noted by A4 
and A11 above is prevalent amongst members of the political class. As Nahavandi 
(2006) observed, leaders’ ability to influence their followers’ choices is based on the 
control they hold over the vision and mission of an organisation. However, in an 
environment where knowledge of management is low, leaders’ actions may be 
inconsistent with organisational objectives. The implication for corporate 
governance is that, as a checks and balance mechanism (see Lessing, 2009), the 
possession of such powers undermines the capacity of existing corporate 
mechanisms to effectively monitor behaviour. Further interrogation to explore why 
politicians wield such political influence revealed a variety of reasons39 but notable 
among these is the desire to create or maintain their public status. B5 opined that:  
                                                 
39
 Some of these reasons include weak legal institutions, unrestricted power, greed, societal 
expectations, poor upbringing/background and illiteracy, amongst others. 
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Politicians must live up to the expectations of friends and cronies. Once you 
are a top politician, some kind of public status is bestowed on you. The next 
thing is to do whatever you can to preserve that status…. preserving that 
status often times involves engaging in unethical activities.  
    
Whereas the attainment of public status might not necessarily constitute a problem, 
how the status is achieved and/or maintained requires some attention. From B5’s 
comment, there are indications that politicians engage in unethical practices to 
enhance their public status. The fact that members of the public are unable to 
question the rewards of these politicians (see Aplin & Hegarty, 1980) accelerates 
illegal wealth accumulation. Accumulating illegitimate wealth helps enhance their 
public status due to two main factors. First, the weakness in legal institutions means 
that that they can avoid prosecution and, second, the lack of systemic accountability 
(see Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010) means that offenders can freely use their illegal wealth. 
These factors subsequently inform the political relevance and influence of such 
individuals. Whilst it can be argued that the link between public status and political 
influence is prevalent in developing economies, it raises questions regarding the 
influence of institutional elements and the power of economic actors, highlighted in 
Chapter Two. This concern will be further explored as a cultural issue in Section 
4.4.1.   
The ineffectiveness of existing checks and balances mechanisms in the political 
domain has been sustained by the ‘unethical relationships’ which corporate leaders 
such as CEOs build with politicians. These relationships ensure that the whims of 
politicians are satisfied as a way of gaining government patronage. This represents a 
major concern because as government stimulates investments (such as in providing 
infrastructure), it makes funds available to the system which the private sector seeks 
to access. The ability of the private sector to do the same with individuals in the 
country is very restricted due to high level of poverty, hence ‘doing business’ 
continues to remain attractive. The potential effect of this relationship was 
highlighted in Shleifer and Vishny (1994). This concern is not only restricted to 
corporate (private sector) Boards, but widespread in government-owned 
establishments. B7 stated that; 
…when political office holders violate the rules in their ministries, there are 
varieties of ways which they employ to avoid any repercussion. Of course, 
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you know …that the mechanism which they use …is to use their “connections” 
with people at the top to get off the hook. …. they will always get away with 
their corporate governance infractions. 
 
The implication of government as the biggest economic agent makes the pursuit of 
government patronage a goal for corporations. However as Dike (2005) observed, 
these relationships are not premised on sound business ethics. Thus situations exist 
where CEOs and their political associates act in a way that undermines governance 
principles. Okpara (2009) also noted that many executive appointments are not based 
on expertise or knowledge but on political affiliations. This links with B4’s view; 
You see, because of the power and influence which these (politicians) enjoy, 
they appoint and sack people (on the Board) as they please …these 
(appointees) are then expected to help (politicians) achieve their illegal aims. 
 
Whilst these acts create and sustain the influence of politicians in the economy, they 
have implications for corporate governance implementation and compliance 
mechanisms. It may be unlikely for an offender to face the wrath of the law in view 
of their connections with relevant politicians. On the basis of the preceding analysis, 
it can be suggested that issues such as relationship, public status, position and power 
have been manipulated, such that political influence tends to connote a negative 
variable on the country’s corporate governance environment.  
 
Political Authority 
In relation to the preceding subcategory, the political influence exerted by members 
of the political class has produced unrestricted political authority.40 Cassinelli (1961) 
explained that political authority relates to the ordering, regulating, shaping, or 
determining the behaviour, of human beings. The feature of political authority, as 
acknowledged in the above definition, connotes control of individuals. Indeed, whilst 
words such as ‘shaping’ or ‘determining’ can be viewed positively, words such as 
‘ordering’ and, to some extent, ‘regulating’ suggest a desire to compel performance. 
                                                 
40
 A reminder of the collapse in political institutions, as such institutional frameworks are normally 
expected to guide against the emergence of this type of problem.  
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Hence, the objective of political authority remains a major concern in political 
domains.  
With respect to Nigeria, Ogbeidi (2012) noted that political authority is usually 
exercised not necessarily for the country’s benefit, but for the personal financial 
benefit of the politicians. This is consistent with A1’s view; 
In this country, possession of political authority comes with a lot of benefits 
to the holder. As you can see, they are so rich but unfortunately, you can’t 
verify their source of wealth.  
 
In relation to the above, B3 (a regulator) also noted that; 
Our politicians enjoy an unrestricted capacity to impose obligations on the 
people.  There are virtually no opportunities for the citizens to question the 
authority of these politicians, especially infractions in the area of governance. 
 
The above comment from a regulator further highlights the challenges that could be 
encountered by regulators when investigating politicians. The political system limits 
the capacity of regulators to prosecute offenders, especially when they are prominent 
politicians. That it is possible to avoid such prosecution promotes the pursuit of 
political authority. Whilst the continued display of unwarranted influence and 
authority is aided by weaknesses in legal and political institutions (Adegbite, 2012), 
as offenders are able to avoid penalties (Akers, 1990), there have been significant 
implications for the legitimacy of political institutions in the country.  A9 stated that: 
You see the way political leaders parade themselves and show off their 
wealth. They do this to oppress the people and remind us of their public 
status. That is why these politicians and even the entire political system that 
brought them to power are not respected by the people. 
 
Legitimacy is affected when leaders appear to violate the expectations of citizens via 
inappropriate behaviour. As noted in A9’s comments, there is a misuse, by 
politicians, of the authority which their positions confer upon them. The implication 
for corporate governance is that policies emanating from the government also lack 
legitimacy. Interestingly, Coglianese (2007) observed that corporate governance is 
becoming structured more akin to governments in certain ways. This clearly suggests 
that, whereas a well-run government might produce a good governance system, 
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governments lacking legitimacy may hinder the emergence of a sound governance 
structure. In fact, an outcome of this challenge is that those operators tend to 
abandon their principles. B2 (a regulator) explained that; 
I have seen instances amongst my colleagues where they are even afraid to 
ask questions …because of the authority that person has. You know, such 
politicians can make sure you lose your job or you suffer heavily for it. 
 
Problems created by political authority have intensified because government support 
for regulators is restricted, and the existing institutional structure is simply unable to 
support regulatory compliance. There is evidence which indicates that the activities 
of politicians cannot be regulated by existing governance codes. Therefore, in a weak 
institutional context, corporate governance regulations must be designed such that it 
is able to address political influences. This explains why acknowledging institutional 
peculiarities is crucial to developing corporate governance codes (Rwegasira, 2000; 
Adegbite & Nakajima, 2012; Mangena et al., 2012). Furthermore, it is important to 
note that while several factors have helped to build the authority enjoyed by 
politicians, the immunity clause provided in the Nigerian Constitution represents a 
key contributor to the unhealthy political authority of politicians.  
 
Political Immunity 
Some interviewees identified political immunity as another area which politicians 
have succeeded in manipulating to their advantage. Corporate governance challenges, 
they claim, have been heightened by the ‘immunity’ which politicians are able to 
access. The immunity clause, Section 308 (Subsection 1) of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitutions provides that; 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, but subject to 
Subsection 2 of this section: 
a) No civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a person 
to whom this section applies during his period of office; 
b) A person to whom this section applies shall not be arrested or imprisoned during 
that period either in pursuance of the process of any court or otherwise; and 
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c) No process of any court requiring or compelling the appearance of a person to 
whom this section applies, shall be applied for or issued. 
In essence, some political office holders41 cannot be held accountable to the law 
whilst they are in office, irrespective of the offence committed. The use of immunity 
is not necessarily restricted to political office holders, their cronies, representatives, 
relations and those who do their bidding can be immune from prosecution, using 
their relationship with political office holders. In view of this C1 asked; 
What kind of corporate governance do you expect when some people cannot 
be held accountable for their illegal acts because of the position they hold? 
As far as I am concerned, political immunity does not connect with corporate 
governance. Unfortunately, immunity is enjoyed by top politicians who 
should be at the forefront of promoting good corporate governance.  
 
Thus the use (and abuse) of the immunity clause is widespread. Conversely, 
corporate governance thrives on equity; hence the absence of this requirement 
undermines its functionality. Immunity ‘powers’ have meant that some politicians 
are not accountable for their actions as they can circumvent the legal system to 
achieve their objectives. On paper, political office holders can be brought to account 
at the expiration of their tenure of office, but as Markovska and Adams (2015) 
observed, the immunity clause gives political office holders enough time to ‘clean up 
their acts’ while in office. This system of protectionism (Markovska & Adams, 2015) 
facilitates the appointment of individuals who gratify political leaders, who 
subsequently work for them and conceal their acts. An example is the James Ibori42 
(a former governor of a state in Nigeria) case. He (Ibori) was discharged and 
acquitted by the Federal High Court in Delta State, Nigeria, but was sentenced to jail 
when tried in London in the UK for similar offences. The concern relating to 
impunity was summed up by A12; 
…you can imagine when a (politician) has the powers to do anything and is 
not questioned because he is holding a certain position. What would you 
expect from such a person? …Do you expect such person …to observe 
corporate governance principles? 
 
                                                 
41
 Section 308 (Subsection 2) of the 1999 Federal Constitution clarifies that the immunity clause 
applies to the President, Vice-President, Governors and Deputy Governors.   
42
 A former governor of Delta State in Nigeria, between May 1999 and May 2007. 
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The above quotation demonstrates how the immunity accessible by politicians could 
hinder good corporate governance. The extent of immunity in Nigeria was noted in 
Markovska and Adams (2015). They explained that there are ‘two faces of power’ 
wielded by Nigerian politicians: Formal power, described as the power in the routine 
legitimate business of politics; and informal power in the routine illegal business of 
politics. They add that the existing immunity clause covers both levels of power. As 
the distinction between both levels of power is blurred, politicians can engage formal 
power to reinforce informal power, aided by existing weak institutions which 
undermine the accountability of politicians.   
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Solomon (2013) note that corporate governance aims 
to ensure that agents act in a way which is consistent with stakeholders’ wealth 
maximisation goals. However, when there is a lack of state support to punish 
corporate governance offenders, the progress of corporate governance is constrained. 
Further indication of the dangers posed by immunity clauses can be assessed in the 
context of Ellis’ (2003) deterrence proposition. Ellis (2003) argues that rules are 
intended to serve as deterrents but could also produce contradictory outcomes when 
legal frameworks are weak. This vulnerability has been exploited by politicians thus 
creating many other problems, particularly corruption. This is explained next.  
 
4.2.2 Corruption 
In the previous section, corruption-related issues were evident. The scale of 
corruption in Nigeria based on 2014 Transparency International figures and 
comments from participants suggests that it should be examined as a separate 
concern. Whilst engaging with participants, the influence, form and magnitude of 
corruption in the country’s political structure was worrisome. As Ojukwu and 
Shopeju (2010) claimed, Nigeria is now regarded as a nation where corruption is 
extolled as a national culture. To support this assertion, A10 states that; 
…corruption is embedded in our system and it has massive negative 
implications for the performance of corporate governance in the 
country. …while the level of corruption in the organised private sector is 
high, it is nothing compared to what happens with our government officials. 
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As a generic category, the subcategories of corruption (see Figure 11) were quite 
extensive, further indicating the degree to which corruption has permeated the 
Nigerian political and economic environment. In view of the negative effects of 
corruption (Jain, 2001; Caron et al., 2012), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) show that the 
level of corruption is considerably influenced by government institutions and 
political processes. This informs as to why corruption is classed as a generic 
category of political institution in this study. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) explained 
that weak governments, which are unable to monitor the activities of their agencies, 
produce ultra-high corruption levels. The following subcategories (motives and 
opportunities; exit via ‘protection’ and ‘connections;’ fear of the unknown; and 
systemic moral decadence) are analysed to evaluate the contributions of research 
participants. 
 
Motive and Opportunities 
Motive represents the incentive to engage in certain activity. B4 stated that the 
motive for engaging in the political system by some politicians is driven by greed 
and the unlimited opportunities for perpetrating fraud. A6 agreed with B4’s position, 
noting that; 
Some people want to participate in the country’s politics not because of what 
they can offer but because of what they can get from the system. 
These views are supported in the literature on politics in Nigeria (see Osoba, 1996; 
Ogbeidi, 2012). The effect of this development is critical to corporate governance as 
such officers are unable to offer support to programmes or policies that may 
undermine the attainment of their ulterior motives. Nwabuzor (2005) informed that 
this behaviour is also evident in many other areas of human endeavour in the 
country’s business environment.  
C2 however suggests that the unethical motives of some politicians are fuelled by the 
opportunities which the political system offers for corruption to thrive. These 
opportunities are activated by the weak institutional frameworks in the country. This 
view connects with A7’s position; 
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In my view, what has made (corruption) possible are the very weak 
institutional frameworks we have in the country which encourage the 
exploitation of opportunities for corruption. 
 
The effect of weak institutions as the basis for corruption was also noted in Levin 
and Satarov (2000). In their study, they demonstrated how, in Russia, the state 
facilitates rather than hinders corrupt tendencies, thereby enhancing opportunities for 
perpetrating the corrupt act. This problem connects with the views discussed in the 
literature review chapter regarding the relationship between weak institutions and 
corruption (Aidt, 2003; Okike, 2007; Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011a).  
 
Exit via ‘Protection’ and ‘Connections’ 
Opportunities which encourage corruption are also aided by an offender’s ability to 
exit an offence without sanctions. This is also possible owing to weaknesses in 
institutional frameworks, particularly the legal institution. Two themes were 
variously used by research participants to explain ‘exit.’ The first is protection. 
Protection can be from the state (via immunity clauses) which disallows the state 
prosecuting an offender whilst in office. Whilst C1 believes that this government 
instrument is a reflection of how the state potentially protects offenders, A2 suggests 
that; 
The country should demonstrate its seriousness towards curbing corruption. 
Any effort in this direction must start with the politicians. I believe that when 
politicians can be held accountable for their corruption, regulations like 
corporate governance will witness a substantial degree of compliance.  
  
Evidently, making politicians accountable for their actions will help address the ‘exit’ 
possibilities which encourage corruption. More importantly, as indicated by A2, it 
will bear a positive impact on corporate governance compliance. Based on the 
foregoing, it could then be rationalised that poor compliance levels in the system are 
a response to increasing corruption in government. Whilst similar observations were 
made in Adegbite (2012), it is necessary to examine how to address this problem. 
Two strategies are identified i.e. eliminate the immunity clause from the constitution 
or apply state prosecution. It may be appropriate to consider both alternatives as an 
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instrument to ‘prevent’ or ‘cure’ the identified challenge. Corporate governance is 
certainly a ‘prevent’ instrument as it aims to communicate what constitutes anti-
governance practices, in order to discourage infractions. In this way, eliminating 
immunity clauses will promote a ‘prevent’ strategy as benefactors will understand 
that their actions are subject to increased scrutiny. In addition, the weak legal 
frameworks in developing economies undermine the use of state prosecution.    
The second property of ‘exit’ is ‘connections.’ As previously argued under the 
heading of political influence, connections (which can be related to relationships) 
have been variously used by operators to avoid sanctions. Political actors use their 
influence and authority to induce other stakeholders in order to avoid legal sanctions. 
This tool is commonly used in the Nigerian business environment. Indeed, the use of 
‘connections’ can be applied to other economic ventures. B3 indicated that; 
…the success of your business in this country can be linked to ‘connections.’ 
If you have strong connections, you can almost get away with anything. You 
can get juicy contracts from the government; you can even avoid fines and 
penalties from regulators, and so on.  
  
It is worth mentioning that the above comment was offered by a regulator, indicating 
that the authority of regulators could be undermined when the offender has 
influential ‘connections’ (or contacts) within society. The implication is that 
regulators are unable to perform their assigned responsibilities (see Okaro & 
Tauringana, 2012) which increases the laxity in corporate governance enforcement.  
Fear of the Unknown 
The concepts of motive, opportunity and exit have been identified as crucial to the 
present state of corruption in Nigeria, and are supported by what A4 referred to as 
‘fear of the unknown.’ Economic uncertainties appear to have provoked the 
increased pursuit of financial freedom, which is sometimes achieved by engaging in 
corruption. This view was reinforced by A5’s comments. In providing reasons for 
this development, A5 explained that; 
…the military intervention, especially from 1975, destroyed the confidence of 
many people, as working and waiting on pensions was just not worth it. Thus, 
people started preparing for tomorrow, from today. And that meant a lot of 
corruption in the system. The values in the system changed. 
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From A5’s account, two factors are identified, namely military intervention and the 
discovery of petroleum. The takeover of the government by the military regime of 
Gen Muritala Mohammed in July 1975 culminated in the dismissal, without benefits, 
of more than 10,000 public officials and employees on account of age, health, 
incompetence or malpractice. The regime also sanctioned the demobilisation of 
approximately 100,000 troops from the armed forces. These policies came as a shock 
to many who had always assumed they had job security and pensions on retirement 
from public service. As a result, in the words of A5, Nigerians started “preparing for 
tomorrow, from today” which led to an unprecedented spate of corruption, 
particularly in government establishments.  
The ‘fear of the unknown’ meant that there was an increased scramble for the 
country’s resources, referred to as ‘national cake’ (Ogundiya, 2009). A5 concurs that; 
…the discovery of oil has also contributed to the present state of corruption 
in the economy. 
 
The discovery of petroleum increased opportunities to engage in corruption due to 
the increased but poorly-managed wealth of the country, as more people sought to 
benefit from the oil windfall. This windfall increased the desire to make money 
“easily” among the citizenry (Smith, 2010) as this was the message being 
communicated by those in charge of petroleum-related activities in the country at the 
time. B4 informs that; 
Because the institutions are weak and very porous, everybody is trying to get 
whatever they can get from the system. The impact of this on the economy 
cannot be downplayed. 
 
This view was also noted in Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov’s (2010) framework 
where Nigeria scored low for pragmatism. One of the criteria for this score is the 
desire to ‘get rich quick,’ an attitude which is prevalent among Nigerians. Whilst 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2013) demonstrate the effects of mismanaged 
resources on an economy, Watts (2004) reported the negative effects on societal 
culture when natural resources are mismanaged. One of its outcomes is moral 
decadence. 
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Systemic Moral Decadence 
The two issues discussed above i.e. the military intervention in the civil service and 
the discovery/mismanagement of oil contributed to a considerable erosion of societal 
and moral values (Ogundiya, 2009), substituted with the aggressive pursuit of 
financial resources, mostly via illegal and corrupt channels (Smith, 2010). This 
presents a major concern as some studies show that in terms of moral integrity 
Nigeria is worse today than during the pre-colonial era (Adeoye, 2010; Omonijo & 
Nnedum, 2012). Thus, as A8 enlightens “our values system …changed completely 
for the worse.” The concern around A8’s observation is that the illegal pursuit of 
wealth through corruption engenders, as Aluko (2002) and Lawal (2007) posit, a 
continuous decline in morals and a subsequent erosion in values across society. 
Themes such as low integrity, morals and character were frequently offered by 
respondents as possible explanations for the degree of corruption in Nigeria. 
In the Nigerian business environment, corruption has thrived as a result of growing 
insensitivity towards issues of integrity, morals and character (Ojukwu & Shopeju, 
2010). This development is of such significant systemic proportion that it is 
gradually being perceived as the norm in some areas of the Nigerian society. The 
accumulation of wealth is considered paramount whilst issues relating to integrity 
and character are deemed secondary. This perception has affected the ability of some 
citizens to question individuals whose means of wealth accumulation are suspicious. 
B5 offers an example; 
…somebody doesn’t have a single kobo (local currency) …becomes a 
(government appointee) and after (few months of appointment), he starts 
buying (properties all over the world). Nobody asks him how (he came about 
the money) Rather …he becomes a rallying point. 
 
Whilst this shows the extent of societal moral decadence, it further highlights the 
degree to which corruption has infiltrated government establishments. Aliyu and 
Elijah (2008) discovered that approximately 20% of the increase in government 
capital expenditure is eventually found to be ‘in personal pockets.’ Considering the 
leadership role expected of government in entrenching corporate governance, it is 
quite disturbing to note the destabilising effects of corruption in government on the 
behaviour of the citizenry.  
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Hence, whilst this indicates that the behaviour of economic agents in relation to 
corporate governance has developed considerably from the actions or inactions of 
the government and politicians, it could also be rationalised that a change in the 
attitude of government could potentially prompt a renewed way of thinking among 
the citizenry. This reinforces Goergen’s (2012) opinion that government can deploy 
corporate governance as a tool for economic development. Therefore, as suggested 
by B3: 
…until Nigeria is able to elect those with integrity into government and other 
high calibre positions, corruption will remain an impediment to national 
development and the development of resilient regulations such as corporate 
governance.   
 
The foregoing view reinforces the role of a good democratic system in promoting 
corporate governance. A good democracy will emerge where institutional elements 
are robust. However, from the accounts of participants, issues relating to these two 
generic categories (political system and corruption) do not completely explain the 
main category of political institution. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) posit that in many 
developed countries the legal instrument has often been applied to strengthen 
institutions of corporate governance. It is therefore unsurprising to note that 
regulatory and legal system-related themes were equally dominant during data 
collection, which explains its (regulatory and legal system) subsequent emergence as 
a subset of political institutions.   
 
4.2.3 Regulatory and Legal System 
Corporate governance principles are implemented using regulations promulgated by 
government and/or its agencies. Successive Nigerian governments, particularly in the 
last two decades, have been involved in publishing regulations to address corporate 
governance issues. However, despite governments’ regulatory intervention, various 
problems have constrained the effectiveness of these regulations. A critical factor 
underlying this challenge remains the indifferent attitude of the typical Nigerian 
towards laws and regulations (Ahunwan, 2002). This perception was evident in the 
responses offered by participants. Relying on the use of QCA techniques, the 
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subcategories generated for the regulatory and legal system generic category are 
noted in Figure 11.  
 
Compliance 
Globally, as most countries adopt the mechanism of law to establish their corporate 
governance system (La Porta et al., 2000), poor compliance with these regulations 
can undermine the achievement of corporate governance objectives. Berglöf and 
Claessens (2006) and Okpara (2011) identified this issue as a barrier to good 
corporate governance in many developing economies. The poor perception towards 
regulation has meant that stakeholders (especially governments) continually explore 
avenues to circumvent laws, presenting sizeable implications for the economy (Ake, 
1991).  
This challenge had been partly traced to the view that governance codes fail to take 
into account local specificities (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Judge et al., 2008; 
Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011b). Consequently, the motivation and desire to comply 
with the ‘imported’ governance codes are impaired (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2012). 
Interestingly, this position was expressed by participants. For instance, whilst 
explaining the reason for low compliance, A2 informed that; 
 …to a large extent, the average Nigerian is not inclined to abide by …law 
compared to an average Westerner. I think many people feel that it (the laws) 
is not really made for us.  
 
This informs of a major problem with the Nigerian corporate governance codes as 
presently constituted. Adekoya (2011) remarked that the perception by stakeholders 
that corporate governance codes are imported and do not address national 
peculiarities has been engaged as a rationale for non-compliance. This raises 
concerns regarding the application, in developing countries, of concepts developed in 
the Western world (see Rwegasira, 2000; Adu-Amoah et al., 2009). For instance, it 
could be reasoned that the compliance mechanisms in advanced economies could 
have been influenced by the robustness of their institutional frameworks. However, 
replicating similar strategies in Nigeria might not yield the same results in view of 
weaknesses in institutional elements. The effect of contextual variations is also 
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observable in the approach towards the implementation of corporate governance 
regulations. As noted in Chapter Two, the SEC Code (2011) is primarily 
implemented as a voluntary (principles-based) regulation. This is not consistent with 
Ahunwan’s (2002) evaluation of the typical Nigerian attitude towards regulation. 
The use of this approach has been subjected to extensive criticisms by scholars (see 
Ofo, 2011; Adegbite, 2012). Whilst it could be rationalised that this approach was 
adopted in view of the country’s colonial affiliation with Britain, a majority of 
respondents opine that it does not offer ‘a good fit’ for the Nigerian business 
environment. B1 notes that; 
If we desire better corporate governance in this country, operators must be 
compelled to comply. When you ask them (operators) to comply voluntarily, 
you give room for manipulation. We are not ready for that. I can assure you 
that mandatory codes will offer better results. This is why the banking sector 
has witnessed some relative improvement in terms of corporate governance.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the above comment is offered by a regulator. This view is 
crucial to resolving corporate governance issues in Nigeria as regulators, by virtue of 
their responsibilities, engage constantly with organisations and their executives. 
Leveraging on the relative success achieved in the banking sector in terms of 
corporate governance further validates the position of B1. In addition, the use of a 
principles-based approach to corporate governance regulation is reliant on the 
robustness of institutional frameworks. The Nigerian business environment cannot 
be deemed to possess that level of institutional strength to warrant the adoption of a 
principles-based approach to its corporate governance regulation. It must however be 
stated that the success of a rules-based approach to corporate governance is 
facilitated by the enforcement strategy in operation. In many developing economies, 
the problems of enforcement are well-documented (Berglöf & Claessens, 2006; 
Okpara, 2011). This is discussed next. 
 
Enforcement 
Berglöf and Claessens (2006) explain that enforcement is crucial in creating an 
effective business environment and good corporate governance, particularly in 
developing countries. Enforcement has remained contentious owing to many factors 
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such as corruption and weak legal institutions, amongst others. Indeed, Wilson (2006) 
argued that enforcement has probably emerged as the main impediment to good 
corporate governance in Nigeria, with Inyang (2009) suggesting that the attainment 
of good corporate governance will remain elusive if enforcement procedures are not 
strengthened.  
The foregoing could be examined in conjunction with the postulation of deterrence 
theorists (Akers, 1990; Ellis, 2003). It is widely acknowledged that deterrence would 
be effective only when an approximate control instrument e.g. an effective 
enforcement mechanism, is in operation. What constitutes a control instrument may 
vary between countries. Whilst institutions could act as a restraint in developed 
economies, social disequilibrium variables (e.g. poverty) could be manipulated as a 
control mechanism in developing countries. The effect of this is reflected in a variety 
of areas such as uncertainty around the supremacy of, or equality before, the law. 
Despite the fact that it is common knowledge that enforcement issues are central to 
corporate governance challenges in Nigeria, it has been indicated that the use of 
conventional courts has undermined the enforcement of corporate governance (see 
A8’s comment below). Shleifer (2010) argues that one concern for regulation relates 
to the failure of courts to address legal disputes inexpensively, predictably and 
impartially. As A8 noted, the concerns expressed by Shleifer (2010) appear evident 
in Nigerian courts; 
The enforcement of corporate governance has been weakened by the role 
which the judges play in their various courts. …many of the culprits are not 
handed appropriate sanctions for their infractions while some are discharged 
for, supposedly, a lack of evidence. In some of these judgements, you could 
(sense a corruption-induced judgement). 
 
The reason for this is traced to a weakened judiciary whose authority appears to have 
been challenged by the powerful political class. Furthermore, prevalent corrupt 
practices across society seem to have infiltrated the ranks of judicial officers. 
Abdulkarim (2012) agreed that discrepancies in the distribution of justice in Nigeria 
are responsible for the pervasiveness of corruption. In recent times, politicians, 
public officers and corporate executives have been convicted of governance-related 
 129 
 
infractions,43 44 45 however the punishments have been deemed to be very lenient. 
Another problem identified with the use of conventional courts is the length of time 
taken to conclude court proceedings. This affords the accused time to explore 
opportunities for eventual acquittal or at best, minor sentences.  
The leniency of sentences, which highlights a concern among deterrence theorists, 
accounts for another problem discussed by participants with sentences not appearing 
to be commensurate with the offences committed. While issues relating to corruption 
have been identified as responsible for this development, the extensive use of 
‘connections’ and political influence also accounts significantly for poor judicial 
enforcement. A1 sought to establish a connection between enforcement and 
deterrence; 
…you know, we have what I call a jo-jo (begging) culture, so a guy commits 
an infraction but he is not sent to jail. He begs to resign (from his job) and he 
is let off the hook. Thus, there is no deterrence for the next person but we 
forget that that is why people are sent to jail, so that other people will know 
the consequences of committing a fraud. 
While compliance and enforcement issues continue to dominate discourse regarding 
the establishment of a robust corporate governance system, other issues have also 
attracted attention in view of their relevance and contribution to the present state of 
corporate governance in the country. Thus, participants discussed the role of 
regulators and concerns which inhibit the professional and ethical discharge of their 
responsibilities. 
Whilst a variety of issues has been highlighted which impacts enforcement, the 
‘comply or explain’ nature of corporate governance regulation presents additional 
challenges. This system, which expects the market to react to governance practices in 
an organisation (Arcot, Bruno, & Faure-Grimaud, 2010), is driven by the existence 
of a sophisticated information infrastructure (Black, Hopper, & Band, 2007). This is 
not the case in Nigeria however, thus questioning the rationale for adopting such a 
                                                 
43
 Cecelia Ibru, a former CEO of one of the top banks in Nigeria was sentenced to six months’ 
imprisonment and ordered to hand over approximately £786m in cash and assets  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11506421   
44
 Tafa Balogun, a former Inspector General of Police was jailed for six months for corruption  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4460740.stm  
45
 James Ibori, a former governor of Delta State was jailed for 13 years for fraud totalling nearly 
£50m http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17739388  
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governance system. This point will be further explored in a subsequent chapter of 
this thesis. 
    
Regulators 
As noted previously, regulation is central to the entrenchment of a sound corporate 
governance system but equally important are the regulators whose responsibility is to 
ensure that the provisions of the regulation are complied with. In Nigeria, it is 
suggested that the problems of weak enforcement are influenced by the 
unprofessional conduct of corporate governance regulators. Kajola (2008) agrees that 
corporate governance continues to experience challenges in Nigeria as regulators 
lack the necessary empowerment to compel compliance or enforcement. Views from 
respondents are consistent with the preceding positions. A variety of issues was 
identified which impacts the conduct of regulators. The first issue relates to 
remuneration packages for regulators.  A7 remarks that; 
…what do you expect from a regulator whose remuneration is so poor. These 
guys are constantly under pressure to accept bribes which would alter their 
decisions. Even those that initially refuse... You realise that eventually, they 
cave in. They start collecting bribes.  
 
The above account highlights an important issue. Poor financial conditions could 
induce regulators to engage in unscrupulous corporate governance activities. Some 
regulators who participated in this study also lamented the remuneration system for 
regulators which is based on the civil service remuneration structure. As a result, 
these regulators agree that they are constantly under pressure to refuse financial 
inducements from operators. The danger, as highlighted by A7 above, is the 
eventuality of such regulators accepting bribes. This practice has subsequently 
grown amongst regulators, creating a systemic challenge.  
It is also imperative to state that apart from pressure occasioned by financial 
inducements, exogenous influences tend to create further degrees of pressure for 
regulators. Owing to the power wielded by politicians, executives, family members 
and colleagues, amongst others, regulators are pressurised to engage in unethical 
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practices, sometimes jeopardising their jobs. C2 established a relationship between 
external pressure, job security and financial inducements. C2 commented that; 
…sometimes, the pressure that regulators are exposed to obliges them to act 
unethically. If they insist on acting professionally, it is usually at the expense 
of their jobs. You know, that could have serious implications for their future 
sustenance. So, some will ‘play ball’ and accept whatever financial 
enticement comes with that.  
 
Another issue that was observed relates to the capacity of regulators to discharge 
their responsibilities. Effective regulation demands that regulators must possess the 
necessary power and authority to compel compliance and enforce regulatory 
provisions. However, participants are of the view that this is lacking. A6 comments 
that;    
In my view, the regulation of corporate governance is the primary challenge 
facing corporate governance in this country. Regulators do not have the 
power to regulate. And if they can’t regulate, who will? So, there can be no 
sound corporate governance system without effective regulators.   
  
The lack of power and authority is inconsistent with the public interest theory 
assumptions of den Hertog (2010) who argues that regulators have sufficient 
information and enforcement powers to promote the public interest. In many 
developing countries such as Nigeria regulators do not only suffer from a lack of 
necessary enforcement powers, they also have their access to sufficient information 
inhibited by weak political and social institutions. Poor disclosure of key information 
and a lack of transparency restricts the ability of regulators to make informed 
decisions, hence the quality of their output is inadequate. Despite the prevalence of 
issues which have affected the discharge of the functions of regulators, there is still 
an explicit and implied responsibility by regulators to uphold their professional 
canons. It is therefore important to understand other possible motivations which 
explain why regulators act unprofessionally. The comments from A7 offer some 
indication, suggesting that it is a systemic issue:  
I really think our system is to blame for this, because nobody cares about 
good name, about reputation, about values anymore. Everybody wants to 
make more money. 
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As values erode in a society, economic actors become increasingly open to 
undesirable societal developments. When A5 was asked to explain the cause of this 
problem, their response was simply “greed.” Solomon (2013) notes that, on the 
negative side, capitalist economies are often associated with greed. Nonetheless, 
capitalist economies such as the US have, to a considerable extent, controlled the 
manifestation of ‘greed’ in its system using regulatory machinery and related 
institutional mechanisms. It could be reasoned that a consistently robust institutional 
framework has had a positive impact on the personal norms and belief systems of 
stakeholders in the US. This re-emphasises the need to entrench functional 
institutions, particularly a legal system, to build and maintain values and ethics in a 
society. 
 
Outdated Regulations 
Interviewees observed that a concern which requires immediate attention is the 
review of corporate governance codes and regulations in Nigeria (Okike, 2007). 
Some interviewees opined that regulators have failed to acknowledge the dynamism 
of and changes in the international corporate governance environment by their 
failure to respond promptly with appropriate regulations. These interviewees claim 
that many corporate regulations in Nigeria have suffered from ‘neglect.’ With 
respect to corporate governance, B8 acknowledged the lack of regular review of 
existing codes, hence the codes become obsolete and outdated. A4 explained why the 
codes are obsolete: 
…a lot of their sanctions are outdated because a sanction becomes outdated 
when it is easily affordable. 
 
The relative affordability of the codes highlights the need for an effective deterrence 
strategy. The main corporate governance regulations in Nigeria are usually not 
reviewed appropriately to reflect emerging trends. As a consequence, they fail to 
recognise contemporary developments. For example, the first corporate governance 
code in Nigeria (the SEC Code) was issued in 2003. It was not updated until 2011. 
As a result, concepts such as the role and appointment of Independent Directors 
which were not addressed in the 2003 code were recently recognised in the 2011 
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update. Similar countries, such as India, implemented these procedures (relating to 
Independent Directors) as early as 2004.  
The same scenario is evident with the foremost corporate law in Nigeria, the 
Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) which was promulgated in 
1990. This Act, intended to regulate all aspects of operations of registered companies 
in the country, has not been updated since its release. The problem with time passage 
is that sanctions and penalties become affordable. For example, Section 55 of 
CAMA stipulates a fine of N2500 (less than £10 at the prevailing exchange rate of 
N286:£1) when a foreign company violates the requirements of Section 54. This 
does not reflect the realities of the present day in terms of affordability. It is therefore 
impossible for such penalties to act as a deterrent (Becker, 1974; Sutinen & Kuperan, 
1999) to governance infractions. 
 
4.2.4 Summary of Political Institutions 
Section 4.2 identifies the influences (subcategories and generic categories) which 
impact the political institutional environment of corporate governance in Nigeria. 
From subcategories such as ‘fear of the unknown,’ ‘exit via protection and 
connection’ and ‘political immunity,’ the political domain of institutional theorising 
is enriched, as the examination of these concerns has been considerably limited in 
the literature. The generic categories of political system and the regulatory and legal 
system also indicate the degree of influence exerted upon the system by influential 
economic actors, which is inconsistent with the fundamentals of ‘institutions’ in 
institutionalism discourse. It would appear that the robustness of institutional theory 
could benefit from activities channelled towards addressing the influence of 
economic agents, compared against institutional elements, in economies where the 
institutional framework is weak.  Concerns identified with respect to economic 
agents can also have implications for the social domain of institutional theory. This 
is evaluated in the next section. 
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4.3 Social Institutions 
According to Turner (1997), it could be inferred that social institutions represent a 
complex, integrated set of social standards intended to preserve basic societal values; 
designed to support society’s survival. The field of corporate governance has 
acknowledged the influence of social institutions towards building a robust 
governance system (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Davis, 2005). In particular, studies 
(Fiss, 2008; Filatotchev et al., 2013) have demonstrated that differences in social 
institutions could explain variations in governance practices, thus informing the need 
to analyse this variant of institution. 
Figure 12 - Thematic Frameworks for Social Institution 
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Findings from participants produced themes which subsequently generated three 
generic categories (culture, religion and ethnicity) (see Figure 12). This produced 
social institutions as a main category. Thus, this analysis focuses on these three areas 
of social institutions. Cornelius and Esheya (2013) explained that these three 
elements explain the peculiarity of the Nigerian social structure. Indeed, these 
categories have featured consistently in various analyses of social structures in 
Nigeria (see Ukiwo, 2003, 2005; Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011a).  The first subsection 
(Section 4.4.1) examines themes related to culture and their implications for 
corporate governance. Considering the strong religious affiliations of Nigerians, 
Section 4.4.2 evaluates the possible effects of religion on corporate governance. 
Finally, Section 4.4.3 examines the impact of multi-ethnic groups on corporate 
governance in Nigeria.  
 
4.3.1 Cultural Influences on Corporate Governance 
In corporate governance discourse, there is evidence (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Licht 
et al., 2005) to suggest that corporate governance has been influenced by a dominant 
culture. Similar conclusions have been reported in Nigeria. Oghojafor, George, and 
Owoyemi (2012), whilst describing the relationship between corporate governance 
and national culture as “Siamese twins,” posited that national culture plays a crucial 
role in the efficacy of corporate governance.   
Some other work (Ite, 2004; Amaeshi, Adi, Ogbechie, & Amao, 2006) suggests that 
the implication of culture upon corporate governance practices in Nigeria is 
substantial. This view was alluded to by a majority of the participants, as they agreed 
that culture has implications for corporate governance in Nigeria. For instance, while 
C3 stated that “you cannot separate people from their culture,” B1 commented that 
“culture …plays a very significant role in all that we (Nigerians) do.” 
According to Licht et al. (2005), the effect of culture on corporate governance 
practices across the world varies as it is dependent on a wide range of factors.  This 
stance is expressed in the work of Hofstede (1980); Hofstede et al. (2010), 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2004) and Hall (1976). These studies identified 
various factors which define culture across the globe, and their impact on behaviour. 
Similar views were noted whilst engaging with interviewees. Initial responses 
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suggested that the cultural beliefs of many Nigerians should ordinarily serve 
corporate governance positively. For instance, A6 noted that; 
…culturally, as Africans, we are a set of people who take pride in working 
and achieving great success. A typical African man will want to be identified 
with a specific productivity record and achievement. I think this conform(s) 
with some principles of corporate governance such as performance, 
accountability, transparency, and so on. 
 
As shown in Figure 13, Nigerians display a relatively masculine disposition which 
indicates that “people live in order to work” (Hofstede et al., 2010) hence there is 
emphasis on competition and performance. This is consistent with the statement of 
A6 above. 
Figure 13 - Hofstede’s Cultural Outcomes - Nigeria 
 
Source: Adapted from Hofstede Website46  
To facilitate a comprehensive analysis of cultural influences on corporate 
governance in Nigeria, Figure 12 shows the subcategories emerging from the 
comments and findings from research participants. These subcategories form the 
basis of subsequent analysis.  
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Social Inequality 
The view expressed by A6 (see above) suggests that individuals take pride in 
engaging in legal and ethical activities to perhaps preserve their social status. The 
preservation of social status is crucial to Nigerians. This is reflected in the high score 
for power distance (Figure 13). The society and its organisations assume that 
individuals are not equal hence subordinates expect to be ‘told what to do,’ whereas 
the boss is permitted to display some autocratic tendencies. Trompennars and 
Hampden-Turner (2004) cultural framework describes this variable as ‘ascription.’ It 
explains that in such societies, power, title and position matter, and these ‘privileges’ 
define behaviour. Those that possess these privileges can act with less restraint 
compared to those without such privileges. As a result, social status is enhanced by 
the possession of these rights. A3 acknowledges this concern; 
…when some people tell you that fingers are not equal, you can see that they 
believe everything, including human beings are not equal. Unfortunately, 
that perception influences most of their action: be it in private, public, (for 
example). …why would some people drive against traffic when others are not 
supposed to?  
 
The above reflects social inequality. In contrast, the concept of corporate governance 
as a regulatory instrument assumes that stakeholders should be treated fairly.  
However, the problem with this assumption, according to Omololu (2007), is that 
legal concepts such as the rule of law may be redefined to accommodate the excesses 
of the privileged few, with implications for corporate governance functionality. The 
concern of social inequality is also deepened with respect to age, which is 
subsequently addressed. 
 
Respect for Age 
There is also the view that culture’s negative impact on corporate governance 
practices stems from the respect accorded to elders and notable members of society 
on the basis of age. Consequently, their actions and/or inactions are usually not 
questioned, in observance of implied cultural expectations. This view was 
highlighted in A9’s response; 
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…in (earlier times), there is respect for leaders but the leaders of those eras 
were very powerful. Do you know that you can actually be (driven away) 
from your community if you question their authority or even ask basic 
questions? Even your family members can disown you just to show allegiance 
to the leader…. respect for age and authority undermine good corporate 
governance. 
 
Despite increasing westernisation, this belief system is still evident in the Nigerian 
society, even in public and private entities. B1 agrees that “our culture requires that 
we respect elders,” hence questioning a CEO, for instance, might be unacceptable in 
an organisation. Whilst this development also indicates power distance, as noted in 
Hofstede et al. (2010), Conton (1964) observed that Africans value and have much 
respect for old age, such that, the older you are, the more respect you earn. This 
attitude towards age is manipulated such that the aged are exempt from liabilities and 
even penalties. To further highlight the relevance of age in Nigeria, an Ibo47 adage 
proclaims that “paying attention and listening to an elderly person is like consulting 
an oracle.”48 Whilst this simply equates an elderly person to an oracle, it highlights 
the innate challenges in confronting the activities of an elderly person even when 
infractions are apparent. This concern can be further extended to discuss the next 
cultural problem of submissiveness to power and authority. 
 
Submissiveness to Power and Authority 
In view of the respect for age prevalent in the Nigerian society, similar respect is 
preserved for those with power and authority. A8 remarked that; 
…We defer to authority. For instance, if you have a traditional ruler as the 
chairman of a Board, would you argue with him? 
 
The connection which A8 sought to establish between a corporate executive and a 
traditional ruler offers a stimulating proposition. Whilst traditional rulers have been 
engaged to oversee activities in their local domain, their engagement by the British 
during the colonial era reinforced their relevance. British colonialists introduced the 
                                                 
47
 The Ibos are one of the three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria occupying the South-Eastern 
geographical location in the country. 
48
 According to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, an oracle, among others, is a “person or 
thing regarded as an infallible authority on something.” 
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indirect rule system, which had traditional rulers at its foundation. Traditional rulers 
acquire their status through succession, hence their authority is often rooted in 
traditions and customs.  
A3 observed that the traditional rulers are viewed as gods in their domain, hence 
their decisions or authority are unquestionable. The respect accorded to traditional 
rulers has meant that they are widely-engaged across different spheres. For instance, 
some serve as board chairmen of corporate organisations, whilst virtually all 
universities in Nigeria appoint traditional rulers as chancellors. However, regardless 
of these assignments, their status as traditional rulers appear to attract reverence, 
even when they err. A3 illustrates the possible effect on corporate governance; 
…when that mentality is brought into a corporate setting, you find that the 
chairman or the CEO can have a superiority complex or even a god-complex, 
such that the person is unable to …obey corporate governance codes because 
culturally, he, as the CEO or he as the chairman, sees himself as a god. 
 
This further highlights the inequality which pervades the system. The effect of this 
development was noted in Warren (1996). Whilst examining a common conception 
of authority, Warren (1996) noted that authority compels a surrender of judgement 
by those subject to that authority. However, when Solomon’s (2013) description of 
corporate governance (as a system of checks and balance) is taken into context, the 
effect of the misapplication of authority in the Nigerian business environment is 
understood. Submissiveness to power and authority has literally created two 
operators in the system; those who are denied the opportunity of expressing their 
observations and secondly, those whose actions are not expected to be scrutinised.  
Whilst the preceding concern connotes social inequality, it also implies that 
measures such as whistle-blowing become difficult to entrench in organisations as 
employees and other stakeholders who possess sensitive information are constrained 
from divulging or reporting the unwholesome activities of the executives of the 
organisation.  
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Whistle-Blowing 
Indeed, whistle-blowing initiatives represent one of the areas that have been 
weakened by the cultural challenges in the Nigerian society. The prevailing culture 
in Nigeria does not appear to support whistle-blowing. In line with Hofstede et al. 
(2010) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2004) classification of Nigeria as a 
collectivist and communitarian society respectively, individuals tend to pursue group 
interests. It is assumed that reporting the infractions of a group member could affect 
group dynamics or weaken the group in relation to other groups. As a result, 
individual infractions may be addressed in-house (within the group), but in most 
cases, the status of the culprit does influence the level of sanctions.  
Whistle-blowing suffers from the cultural implications of age and status. The system 
lacks support and protection for subordinates who intend to whistle-blow. As Iwu-
Egwuonwu (2010) reported, the Cadbury (Enron-like) debacle was exposed when 
the Chairman ‘blew the whistle.’ Iwu-Egwuonwu (2010) postulated that the 
infractions in the company may have been observed by some employees but the 
possible repercussion for exposing such unethical practices may have discouraged 
these employees from ‘blowing the whistle.’ C3 identified a likely explanation for 
the poor whistle-blowing culture; 
…whistle-blowing is not encouraged in Nigeria …because whistle-blowing is 
often targeted at those at the top, either in government or private 
organisations. Remember that laws often originate from these people so 
would you expect them to call for the establishment of (regulation) that will 
disallow them from perpetrating their fraudulent activities?  
 
This account further reinforces the opinion that leadership is at the foundation of 
many corporate governance challenges facing the country. The absence of whistle-
blowing provisions in the latest SEC code is indicative of poor leadership from both 
regulators and the government, and signals the government’s attitude towards 
corporate governance. Notwithstanding the indifference of government to whistle-
blowing, there are suggestions among participants that whistle-blowing is unfamiliar 
within the cultural context of Nigeria. This may have influenced the perception of 
corporate governance as a foreign concept.   
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Governance as a Foreign Concept   
Whilst issues regarding regulatory codes for corporate governance have been 
considered, comments from participants indicate that some issues of governance in 
Nigeria border on the perception of corporate governance as a foreign concept (see 
Paredes, 2005). This concern emerges from the view that the codes are ‘imported’ 
from foreign countries, hence they lack the capacity to address, in particular, the 
cultural specificities of an ethnically-diverse country such as Nigeria. A7 admits that; 
…maybe the problem of the code is that it failed to integrate our own culture 
because it was imported from abroad. So people will not identify with it. 
These codes do not address our local cultural peculiarities. 
 
However, B6 noted that the company concept, which informs corporate governance, 
is not indigenous to Nigeria. It could be argued that the case of Nigeria is not 
different from that expressed in Koutoupis (2012) regarding Greek corporate 
governance. As a country, Nigeria has experienced various levels of governance 
through its traditional rulers in the past. Hence, the governance concept cannot be 
deemed as alien. The concern, however, is that the governance of corporations (or 
corporate governance) is a relatively new concept, especially as the idea of 
corporations (or firms) is indeed alien.  
B6 therefore reasoned that it is the country that must adapt to the ‘imported’ 
principles of corporate governance, adding that operators must understand that the 
codes are simply ‘best practice,’ designed to guide their actions. A similar view was 
noted by Koutoupis (2012). Despite adopting international corporate governance 
codes to establish good governance amongst Greek companies, findings indicate 
there is still a long way to go towards achieving best practice. However, Koutoupis 
(2012) did not hold the ‘imported’ codes responsible for the weak governance in the 
system, rather the application strategy was deemed to be faulty.  
Therefore, whilst it is the prerogative of stakeholders to ‘make corporate governance 
work,’ B6 explained that deviation from regulation might be a reflection of the 
questionable intentions of the operators involved. Indeed, as Okike (2007) noted, the 
need to play an increasing role in the global market means that Nigeria cannot afford 
to isolate itself from global developments such as corporate governance. It is 
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therefore imperative for the country to continually explore means of building a 
robust corporate governance system, even if, as Rwegasira (2000) advised, it has to 
rework the concept to efficiently incorporate local specificities. 
 
The Impact of Globalisation  
A considerable number of participants’ responses attribute the country’s corporate 
governance failures to the continuing decline in cultural values and other cultural-
inspired factors. In turn, this development has had substantial impact on societal 
values. The declining cultural values, occasioned by culture change, can be traced to 
some exogenous factors.  
A1 indicated that external factors, prompted by globalisation and the use of 
technology, could have had the greatest implications for cultural change in Nigeria. 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2004) explained that some cultures are 
significantly influenced by “outer direction” or external focus of control. In these 
societies, people believe that nature and their environment determines how they 
behave, hence they rely on the dictates of their environment. There is no doubt that 
external developments have redefined some elements of the Nigerian culture. The 
desire to gain financial success is a feature of capitalist economies. B3 went on to 
explain how this development has manifested itself in the cultural behaviour of 
Nigerians; 
…Nigerians have chosen to behave like people in some very corrupt 
countries. We celebrate people with financial success without raising 
questions regarding how they became financially successful. We attach high 
value to financial success. 
 
The pursuit of financial success could necessitate deterioration in cultural values, as 
the desire to secure financial freedom may be achieved at the expense of other 
stakeholders. However, countries such as the US, which is regarded as the home of 
capitalism, have succeeded somewhat in managing the impact of globalisation on the 
governance system in its business environment. It can therefore be recommended 
that the Nigerian authorities must embrace the positives of globalisation to negotiate 
a better governance system. 
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As noted by B3 above, it can be argued that corruption in Nigeria has benefitted 
from increasing globalisation. For instance, whereas Markovska and Adams (2015) 
established a relationship between corruption and money laundering, Alldridge 
(2008) explains that money laundering, more than any other, is the crime that reflects 
and energises globalisation. This establishes a link between corruption and 
globalisation. Therefore, it might be necessary for the authorities to look inwards to 
resolve the governance issues in the country. In other words, addressing endogenous 
issues may initiate an enhanced governance framework for the country. Smith (2010) 
noted that Nigerians are ambivalent towards corruption. He reported that whilst 
Nigerians recognise that corruption undermines the country’s democratic institutions, 
they are also aware that wealth, power and prestige are often attained through corrupt 
practices. This behaviour, according to Nwabuzor (2005), is a reflection of the 
challenge posed by widespread systemic poverty. As a consequence, Dike (2005) 
proposed that the need to secure financial freedom has also contributed substantially 
to the deteriorating cultural values in Nigeria.  
 
From participants’ responses, it is evident that social structure has not only been 
affected by culture, it has also been impacted by the increasing relevance of religion. 
Thus, to what extent does this impact the practice of corporate governance? What 
religious concerns were identified by participants as critical to the present state of 
corporate governance in Nigeria? These themes are examined in the next section.   
    
4.3.2 The Effects of Religion on Corporate Governance 
According to Barro and McCleary (2003) and McCleary (2008), religious belief 
matters for economic development, but literature regarding the impact of religion on 
the practice of corporate governance is limited. This possibly suggests that the 
influence of religion on corporate governance is negligible. However, the variation 
regarding the importance of religion across societies indicates that religion could be 
crucial to corporate practices in some countries (see Castles, 1994). This supports 
Kempf Jr.’s (2008) observation that factors pertaining to religion may contribute to 
the success or otherwise of corporate governance.  
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Indeed, countries with a dominant religion are likely to have many of their policies 
influenced by religion. Thus, when A2 posits that religion is crucial to societies, such 
assertions may have been informed by practices in the respondent’s immediate 
environment. Nonetheless, the foregoing connects with Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales’ (2003) position that much of the existing evidence regarding the impact of 
religion is based on cross-country studies in which the impact is overwhelmed by 
variances in institutional frameworks. 
Contextualising Kempf Jr.’s (2008) position, however, requires that it is analysed 
with respect to research participants’ views. The analysis commenced by evaluating 
the views of participants regarding the relevance of religion to good corporate 
governance. From their responses, some codes were developed which formed the 
foundation for the analysis. 
 
The Relevance of Religion 
It is essential to examine the relevance of religion to corporate governance discourse 
in the Nigerian business environment from participants’ perspectives. In their 
responses, a majority of respondents agreed that religion is crucial to good corporate 
governance. They note that the doctrines of religion should typically connect 
positively with the practice of good corporate governance. A9 advances that; 
…religion plays a significant role (in corporate governance). Religion 
preaches fairness, ethics and the need to consider others before oneself. 
Corporate governance is an offshoot of what religion is all about. I think 
religion affects corporate governance positively. 
 
In the context of A9’s comment, it would be logically expected that the good values 
associated with religion should have a positive effect on corporate governance. 
Grullon et al. (2009) suggest that religious foundations provide a robust explanation 
for the developmental path of corporate governance witnessed in some developed 
economies. Furthermore, they (Grullon et al., 2009) note that religiosity can deter 
undesirable corporate behaviour, they added that regulation could yield better 
outcomes in environments that display a high degree of religiosity. A similar 
position was noted in McCleary (2008), indicating that religious beliefs reinforce 
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character traits such as hard work, honesty, spending time wisely etc. which 
ultimately motivate people to work and cultivate virtuous behaviours. From the 
preceding comment, which is consistent with the data, it is necessary to examine 
whether religion has promoted desirable corporate behaviour. This is evaluated 
subsequently.   
 
Religious Impact and Belief 
Having examined the view that religion is relevant to good corporate governance 
practice, how do the fundamentals of religion such as ethics and spirituality promote 
corporate governance in Nigeria? Adi (2005) observed that the belief in the 
supernatural or spiritual realities is core to the worldview of the average Nigerian. A 
quotation from Adamo (2001, p. 41) attests to this perception; 
The richest and the most important heritage of Africa is religion. This 
heritage permeates the entire life of the African people. This heritage has 
dominated the thinking of African people to the extent that it shapes their 
cultural, social, political and economic activities.   
 
In connection with the above, it must be specified that the Nigerian society is 
dominated by Christians and Muslims. C1 provides a proper perspective; 
…we are very religious in this country. Some of the churches and the 
mosques are very strong. They have a lot of impact on the people. 
 
This fact is reflected in the religious background of participants as all are either 
Christians or Muslims. However, despite the fact that the majority of participants 
suggest that religion is related to good corporate governance, these sentiments were 
not shared by a minority of the participants who argued that religion has no influence 
on corporate governance practice in the country. For instance, when B1 was asked if 
religion affects corporate governance, their response was;  
I don’t think so. Because the rules are clear. The code is explicitly clear so 
religion does not necessarily have any input in determining the extent of 
compliance with corporate governance codes. 
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With respect to B1’s opinion above, Kuran (2009) takes a similar view but 
acknowledges that country and geographical specificities could compel a different 
opinion, similar to the stance taken in Guiso et al. (2003) and Grullon et al. (2009). 
Considering that Adamo (2001) and Adi (2005) have emphasised the criticality of 
religion in the Nigerian and African context, it is fair to proceed this analysis on the 
basis that religion could be a factor in corporate governance practice in Nigeria.    
 
Religion and Conduct 
If the preceding notion is true, the nature of religion is such that it is intended to 
reform the behaviour of its devotees. As religions generally preach fairness and 
equity, it can be rationalised that a religious person should be able to imbibe the 
principles of corporate governance and live by that standard. Therefore, in view of 
the high degree of religiosity amongst Nigerians, corporate governance stakeholders 
would be expected to display a high level of compliance with corporate governance 
provisions. Coincidentally, Amaeshi et al. (2006) also reasoned that the strong 
inclination of Nigerians towards religion should influence their attitude towards 
corporate vices such as corruption and favouritism, among others. However, 
evidence from the literature (see Chapter Two) and from respondents (Section 4.2 of 
this chapter) indicates that the present state of corporate governance remains a source 
of concern.  
Respondents provided information detailing how religion has been manipulated to 
rationalise corporate governance infractions. When A11, for example, was asked to 
assess the impact of religion on corporate governance in Nigeria, they responded; 
…because Nigeria is a religious country, top executives use their religion as 
a cover to arrogate a lot of powers to themselves which will be used for their 
own selfish interests and most times, to the detriment of the organisation and 
stakeholders. 
 
In Section 4.3, issues of political influence and authority were analysed. Similar 
traits are observed from A11’s statement above indicating how the instrument of 
religion is used to impose power and influence over other stakeholders. The 
implication of this development is that, in the Nigerian context, there seems to be a 
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disconnection between religion and corporate governance practices. Indeed, it can be 
argued that the prevalence of religion in Nigeria has not contributed to the 
advancement of good corporate governance practice in Nigeria. The majority of 
respondents allude to this view. Certainly, it has had negative consequences. Some 
accounts of interviewees detailing why this is the case were noted. For instance, C1 
states that; 
I think the church itself in this country has a kind of subtle effect on making 
our systems not work effectively. Because, I found out that the more religious 
we become, the weaker our institutions are. …the behaviour (of these people) 
is the antithesis of what (religion) is about. So, I feel that in a way religion 
has a means of not allowing our institutions to work effectively. 
 
The above comment suggests that the church in Nigeria has contributed to the 
ineffectiveness of institutional elements in the country, which has consequences for 
good governance behaviour, considering the high level of religiosity among 
Nigerians. The view indicates that being religious may not necessarily promote good 
corporate governance practice. This concern obliges an assessment of spirituality as 
an alternative to religiosity. This is examined next. 
   
Spirituality 
The perception that religion has not positively impacted corporate governance 
practice in Nigeria can be traced to how stakeholders understand the concept of 
religion. In other words, religion appears to be confused with spirituality. The 
boundary of spirituality extends beyond religion. James Martineau described religion 
as the belief in an ever-living God. However, as Harrison (2006) observed, this view 
failed to take into account equally prominent religious emotions such as piety and 
faith. On its part, spirituality incorporates these elements, as it transcends beyond the 
scope of religion. It entails a process of personal transformation in accordance with 
religious ideals. In relation to Harrison’s (2006) view, spirituality can only be 
associated with religion when religious emotions are inculcated such that a positive 
transformation in human behaviour is created.  
The foregoing provides a context for analysing corporate governance practices 
amongst Nigerian stakeholders, taking into account the degree of religiosity amongst 
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Nigerians. What has been the impact of the high degree of religiosity amongst 
Nigerians? A1 offered an opinion; 
…we don’t have the underlying real religious commitment; so much of our 
religious posturing is (shallow). I am not convinced that it has any 
substantive impact on our values.  
 
The above comment indicates that many Nigerians have not moved beyond the scope 
of religion, to spirituality. As a result, the inherent benefits of religion have not been 
exploited to facilitate the emergence of transformed economic agents who are able to 
recognise and apply the norms of corporate governance. This presents a crucial 
concern.  
The inability to apply the basic religious teachings has not helped the advancement 
of good corporate governance principles. Issues of corruption and other related vices 
have crept into the religious consciousness of many stakeholders such that these 
vices have overwhelmed sound religious doctrines. Attempts at addressing this 
challenge would require redirecting stakeholders to embrace morals, good values and 
principles or, as Harrison (2006) posits, the “transformation of operators,” which 
integrates sound religious emotions. It is vital for stakeholders to understand that 
religious ideals could act as fundamental drivers of good corporate governance, 
especially in a country where religious consciousness is high. Although the outcome 
could be different when spirituality is taken into account, it can be argued that 
Nigerian governance stakeholders require a reorientation via education to increase 
their awareness of the relationship and limits of religion with respect to corporate 
governance.  
 
Religious Herding 
Following the preceding analysis, the manner in which many Nigerians perceive 
religion has probably not helped the corporate governance cause, owing mainly to 
lack of application of religious ideals. Despite this, religious consciousness is on the 
increase. This development has been traced to a variety of factors (see Falola, 1998; 
Ukiwo, 2003) but central to these is the role of religious leaders. 
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The influence and power of religious leaders appear to be significant factors that 
have stimulated the surge in religiosity among Nigerians. A BBC News survey 
revealed that 85% of Nigerians trust their religious leaders and would be willing to 
give them more power (Ferrett, 2005). As leaders, they have engaged various 
approaches to shape the consciousness of Nigerians, which has further ensured their 
growing relevance. However, B3 notes a problem; 
… (Religion) is supposed to be a moderator or check on people’s behaviour 
but it has not lived up to expectation. There have been many instances of 
unethical behaviours on the part of religious leaders in the country. 
Unfortunately, many of the followers have followed suit. 
 
The above quotation highlights an important concern; that of a herding mentality. 
Due to challenges linked to low economic power, high death rates, social inequalities 
and poverty, among others, religion has been embraced to provide succour to many 
citizens, in order to reduce despondency. C3 indicated that some religious leaders 
acknowledge that the desire of devotees to address these concerns was critical to 
their search for religious empowerment. Consequently, these leaders tend to take 
advantage of these opportunities. As Abioje (2005) observed, many Nigerians are 
conditioned by what they learn from those who act as their religious leaders. 
However, findings in Abioje (2005) show that many religious leaders impart a 
negative influence on their followers, as some of these leaders are not morally sound. 
The effect of such negative influences is that, with the passage of time, devotees also 
begin to exhibit similar traits as their leaders. This creates a herding behaviour. This 
behaviour, which could be initially rational in an individual sense, subsequently 
produces a group behaviour that could be perceived as irrational. Whilst these 
individuals can be sufficiently classed as religious, the basic principles of religion 
are not manifest in their individual character. As a consequence, the expected 
positive influence on corporate governance practices remains unachievable. B2 
provided a perception which aims to contextualise some Nigerians’ religious beliefs; 
People take God for granted. (They) believe in God but what they do is not 
the business of God. They do things according to their individual whims and 
caprices, and greed in most cases guides most of their (actions). 
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The above statement reveals a gap between religious beliefs and the manifestation of 
such beliefs i.e. the gap between religion and spirituality. This reveals that the degree 
of religiosity cannot be relied upon as a determinant for good corporate governance. 
This contradicts the views expressed by many of the participants as noted in the 
‘relevance of religion’ section, it is however consistent with the positions expressed 
by participants in the ‘religious impact and belief’ and ‘religion and conduct’ 
sections of this chapter. Consequently, it is worth noting that evidence regarding 
corporate governance practices in Nigeria does not support Grullon et al.’s (2009) 
assertion that in an environment with a high degree of religiosity, regulations yield 
better outcomes. Perhaps it is vital for stakeholders to examine whether the extent of 
spirituality will have a positive or negative influence on corporate governance 
behaviours amongst operators.   
 
4.3.3 The Impact of Ethnicity on Corporate Governance 
Whilst validation regarding the impact of ethnicity on corporate performance is 
limited, the fact that countries where corporate governance has achieved relative 
success (UK, US, Canada, Australia) tend to display a narrow and less 
heterogeneous ethnic structure may have restricted the examination of ethnicity. 
However, evidence from Cox, Lobel, and McLeod (1991) and Thomas and Bendixen 
(2000) offers indications regarding the potential influence of ethnicity on 
corporations and their performance. This view was shared by some participants as 
they discussed the implications of themes relating to ethnocentrism and tribal 
affiliations and federal character on corporate governance practice in Nigeria.  
 
Ethnocentric Concerns 
Based on the account of Ukiwo (2005), Nigeria was acknowledged as one of the 
most ethnically diverse countries in the world, hence there is some sensitivity around 
ethnicity issues in Nigeria. Nnoli (2003) maintained that in competitive and non-
competitive settings, Nigerians are more likely to define themselves based on their 
ethnic affiliations rather than any other identity. The emergence of some ethnicity-
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related themes suggests that an assessment of corporate governance in Nigeria must 
take into account ethnocentric issues.   
To commence the analysis, respondents’ views were sought regarding the impact of 
ethnicity on corporate governance. A11 claimed that; 
…the society is divided along ethnic lines …Positions held by individuals are 
usually not based on competence but rather on where you are from.  
This view links with Ukiwo (2005) position regarding the depth of ethnicity 
problems and their impact on the economic performance of the country. Ukiwo 
(2005) explained that securing a compromise in various activities in the country has 
proven problematic due to the desires of key individuals to seek the growth and 
development of their own ethnic group over others. Adegbite (2015) also informs 
that, although there is no regulatory requirement for this practice, the Boards of 
Nigerian firms, particularly those that operate nationally, should reflect the country’s 
diverse cultural ethnicities in their composition. These perceptions have encouraged 
ethnocentrism, as members of one ethnic group assume that their ethnic group is 
superior to others (Cornelius & Esheya, 2013). Wrong (2009) highlighted the 
ethnicity mentality dominant in many developing economies using the Kenyan 
context; 
In Kenya, as in so many African states (such as Nigeria), your entire life's 
chances are based on which ethnic group you belong to. And there is this 
mentality spread across Kenyan society that once your tribe gets into power 
then state assets are yours to do with as you wish. And since the previous 
tenant had exactly the same approach, then of course you are completely 
justified to be very greedy to compensate for how your group was treated in 
the past. 
 
The concern expressed by Wong (2009) stresses the problem which could emerge 
from ethnic affiliations. This challenge, as noted in A11’s response, has seen the 
emergence of mediocrity and incompetence in numerous economic interests. With 
respect to corporate governance, a possible outcome of such a challenge was 
identified by A5; 
…ethnicity impacts the way we practice corporate governance because I 
have seen a Board of a quoted company where all the members are from a 
particular ethnic block. In this organisation, the whistle-blowing mechanism 
was shut down because they now see themselves as a single body. 
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The above indicates that the whistle-blowing mechanism could be weakened on the 
basis of ethnicity. People prefer not to report suspected offenders from the same 
ethnic block but will be willing to share such information regarding the activities of 
suspected offenders from other ethnic backgrounds. Similar practices translate to 
situations where ethnicity becomes engrained in the organisation. Several other 
issues emanate from this notion. For instance, there is an increased tendency for 
CEOs to engage more in business relationships with members of their ethnic groups. 
They also engage in policies which may not necessarily be in the organisation’s 
interest, but intended to sympathise with individuals from the same ethnic group.   
Ethnocentrism further manifests in the level of diversity in the belief systems of the 
various ethnic groupings. The potential implication of this issue on the practice of 
corporate governance is substantial. The participation of women in economic 
development is viewed differently in the northern and southern regions of the 
country. Okafor and Mordi (2010) examined women’s involvement in economic 
development and agreed that environmental factors, informed largely by ethnic 
configurations, have meant that there is a significant diversity regarding the role of 
women in Nigeria’s economic development. Furthermore, the low level of education, 
which is more pronounced among some ethnic groups in Nigeria, has also played a 
part in the problems generated by ethnic configurations.  
 
Federal Character 
The ethnicity challenge has also been worsened by the ‘federal character’ policy of 
the government. The federal character issue has dominated public discourse since the 
period of acquiring independence in 1960 to the present day. Federal character, 
according to Adamolekun, Erero, and Oshionebo (1991), aims to ensure that 
appointments to the civil service institutions sufficiently reflect the linguistic, ethnic, 
religious and geographic diversity of Nigeria. However, whilst the underlying basis 
for pursuing ‘federal character’ appears sensible in a country as ethnically diverse as 
Nigeria, views from participants suggests that it has not achieved its intended 
objectives. Indeed, it has worsened the country’s socioeconomic challenges. Whilst 
A6 describes ‘federal character’ as the greatest disaster in the country, A4 notes that;  
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…because of federal character, we have been forced to share portfolios not 
on the basis of what people can offer but on the basis of where they are from. 
You see that some states termed ‘disadvantaged’ are now being spoon-fed 
instead of allowing them to compete with other states.  
 
As previously indicated, the desire to promote national unity and ensure ‘ethnic 
balancing’ was crucial to the federal character policy (Cornelius & Esheya, 2013). 
However, the policy has been manipulated such that it has served as a vehicle for 
promoting mediocrity. As a result, rather than relying on a quota system or ethnic 
balancing, the pursuit of competence offers a nexus for successful and effective 
performance amongst public organisations. In fact, pursuing competence can 
ameliorate the various problems posed by ethnicity. The failure of ‘federal character’ 
also bears implications for good governance.  A6 commented that; 
…many Boards’ appointments are influenced by federal character. …the 
danger is that people that are not qualified are considered for such 
significant positions. When you are appointed in this manner, there is (a 
chance) that appointees will have little or no regard for corporate 
governance principles, considering the system that brought such an 
individual on board. 
 
C1 expanded the frontiers of the ‘federal character’ problem by highlighting its long 
term implications for individuals, firms and the country; 
…federal character is damaging every facet of our economic life.  …some 
people now claim they are from a ‘disadvantaged’ state (part of the country) 
just to bypass standard requirements for jobs, university admissions, etc. 
These people will eventually find their way to top positions on the strength of 
where they are from. Even though I am not aware of any study regarding the 
effect of this activity, I am very positive that this country will continue to be 
short-changed by its consequences. …federal character negates the 
principles of good corporate governance. 
 
From the evaluation conducted in this section, it is evident that the implications of 
the continued elevation of ethnic-related issues such as ethnic affiliation and ‘federal 
character’ are not consistent with good governance practice. As Cornelius and 
Esheya (2013) proposed, the pursuit of value-orientation may help in redefining the 
behaviour of the typical Nigerian economic agent, particularly the elite who appear 
to have been benefactors of the opportunities created by ‘federal character’ and 
ethnicity. The pursuit of good moral values may promote fairness as opposed to 
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sentimentalism and bias. The attainment of this objective requires an appropriate 
form of education and regulatory strategy. A strategy for proposed reforms in the 
area of education and regulatory intervention is presented in Chapter Five. 
 
4.3.4 Summary of Social Institutions 
The findings in this section (Section 4.3) reveal that the social environment, 
especially in developing economies, is challenged by unique concerns. In the cultural 
domain, concerns bordering specifically on social inequality, respect for age and the 
perception of governance as a foreign ideology, have meant that the practice of 
corporate governance is persistently weakened.   
Similarly, findings from this section also reveal that the positive elements often 
associated with religion has not promoted the practice of good governance in the 
Nigerian business environment. Indeed, the variety of sub-categories which emerged 
from this analysis implies that religion, as presently engaged by stakeholders, is 
inconsistent with the development of a robust corporate governance system.  
Finally, this section also identified the problems created by ethnocentrism and 
‘federal character’, and its effects on the social institution for corporate governance. 
Therefore, in view of the multi-ethnic nature of the country, stakeholders must 
continually explore opportunities that would promote the emergence of a corporate 
governance system that acknowledges the problems associated with multiple 
ethnicities.   
4.4 Economic Institutions 
Economic institutions, according to Acemoglu et al. (2005), determine the incentives 
of and the constraints upon economic actors that shape economic outcomes. They 
constitute well-established arrangements and structures which are part of a culture or 
society. As indicated in Chapter Two, the behaviour of economic agents is typically 
influenced by their individual economic rationalisations. In addition, a variety of 
economic factors also informs individual reasoning and conduct. Whilst the literature 
has indicated that the state of corporate governance in Nigeria is weak, this section 
examines the role of the Nigerian economic institutions in governance challenges. 
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Figure 14 - Themes Relating to Economic Institutions 
Conflicting Regulatory 
Provisions
Effectiveness of Sanctions
Deterrence
Cost-Benefit Motivation
Dearth of Knowledge
Economic Regulatory 
Issues
Rational Choice and 
Economic Motivation
Economic Institutions
Main Category Generic Categories Sub Categories
 
Themes generated from respondents’ comments were coded, the outcome of which is 
presented in Figure 14. Themes such as conflicting regulations, effective sanction, 
deterrence, cost-benefit and dearth of knowledge were used by participants to discuss 
some of the issues challenging corporate governance. These themes are subsequently 
classified into two generic categories of economic regulatory issues; rational choice 
and economic motivation. The two generic groups produced economic institutions as 
a main category. 
 
4.4.1 Economic Regulatory Issues 
Regulation is central to good corporate governance. Corporate governance exists 
significantly within the scope of guidelines which are codified as regulations. Indeed, 
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the decision to regulate every economic activity is a fact of life (Sutinen & Kuperan, 
1999). It is therefore not surprising that many developing countries including Nigeria 
have engaged the instrument of regulation to promote corporate governance. B6 
agreed thus; 
…the key thing is that the laws (for corporate governance) are there. Having 
the laws (indicates) that the government wants the people to practice good 
corporate governance. 
 
The establishment of regulations could be seen as an intention by the government, 
through its regulatory agencies, to engage relevant stakeholders in good governance. 
However, could regulation be viewed as the first step in instituting sound governance 
practices? B3 appears to concur; 
I don’t really think there can be any good corporate governance if you don’t 
have the laws. Do you think people will be willing to let you tell them to do 
corporate governance without pointing them to a document with the backing 
of the law which forces them to comply?    
 
While the above comment reinforces the view that regulation could serve as a 
foundation for the pursuit of good governance in the system, it also emphasises that 
the force of law is crucial to promoting the achievement of the economic objectives 
of corporations. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) affirm that codes have served to enhance 
the advancement of corporate governance in many parts of the world.  
Regarding economic regulation, various factors have congregated to ensure that 
regulation levels across industries and countries differ (Polinsky & Shavell, 2000). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) recognised that differences in the effectiveness of 
regulation in countries have resulted in varying outcomes for corporate governance. 
Needless to say, whilst there are challenges plaguing corporate governance in 
Nigeria, this is not due to a lack of appropriate regulatory frameworks. Nigeria 
currently has three industry-specific corporate governance codes and one all-
encompassing code (see Chapter Two). Therefore, considering the availability of 
these regulations, why has the state of corporate governance practice in Nigeria 
remained weak? Three key themes emerged from the data (see Figure 14).  
 
 157 
 
Conflicting Regulatory Provisions 
The first concern is the conflict inherent in these regulations. Ofo (2011) and 
Osemeke and Adegbite (2016) extensively examined this problem. The result of this 
issue is that operators identify with the provisions which would help them rationalise 
their economic benefits. This problem drew comments from participants. B2 (a 
regulator) informed that; 
We complain that operators are not abiding by the principles of corporate 
governance. How can they (abide) when (other) existing provisions expect 
them to do different things on the same matter? 
 
The above quotation clearly highlights a major problem hindering the functionality 
of existing codes. In addition, it indicates the challenge faced by regulators in 
enforcing corporate governance. This concern reiterates the need for a harmonised 
code system. The multiplicity of codes creates opportunities for operators to take 
advantage of loopholes. For instance, a bank could be involved in making a decision 
when faced with conflicting provisions in the SEC Code (2011) and the CBN Code 
(2006). Adegbite (2012) agrees that this development potentially transfers the power 
to comply with a regulation to operators. As a result, operators tend to conform to 
the provision whose penalty is less punitive. This challenge is intensified by the 
different approaches (rules-based and principles-based) underlying the enforcement 
mechanisms of existing corporate governance codes in the country.  
In view of the above, opinions were sought as to how this problem could be 
addressed. The majority of the research participants opined that harmonising the 
existing corporate governance codes could engender a robust corporate governance 
system. In particular, A9 suggests that; 
I don’t see the rationale in having multiple codes. In those countries where 
corporate governance was imported from, do they operate a multi-regulatory 
regime for corporate governance?    
 
The issue of harmonisation of existing codes has been previously noted in Chapter 
Two. However, it is important that this concern is evaluated in the light of emerging 
developments. This issue will be discussed in the next chapter (Chapter Five). 
 
 158 
 
Effectiveness of Sanctions   
In many developing countries, the effectiveness of existing sanctions continues to 
attract debate (Graham & Woods, 2006). In Chapter Two, one of the challenges of 
corporate governance in Nigeria was identified as weak corporate regulation. Many 
of the reasons for this development have been noted in Section 4.3 of this chapter to 
include outdated regulations, lack of capacity to enforce on the part of regulators and 
political influence, among others. These challenges were noted in B4’s comments; 
The real reason people behave the way they do in Nigeria is because there is 
no certainty of enforcement of our regulations. The result is that regulations 
can be easily set aside as there is no regard for it, which effectively destroys 
the sanction mechanism. 
 
The above quotation suggests that the weakness in the sanction strategy is informed 
by concerns around the legitimacy for such regulations. The regulations are not 
widely accepted by stakeholders. This development could be traced to some of the 
challenges identified in Section 4.3, particularly in concerns around political 
immunity and political authority, among others. This problem implies inequality 
before the law which, according to A7 (an executive), impacts the value accorded to 
such regulations by stakeholders. As a consequence, the lack of legitimacy means 
that its provisions, including its sanctions, are not respected. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of sanctions could also be linked to the dominant 
regulatory approach in Nigeria. By its nature, the principles-based model (implied in 
the SEC Code, 2011) is such that operators are expected to comply, and when they 
fail, they are expected to explain their reasons for non-compliance. The fact is that 
the market is expected to respond appropriately to actions taken by operators. This is 
only possible in a well-developed market i.e. a market where all stakeholders are 
aware of their rights and responsibilities and there is minimal information 
asymmetry. However, low literacy levels in Nigeria compound these problems. As a 
result, operators avoid penalties as the market fails to respond appropriately to their 
infractions. Consequently, regulations lack the capacity and legitimacy to act as 
deterrents against repeated infractions. The necessity for regulations to present 
effective deterrence mechanisms is examined next.      
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Deterrence 
Another factor which relates to regulatory conflicts and effectiveness of sanctions is 
the impact of deterrence strategies. Regulatory effectiveness is enhanced where 
sanctions and penalties are serious enough to deter a recurrence of an infraction 
(Becker, 1974). Proponents of deterrence theory posit that economic actors choose to 
obey or violate the law after accounting for the gains and consequences of their 
actions. Therefore, as a matter of logic, the greater the consequences of an action 
over its gain, the likelier it is that economic actors will be deterred from engaging in 
infractions.  
Following the above, the aim of regulation is to constrain individual behaviour or, 
alternatively, deter individuals from engaging in unlawful actions. Sanctions are 
included in regulations to achieve this objective. However, with respect to Nigeria, 
A5 opined that; 
There is little or no regard for our laws. They (operators) know these laws 
exist but they also know they can use their contacts to manipulate these laws. 
So, at least for them, the law does not constitute deterrence.  
 
Whereas A5’s sentiments were shared by the majority of interviewees, it is evident 
that issues acknowledged in Section 4.3.3 such as compliance, enforcement and 
updating of outdated regulations, must be reviewed if existing regulations are to act 
as deterrence to operators. While this examined what it would mean when proposing 
a reform agenda, it is reasonable to suggest that the attitude of operators towards 
these three subcategories is influenced by the concept of rational choice. 
 
4.4.2 Rational Choice and Economic Motivation 
Rational choice suggests that every individual will pursue decisions which will 
enable him/her to gain the highest possible benefit that is in their personal interest 
(Akers, 1990). In other words, compliance with regulations is premeditated by how 
an individual benefits from obeying legal requirements. What is the effect of this 
generic category on regulation and corporate governance in Nigeria? From the 
responses of participants, two subcategories were identified, namely cost-benefit 
motivation and knowledge gap. 
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Cost-Benefit Motivations 
Why is the practice of corporate governance in Nigerian weak? The majority of 
research participants suggest that the desire to act as a rational economic agent could 
explain the present state of corporate governance in the country. The weakness in 
existing institutional frameworks (for example, regulation) potentially maximises the 
opportunities and benefits which economic agents can achieve from the system. B8 
posits that;  
I agree that regulation is a good thing but it can be difficult to implement 
when you have people who, for (some) reason, have decided not to abide by 
its provisions. If someone is making money and you introduce a law that will 
limit what he is (gaining), do you think he will want to abide by such law? 
Why do you think we still have instances of money laundering in our banks? 
 
This view reinforces earlier positions regarding cost-benefit evaluation as a 
justification for engaging in anti-corporate governance activities. The desire to 
maximise benefits, as Becker (1974) pointed out, indicates why human beings are 
inclined to ‘rationalise’ their choices, sometimes paying little or no regard to 
potential legal restrictions. This view advocates that regulation may not necessarily 
be a key factor in establishing good corporate governance, but the thinking that 
preceded a corporate governance-related activity. A1 explained thus; 
 …having been a member of some boards for some years now, what you see 
is that the decisions of many board members are induced by many other 
things. I really think that most of these things are personal…I mean, they 
smack of personal interest. 
 
This indicates that decision making by board members could be influenced by 
rational choice motivations and, by extension, cost-benefit decisions. That is, 
regulations could be deemed to be secondary if rational choice precedes the decision 
(whether or not) to comply with regulations. This, according to Piliavin et al. (1986), 
will logically be the case when benefits exceed penalties. Whilst this argument may 
not hold true in every case, a statement cited in Ahunwan (2002) regarding the 
attitude of the typical Nigerian economic agent towards rules and regulation supports 
this proposition.  
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Unfortunately, these behaviours and attitudes towards regulation appear to be 
widespread among stakeholders in the country. It is therefore necessary to 
understand why rationality appears to overwhelm regulatory compliance. That is, 
what motivates or explains stakeholders’ desire to pay minimal attention to codes. 
This highlights the need for regulators to strive towards achieving equilibrium 
between rational choices and regulatory sanctions. It is noticeable that the cost-
benefit gap between both concepts is wide enough to stimulate continued anti-
corporate governance practices.  
 
Dearth of Knowledge 
As a variety of reasons have been adduced for governance challenges in earlier 
sections (corruption, laxity in enforcement, etc.), B6 identifies a reason which 
focuses on limited knowledge of economic agents; 
…we need to enlighten the people to see that corporate governance is not 
something that is outside the corporation itself. That it is …meant for the 
benefit of the company…we need to enlighten the people because by the time 
we align the benefits of corporate governance to the main purpose of the 
company, people will appreciate it more. 
 
It can be argued that knowledge of the benefits and implications of corporate 
governance is underdeveloped in the system. C2 supported this view; 
Do they (executives) really understand what corporate governance is all 
about? Many of them actually have this short-term understanding... They 
think that money spent to bring about good corporate governance …such 
as…training will reduce their profit so they will rather avoid it. 
 
Based on these submissions the importance of corporate governance is not fully 
understood or well appreciated by the majority of stakeholders. This has resulted in 
continued apathy towards corporate governance regulations and other instruments of 
corporate governance. It is apparent that the lack of understanding of corporate 
governance could have stemmed from short-termism prevalent in the system. For 
instance, the desire to sidestep regulations and pursue economic alternatives that 
would yield benefits for operators reflects a desire to achieve, but only in the short 
term. These behaviours are often not sustainable which is evident in the rate of 
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corporate collapses that have been witnessed in the system over the last few decades 
(see Nworji et al., 2011). Therefore, addressing this challenge will require that an 
appropriate mechanism is instigated for stakeholders to appreciate and understand 
the value and need for good corporate governance in corporate life, and as a strategy 
for enhancing the perpetual succession objectives of corporations.   
 
4.4.3 Summary of Economic Institutions 
Section 4.4 presents the outcome of analysis which are categorised as economic 
institutions. Two generic categories emerged from the analysis in this section namely 
economic regulatory issues, and rational choice and economic motivation. These 
generic categories were engaged is examining issues such as conflicting regulatory 
provisions, effectiveness of the existing sanction regime, the capacity of existing 
regulations deter infractions, stakeholder motivation based on cost-benefit 
evaluations, and the prevailing dearth of knowledge in the system.  
The analysis indicates that the impact of the subcategories and generic categories 
examined in this section has contributed substantially to the present state of 
corporate governance in Nigeria. It therefore becomes imperative that, as noted in 
Sections 4.2.4 and 4.3.4, stakeholders must continuously develop strategies and 
mechanisms to ensure that elements of ‘economic institutions’ are controlled such 
that they are able to check the economic choices and preferences of corporate 
governance practitioners.  
 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
Relying on the coding process described in Chapter Three, the analysis embarked 
upon in this chapter produced three main categories of institutions which sufficiently 
describes the key institutional drivers for corporate governance in Nigeria. It could 
be argued that the impact of the three varieties of institutionalism generated from this 
analysis could be deemed antithetical for good corporate governance in Nigeria. 
Whilst it appears that the political institution has been unable to entrench a political 
and regulatory system that can enhance good corporate governance, the same 
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assertion can also be made regarding social institutions in the country. Analysis 
shows that the prevailing culture, religion and ethnic affiliations of the people have 
combined to weaken the social environment for establishing a sound corporate 
governance system.  
Furthermore, the economic rationalisation of economic agents which takes advantage 
of the laxity in the system has further undermined the impact of institutional 
frameworks. The analysis indicates that the behaviour of economic agents and the 
prevalence of corruption have contributed to and influenced the majority of opinions 
shared by respondents regarding the governance concerns in Nigeria. Indeed, it could 
be summarised that the presence of influential individuals who have exploited and 
taken undue advantage of institutional deficiencies, define the majority of the 
problems plaguing corporate governance in Nigeria. This view also incorporates the 
role of government which, it would seem, has been unable to instigate an 
institutional framework that possesses the necessary robustness to control the actions 
of economic agents.    
The concerns identified in this chapter offers the basis for the discussions embarked 
upon in the next chapter. Chapter Five discusses the issues in the institutional 
environment for corporate governance in Nigeria, in relation to the research 
objectives and existing literature.   
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Chapter Five 
Discussion and Implications of Interview Findings 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the findings from transcribed interviews were presented. The 
analysis of the interview data resulted in the emergence of three main institutional 
categories which substantially influence the institutional environment for corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Following from these findings, this chapter sets out to 
accomplish three tasks. This chapter commences by discussing the findings from the 
previous chapter in relation to existing literature (Section 5.2). This discussion 
provokes an evaluation of the theoretical implications of a Nigerian corporate 
governance scholarship (Section 5.3). Lastly, relying on the understandings 
emerging from the previous chapter and in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of this chapter, a 
framework for good corporate governance in Nigeria is proposed (Section 5.4). 
 
5.2 Discussion of Interview Findings 
The discussion focuses on the three main strands of institutionalisation which 
emerged from the analysis of participant’s comments in the previous chapter i.e. 
political institutions, social institutions and economic institutions. 
 
5.2.1 Assessment of Findings regarding Political Institutions 
From the analysis relating to political institutions, it is noticeable that the political 
environment has been overwhelmed by corruption and regulatory inefficiencies. 
Literature (see Aluko, 2002; Akindele, 2005; Lawal, 2007) and data both indicate 
that the political and regulatory systems have suffered from the stifling effects of 
corruption. A3 explained that three elements have contributed to the high incidence 
of corruption in the country. These factors are motive, opportunity and exit (escape). 
‘Motive,’ according to A3, describes an individual’s need or greed, adding that 
individuals do not steal out of need but because of greed.  Solomon (2013) agreed 
that corruption is reinforced by greed. But why is the rate of corruption (or greed) 
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higher in Nigeria than in many other countries? A3 engages the second factor of 
opportunity (or chance) to explain high corruption levels in Nigeria.   
In view of the weak institutional frameworks, poor accountability and transparency, 
Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003) affirm that opportunities to steal abound for 
public office holders. Many government agencies lack the structure to prevent 
corruption. There is also apathy towards accounting for and declaration of private 
assets, thereby exacerbating the difficulty of prosecuting corrupt public office 
holders. According to Omololu (2007), this has contributed to the development of a 
weak and inefficient political system. In addition to motive and opportunity, the last 
factor is ‘exit’ or escape. Deterrence theorists suggest that corrupt activities are aided 
when offenders believe there is a strong possibility of avoiding or escaping 
punishment. This view connects with Akers (1990) and Ellis’ (2003) proposition that 
an increase in offenders would occur when benefits (from corruption) exceed 
punishment. In such cases, sanctions are not expected to serve as a deterrent. In fact, 
Inyang (2009) claimed this might strengthen the resolve of both existing and 
potential culprits to engage in infractions.  
Further evidence of the connection between the political system and corruption was 
established in Shleifer and Vishny (1993). They suggest that attempts to influence 
firms to pursue political objectives could be achieved irrespective of who actually 
controls firms, by manipulating the instrument of corruption. They argue that when 
managers control firms, politicians are able to employ tactics such as bribes and 
subsidies to ‘convince’ them to pursue political objectives. However, in developing 
economies, little or no ‘convincing’ is involved. To reinforce this view, Aluko (2002) 
informed that politicians are able to use their influence and authority to manipulate 
managers. The possibility of ‘exit’ (via threat of termination of employment) obliges 
managers to ‘cooperate’ with politicians. In addition, a lack of ‘co-operation’ by 
managers could mean loss of government patronage for an organisation. Aburime 
(2009) demonstrates that political affiliation has a positive effect on bank 
profitability in Nigeria, concluding that in order to maximise profitability, Nigerian 
banks should consider the political affiliation strategy.  
On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) also explained that if politicians 
control firms, managers could also employ bribes to convince them (politicians) not 
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to pressurise firms to pursue political objectives. The ability of managers to convince 
politicians is dependent upon which alternative maximises potential utility i.e. does 
the bribe offer exceed the benefits inherent in achieving the political objectives? 
Whilst the bribe offered may be constrained by an organisation’s budget, political 
benefits can be vast in an economy driven by members of the political class, 
especially in countries with weak institutions. Lawal (2007) therefore note that 
whilst it is possible that bribes from managers may not compensate for political 
benefits, the opportunity for the increased perpetration of corruption is unaffected. 
The implication of the foregoing on corporate governance is that corruption levels 
may continue to influence corporate governance practice.  
The corruption challenge has also had an impact on the regulatory framework. For 
instance, Adegbite (2012) noted that a critical challenge hindering corporate 
governance regulation is the extent of corruption in the system. Laws are usually 
established to protect stakeholders from expropriation by managers and controlling 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). However, as highlighted in Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993), both managers and politicians could embrace corruption as an instrument to 
achieve their respective aims. The capacity of corruption to thrive is enhanced by the 
perception towards regulation. Rather than embracing universalism, there is 
sufficient evidence to indicate that Nigeria embraces particularism (see Trompenaars 
& Hampden-Turner, 2004) as a regulatory model. With particularism, it is assumed 
that an individual’s circumstances and relationships dictate the rules by which they 
live, thus compliance with regulations may depend upon what is happening in their 
life and, typically, who is involved.  In other words, regulatory compliance is 
determined by certain conditions, thus undermining the absoluteness of regulations. 
These have ensured that regulations can be manipulated to suit individual desires. 
It therefore appears that the most important challenge facing political institutions in 
Nigeria is corruption. Whilst Aluko (2002) agreed that corruption has become 
institutionalised in Nigeria, Ogbeidi (2012) posits that the phenomenon of corruption 
is primarily responsible for the socioeconomic stagnation in the country. It is thus 
fair to suggest that reform must provide strategies to address corruption challenges. 
Addressing corruption will require the establishment of a robust regulatory 
mechanism. The effectiveness of this mechanism will be driven by the enforcement 
structure, fortified with appropriate sanction strategies. Interestingly, the issue of 
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effective enforcement featured prominently when participants were asked to suggest 
strategies to address the effect of corruption on corporate governance. Respondents 
indicated that the difference between corporate governance regulation in the Western 
world and Nigeria is the certainty of enforcement. For example, A7 and B4 argued 
that until there is certainty in enforcing regulations, reducing corruption and the 
subsequent achievement of corporate governance objectives in the Nigerian business 
environment will remain a difficult task. In agreement with Aluko (2002), 
participants also opined that the creation of a new social order can help address the 
corruption challenge. This strategy will entail educating, mobilising, enlightening 
and sensitising citizens towards a tradition of honesty, excellence, integrity, 
reputation and other moral virtues.  
Whereas the dangers of corruption have been severally acknowledged, it is crucial to 
examine some additional insights which emerged from this study in relation to 
political institutions. For instance, ‘fear of the unknown’ has contributed to 
increasing levels of corruption and ultimately, poor governance. Fear of the 
unknown emphasizes a reluctance to deviate from a specific status quo position (Cao, 
Han, Hirshleifer, & Zhang, 2009). This may be connected with short-termism, 
wherein people tend to focus on achieving quick results (Hofstede et al., 2010). This 
preference is however significantly influenced by the existing poverty prevalent in 
the system. Stakeholders are uncertain of what tomorrow holds in view of the 
disregard for contractual agreements and the inability of existing institutions to 
check the unilateral decisions and interventions of political elites. Indeed, several 
incidences of fraud committed by members of the political class go unpunished, as 
the culprits are able to employ their ‘connections’ to obtain ‘protection’ from the 
laws of the land. This development contradicts the main position of deterrence 
theorists. The argument in Akers (1990) is that the key basis for the development of 
a regulatory framework is to discourage or eliminate infractions in a particular 
context. The influence wielded by political actors in Nigeria necessitates that the 
ability of regulations to act as a deterrent is reconsidered. 
In addition to the above, the political environment for corporate governance is also 
challenged by concerns bordering on the political immunity enjoyed by some 
politicians. A fundamental requirement of any regulatory framework is the rule of 
law (and supremacy of that law), which connotes the restriction of the arbitrary 
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exercise of power and authority by subjecting it to defined and established laws. 
However, the nature of immunity is inconsistent with the dynamics of rule of law. 
Whereas Levin and Satarov (2000) observed that the legal immunity for government 
officials promotes the incidence of corruption, Markovska and Adams (2015) 
explained that the immunity clause present in the Nigerian constitution offers a 
significant advantage for corrupt politicians, as it empowers and provides these 
politicians with endless opportunities for defrauding state resources. 
While the above issues mainly focus on the main objective of this study as noted in 
Chapter One, it is also important to discuss political institutions with respect to the 
secondary objective of this study. As a regulatory mechanism, it is necessary to 
understand the extent to which the various sub categories and generic categories of 
political institution are recognised in the primary code for corporate governance in 
Nigeria i.e. the SEC Code (2011). Table 14 shows the outcome of a review of the 
SEC Code (2011) with respect to political institution. 
Table 14 - Tallies for Political-Related Themes in the SEC Code (2011)   
 
Main Categories Generic Categories Frequency 
Counts 
 
Po
lit
ic
a
l 
In
st
itu
tio
n
s Political System 0 
Corruption 4 
Legal Institutions 6 
 
Whilst it appears that some recognition has been accorded to political institutions, 
the word ‘political’ or the term ‘political system’ did not feature in the code. It may 
be necessary to reconsider this position, particularly for a country where the 
government, represented by members of the political class, is the major player in its 
economy. Corruption was noted four times in the code. In Part D (Relationship with 
Other Stakeholders) of the code, corruption was noted three times in Section 28 
(Sustainability Issues), whilst in Part F (Accountability and Reporting), Section 34 
(Disclosures), it was noted once (Section 34.4). Indeed, in Section 28.2, companies 
were advised to recognise corruption as a major threat to business and to national 
development. Okike (2007) informed that, before the introduction of the SEC Code 
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(2011), the non-identification of corruption constituted a significant concern for 
corporate governance. However, despite recent efforts to recognise the impact of 
corruption in the Code, it could be argued that the recognition could be better. This 
standpoint has been informed by various accounts detailing the effects of corruption 
on the Nigerian business environment. In fact, ROSC (2004) indicated that 
corruption presents a major obstacle to the enforcement of standards, hence the 
severe weakness of the enforcement mechanism. Consequently, the enactment of the 
code must be developed such that it provides a framework for tackling the effects of 
corruption with regard to the functionality of the code.  
    
5.2.3 Evaluation of Findings regarding Social Institutions 
From the analysis of findings relating to culture, the majority of the interviewees 
indicated that the prevailing culture in Nigeria has worked against corporate 
governance. It is instructive to note that Ringov and Zollo (2007) contend that 
organisations based in countries that are characterised by higher levels of power 
distance, individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance tend to exhibit lower 
levels of social performance. This signifies that culture could influence corporate 
governance in a country such as Nigeria which shares many of the Hofstede et al. 
(2010) elements that formed the basis of Ringov and Zollo’s (2007) conclusion. 
Okike, Adegbite, Nakpodia, and Adegbite (2015) also noted that developments in 
corporate governance in Nigeria have been informed by various factors in the 
internal and the external environment of the country. 
Unfortunately, as denoted in Table 15, the relevant regulatory authorities for 
corporate governance in Nigeria have not sufficiently taken the foregoing view into 
consideration in designing corporate governance regulations. Despite the substantial 
impact of culture (Oghojafor et al., 2012), religion (Amaeshi et al., 2006) and 
ethnicity (Adegbite, 2015) in the institutional environment of Nigeria, their 
continued lack of recognition of themes such as religion and ethnicity in corporate 
governance codes may offer some explanations for the present state of corporate 
governance. The comments from participants (see previous chapter) underscores the 
impact of religion and ethnicity. Indeed, these elements were crucial to the 
development of the King Report in South Africa, a country similar to Nigeria in 
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many respects. The King Report (2002, p. 17) actually noted that the principles 
adopted in the code were greatly influenced by the need “to recognise the diversity 
that exists in South Africa in relation to culture, religion, ethnicity, etc.” 
Furthermore, in addition to language, Limbs and Fort (2000) identified religion and 
ethnicity as the three major influences on Nigerian business practices. It is also 
important to state that issues relating to culture (mentioned three times – see Table 
15) mostly addressed micro (firm) issues rather than macro challenges which focus 
on the business environment. On this basis, it can be suggested that key social 
institutions have not been sufficiently integrated into the SEC Code.  
Table 15 - Counts for Social-Related Themes in the SEC Code (2011)   
 
Main Categories Generic Categories Frequency Counts 
 
So
ci
al
 
In
st
itu
tio
n
s 
Culture 3 
Religion 0 
Ethnicity 0 
However, as observed in the previous chapter, the impact of influential economic 
agents continues to shape institutional variants in Nigeria. In many (similar) 
developing economies, individuals are increasingly able to impose themselves on the 
society due largely to weak institutions which are unable to curtail the activities of 
these individuals. A good example is the traditional rulers who command enormous 
traditional authority in their domain (Tonwe & Osenmwota, 2013). Courtesy of their 
positions, they are able to redefine their subjects’ culture and choices, oftentimes to 
suit their (traditional rulers’) own preferences. This tends to create a high level of 
dynamism in cultural perspectives as the installation of a new traditional ruler 
provokes the emergence of a new cultural paradigm. In this context, culture can be 
viewed as an evolutionary process. The implication for corporate governance, 
particularly in such traditional domains, is that it can be defined by the ruler. 
Corporate governance principles rely entirely on legitimacy, but the legitimacy 
accorded to traditional institutions (institutions created by traditional rulers) is 
recognised and respected much more than for those institutions created by the state, 
in some domains.    
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It can thus be argued that culture, be it in companies or societies, is the outcome of 
individual preferences. For instance, Handy (1993) identified four main types of 
organisational culture (power, role, task, person) but central to this culture type is the 
individual. Therefore, attempts at establishing sound governance structures must be 
disconnected from the inconsistencies in culture and leadership. It is also worth 
mentioning that the presence of influential individuals could clarify why institutions 
in developing economies generally lack sustained impact which leads to weakness in 
addressing emerging challenges. The concern is that these issues are the cumulative 
actions of various actors. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) observed that as these 
behaviours and beliefs emerge, economic agents shape their organisations and 
business environments to be similar. Therefore, these behaviours aggregate and 
develop into the prevailing culture. This is indicative of a mimetic isomorphism. 
Consequently, the development of an anti-corporate governance belief system, for 
instance, emerges as the central paradigm in the system.  
Based on this assertion, therefore, it could be rationalised that the influence of 
culture on corporate governance is considerably determined by the influence which 
influential agents of culture are able to exert upon existing institutional frameworks. 
In Nigeria, as in many other developing countries, the challenges regarding the 
economy and its institutions suggest that culture represents a major influence on 
corporate governance performance. Evidence gathered from the data also indicates 
that individual influences determine the direction of culture and its subsequent 
impact on corporate governance. As observed by participants, religion represents 
another important social variable amongst Nigerians. A review by Kuran (2009) 
indicates that, many decades ago, religion had a considerable impact in China, for 
instance, but observed that in modern times, the power and impact of religion on 
economic issues is dwindling. Thus, it could be reasoned that the level of religious 
impact is determined by how relevant religious institutions are in a country. As many 
countries appear to have moved on from the era when religion was a dominant force, 
particularly in developed countries, this possibly explains why the generality of 
literature, which is often based on developed market contexts, considers the effect of 
religion to be insignificant. 
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Table 16 - Belief in God (1947 – 2001) 
Nations 1947 2001 Change 
  % % % 
Sweden 80 46 -34 
Netherlands 80 58 -22 
Australia 95 75 -20 
Denmark 80 62 -18 
France 66 56 -10 
Canada 95 88 -7 
Source: Adapted from Norris and Inglehart (2011) 
Stastna (2013) attempted to examine whether citizens overlook religion as they 
become wealthy, acknowledging that poor countries have the highest proportion of 
people who identify with a religion. This view is consistent with findings in Norris 
and Inglehart (2011) (see Table 16). Table 16 reveals that there was a decrease in the 
religiosity index between 1947 and 2001 in the six developed economies listed in the 
table. Whilst other variables could have contributed to the economic buoyancy of 
these countries, it is necessary to note that the religiosity perception of citizens of 
these countries has dipped, thus exposing the relevance (or irrelevance) of religion.  
However, this is not the case in poor and developing countries. As revealed in Table 
17, religion is held in high esteem among citizens of many developing countries. 
Whilst it is remarkable to note that all 10 countries in Table 17 can be reasonably 
classed as developing economies, it is interesting to notice that Nigeria ranks high on 
the list, as 93% of its citizens claim to be religious. The data from Table 17 also 
connects with Paul (2009) findings that a situation where a highly religious nation is 
highly successful socially does not exist. The 10 countries in the table cannot be 
regarded as socially wealthy. 
As shown in Judge et al. (2008), corporate governance models in these countries are 
largely regarded as ‘emerging’ in recognition of the challenges faced. Paul (2009) 
agrees that religion is popular in societies that reflect a high rate of dysfunction, as 
this compels people to be anxious about their lives and consequently look to religion 
for support.  
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Table 17 - Top 10 Religious Populations in the World 
Countries A 
Religious 
Person 
Not A 
Religious 
Person 
A 
Convinced 
Atheist 
Don’t Know 
/No 
Response 
  % % % % 
Ghana 96 2 0 1 
Nigeria 93 4 1 2 
Armenia 92 3 2 2 
Fiji 92 5 1 2 
Macedonia 90 8 1 1 
Romania 89 6 1 3 
Iraq 88 9 0 3 
Kenya 88 9 2 1 
Peru 86 8 3 3 
Brazil 85 13 1 1 
Source: WIN-Gallup (2012)49 
Coşgel and Miceli (2009) also provided an interesting basis which further explains 
the impact of religion. They affirm that religion provides utility to citizens, 
especially in countries where there is a high level of poverty. Increasing poverty 
levels compel many people to seek succour from religious bodies. This view is 
supported by Norris and Inglehart (2011) who observed that in poor countries, 
religious bodies not only offer essential services such as education and healthcare, 
they also provide other varied support which can be critical during crisis situations. 
Issues of poverty have remained a concern in developing countries, hence it would 
be logically expected that many citizens will embrace religion to provide some 
reassurance, if only temporarily.  
The effect of the preceding notion is that as people increasingly relate with religion, 
their actions gradually reflect the teachings of that religion. Considering the number 
of religious people in Nigeria, it could be reasoned that many areas of human 
                                                 
49
 The WIN-Gallup International ‘Religiosity and Atheism Index’ measures global self-perceptions on 
beliefs, based on interviews with more than 50,000 men and women from 57 countries. The survey 
also presents trend data for shifts in attitudes since 2005. 
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endeavour in the country may have been influenced by religious beliefs. Although 
questions remain as to the degree of influence, an appraisal of participants’ responses 
indicates that it is quite substantial. Whilst the degree of influence could be traced to 
various factors, it is necessary to examine whether there is indeed any connection 
between religion and corporate governance.  
Iyer (2008) and McCleary (2008) suggested that religion is conducive to economic 
development when it is disconnected from political and economic life. Thus, the 
realisation by economic agents that religion should be isolated from economic 
policies such as corporate governance could be vital to good governance practices. 
Despite the position of Grier (1997), it may be difficult to completely separate 
religion from corporate governance, particularly for those who consider religion as 
their worldview (Adi, 2005). Barro and McCleary (2003) examined the effect of 
church attendance and religious beliefs on economic growth. Their study showed 
that economic growth responds positively to the degree of religious belief but 
negatively to church attendance. They conclude that economic performance benefits 
from individual traits which are fortified by religious beliefs.  
In the course of this discussion, some observations are noted. First, it could be 
rationalised that correlation between religion and economic development is not 
necessarily positive. Second, societal dysfunction and poverty appear to explain the 
increasing relevance of religion in countries such as Nigeria (Zuckerman, 2008; 
Coşgel & Miceli, 2009; Norris & Inglehart, 2011).  Whereas Norris and Inglehart 
(2011) posit that religion actually becomes less central to people as their lives 
become less vulnerable to the constant threat of death, disease and misfortune, 
Zuckerman (2008) informs that prosperity remains a strong causal factor to explain 
why religion disintegrates. Coşgel and Miceli (2009) suggest religion offers a utility 
maximisation mechanism for people who are constantly threatened by factors noted 
in Norris and Inglehart (2011) above. Therefore, in summary, it can be posited that 
the achievement of good corporate governance is not necessarily dependent on the 
level of religiosity of economic agents. Religion can be reasonably disconnected 
from corporate governance, if other relevant economic issues are functioning 
optimally. 
 
 175 
 
The final generic category of social institutions is the effect of ethnicity on the 
practice of corporate governance in Nigeria. It can be discerned from discussion 
hitherto that ethnic and tribal affiliations, variations in ethnic beliefs and ‘federal 
character’ have influenced corporations and, by extension, corporate governance 
practices. As a result, it is logical that governance reforms must consider the 
peculiarities of these ethnic groups. Whilst the dynamic of developing such reforms 
remains problematic, it is necessary to acknowledge the motivation driving ethnic 
interests in corporations. 
To identify these motivations, it is paramount to comprehend why ethnicity poses 
serious challenges to the Nigerian society. In recognition of the need to address 
ethnicity-driven challenges, Nnoli (2003) identified several measures implemented 
by the government to minimise their impact. These measures include ‘federal 
character,’ formation of unity colleges, ethnic balancing, various attempts at 
developing a fair revenue allocation formula, attempted development of a single 
indigenous language (Wazobia), and relocation of the federal capital, amongst others. 
However, despite these efforts, the country is still wrestling with ethnicity-related 
tensions. As Nnoli (2003) posits, it is apparent that the understanding of the ethnic 
phenomenon is shallow, hence the difficulty in tackling the issue. Therefore, in 
developing a new strategy for addressing the problem, the challenge must be initially 
clarified.  
Jalali and Lipset (1992) offered an explanation for ethnicity problems. They inform 
that Marxists and non-Marxist scholars opine that ethnicity is a reflection of 
traditional societies in which people lived in small communities, isolated from one 
another, as there were limited modes of communication and transportation. Jalali and 
Lipset (1992) added that the scholars assumed that the advent of industrialisation, 
urbanisation and increased education would overwhelm ethnic consciousness, which 
would ensure that universalism overpowered particularism. However, despite 
improvements in industrialisation, urbanisation and education, ethnic consciousness 
remains high. The issue, which was noted in the previous chapter, relates to the 
failure to acknowledge that factors such as industrialisation, urbanisation and 
education will manifest differently across countries in view of the varying levels of 
economic sophistication of those countries. As a result, whilst European countries, in 
particular France (see Jalali & Lipset, 1992), have leverage on the benefits of these 
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factors to narrow ethnic consciousness, the case is different for developing 
economies. Indeed, there are sufficient evidence that the factors noted in Jalali and 
Lipset (1992) have served to further widen the gap between Nigerian ethnic groups.  
It must be noted however that from the interviews conducted, relating to this issue, a 
different perception is observed. The influence or role of individual actors appears to 
act as a major determinant of ethnicity problems in Nigeria. Influential individuals 
are able to sway public perception in their ethnic domain to achieve personal 
objectives. This practice is prevalent amongst politicians. This connects with 
Adamolekun et al.’s (1991) position, as they observed that the desire to attain 
unmerited personal interest seems to be a main driver of ethnicity-related problems 
in Nigeria. As has been noted, greed and other similar vices (aided by value erosion 
in society) have contributed to the proliferation of these behaviours. The emergence 
of influential individuals is traceable to weak institutional frameworks, as existing 
structures to control oppressive behaviours lack the requisite robustness.  
Based on the preceding discussion, it is envisaged that three issues must be 
addressed to limit the inclination towards ethnic affinities among Nigerians. It is 
believed, as Ukiwo (2003, 2005) recommended, that the de-recognition, or at least 
attenuation, of ethnicity issues in corporate environments will signal the need to treat 
every individual equally and fairly, irrespective of their ethnicity. To achieve this, 
the first issue that must be addressed is the economic emancipation of the people. 
Chukuezi (2009) identified poverty levels as a driver of ethnic consciousness in 
Nigeria. Economically-emancipated, informed and well-educated individuals are 
better able to appreciate and respect the supremacy of institutions over ethnic 
affiliations. Okogbule (2006) agrees that weaknesses in institutional frameworks in 
Nigeria are a reflection of the perception of Nigerians towards those institutions. 
 
5.2.3 Consideration of Findings with respect to Economic Institution 
The decision to comply with or defy regulations is the prerogative of economic 
agents. Many factors influence an individual’s orientation towards regulation. These 
factors are important in evaluating regulation and proposing how compliance can be 
enhanced. However, regulation is not everything. The presence (or absence) of 
regulation does not suggest good corporate governance practice (Arjoon, 2005); it is 
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influenced by the rational choice and economic motivation of an individual (Steel & 
König, 2006).  
In Chapter Two it was indicated that regulation should embed corporate governance. 
This view needs to be examined to disentangle potential ambiguities. The effect of 
sound morals and ethics as precedents and predictors of good governance practices 
has been explored (see Jensen, 2001; Thomsen, 2004). Furthermore, the findings in 
Arjoon (2005) offer some insights. Whilst making a distinction between regulatory 
and ethical compliance mechanisms, Arjoon (2005) demonstrates that regulatory 
compliance mechanisms have proven inadequate to independently drive corporate 
governance compliance, in view of their inability to restore confidence and trust.  
However, this proposition must recognise the prevailing corporate governance model 
in an environment. For instance, the use of the principles-based model in the UK is 
enhanced by the robustness of its institutions and, perhaps, the largely unwritten 
nature of the UK constitution. Similarly, it could also be argued that the relative 
success achieved with the use of the rules-based model in the US is also facilitated 
by the strength of its institutions and its written constitution approach. Whilst these 
views suggest that the use of principles-based or rules-based models is irrelevant as 
long as institutional frameworks are resilient and durable, Doidge et al. (2007) and 
Judge et al. (2008) show that country institutional specificities are crucial to this 
outcome.  
Berglöf and Claessens (2006) posit that institutional frameworks in many developing 
countries have been impaired as a result of increasing erosion of morals and values 
in these systems. Thus, it becomes challenging to establish a governance model 
(principles-based) which links with the proposition recommended in Arjoon (2005) 
where ‘freedom of indifference’ and ‘freedom for excellence’ are crucial. However, 
whilst the need for values and morals cannot be discounted in corporate governance, 
regulation might offer a plausible strategy, particularly in environments where 
economic decisions are commonly based on variables other than principles. The 
obvious alternative (rules-based) requires a robust regulatory regime, however 
accounts by Inyang (2009) and Adegbite (2012) affirm that the regulatory system in 
Nigeria is weak, hence a reassessment of the existing governance regulatory 
structure is required. 
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It is particularly noteworthy when rules-based and principles-based regulatory 
regimes are examined. In the US, where rules-based regulation is in force, corporate 
governance infractions are still evident. For instance, Kirkpatrick (2009) and Conyon, 
Judge, and Useem (2011) traced the 2008 global financial crises to the subprime 
crisis in the US and, more specifically, to incidences of poor corporate governance. 
However, in the UK, the principles-based model appears to have had some positive 
effects, despite lacking the same force present in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the US. 
Black et al. (2007) agreed that the UK financial services have benefitted from the 
adoption of a principles-based regulation. The preceding examples emphasise 
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) assertion that corporate governance regulations have 
produced varying results across countries. From Aguilera and Jackson (2003) 
accounts, it could be stated that existing institutional frameworks in these countries 
may have accounted for these differences.  
This issue creates concern in developing countries where the existing institutions do 
not possess similar robustness to constrain behaviour (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011b). 
As a consequence, issues of rationality become crucial. According to Scott (2000), 
fundamental to rational choice is the assumption that complex social phenomena can 
be explained in terms of individual action. This position, termed ‘methodological 
individualism,’ suggests that individual human action is the unit of social life. Thus, 
the idea of rationality implies a conscious agent engaging in deliberate calculative 
strategies to maximise their preferences. Economist Gary Becker provided an 
example. As he was running late for an important appointment, he had to weigh up 
the costs and benefits of legally parking in an inconvenient garage, or illegally 
parking in a convenient place. After roughly calculating the probability of getting 
caught and the potential punishment for being late, he rationally opted to commit the 
crime by parking illegally.  
The foregoing example provides the foundation for examining the effect of 
regulation as a deterrent. As noted in Becker (1974), the gains and pains of 
infractions determine the effectiveness of regulations as deterrents. Whilst an 
individual would rationally aim to maximise their gains, an environment with weak 
legal systems enhances the possibility of gains exceeding pains (Ellis, 2003), such 
that, over time, it becomes rational to engage in infractions. As informed by the 
discussions in the political and social domains, the emergence of a good corporate 
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governance system, especially in societies where agents display apathy to regulations 
(Ahunwan, 2002), is undermined by ineffective sanction regime.    
A subsequent danger of this is where economic agents regard the maximisation of 
their gains, via unethical means, as utility. 50  This is particularly worrisome 
considering Hodgson (2012) observation that people generally seek to maximise 
their utility. Thus, utility can be modified to describe any form of behaviour, 
irrespective of the procedure or motive underlining the behaviour. Though, as agreed 
by Hodgson (2012), this indicates a sign of weakness rather than strength. For 
instance, in a society where influential individuals have consistently exploited the 
system over a long period of time, continuous engagement in such unethical 
activities could become the norm, or alternatively, satisfying a habit (utility). This 
emphasises the need to understand the motivations influencing the behaviour of 
economic agents.   
Furthermore, rational choice theory posits that an individual’s preference is informed 
by his beliefs and fundamental desires. However, Dietrich and List (2013) suggest 
that whilst new information may provoke a change in beliefs, fundamental desires 
are unshakable. New information bears little effect on the fundamental desires of 
individuals. Therefore, it may be necessary to understand the reasons which 
influence an individual’s fundamental preferences. Dietrich and List (2013) 
formulated two axioms to examine reason-based preferences. First, they note that 
preferences are inspired by motivating reasons and, second, preferences mutate in a 
coherent way as additional reasons become motivating. This indicates that utility can 
be a motivating reason to explain why agents engage in unethical practices, and not 
necessarily to maximise their gains. This raises questions regarding the relationship 
between rationality and economic motivation. In addressing this issue, there are 
sufficient basis to argue that the depth of knowledge available to a stakeholder 
determines their rationality.  
From the foregoing, it is therefore instructive that the main corporate governance 
code in Nigeria (SEC Code, 2011) has not given adequate considerations to matters 
relating to economic institutions as highlighted in Table 18. In the table, issues 
                                                 
50
 Utility describes a situation where an act is deemed profitable or beneficial (see Levin & Milgrom, 
2004). 
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relating to the generic and subcategories of rational choice was not addressed. The 
cost-benefit motivation is compensated by the engagement of corruption to outsmart 
the weak regulatory policies. This problem is accentuated by low literacy levels 
which mean it remains a difficult task for many economic agents to comprehend the 
worth of good corporate governance. Nalukenge, Nkundabanyanga, and Tauringana 
(2012) show how literacy levels could impact the quality of accounting information 
in a developing economy.  
On the contrary, the relative strides achieved with respect to corporate governance in 
many developed countries have been related to many factors among which is high 
literacy levels (Barro, 1996). A UNESCO (2006) Report also noted that the 
empowering potential of literacy can translate into increased political participation 
and thus contribute to the quality of public policies and to democracy. The stifling 
effects of key institutional elements in developing economies such as Nigeria ensure 
that the potentials inherent in a high literate environment remain unachievable. 
Table 18 - Frequency of Economic-Related Themes in the SEC Code (2011)   
 
Main Categories Generic Categories Frequency Counts 
 
Ec
on
om
ic
 
In
st
itu
tio
n
s Economic Regulation 1 
Rational Choice 0 
 
To conclude, it should be noted that rational choice is based significantly on reasons. 
Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky (1993) observed that when individuals are faced with 
making a decision, they often seek and construct reasons to rationalise their choices. 
It can therefore be reasonably concluded that rational agents act on the basis of 
motivating reasons. However, political and social elements could have an impact on 
individual reasoning, with subsequent impact upon what that individual considers to 
be a rational choice. Thus, in environments with weak political and social structures, 
it is possible that the majority of the motivating reasons accessible to economic 
agents (which centre on profit generation rather than wealth maximisation) may be 
inconsistent with good corporate governance principles.       
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5.3 Theoretical Implications of Nigerian Corporate Governance Scholarship 
From Chapter Four and so far in this chapter, insights have been generated regarding 
the practice of corporate governance in Nigeria. However, a PhD thesis, according to 
Petre and Rugg (2010), aims to enrich theoretical discourse hence it is appropriate to 
present the theoretical significance of this study. Consequent upon the 
aforementioned, this section discusses some emergent understandings regarding two 
theories relevant to corporate governance. 
 
5.3.1 Institutional Theorising of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
In Chapter Two it was noted that institutions and institutional environments are the 
drivers of institutional theory (Suddaby, 2010). In the same chapter, the application 
of the propositions established by institutional theorists (with respect to corporate 
governance) (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Judge et al., 2008; Filatotchev et al., 2013) 
was examined. Consequently, this discussion commences by examining whether 
institutional weakness is the main factor influencing corporate governance 
challenges in Nigeria. This contention is the basis for Figure 15. 
Figure 15 shows the relationship which exists amongst institutions, economic agents 
and the corporate governance system. The objective of institutions, whether it is 
political, social or economic, is to constrain or check the behaviour of an individual 
economic agent (North, 1990). In achieving this objective, institutions act as an 
agent of diffusion (Nee & Strang, 1998) by seeking to impose mutually-beneficial 
institutional norms on individuals operating in a society (Judge et al., 2008). This 
position, which is fundamental to the framework in Figure 15, indicates that the 
objectives of corporate governance are better served when economic agents 
acknowledge their limits, as imposed by institutions and the institutional 
environment (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003).  
 
 
 
 
 
 182 
 
Figure 15 - Institutions, Economic Agents and Corporate Governance  
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Assuming that the preceding view is valid, it can be concluded that the capacity of an 
institution to act as a constraint on the behaviour of economic agents is determined 
by the robustness of that institution (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2012). For instance, the 
relatively higher level of compliance to corporate governance regulations displayed 
by corporations in developed economies can be traced to the fact that the legal 
institutions in those regions possess the capacity to ensure that sanctions are certain 
to be enforced (La Porta et al., 2000; Licht et al., 2005). The possibility of evading 
enforcement is low. It can therefore be argued that institutional frameworks, 
represented by political, social and economic institutions (Figure 15), relate such that 
two objectives are achieved, which are discussed in the next paragraph.  
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The first objective is the influence on the behaviour of economic agents with respect 
to how they undertake their activities (North, 1990), acting as a system of checks and 
balances which is consistent with Solomon’s (2013) definition of corporate 
governance. The second objective of institutional elements as represented in Figure 
15 entails diffusion (of acceptable behaviour) and imposition (of restrictions to 
behaviour) in an institutional environment (Judge et al., 2008). As these institutions 
become increasingly robust over time, it is expected that the positives inherent in 
these institutions are dispersed to agents. This, in turn, controls the actions of agents 
and stimulates positive implications for the practice of corporate governance.  
However, as indicated in Figure 15, the framework does not sufficiently account for 
variations in the degree of effectiveness, sophistication, reputation and awareness, 
amongst others, in institutions and institutional environments across the globe. 
Whereas Adegbite and Nakajima (2011b) agree that the capacity of institutions to 
promote good governance varies between countries, Fiss (2008) and Roe (2008) 
argue that the degree of robustness of institutional structures in individual countries 
is critical to explaining the state of corporate governance in those countries. In fact, 
inconsistencies in the robustness of institutional frameworks in capitalist 
environments represent a useful basis for evaluating the significance of institutional 
theory between developed and developing economies (Glaeser et al., 2004; 
Fukuyama, 2006). To highlight this point, Hussainey and Salama (2010) demonstrate 
that organisations with higher levels of corporate environmental reputation (CER) 
exhibit a corresponding higher degree of share price anticipation of earnings as 
opposed to organisations with lower levels of CER scores. The key factors upon 
which the outcome is based (efficient resource allocation and information flow) have 
remained a challenge in developing economies, limiting the development of CER, 
with implications for share price anticipation.  
The preceding notion supports an examination of the significance and application of 
institutional theory in developing economies. This is crucial, as institutional theory 
has been engaged in explaining corporate governance in Nigeria and its variations. 
This is also consistent with the approach employed in Adegbite and Nakajima 
(2011b). However, it can be argued that the capacity of institutions to entrench good 
corporate governance practice is context-specific (Judge et al., 2008) i.e. it is 
informed by the peculiarities of the institutional environment. This is denoted in 
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Figure 16. The figure shows that the impact of institutional elements on business 
practices could be influenced by economic actors and the government. This is 
particularly true in developing economies (see Figure 16) where weaknesses in 
institutional frameworks could be the outcome of an increase in influential economic 
agents and powerful governments. During data analysis in Chapter Four it was 
consistently observed that the activities of individual economic agents and the 
government in Nigeria, for example, are inconsistent with the positions established 
by institutional theorists such that the outcomes of corporate governance are usually 
at variance with projections.  In this thesis, these two factors serve as the basis of 
enriching the institutional theorising of corporate governance.    
Figure 16 - Influences on Institutional Theory in Developing Economies 
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5.3.1.1 The Individual Economic Agent and Institutional Theorising 
It is critical to note that the fundamental basis of definitions and views on 
institutional theory is its capacity to control the actions of economic agents as a 
means of achieving mutually-beneficial common goals (North, 1990). However, 
differences in institutional environments indicate that possible variations could exist 
regarding its impact on corporate governance practice, for instance. The views of 
respondents are consistent with this position. In fact, the majority of respondents 
indicated that the unfavourable contributions and impact of individuals on 
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institutions of corporate governance in Nigeria may explain the present state of its 
corporate governance. The interest generated by the ‘individual’ concern amongst 
participants was somewhat substantial. Table 19 reveals an NVivo extract of the top 
10 words used by all research participants. As can be seen from the table, ‘people’ is 
uppermost. Whilst the usage of the word could have other meanings, the researcher 
can confirm that the word has been substantially used by participants to represent 
individuals or economic actors.  
Table 19 - 10 Most Cited Words by Research Participants   
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
people 6 291 1.11 
Nigeria 7 269 1.02 
code 4 238 0.91 
think 5 217 0.83 
also 4 216 0.82 
even 4 216 0.82 
culture 7 207 0.79 
want 4 170 0.65 
way 3 162 0.62 
system 6 159 0.60 
 
Following the above, it can be rationalised that the functionality of existing 
institutions in Nigeria has been undermined by the activities of certain influential 
individuals. Consequently, it is understood that individual economic agents are 
central to the establishment of robust institutional frameworks in Nigeria. This view 
is consistent with the result in Glaeser et al. (2004). Their study indicates that human 
capital is a better basis of growth than institutions. Indeed, it could also be reasoned 
that human capital offers a more important variable for predicting economic 
development than institutions. This has implications for the understanding of 
institutional theory, as it highlights the role of humans in institutions.   
In addition, Glaeser et al. (2004) reported that poor countries tend to resolve their 
problems by means of good policies established by dictators. This indicates that 
corporate governance can be improved even by a dictator as long as sound policies 
are established and complied with. Hence it could be advocated that it is the 
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economic actor (such as a dictator) who builds an institution that should take 
priority, not the institution. To extend this assertion, an influential economic agent 
can implement measures towards building strong institutions, hence the resilience of 
institutional elements is determined by influential economic agents. This is 
consistent with Lipset’s (1960) position which affirms that even over a relatively 
short time span of five years, human capital can lead to institutional improvement. 
Figure 17 - Bottom-Up Approach to Corporate Governance 
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Furthermore, the role of economic agents is supported in Oliver’s (1992) 
deinstitutionalisation argument. For example, drawing from the concept of normative 
fragmentation,51  Oliver (1992) identified leader succession as a force which can 
                                                 
51
 Normative fragmentation describes the loss of cultural consensus among members of an 
organisation on the meanings and interpretation they attach to existing organisational tasks and 
activities (Oliver, 1992). 
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impede the endurance of organisational and institutional traditions. The basis for this 
position is that new members, whose backgrounds are different from those of 
existing members, bring different interpretive frameworks which act in a way that 
gradually diminishes consensus and unquestioning adherence to existing taken-for-
granted practices. Thus, institutional endurance is linked to the preferences of new 
institutional members.     
The position noted in the last two paragraphs is inconsistent with the objective 
emphasised by institutional theorists as denoted in Figure 15. Therefore, as 
represented in Figure 17, a bottom-up approach to institutional theorising of 
corporate governance is proposed to reflect developments in many developing 
economies such as Nigeria. In Figure 17, greater emphasis is placed upon influential 
economic actors. Emphasising the role of economic actors is consistent with Scott’s 
(2014, p. 5) “diachronic and synchronic analysis,” which seeks to ascertain how 
economies acquire their features and explores the conditions that cause the features 
to vary over time and space. In other words, the nature of development in social 
systems can impact institutionalisation processes. An example is the development of 
traditional institutions in many developing economies such as Nigeria, where 
traditional leaders are powerful and possess the authority to substantially influence 
decision-making in their domain. This mode of thinking has infiltrated the Nigerian 
political and business environment, as some corporate executives display similar 
dispositions (see Nwabuzor, 2005). Thus, rather than institutions monitoring the 
behaviour of these agents, the situation is vice versa in most developing economies.    
As shown in Figure 17, these influential agents possess the ability to engage in two 
activities. First is to invent the institutions. Thus, institutions generally lack expected 
endurance and independence, as their existence and relevance is tied to the inventor, 
and mutates with the emergence of another influential agent. This leads to the second 
activity. As agents consider themselves responsible for inventing institutions, they 
interpret these institutions to suit their individual preferences, as is often witnessed 
with the legal institutions in many developing economies. For instance, the direction 
of the political system is determined not usually by the political parties or structures 
established for this purpose but by those who have emerged from the (political) 
institution (Omololu, 2007). This concern was summed up in Sokoloff and 
Engerman (2000, p. 223); 
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Specifically, in those societies that began with extreme inequality, elites were 
better able to establish a legal framework that insured them disproportionate 
shares of political power, and to use that greater influence to establish rules, 
laws, and other government policies that advantaged members of the elite 
relative to non-members, contributing to persistence over time of the high 
degree of inequality. 
 
While this challenge poses serious consequences for the practice of corporate 
governance in Nigeria, its theoretical implication is equally crucial to the literature 
on institutional theory. Judge et al. (2008) intimated this possible challenge when 
they suggested that economic actors can invent institutions through negotiation. 
Thus, whilst it is agreed that institutions can be invented by influential individuals, 
institutions are not always the outcome of a negotiation process, particularly in the 
developing world. Rather, other undesirable strategies such as wars could be 
employed by economic actors to create institutions. Therefore, this thesis argues that 
individual economic actors are more important with respect to achieving the 
objective of good corporate governance in developing economies. The foregoing is 
the basis for proposing a bottom-up approach to corporate governance (Figure 17) 
rather than the dominant top-down approach, presented in Figure 15.    
To conclude, this thesis engaged with another strand of literature which examines the 
relevance and applicability of institutional elements in corporate governance 
discourse (Glaeser et al., 2004; Przeworski, 2004; Fukuyama, 2006). These authors 
posit that it is the conditions that underpin institutions, more than the institutions, 
that influence the direction and practice of corporate governance. Further evidence of 
the preceding view was noted in Majumdar and Mukand (2014). Engaging the 
concept of institution-building, they identified two effects in relation to political 
institutions and institutional change. They argue that, whereas good institutions can 
be developed by increasing political accountability which offers an incentive effect, 
they demonstrated that the preceding activity increases the incentive of the rentier 
elite to ‘tighten their grip’ on political institutions, which represents the political 
control effect. The implication is that incentive and political control move in parallel. 
Where influential political actors lack control, the incentive for political 
accountability may be low, and vice versa. This further indicates that the 
development of robust institutions is a reaction to the preferences of some actors. 
This is certainly the case in most developing economies.    
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The foregoing argument is extended using Nigeria as a case study to offer further 
insights into the ideas underpinning institutional theory. It was found that rather than 
seeking to build institutions in an effort to enhance corporate governance practices, 
concerns created by powerful/influential individuals need to be addressed in advance 
prior to strengthening institutional frameworks. This was the basis for 
conceptualising the bottom-up approach to good corporate governance, focusing on 
human institutionalism.52 This challenges the top-down approach which has enjoyed 
significant scholarship, particularly in studies examining corporate governance in 
both developed and developing economies.    
 
5.3.1.2 The Government as Agents of Institutional Isomorphism 
In Chapter Two, the paucity of literature regarding the potentiality government as an 
agent of isomorphism was noted. This thesis posits that an understanding of the 
influence of government in promoting isomorphic tendencies will be beneficial to 
the scholarship of institutional isomorphism. Ahunwan’s (2002) analysis of the 
ownership structure of businesses in Nigeria reveals that the government controls a 
significant percentage of economic activities. Furthermore, Taiwo and Abayomi 
(2011) contend that the Nigerian government expends significant public funds. 
Similar situations exist in some other developing economies. For instance, evidence 
was found in Mangena and Tauringana (2007) that the Zimbabwean government also 
wields significant economic power and control. 
Following the above, this study proposes that the dominant economic force of the 
government in developing economies could have implications for institutional 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) with respect to corporate governance 
practices. Notably, Frumkin and Galaskiewicz (2004) report that public sector 
organisations have long been considered major drivers of the institutionalisation 
process in business organisations. 53  However, conversely, Frumkin and 
Galaskiewicz (2004) observed that these government agencies have rarely been 
                                                 
52
 This concept will be further discussed in the next chapter as a contribution emerging from this 
study. 
53
 The emergence of ‘political institutions’ as a main category in prior analysis undertaken in this 
study supports the position expressed in Frumkin and Galaskiewicz (2004). 
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considered as agents of institutional pressures. This is worth noting despite the fact 
that DiMaggio and Powell (1983), in framing Hypothesis B-2, acknowledged that; 
The greater the extent to which the organisations in a field transact with 
agencies of the state, the greater the extent of isomorphism in the field as a 
whole.   
 
Indeed, as observed in Chapter Two, studies on institutional isomorphism have 
largely concentrated on building the structures of one private firm to be similar to 
those of other comparable firms (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The focus on 
private firms is informed by the fact that in many developed economies, the private 
sector enjoys similar, if not greater, economic influence than their government. This 
is not the case in many developing countries. As shown in Ahunwan (2002) and 
Taiwo and Abayomi (2011), the economic influence of governments consistently 
overpowers the economic contributions of the private sector, such that many firms 
are dependent upon it (government) for patronage and continued survival (Osemeke, 
2011). Hypothesis B-1 in DiMaggio and Powell (1983) supports this assertion. 
Thus it could be argued that, in Nigeria, institutional isomorphism is driven by the 
government rather than private sector organisations. With this background, the well-
documented concerns associated with public sector governance in Nigeria have 
contributed to creating weak systemic governance. This connects with Hawley’s 
(1968) proposition that firms subjected to the same environmental conditions tend to 
acquire a similar form of organisation. It is consistent with DiMaggio and Powell’s 
(1983, p. 147) stance that institutional isomorphism could actually “make 
organisations more similar without necessarily making them more efficient.” 
Subsequently, the weak governance system in many government establishments 
appears to have extended to every facet of the institutional environment, with the 
outcome that many private-sector corporations exhibit similar poor governance 
practices. Thus, isomorphic manifestations, with government as the main agent, 
could be engaged as an instrument for explaining the present state of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. If that is the case, the instrumentality of government can be 
correspondingly engaged to stimulate systemic institutional change by exploiting its 
isomorphic propensities.  
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In conclusion, the institutional isomorphism literature has not sufficiently 
acknowledged the role of government in creating the dominant practices and 
traditions in the institutional environment of developing economies. The increasing 
relevance of developing economies in the global marketplace demands that attention 
is paid to this research area considering the present unenviable state of corporate 
governance practices amongst these economies. 
 
5.3.2 Realignment of Agency Theory: The Principal-Principal Alternative  
As indicated in Chapter Two, Letza et al. (2008), with respect to agency theory, 
noted the conflicting opinions regarding its influence and relevance to practice. In 
addition, Fama and Jensen (1983) made a crucial contribution to the problems 
associated with agency theory, proposing that the wealth maximisation objective of 
firms is constantly threatened by organisational survival due to factors relating to the 
‘separation of ownership and control.’ They argue that as decision agents are not 
significantly affected, financially, by their decisions, firms are inherently exposed to 
agency issues. This concern appears to be the trigger for governance abuses in 
corporations globally, intensified by the narrowness of the agency model (Hirsch & 
Friedman, 1986).  
In reference to the narrowness of the agency model, a shift or realignment in its 
theoretical focus may be necessary. Agency debates are concentrated on two 
economic agents (shareholders and management). Whilst stakeholder theory 
recognises the need for stakeholders to be integrated into the model, it is crucial to 
identify who is indeed the most important stakeholder in a firm. Letza et al. (2008) 
admits that despite the volume of criticisms regarding theories of corporate 
governance, the primacy of the shareholder is not in doubt. The reasons are not 
fanciful, as ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune.’ Thus, it could be suggested that 
the ‘suppliers of finance’ (see Friedman, 1970; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) idea 
underpins the agency model. 
Nonetheless, if the objective is to maximise wealth, other factors become equally 
crucial. The banking system is employed to illustrate this point. The relevance of the 
system in many facets of life, particularly in economic development, is well-
documented (Mayer, 1990; Levine, 1997). The system, built upon what is known as 
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the ‘process of financial intermediation’ (Allen & Santomero, 1997; Cetorelli, 
Mandel, & Mollineaux, 2012), brings together interested parties and facilitates 
exchange between lenders (surplus-income units) and borrowers (deficit-income 
units).  
Lenders (who could be likened to shareholders) engage in this process as they are 
desirous of maximising their wealth (mainly via interest received). However, their 
wealth maximisation objectives depend considerably on the intermediaries (banks). 
The alternative is to connect with the deficit-income unit without employing the 
bank. This will potentially increase transaction costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
thereby impacting wealth maximisation objectives. Therefore, the wealth 
maximisation objectives of lenders can be enhanced when a middleman i.e. a banker 
with the requisite skills, is engaged to source borrowers and, in particular, ensure that 
the principal and interest is available to the lender when the ‘contract’ matures. A 
different path could potentially lead to wealth erosion. 
The above illustrations indicate that, in creating wealth, on the one hand shareholders 
rely on management, whilst on the other management depends on shareholders to 
equally maximise their own (management) wealth. This shows that agents are as 
powerful and important as the shareholders. Since shareholders solely depend on 
management to maximise their wealth, this thesis posits that the literature should call 
for the increased recognition of the value of management in agency scholarship.  
Figure 18 expands the shareholder model to incorporate other stakeholders. Every 
stakeholder (including shareholders) desires to maximise their wealth. The only 
stakeholder who can facilitate the realisation of this objective is the management. 
Based on this premise, managers could be deemed as key players in the Mendelow 
(1991) stakeholder mapping framework. According to Mendelow (1991), key 
players are stakeholders with great power and high influence. Whereas Kotter (2010) 
notes that the possession of power increases influence, Pettigrew and McNulty 
(1995) suggest that management possesses as much power as shareholders in 
influencing the performance of corporations. Therefore, taking the preceding view 
into account, the power possessed by management comes with corresponding 
influence. As a consequence, management could be considered a key player, 
equating the power and influence possessed by management to those of shareholders. 
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From Figure 18, it is only management that has direct control over the pursuit of all 
other stakeholders’ objectives. An example is corporate collapses, which are often 
the outcome of poor or unethical management decisions.    
Figure 18 - The Role of Management in Corporations 
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Whilst the advocates of agency theory have been criticised for not vigorously 
pursuing a system for addressing management objective, would the maximisation of 
management objective necessarily translate to the maximisation of other 
stakeholders’ wealth? A manager’s action could be influenced by regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive systems (Scott, 2014) existing in an environment. 
Giddens (1984) explained that the normative (ethics, principles, beliefs and values) 
systems offer an enduring orientation for an individual. Thus, maximising 
shareholder wealth could be enhanced by the institutional environment within which 
management operates. Letza et al. (2008) describe this as pluralistic corporate 
governance theorising i.e. the adaptation of the core theories of corporate governance 
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to integrate institutional contexts. This has become crucial as the boundaries of the 
firm are increasingly unfixable and constantly shifting. This is evidenced by 
changing relationships with suppliers, easier access to financial capital, the 
increasing importance of human resources to a firm’s survival, globalisation effects 
and developments in information technology (Letza et al., 2008).  
In the context of developing economies, the need to explore a realignment of agency 
theory is compelling. Agency theory postulates that, in imperfect markets, managers 
will seek to maximise their own interests at the expense of shareholders’ (Eisenhardt, 
1989). However, the ability of agents to pursue this objective derives from 
information asymmetry i.e. where managers have access to more information than 
shareholders. This challenge represents the main conflict in agency relationships 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). The well-developed nature of the information systems in 
many developed countries has facilitated a continuing thorough assessment of the 
challenge. The same cannot be said of developing economies, where information 
flow has remained a concern (Khanna & Palepu, 2000). Furthermore, as Young et al. 
(2008) noted, concerns regarding weak legal protection of minority shareholders, 
concentrated ownership structures, extensive family ownership and control, which 
are prevalent in developing economies, call for an adjustment of the agency 
postulation. 
In view of the foregoing, this study proposes a principal-principal alternative to 
agency theorising in developing economies. Whereas evidence from corporate 
failures, and many other incidences, has shown that agency complications and the 
corresponding agency costs cannot be completely eliminated (Wright, Mukherji, & 
Kroll, 2001), this problem is compounded in environments that do not possess many 
of the basic requirements for a functional agency relationship (see Dharwadkar et al., 
2000; Young et al., 2008). As a result, the number of incidences of corporate failures 
in developing countries such as Nigeria is typically higher than in many other parts 
of the world (Nworji et al., 2011; Adeyemi & Olowu, 2013).  
Against the background of both management and shareholders being classed as key 
players in an organisation, firms, particularly in developing economies, may benefit 
from embracing a principal-principal perspective. Therefore, rather than agents 
working towards maximising shareholder wealth, it is proposed that a profit sharing 
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arrangement between management and shareholders (including other stakeholders) 
can help address prevailing agency challenges. This view offers a framework which 
ensures that both parties strive towards maximising organisational wealth, contrary 
to agency theory which assumes that managers endeavour to maximise shareholder 
wealth, creating concerns in relation to goal congruence (Young et al., 2008).        
 
5.4 Framework for Good Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
Figure 19 reveals the thesis’ proposal for establishing a robust corporate governance 
system in Nigeria. It has been argued that the effective functioning of a corporate 
governance system requires that certain conditions are established and clarified, such 
as the role of government (Coglianese, Keating, Michael, & Healey, 2004; Goergen, 
2012). In the upper part of Figure 19, two conditionalities are acknowledged, namely 
increased government intervention and an enabling business environment. These 
conditionalities are projected to drive reforms (see Section 5.4.2) proposed for 
corporate governance in Nigeria. The lower part of Figure 19 denotes proposed 
reforms. These reforms are classed into two categories. The first category, the 
awareness-related (AR) reforms are intended to trigger a positive change in the 
behaviour of economic agents, and promote institutional consciousness. The second 
category of reforms, the regulation-related (RR) reforms will not only enhance the 
functionality of AR reforms, but specifically seeks to engage the force of law in 
addressing corporate governance challenges in the system.  
Whilst the description in Figure 19 suggests that the implementation of proposed 
reforms can work in a linear manner, the relationship between conditionalities and 
reforms can mutate such that reforms can facilitate the continued reinforcement of 
conditionalities (depicted by the dashed lines in Figure 19). In an environment where 
the interest of government in establishing a sound governance structure is questioned 
(Inyang, 2009), legitimacy can be important. If AR and RR are established and 
subsequently gain societal legitimacy, these reforms can be strengthened over time 
such that increased government participation and the development of a sound 
business environment becomes a rational and inevitable outcome.     
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5.4.1 Prerequisites for Effective Governance Reforms in Nigeria 
There are various drivers which can propel the practice of corporate governance 
towards attaining the desired expectations in an economy (Enriques & Volpin, 
2007). These drivers include investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000), shareholder 
activism (Gillan & Starks, 2000), board independence (Adams, Hermalin, & 
Weisbach, 2010) and information disclosure (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012), amongst 
many others. However, these drivers require that some fundamentals are established. 
This section discusses two preconditions which should support proposed corporate 
governance reform in Nigeria.  
Figure 19 - A Model for Good Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
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The first condition is increased (but positive) intervention by the government. 
Adelman (2000) remarked that the role of government in economic development 
represents the degree to which it can shape, or is inevitably shaped by, the society to 
which it belongs. This suggests that both society and the government have ‘powers,’ 
the extent of which determines ‘who shapes what.’ As previously noted, the Nigerian 
economic environment is dominated by the government and its various agencies. 
Ahunwan (2002) provides evidence which support this position. First; the 
government retains near-absolute control over public utilities and infrastructure. 
Furthermore, in Chapter Two, it was indicated that the government enjoys significant 
shareholdings in three of the four business ownership categories identified in 
Ahunwan (2002). This, once again, questions the isomorphism postulation of 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) which did not sufficiently account for the role and 
influence of government as isomorphic agents. Where an economy is dominated by 
government, Frumkin and Galaskiewicz (2004) stated that government and its 
organisations often drive the institutionalisation of business firms and non-profit 
organisations.    
In relation to the foregoing, comments from interviewees generally suggest that 
government has not shown enough commitment to the ideals of corporate 
governance. As shapers of society, the government has not provided essential 
leadership, which is central to good corporate governance. This point drew numerous 
comments from interviewees. For instance, B3 (a regulator) stated that; 
Leadership must set the pace. They must live above board. They must serve 
as a model for followers. 
 
The main thrust for providing effective leadership is that it inherently increases the 
extent of government involvement in corporate governance matters across the 
country. The desire for increased participation of government can be examined in the 
context of low-trust countries conceptualised in Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer 
(2010). According to Aghion et al. (2010), individuals in low-trust countries yearn 
for more government intervention even when they know that the government is 
corrupt. This is because despite the unfavourable perceptions regarding the role of 
government, there is still a belief that increased intervention by the government is 
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crucial to building a sound governance structure. In other words, distrust creates 
demand for government intervention through regulation (Aghion et al., 2010). 
Adegbite (2012) also posits that more government participation in corporate 
governance will be beneficial and foster better corporate governance practices. In 
view of this suggestion, it becomes important to examine how government can 
improve its participation in corporate governance in Nigeria. B7 suggests that; 
…powers that be (political leaders) in Nigeria must buy into corporate 
governance. They must be made to see it as necessary for the country’s 
economic development. 
 
Therefore, a strategy for improved governance performance must have the capacity 
to ensure that the benefits inherent in good corporate governance are understood by 
government and its agents. In other words, the government needs to be enlightened 
as to the values and worth of corporate governance. This would enhance the 
willingness of government to operationalise the principles of corporate governance 
in all areas of its activities. Wilson (2006) suggests that this represents an area where 
government has displayed a lack of sustained interest towards corporate governance, 
as corporate governance principles lack the necessary grounding in its 
(government’s) businesses.  
The weak corporate governance system in these organisations tends to create many 
other challenges. For instance, it becomes possible for the operations of government-
owned companies to suffer from excessive political interference (Adegbite et al., 
2013). These problems restrict the ability of government and its corporations to offer 
leadership and inspire good corporate behaviour within the economic environment. 
In view of government’s influence on society, this attitude is subsequently replicated 
as the norm in the business environment. Unfortunately, the extent of corruption and 
apathy towards regulation (see Ahunwan, 2002) means that other stakeholders 
consequently fail to appreciate the value of corporate governance.  
However, it is crucial to state that efforts to address unconvincing government 
involvement in corporate governance must explore the capacity to depoliticise 
government organisations. 54  Vasilescu (2008) recommends the depoliticising of 
decision-making and the establishment of ‘firewalls’ between government and the 
                                                 
54
 It is important to note that depoliticising does not mean less government intervention. 
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management of state businesses where the government is the majority shareholder. 
Good corporate governance in these organisations would protect the interests of 
minority shareholders thus enhancing the protection of property rights. Attaining this 
goal must also be integrated into the awareness programme. Stakeholders will need 
to be trained, such that they appreciate the need to depoliticise and the potential 
benefits therein with respect to corporate governance.  
The increased intervention of government can stimulate the pursuit of the second 
prerequisite i.e. the establishment of enabling business environment. Ogunro (2014) 
affirm that businesses thrive in a conducive and sustainable environment. However, 
as Sanda, Mikailu, and Garba (2010) acknowledged, the business environment in 
Nigeria, as presently constituted, hinders the entrenchment of sound corporate 
governance. It is no coincidence that countries in which corporate governance has 
achieved relative success (mainly in developed countries) operate a functional 
business environment which allows policies such as corporate governance to thrive. 
Using the PESTEL55 model, the developed countries have succeeded in building a 
responsive business environment. Politically, these countries operate a democracy 
which acknowledges the importance of transparency and accountability to its 
citizens. In economic terms, these countries also tend to display a high level of 
economic development which stimulates the effectiveness of policies such as 
corporate governance. Similar positive developments are observable with respect to 
technology, social systems, environmental awareness and management. Notably, 
their legal institutions are well developed to cope effectively with the basic 
expectations of rule of law. 
Whilst these elements have contributed to the emergence of a sound corporate 
governance system in developed countries, the same cannot be said for Nigeria. In 
Nigeria, the PESTEL elements are extremely challenged (Osemeke, 2011). For 
instance, whilst Nigeria is currently experiencing its longest period of uninterrupted 
democratic governance after independence (in 1960) since 1999, the quality of the 
electoral process has been constantly doubted. As a result, the country’s democratic 
institution lacks the requisite legitimacy. The political institution is also challenged 
                                                 
55
 PESTEL is an acronym for political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal. The 
model is used to evaluate the macro business environment (Johnson et al., 2014). 
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by political corruption and power rotation among ethnic blocs which have created 
regional and ethnic tensions.  
The country has not fared any better economically. Its business environment is 
overwhelmed by a variety of problems which include mono-product (crude oil) over-
dependence, high interest rates, high inflation rates, multiple tax regimes, weak 
capital markets, falling external reserves and high levels of unemployment, amongst 
others. In a similar vein, the business environment is also beset by social problems, 
particularly an acute shortage of infrastructural facilities (Ogunro, 2014). Notably, 
the lack of amenities such as electricity power supplies, water provision, 
transportation networks and high levels of insecurity have converged to create 
unwarranted social problems. The legal institution is also plagued by corruption, 
such that issues of compliance and enforcement, which are fundamental to corporate 
governance, have been constantly subjected to manipulation. The foregoing 
summarises the present state of the Nigerian business environment. 
The proposed reforms (presented in Section 5.4.2) may not yield the desired results 
if steps are not taken to address the challenges plaguing the Nigerian business 
environment. Indeed, no form of corporate governance can thrive if these challenges 
persist. However, it could be observed that the responsibility for improving the 
business environment lies substantially with the government. This reinforces the 
decision to recognise the government’s increased involvement in corporate 
governance matters as a central prerequisite for the development of an enduring 
corporate governance system in Nigeria.  
 
5.4.2 Proposed Reforms 
In Chapter Four it was observed that the state of corporate governance in Nigeria is 
shaped by institutional elements in the political, social and economic domains. 
However, an argument was proffered indicating that institutional frameworks may 
not be broadly responsible for the problems of corporate governance in Nigeria as 
the existence of some conditions has heavily influenced the current state of the 
institutional environment. In the concluding discussion of the conditions shaping the 
institutional environment, it was established that individuals, as economic agents, 
impact institutions the most in Nigeria. Thus it is posited that improving corporate 
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governance in Nigeria demands that concerns relating to economic agents be 
addressed as a matter of priority. Any reform, in essence, must therefore seek to 
achieve two objectives. The first is to propose what measures can be taken to ensure 
that individuals identify with corporate governance and the second is to recommend 
how institutions (particularly regulatory) can be strengthened to enhance the capacity 
of corporate governance to constrain human behaviour. Consequently, two areas of 
intervention are proposed. The first deals with AR interventions which address 
individual consciousness, whilst the second focuses on RR interventions, which are 
intended to enhance the capacity of the existing legal machinery to entrench good 
governance. 
 
5.4.2.1 Awareness-Related (AR) Reforms 
From the analysis of interviews conducted during the course of this study, a dearth of 
knowledge regarding corporate governance issues was evident. Similarly, evidence 
from the literature (Okeahalam & Akinboade, 2003; Ofo, 2010) indicates that 
knowledge regarding corporate governance in Nigeria is narrow. Consequently, this 
study posits that any attempt to reform corporate governance in Nigeria must 
commence by proposing and implementing an awareness-driven programme.  
 
Education and Enlightenment 
To entrench sound corporate governance, it is recommended that stakeholders 
(regulators and executives) should undergo regular education and enlightenment 
programmes regarding the benefits of adopting corporate governance, facilitated by 
renowned corporate governance consultants. Wilson (2006) identified lack of 
knowledge as the bane of corporate governance in Nigeria. Virtually all interviewees 
identified the provision of education and enlightenment as a first step towards 
building a credible corporate governance structure.  A5 notes that; 
The first thing is to educate the stakeholders on the benefits of adopting good 
corporate governance standards in their organisations. 
 
B8 also suggested that; 
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…there is …a need to drive awareness and knowledge regarding the core 
principles of corporate governance. There is a huge gap in knowledge. 
 
The views of A5 and B8 illustrate the importance of embarking upon an education 
and enlightenment programme for stakeholders. Relatively, corporate governance 
issues are not new in the country. Since SEC introduced the first governance code in 
2003 there has existed an awareness agenda initiated by regulators and some 
corporate bodies, however evidently the rate of internalising governance principles 
does not indicate that these values are understood and/or applied. Okpara (2011) and 
Jimoh and Iyoha (2012) explain that consistent governance breaches across 
industries are a reflection of the lack of knowledge amongst operators. 
In view of the need to address issues around ignorance, it is important to engage 
appropriate enlightenment strategies. Some firms in Nigeria organise in-house 
training programmes and also encourage key employees to attend external seminars 
(both locally and internationally). However, the problem with the training model is 
that it is often based on models adopted in developed economies or on literature from 
developed economies. Unfortunately, the institutional and operating environment has 
continuously impacted the effectiveness of these training outcomes. In addition, 
respondents noted that issues with the mode and frequency of training and the 
trainers themselves have not helped the corporate governance cause in Nigeria. C2 
expresses this concern; 
I believe they (operators) also need to be tutored. Tutored not in Harvard but 
in Africa …where the problem resides. Because, some of the issues we have 
here, (they) don’t have it abroad. They are similar issues but not as 
pronounced as we have it here because our context is different. They should 
attend (seminars and conferences) here, where the problem is. 
 
While C2’s comment above is worth noting, it must be stated that the attendance of 
locally organised training programmes may not be sufficient to understand 
contemporary issues in corporate governance. Rather, it is the content of the 
programme that ensures good outcomes are achieved. Hence it is crucial that a 
training programme satisfy two requirements; it must incorporate global best 
practices and recognise country-defined institutional peculiarities. The latter view 
features in Rwegasira’s (2000) account. Additionally, corporate governance has been 
widely identified with a sound values system, hence training programmes must 
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incorporate this as a feature. When asked how corporate governance should be 
reformed in Nigeria, A10 responded; 
I would want to educate the people. But if I have to do this, then I will want 
to change values. I need to change the way they (stakeholders) think. 
 
This is essential considering that erosion of societal values featured prominently in 
Chapter Four as respondents discussed the problems of corporate governance in 
Nigeria, particularly from the three institutionalism perspectives. C2 reinforces the 
need to teach values; 
…here, we have what we call core values… We teach those core values 
…Those old values; spirituality, capacity building, integrity, responsibility, 
sacrifices. We teach those values in this place. We want people to be able to 
internalise these values. …Once you are able to internalise these values, 
these values now represent (the) foundation for ethics and standards.   
The above suggestion, as noted by C2, can be enhanced with the teaching of values 
from an early age. To this end, some participants recommended that corporate 
governance should be taught in universities (no university at present offers corporate 
governance as a programme of study in Nigeria), whilst acknowledging that the 
outcomes of teaching values will manifest in the long term. It is therefore necessary 
that stakeholders are introduced to good values and corporate governance principles 
early in life to enhance their capacity to internalise related principles, which would 
then enable them to withstand potential infractions.  
Educating stakeholders must also embrace a radically different approach. A 
respondent noted that the available training mode tends to focus on the psychomotor 
and cognitive elements which focus on developing the ‘head’ (mental or knowing) 
and the ‘hands’ (doing) respectively (Marzano, 2001). Unfortunately, this strategy 
does not take into account the affective domain i.e. the heart (feeling) which 
represents a core feature of Bloom’s Taxonomy. The heart represents the building 
block for embracing and manifesting sound values and principles. This is very 
important as whatever is done, either with the hands or the head, derives from the 
heart. The importance of the affective domain was noted in Forbes and Milliken 
(1999). They suggest that training focusing on the affective domain contributes to a 
Board’s effectiveness.   
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Consequently, an enlightenment programme that does not develop from the heart but 
which is based solely on the coordination of the hand (cognitive) and the head 
(psychomotor) may not stimulate the manifestation of sound ethical practices. 
Therefore, where an enlightenment programme is developed such that it is intended 
to address these three elements simultaneously, there is a greater propensity for 
individuals to internalise and exhibit good values (Macfarlane & Ottewill, 2004). 
This is the fundamental premise upon which any system of good corporate 
governance must be established. Corporate actors and regulators must be regularly 
exposed to training programmes incorporating these three elements. 
 
Promoting Corporate Governance at the Micro-Level 
The establishment of sound governance practices in the micro sector represents 
another objective which must be vigorously pursued. The micro sector in many 
countries around the world has proven to be crucial to the economic development of 
such countries (Ayyagari, Beck, & Demirguc-Kunt, 2007). The same can be said for 
Nigeria (Taiwo, Ayodeji, & Yusuf, 2012). Whilst the nature of corporate governance 
appeals more to corporates and multinationals, Abor and Biekpe (2007) argued that 
corporate governance principles are equally vital to SMEs.  
However, despite various accounts which highlight the benefits of good governance 
in SMEs (Ayyagari et al., 2007), they are generally overlooked when issues of 
corporate governance are discussed. For instance, there is no dedicated governance 
legislation for SMEs in Nigeria, though the SEC Code (2011) recommended that 
companies such as SMEs should abide by the principles set out in the code. 
However, this is inconsistent with Uhlaner, Wright and Huse’s (2007) position 
which proposed the development of flexible governance codes that recognise the 
different types of governance needs of these firms and their institutional context. The 
danger of inappropriate regulation was recognised in Rachagan and Satkunasingam 
(2009). They noted its undesirability and added that it promotes compliance with the 
letter but not the spirit of the law.  
In relation to the aforementioned, the absence of dedicated regulation has contributed 
to the lack of knowledge among many SME operators in Nigeria (see Osotimehin, 
Jegede, Akinlabi, & Olajide, 2012). Considering that some publicly-listed 
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organisations such as Dangote Plc commenced in business as SMEs, the acquisition 
of knowledge regarding the principles of good governance at the early stage of 
commercial life will help businesses engrain the principles of corporate governance 
across the business environment. Such businesses will be well-positioned legally to 
transmute from private to public should they decide to enlist on a stock exchange. 
An interesting observation was made in Tauringana and Clarke (2000). They note 
that small companies will be willing to subject themselves to corporate governance 
regimes, such as auditing, only where it would improve the prosperity of the 
business and increase its size. This re-emphasises a dearth of knowledge, hence 
corporate governance can act as a tool in bridging the knowledge gap amongst 
SMEs.  
Based on this view, it is crucial for regulators and policy makers to embark upon 
educating and enlightening small business entrepreneurs. Eriki and Inegbenebor 
(2009) provided an example of a lack of awareness. Their study showed that only a 
small percentage of SMEs accessed funds under the Equity Investment Scheme as 
the SMEs were unaware of the scheme. In addition, whilst the development of a 
dedicated code is proposed, compliance with key corporate governance requirements 
must be part of the company registration process. These proposals must be 
implemented in phases with the first phase focused on medium enterprises. It is 
expected that this phase will help develop informed strategies to address the next 
stage which will be expected to focus on small enterprises. It must be noted that the 
activities in these stages will remain ongoing.       
 
5.4.2.2 Regulation-Related (RR) Reforms 
As part of a two-pronged reform strategy the entrenchment of good corporate 
governance principles in Nigeria necessitates that some factors relating to regulation 
are addressed. Whilst an attempt has been made to substantiate the need for an 
effective awareness programme, this study posits that resolving some regulation-
related challenges will improve the trajectory of good governance in Nigerian 
corporations. From participants’ comments and an extensive review of literature, the 
following regulatory issues should be reformed if corporate governance is to undergo 
an overhaul. 
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Harmonising Corporate Governance Codes 
In Chapter Two it was noted that four codes are presently in force to regulate 
corporate governance in Nigeria. Whilst the proliferation of corporate governance 
regulations is intended to enhance good corporate behaviour among Nigerian firms 
(see Wilson, 2006) and provide the requisite awareness, the variety of challenges 
identified in Chapter Two, reinforced by the data, shows that the objectives of the 
codes have not been achieved.  
Table 20 - Some Disagreements between the CBN and SEC Codes 
 
CBN Code 2006 
 
SEC Code 2011 
Section 1.7 states that "compliance with 
the provisions of this code is 
mandatory" 
Section 1.3a of SEC states that "the 
code is not intended as rigid set of 
rules" 
Section 5.3.5 states that "the minimum 
number of NEDs should be more than 
that of EDs subject to a maximum 
Board size of 20 directors" 
Section 4.2 states that "membership of 
the Board should not be less than five 
and should not exceed 15 persons" 
Section 5.2.3 states that "no two 
members of the same extended family 
should occupy the position of chairman 
and that of Chief Executive Officer or 
Executive Director of a bank at the 
same time" 
Section 7.1 states that "not more than 
two members of the same family should 
sit on the Board of a public company at 
the same time" 
 
Ofo (2010) and Osemeke and Adegbite (2016) documented the challenges which 
have emerged as a consequence of having multiple codes. A notable concern is the 
confusion and uncertainty it generates amongst operators. Some areas of 
disagreement are presented in Table 20. For instance, while the SEC Code indicates 
a principles-based stance, the CBN Code is designed as a rules-based regulation. 
Respondents note that there is a need to harmonise existing corporate governance 
codes, otherwise conflict arises in implementation.  
The above concern also highlights a critical problem. The SEC Code is more tolerant 
compared to industry-specific codes. The industry-specific codes explicitly demand 
that compliance with their provisions is compulsory. This implies that the provisions 
in industry-specific codes take precedence over the stipulations of the SEC Code. 
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This is because companies are duty-bound to comply with the industry-specific 
obligations of their respective industry corporate governance codes, irrespective of 
the provisions specified in the SEC Code concerning the same issue. Another 
implication is that where the SEC Code is more stringent on an issue, operators may 
choose not to comply, as long as reasons for non-compliance can be explained 
(Black, 2008). Hence the relevance of the SEC Code can be narrowed to only those 
issues which are not addressed by the industry-specific codes, thus undermining the 
value of the SEC Code. 
In view of the foregoing issues, it is instructive to note that in many developed 
economies such as the UK, Australia and Canada, countries operate a harmonised 
code system and have achieved reasonable outcomes in their corporate governance. 
Other countries such as South Africa, Ghana and Kenya also operate a single code 
system. These countries, notably South Africa (with the King Code III) have 
achieved substantial results with their corporate governance programmes. This 
therefore provides justification to recommend the harmonisation of existing codes.  
It should be stated that the Nigerian authorities appear to have recognised the need 
for a single code. In 2012, a committee was created by the Financial Reporting 
Council to establish modalities for harmonising the existing codes of corporate 
governance in Nigeria (Onuba, 2013). Whilst the code is still under development, 
this study maintains that having a single code is crucial as operators are able to refer 
to a single regulation, contrary to the existing scenario. However, this single 
regulation should contain generic and industry-specific provisions. This is consistent 
with A8’s opinion; 
Industries should be allowed to add to that (code) depending on the 
peculiarities of their industries. There are certain (activities) that you expect 
banking organisations to engage in but you may not expect the same from a 
manufacturing company, for instance. 
 
It is also believed that, irrespective of the generic and industry-specific provisions 
noted in the code, there is a strong possibility that a single code will minimise or 
possibly eliminate incidences of confusing provisions (see Table 20). Whilst 
harmonisation of the codes is expected to serve companies better, many of the 
challenges besetting corporate governance regulation issues, particularly weak 
enforcement mechanisms, can derail any harmonisation programme, except when 
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appropriately addressed as part of the new regulatory regime. In addition, this study 
also posits that a new regulatory regime will be that which encourages and provides 
opportunities for self-regulation.  
     
A Case for Multi-Stakeholder Co-Regulation 
Generally, regulation has been constantly employed as the instrument for 
establishing good corporate governance practices (La Porta et al., 2000; Gourevitch, 
2003). These regulations, according to Adegbite (2012), are produced by agencies 
with the commensurate power and authority to induce compliance by operators. 
Consequently, regulations could be viewed by operators as unfair in view of their 
coercive nature. This perception tends to have consequences for compliance levels. 
This challenge is more pronounced in a country like Nigeria where the government 
has been repeatedly accused of not abiding by the provisions of existing regulations, 
thus providing a rationale for operators to also seek ways (albeit illegitimate) to 
evade compliance. The nature of this challenge in the Nigerian business environment 
dictates that an alternative strategy be proposed. This is addressed in this section.  
Bartle and Vass (2005) presented a framework (Figure 20) which revealed the 
spectrum of regulation. From Figure 20, ‘no regulation’ and ‘statutory regulation’ 
are isolated. Corporate governance is a regulatory mechanism hence ‘no regulation’ 
is irrelevant. Corporate governance regulations in Nigeria are monitored and 
enforced by the state which defines ‘statutory regulation.’ Evidence (Okike, 2007; 
Adegbite, 2012) has shown that this regulatory system is inefficient in Nigeria. 
Indeed, Hirsch (2011) questioned the appropriateness of strict government regulation 
in a fast-moving and complex economy, and its feasibility in light of major political 
obstacles. For these reasons, alternatives are limited to self-regulation and co-
regulation (see Figure 20). Although Di Betta and Amenta (2004) discuss the 
benefits of self-regulation, the challenges inherent in adopting self-regulation are 
well documented. Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) identified two patterns of self-
regulation failure; under-regulation and misregulation. Under-regulation occurs 
where standards are deficient and monitoring is inadequate. This could manifest in 
the emergence of conflicts of interest as self-regulation could favour the interests of 
the industry over those of the investors and the general public.  
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Figure 20 - Continuum of Regulation 
 
 
No Regulation
 
Self-Regulation
 
Co-Regulation
 
Statutory 
Regulation
 
No explicit controls on an 
organisation
 
Regulations are specified, 
administered and enforced by 
the regulated organisation(s)
 
Regulations are specified, 
administered and enforced by a 
combination of the state and 
the regulated organisation(s)
 
Regulations are specified, 
administered and enforced by 
the state
 
The Regulation Range
Source: Adapted from Bartle and Vass (2005) 
Conversely, misregulation occurs due to false assumptions or misdirected efforts 
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). One example is where Self-Regulated 
Organisations (SROs) limit their transparency and accountability, since they would 
be primarily accountable to their members rather than the government or the public. 
Both under-regulation and misregulation can create concern, as noted in Dyck and 
Zingales (2004). They reasoned that self-regulation can increase private benefits of 
control, indicating that higher private benefits of control are often associated with 
less-developed markets. In addition, Graham and Woods (2006) extended self-
regulation scholarship to developing economies. Whilst observing that the lack of 
self-regulation is more evident in developing economies, they added that this 
problem is intensified by a lack of knowledge regarding self-regulation. Even in 
developed economies, results in DeJong, Mertens, and Wasley (2005), with respect 
to the use of self-regulation in the Netherlands, conclude that little should be 
expected from initiatives that rely on monitoring without enforcement. The concerns 
inherent in self-regulation necessitate an evaluation of co-regulation. 
Co-regulation (see Figure 21) involves a system wherein government and firms share 
responsibility for drafting and enforcing regulatory standards (Hirsch, 2011). Hirsch 
(2011) added that co-regulation is neither purely a government regulation nor purely 
an industry self-regulation, but a hybrid of both. Kirkbride and Letza (2004) 
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suggested that corporate governance regulation has taken a significant new direction. 
They explained that the boundaries of regulation are no longer determined by the 
choice between market-based (self) regulation and state-based (statutory) regulation 
but by a process of collibration.56 The benefit of this approach, according to Hirsch 
(2011), is that it ensures collaboration between government and businesses, leading 
to improved government-industry relationships, making both units problem-solvers. 
Figure 21 - Multi-Stakeholder Co-Regulation 
 
 
Business
 
Stakeholders
 
Government
 
Dialogue
 
The Public
 
Employees
 
Negotiated Corporate Governance Regulations
 
 
However, the general view of co-regulation focuses mainly on cooperation between 
companies and government. Whilst this form of co-regulation is termed ‘co-
governance’ or ‘collaborative governance’ (Hirsch, 2011), this thesis proposes the 
multi-stakeholder form of co-regulation (Jackson, 2010) which Albareda (2008) 
describes as the relationship between business and its stakeholders in developing 
corporate governance regulation (see Figure 21). This expands the frontier of 
corporate governance regulation beyond businesses and government. The main 
rationale for this proposal is informed by concerns regarding the industry-
government relationship which occurs beyond the public view. This could yield one-
sided deals which fail to protect stakeholders (Hirsch, 2011).  
                                                 
56
 Collibration describes the process of government intervention in order to recognise a balance 
between its objectives and those of the market with a view to managing the balance such that 
government policy objectives are achieved (Kirkbride & Letza, 2004). 
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Therefore, to frame co-regulation for corporate governance in Nigeria, the 
framework in Figure 21 is recommended. Fundamentally, the figure indicates that 
dialogue between business and stakeholders generates a negotiated regulation which 
is consistent with the expectations of the parties involved. This ensures a joint 
responsibility amongst stakeholders in administering and enforcing corporate 
governance regulations. This offers a robust strategy for Nigeria, particularly as 
evidence has revealed concerns around marginalisation, predominantly with 
shareholder activism (Adegbite et al., 2012). 
The benefits of engaging in co-regulation are numerous. Whilst this study has 
proposed a rules-based regulatory strategy (in the short term), the principles-based 
strategy is consistent with co-regulation as they both reflect a long-term orientation. 
Co-regulation also allows organisations to better acknowledge the effect of non-
compliance on collaborators (Steurer, 2013). Furthermore, in a highly dynamic 
market environment such as Nigeria, co-regulation offers a more rapid and flexible 
response to changes in market conditions, as it seeks to prevent the occurrence of 
infractions. It is also important to state that in view of the confusing provisions in 
some corporate codes in Nigeria, the use of co-regulation could generate a regulatory 
framework acceptable to all stakeholders which eliminates or minimises existing 
confusion.  
 
Legislation-Backed Governance Scorecard 
Whilst an argument has been proffered for the engagement of co-regulation by 
Nigerian corporations, it is necessary to identify tools that will support this initiative. 
Such tools, according to Estanislao (2008), should deliver the anchors, balance 
systems, initiatives, checks and resolutions that precede good governance. A 
governance scorecard embodies that tool. Estanislao (2008) concedes that one 
proven way of attaining good corporate governance standards is the systematic 
analysis of the governance situation using a scorecard. Since its first application in 
Germany in 2000, the use of scorecards has been well-received by many countries 
across the globe (Strenger, 2004). However, scorecards have been used sparingly in 
Nigeria. Application has been constrained by various problems, particularly the lack 
of support from government and regulatory agencies. In addition, in many Nigerian 
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corporations the application of scorecards has persistently failed to secure 
management buy-in.  
However, views from respondents indicate that it may be valuable to revisit the use 
of governance scorecards by Nigerian organisations. Views regarding the expected 
impact of scorecards on corporate governance practices in the country were 
generally positive. A6 remarks that; 
I believe it (scorecard) will (help). A scorecard concept will help individuals 
as well as their organisations to measure how they stand, corporate 
governance wise. It will help them foresee potential trouble spots and, once 
they address those trouble spots, they are able to get back on track.  
 
Similar positive views were expressed by A7, A9, A11, B1, A4 and A2, among 
others, suggesting that the scorecard concept will assist corporate bodies to measure 
their performance with respect to corporate governance, consequently offering a tool 
that will help foresee potential issues. However, despite the generally positive 
opinions regarding the use of scorecards, a minority of participants expressed 
reservations as to its usefulness. A7 informs that; 
Theoretically, it is good but whether it is going to work, it is really difficult to 
assess. The kind of problems we have in the system especially with corruption 
means that it is difficult to implement such documents …it would be difficult 
to gain acceptance.  
 
Notwithstanding these reservations, a majority of participants are of the opinion that 
if some measures are implemented, the use of scorecards may become worthwhile. 
B5 suggests that; 
If it is given the teeth of the law and if there is punishment for low scores or 
‘naming and shaming’ …there might be some improvement. 
 
A2 shares a similar view;  
If an agreement is reached with the regulatory body and possibly a law is 
enacted to enforce it, I think it will be useful for corporate governance in 
Nigeria. 
 
Consequently, this study assumes that the development of the scorecard, its mode of 
implementation and the legal backing it is able to generate will influence its 
functionality in the Nigerian context. Accordingly, the reform strategy, presented 
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below, is designed to incorporate these features. This strategy recognises that the use 
of scorecards must be built on the following fundamental principles: The scorecard; 
 should reflect global best practices in corporate governance, as informed by 
Strenger (2004), 
 should be designed to encourage the attainment of higher standards. The 
standards could be the outcome of co-regulation. The scorecard should not be 
based on minimum standards,  
 must be comprehensive in scope, representing the essential elements in the 
SEC Code (2011), 
 must be developed such that it can be applied to different markets and 
sectors, similar to a harmonised code,  
 must recognise the significance of some elements over others. Hence, 
weights must be used to communicate the importance of sections of the code, 
 must be supported, in its implementation, by a robust and extensive 
methodology, capable of accurately evaluating corporate governance 
behaviour and compliance levels. 
Whilst it is expected that the scorecard will take into account the above principles it 
must facilitate the achievement of the following objectives: 
 The scorecard must allow for analysis of corporate governance behaviour 
through a systematic and clear overview of key corporate governance issues 
(Donker & Zahir, 2008). 
 It must allow firms to engage in intra-industry comparisons. This, according 
to Strenger (2004), prompts competitiveness amongst firms with respect to 
governance.  
 The document must assist companies to understand the scope and quality of 
their own governance practices and behaviours. 
 The document, just like annual statements, must be readily available on the 
internet. Once companies are aware that the contents of the scorecard could 
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have implications for potential investment decisions, the motivation to 
improve compliance will be higher. 
The attainment of the above objectives requires the total support and commitment of 
the government, through the use of appropriate legislation. Estanislao (2008) noted 
that this must embed scorecards. In addition, such regulation must be enhanced by an 
effective enforcement strategy. The regulation must focus on ensuring the highest 
degree of usage of the scorecard by all relevant companies. It should also set 
expected scores (which should reflect high global best practice levels) and 
commensurate sanctions for violators. 
Finally, unlike the SEC Code which has suffered from a lack of regular review, the 
scorecard must not experience a similar fate. A programme of refinement and 
validation must be regularly applied. The frequency of refinement must be informed 
by the emergence of new concerns. This ensures that the scorecard reflects 
contemporary developments (Northcott & Smith, 2011) and retains its capacity to 
address emerging governance issues. The scorecard must be reviewed on an item-by-
item basis against globally-acclaimed principles such as those of the OECD, the 
World Bank and the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), amongst 
others. It is worthwhile mentioning that Nigerian financial regulators have 
acknowledged the importance of establishing a governance ranking system. Timms 
(2015) reports that with the launching of a Corporate Governance Rating System 
(CGRS), an improvement in the perception of capital markets and business practices 
would be anticipated.  
 
Establishing Effective Whistle-Blowing Mechanisms 
Whistle-blowing, according to Miceli, Near, and Dworkin (2013), entails the 
unauthorised disclosure of any wrongdoing in a firm to parties that are perceived to 
possess the capacity to act on the information. The introduction of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act in the US in 2002 and the inauguration of other national corporate 
governance codes has resulted in a growing number of organisations implementing 
whistle-blowing policies (Hassink, de Vries, & Bollen, 2007). These policies, 
according to Miceli, Rehg, Near, and Ryan (1999), are intended to achieve two 
major objectives. The first is to encourage whistle-blowing while the second is to 
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protect whistle-blowers. While its implementation across the globe has produced 
inconsistent outcomes, the benefits of whistle-blowing are well-documented (see 
Schmidt, 2005; Uys, 2008). 
However, despite the growing importance of whistle-blowing worldwide, the use of 
the concept in Nigeria is somewhat low. Participants observed that whistle-blowing 
is not encouraged in Nigeria. Whilst Adekoya (2011) offered that widespread 
poverty and high unemployment rates have hindered any whistle-blowing culture, 
participants identified ethnic and cultural affiliations as another factor impeding 
whistle-blowing in Nigeria. This view could be examined in the context of the Power 
Distance Index (PDI) propounded by Hofstede et al. (2010). The gap between the 
less powerful and highly powerful members of a firm (such as CEOs and Directors) 
is so wide that the whistle-blowing intentions of less powerful members can be 
easily frustrated (Uys, 2008). These issues are worsened by the prevalent lack of 
awareness and weak regulatory support. For instance, in the 2003 SEC Code, there 
was no single mention of whistle-blowing, whereas the updated version (SEC Code 
2011) provides a whistle-blowing policy (see Section 32). Despite this recognition, 
there are evident concerns in the policy particularly in relation to whistle-blower 
protection. The SEC Code (2011; S32.2) entrusts the protection of whistle-blowers 
to the Board of an organisation. This measure cannot preserve the anonymity of 
whistle-blowers. In the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002), the State (US government) 
assumes responsibility for whistle-blowers’ protection (see Section 806). This 
encourages employees to engage in whistle-blowing activities, thereby acting as a 
safeguard against ethical abuses by executives in the country’s corporations. 
Therefore, the benefits inherent in an effective whistle-blowing policy demand that 
the existing framework in Nigeria be reinforced. The pursuit of this goal motivated 
the following proposals:  
The first feature of the whistle-blowing reform revolves around the view that 
whistle-blowing entails “unauthorised disclosure” (see Miceli et al., 2013). In view 
of the attitude of some Nigerians towards regulation, it is proposed that whistle-
blowing should be institutionalised as ‘authorised disclosure.’ A study by Uys 
(2008) regarding whistle-blowing in South Africa (a country similar to Nigeria in 
some respects) shows that ‘authorised disclosure’ will enhance rational loyalty, as 
opposed to organisational loyalty, which ‘unauthorised disclosure’ advocates.  
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The next step involves securing an obligation from senior management and 
executives to commit to an internal whistle-blowing policy. Schmidt (2005) 
recommends that the commitment should be noted in a compliance statement. This 
commitment can be used subsequently by the capital market to compel firms to 
install internal safeguards against unethical behaviours. This reform will necessarily 
require a rules-based approach, allowing for commensurate sanctions and severe 
penalties for non-compliance. 
Once ‘authorised disclosure of wrongdoing’ and a commitment from senior 
management are successfully negotiated, it is pertinent that a robust framework 
protecting whistle-blowers is established. The lack of a detailed protection 
programme for whistle-blowers was noted by a majority of the interviewees as a 
crucial factor militating against whistle-blowing initiatives in Nigeria. Hwang, 
Staley, Te Chen, and Lan (2008) suggest that the fear of retaliation emanating from 
lack of protection discourages whistle-blowing. Providing a dedicated ‘hotline or 
email system,’ as noted in the SEC Code (2011; S32.3), is not enough to protect 
whistle-blowers, particularly where the hotline or email messages can be eventually 
accessed by an official of the organisation. It is essential that such reports are made 
to an external body, preferably the industry regulator or a professional body deemed 
responsible for such an organisation. Whilst this is expected to offer protection to 
whistle-blowers, there must be a framework to ensure that such communication is 
anonymised.               
This study also proposes that the use of incentives can contribute to a successful 
whistle-blowing reform strategy. It is rational for potential whistle-blowers to assess 
what they stand to gain or lose by engaging in whistle-blowing (Rapp, 2007; Hwang 
et al., 2008). Uys (2008) expressed that this is crucial to whistle-blowers as they 
often ‘pay a heavy price’ for exposing what they perceive to be an organisational 
wrongdoing. This is noteworthy given the poverty levels in Nigeria (see Adekoya, 
2011). Indeed, Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010) affirm that monetary incentives 
help explain employee involvement in whistle-blowing activities. However, this 
study recommends that incentives must not necessarily be restricted to those of a 
financial nature. Whistle-blowing must be designed such that it incorporates various 
forms of incentives such as workplace promotions and management recognition, 
amongst others (Schmidt, 2005; Hwang et al., 2008). 
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To conclude this discussion, regulators must also ensure that whistle-blowing 
represents an important element of any co-regulation arrangement. In addition to 
helping create awareness, it could also serve as an instrument for pressuring 
companies to further embrace high ideals in their operations. It is envisaged that 
effectively implementing these reforms will ensure that the objectives of ‘naming 
and shaming’ initiatives are achieved. In a collectivist society such as Nigeria (see 
Hofstede et al., 2010), public reporting of infractions or offences could lead to public 
shame and loss of reputation. Hence, the more operators realise that they will be 
exposed for their infractions, the higher the probability they will seek to avoid 
committing such violations. 
 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
In the previous chapter, data generated from respondents were subjected to varying 
levels of analysis, at the end of which three institutional classifications emerged i.e. 
political, social and economic institutions. However, during the course of this 
analysis, some perspectives were generated which addressed the research question 
and objectives of this study. Consequently, section 5.2 of this chapter discussed the 
findings emerging from the three institutional perspectives identified in the previous 
chapter. These discussions were undertaken to identify commonalities in relation to 
extant literature.  
Thereafter, section 5.3 focused on the theoretical insights offered by this study. 
Strands of knowledge were generated regarding institutional theory and agency 
theory, informed by the distinctiveness of the institutional environment in 
developing economies. With respect to institutional theory, the prioritisation of the 
needs of key economic agents was noted as a conditionality that must be 
acknowledged as antecedent towards building enduring political, social and 
economic institutions. It was demonstrated that existing institutions lack the 
robustness to regulate the economic preferences of key economic actors. 
Furthermore, in connection with institutional theory, insights were generated 
regarding the observed neglect of the role of government as agents of isomorphism. 
It was apparent that the political and economic power of the government indicates 
that other stakeholders in the economy are considerably reliant on the government. 
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As a consequence, the government is able to influence not only their decision-
making but also their behaviour and attitude. This concern is fundamental in many 
developing countries where the capacity of government to influence economic 
direction is near-absolute. Participants opined that poor governance and business 
practices in government establishments have provoked systemic weak governance 
practices in the institutional environment. It is therefore crucial that government 
must not only act as the ‘generator of codes’ of corporate governance regulations but 
must present itself as ‘accountable to codes’ before corporate governance 
stakeholders. 
The chapter also examined the application of agency theory in developing countries. 
The variety of problems challenging many developing economies with respect to 
corporate governance demands that new perspectives are crafted and adopted. In this 
chapter, a call for the adoption of the principal-principal approach was offered which 
requires that agents or managers have increased influence in determining their 
remuneration. The principal-principal alternative has the potential to address some of 
the tensions created by the dominant agency (shareholders and management) 
relationship in corporations. 
Finally, in section 5.4 of this chapter, proposals for addressing the undesirable state 
of corporate governance in the country were presented. This part commenced by 
presenting a framework for good corporate governance in Nigeria, followed by the 
identification of two prerequisites that must embed an effective reform strategy. 
Once this stage has been negotiated, the proposed reforms were discussed. The 
reforms proposed were categorised by two constructs, namely the awareness-related 
(AR) and regulation-related (RR) reforms, to facilitate a repositioning of corporate 
governance in the Nigerian business environment. In the next chapter, which 
concludes the thesis, the perspectives discussed in this chapter, in conjunction with 
comments from participants, are articulated in framing the contributions of this thesis 
to the body of knowledge.  
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Chapter Six 
Summary, Contributions and Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the study. It commences by summarising the main thrusts of 
the thesis (Section 6.2), followed by the presentation of the contributions of this 
thesis to the body of knowledge (Section 6.3). As this thesis also sought to present 
knowledge regarding the establishment of good corporate governance in Nigeria, 
recommendations aimed at improving the practice of corporate governance in the 
country are discussed (Section 6.4). Thereafter, the limitations of the thesis are noted 
and the mechanisms for restricting their effects on the research findings are reported 
(Section 6.5). Areas for future research are also identified to enable a continuous 
exploration of several issues identified in this study (Section 6.6).  
 
6.2 Summary of Thesis 
The benefits of a robust corporate governance system have been severally 
highlighted in this study. However, the attainment of these benefits can be impaired 
by variety of factors. Drawing from an institutionalism perspective, this thesis sought 
to understand how corporate governance should be regulated in Nigeria in order to 
promote good and ethically-informed practices in the business environment. In 
addressing this expectation, it was essential to determine the main institutional 
factors shaping corporate governance in Nigeria. 
From the analysis conducted in Chapter Four, various institutional influences were 
identified but using the methodological framework recommended in Elo and Kyngäs 
(2008), these institutional elements were coded along three categories. These 
categories (political, social and economic institutions) emerged as the main 
institutional factors influencing corporate governance in Nigeria. Interesting insights 
were observed from the subsets of these three main classifications. With regard to 
political institutions, for instance, the impact of political immunity was noted as a 
factor that has strengthened the political influence and political authority of members 
of the political class with respect to the practice of corporate governance. 
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Furthermore, this thesis not only highlighted the impact of increasing levels of 
corruption on corporate governance but also demonstrates how political immunity 
exacerbates systemic corruption. It is imperative to note that the insights regarding 
political immunity extend the scope of existing knowledge, considering that it 
(political immunity) has not attracted the attention it deserves particularly in the 
context of developing economies.  
Social institutions represent another institutional variant dictating the effectiveness 
of corporate governance policies in Nigeria. Elements such as culture, religion and 
ethnicity were identified by participants as critical to the state of corporate 
governance in the country. With respect to cultural influences, this thesis highlighted, 
among other concerns, respect for age and how it impacts good governance practices. 
Corporate governance is essentially a control mechanism but where the age factor is 
a significant variable in an organisation, the ability to question or control the 
activities of certain stakeholders on the basis of their age is eroded. Similarly, this 
thesis also stresses the increasing influence of religion especially in highly-religious 
countries. In demonstrating that the salient principles of religion are consistent with 
good corporate governance, this thesis equally demonstrate that in countries with 
high religiosity levels, the practice of corporate governance is not necessarily a 
reflection of underlying principles of the dominant religion. Indeed, religious herding, 
as demonstrated in this study, is a better determinant of corporate governance 
practices as the attitude and behaviour of devotees are considerably influenced by 
those of their religious leaders.    
The final institutional classification that emerged from this study is the economic 
institution which incorporates concerns bordering on rational choices and economic 
motivation, and economic regulation. This thesis indicates that the weak institutions 
have meant that cost-benefit considerations take into context the effectiveness of 
sanctions and deterrence mechanisms. Unfortunately, the weakness in these elements 
means that the cost of engaging in misgovernance can be offset by the benefits 
gained, thus influencing the rationality decisions of operators. This problem is 
further emphasised by the dearth of knowledge prevalent in the system.            
Whereas the foregoing paragraphs focused on findings relating to the main objective 
of this thesis (see Chapter One), the thesis also examined the main corporate 
 221 
 
governance regulation (SEC Code, 2011) in the country to understand the coverage 
accorded the main influences on the institutional environment of the country. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, the institutional factors identified in this study have 
been considerably omitted in codes regulating corporate governance in Nigeria hence 
it can be argued that the principal code of corporate governance is Nigeria is alien to 
the requisite demands of the Nigerian business environment. While institutional 
neglect in the SEC Code may explain the weak corporate governance system in the 
country, this challenge is better appreciated when the outcomes in Rwegasira (2000), 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003), Doidge et al. (2007) and Judge et al. (2008), are taken 
into consideration.                  
To conclude, an overriding theme evident in this thesis is the view that the 
effectiveness of institutional frameworks in Nigeria have been shaped by the 
activities and interventions of influential economic agents. While this outcome can 
be extended to many developing and emerging economies and to some extent, 
developed economies, the contributions of this thesis to the body of knowledge 
commences by addressing this finding.  
       
6.3 Thesis Contributions to Knowledge 
This thesis makes the following contributions to the body of knowledge. 
Contributions were made to the theory (see Sections 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3), practice 
(see Sections 6.3.4 and 6.3.5), methodology (see Section 6.3.6) and empirical 
literature (see Section 6.3.7) of corporate governance. 
 
6.3.1 Human Institutionalism 
The first contribution extends the scope of institutional theory. The extant literature 
on institutional theory has extensively explored the capacity of institutions to act as a 
check on the behaviour of economic agents (North, 1990; Scott, 2014). This explains 
why the theory has received increasing interest amongst scholars in view of its 
engagement as a theoretical frame to evaluate corporate governance issues (Aguilera, 
2005; Roe, 2008). 
 222 
 
However, as noted in Chapter Two, institutional theorising of corporate governance 
has been advanced by engaging elements of the institutional environment (Doidge et 
al., 2007; Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2010). Consequently, a body of knowledge has 
emerged affirming that corporate governance is influenced by the robustness of 
institutional elements in the business environment (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Judge 
et al., 2008; Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011b).  The foregoing outcome has motivated 
the examination of the institutional environment, facilitated by the development of 
various institutional categories to enhance the understanding of institutions. As a 
result, classifications such as political, economic and legal institutions (Giddens, 
1984) and historical, political and sociological institutionalism (Amenta & Ramsey, 
2010), amongst others, have been variously adopted in discussing institutional theory 
and the institutional environment of corporate governance (Adegbite & Nakajima, 
2011b).  
Despite this development, this study was concerned with exploring the robustness 
and capacity of the dominant institutional elements and classifications to explain the 
practice of corporate governance in a developing economy such as Nigeria. This 
interest was motivated by the positions of some scholars who question the relevance 
of institutions and institutional elements (Glaeser et al., 2004; Przeworski, 2004; 
Fukuyama, 2006). These authors posit that it is the conditions that underpin 
institutions, more than the institutions, which influence the direction and practice of 
corporate governance. 
The results of this study, as presented in Chapters Four and Five, are consistent with 
the views which support the relevance of institutions (Sorour & Howell, 2012; 
Owoye & Bissessar, 2014), affirming its criticality to the generation of knowledge 
regarding the institutional theory of corporate governance. However, as against the 
outcomes in Fukuyama (2006), Sachs (2003), Glaeser et al. (2004) and Przeworski 
(2004), the extant literature has not sufficiently recognised the existence of a 
condition that influences institutions and the institutional environment in developing 
economies. This thesis demonstrates that, in addition to existing classifications of 
institutional theory, human institutionalism is not only central to understanding the 
institutional theory of corporate governance, but can also offer a framework for 
examining the challenges hindering the practice of corporate governance, 
particularly in developing economies. The analysis and discussion in Chapters Four 
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and Five provide ample evidence to support this position. It is also argued that 
concerns relating to human institutionalism can explain the weak acknowledgement 
of institutions in corporate governance regulatory framework. This is because a 
robust regulatory framework supported by enduring institutional artefacts may 
weaken the notion of human institutionalism.    
 
6.3.2 A Bottom-Up Approach to Corporate Governance 
The above contribution offers the foundation for identifying another contribution of 
this thesis to the body of knowledge. The basic premise of institutional theory of 
corporate governance posits that the establishment of a good corporate governance 
system is dependent on the degree of robustness possessed by institutional elements 
in a particular institutional environment (Judge et al., 2008; Filatotchev et al., 2013). 
This enhances the capacity of institutions to act as a check on the behaviour of 
agents (North, 1990) which, in turn, allows a good corporate governance system to 
manifest (Fiss, 2008). The generality of corporate governance literature which 
integrated institutional theory in its analysis has embraced this view (Scott, 1999; 
Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). This understanding is presented in Figure 15 (Chapter 
Five), which is identified as the top-down approach.  
However, the context of this study offered in-depth but different insights when 
compared with the foregoing position. As noted in Section 6.3.1, the actions of 
individual economic agents were identified as a major condition determining the 
effectiveness of institutions in many developing economies. Consequently, this study 
contends that rather than building institutions in order to enhance corporate 
governance practices (see Acemoglu et al., 2005; Adegbite & Nakajima, 2012), the 
concerns created by overly powerful/influential individuals must first be addressed. 
These concerns must be sufficiently addressed prior to the creation of institutional 
frameworks. This was the basis for developing the bottom-up approach for good 
corporate governance in Nigeria, denoted in Figure 17. The bottom-up framework 
presents a corporate governance system which initially seeks to educate, and create a 
consciousness amongst individuals as a core prerequisite towards building strong 
institutions, which eventually stimulates the emergence of a good corporate 
governance system. In addition, the bottom-up strategy promotes the integration of 
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key institutional drivers in the design of codes of corporate governance, as attempts 
to address key stakeholder issues necessitate an understanding of underlying 
institutional factors. This new thinking challenges the top-down approach which has 
enjoyed significant scholarship, particularly in studies examining the role of 
institutions in corporate governance in developed economies.     
 
6.3.3 Public Sector-Driven Institutional Isomorphism 
This thesis also makes a contribution to the scope and understanding of institutional 
isomorphism.  Institutional isomorphism, according to  DiMaggio and Powell (1983), 
examines how economic actors in a business environment make their organisations 
increasingly similar as they try to change them. From a review of the literature 
(Dacin, 1997; Lai, Wong, & Cheng, 2006; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008), it can be 
claimed that the field of economic or rational actors identified in DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) is narrow, as much emphasis has been placed upon the role of 
organisations and stakeholders in the private sector as drivers of institutional 
isomorphism. As a result, a majority of the extant literature (Dacin, 1997; Liou, Rose, 
& Ellstrand, 2012) has also concentrated on analysing the role of private sector 
operators in entrenching institutional isomorphic tendencies. 
However, whilst undertaking this research, a new strand of thinking was observed by 
the author. As has been noted a few times in this thesis, the generality of the existing 
literature on institutional isomorphism is informed by practices in the developed 
economy (Dacin, 1997; Lodge, 2000; Lai et al., 2006). In such economies, the 
private sector enjoys a significant degree of control over the economy. It could be 
reasoned that this view has informed the low level of interest in examining how 
public sector organisations could become transmitters of institutional isomorphic 
behaviours. As this research engaged a context which is different from those that 
have been engaged in the majority of existing literature, this thesis offers evidence to 
show that government and the public sector are key agents of institutional 
isomorphism. Indeed, the dependence on government by private sector organisations 
in many developing economies (see Soludo, 2004; Aburime, 2009) amplifies the 
capacity of the public sector to provoke institutional isomorphism. As a result, this 
thesis states that institutional isomorphic scholarship must necessarily acknowledge 
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and integrate the public sector, not only to provide a broader platform for addressing 
concerns created by institutional isomorphism, but to also broaden the understanding 
and scholarship of the concept. 
 
6.3.4 Intermediate Regulatory Approach 
This is a contribution to practice. In Nigeria, the foremost corporate governance 
regulation is the SEC Code (2011). The code is substantially operated using a 
principles-based regulatory approach (Ofo, 2011). However, the challenges and 
concerns plaguing corporate governance practice in Nigeria are well-documented 
(Yakasai, 2001; Ahunwan, 2002; Adekoya, 2011), indicating that the code has not 
achieved its objectives (Osemeke & Adegbite, 2016). This preceding view was 
supported by participants. Thus, it was necessary to identify a regulatory approach 
that can promote the establishment of a sound corporate governance system.  
The analysis conducted in Chapter Four of this thesis highlighted the challenges 
experienced in the country’s political, social and economic domains. Indeed, it was 
apparent that some of these problems, such political immunity, cultural belief system 
and dearth of knowledge, among others, do not support the application of principles-
based ideology. The adoption of a principles-driven approach is enhanced where 
information flows freely and institutional elements are robust (Arjoon, 2005; Tariq 
& Abbas, 2013). From the comments provided by participants, the elements that 
underpin a principles-based regulatory system (see Black, 2010) are lacking. As a 
result, it was necessary to propose an alternative strategy.  
Therefore, a strategy encompassing the rules-based regulatory approach was 
considered appropriate for the Nigerian corporate governance system. A rules-based 
approach increases awareness (which requires improvement in Nigeria) of corporate 
governance and stipulates clear penalties for its breaches (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 
2007). However, despite this proposed intervention, several issues were identified 
with the rules-based mechanism which warrant further assessment (Sama & Shoaf, 
2005). These concerns include increased enforcement cost (Chhaochharia & 
Grinstein, 2007) and the inability to account for all corporate governance infractions 
(Trevino & Nelson, 2010), among others.  
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Following the preceding reflection, an intermediate regulatory approach, that 
integrates the appropriate elements of a rules-based and a principles-based approach, 
is proposed. Considering the need to reposition corporate governance practice in 
Nigeria, commencing the new regulatory approach with the rules-based or ‘stick 
approach’ (Arjoon, 2005) is considered necessary. However, in view of its inherent 
limitations (Sama & Shoaf, 2005; Trevino & Nelson, 2010) this approach should be 
engaged only for an appropriate period of time, which will be informed by visible 
improvements. The approach should be altered as soon as improvements in corporate 
governance practice are observed. The second (final) stage of implementing the 
proposed regulation will integrate the principles-based regulatory approach. The 
efficient mix of elements of both systems will be subsequently engaged to manage 
corporate governance in Nigeria, over the long term. This, in this thesis, is termed 
‘the intermediate regulatory approach to corporate governance.’ Evidence (Arjoon, 
2005; Sama & Shoaf, 2005) shows that both approaches can sufficiently reinforce 
each other to generate optimal outcomes in respect of corporate governance.     
 
6.3.5 Engagement of the Affective Learning Strategy 
Another contribution to practice is the identification of a new awareness strategy for 
corporate governance i.e. the affective approach. This thesis offered practical 
significances for corporate organisations operating in the Nigerian business 
environment. In Chapter Five, two strands of reforms were proposed, namely 
Awareness-Related (AR) and Regulation-Related (RR) reforms.  
With respect to AR, strategies were proposed using education to create and sustain 
corporate governance awareness and consciousness. This study observed that 
existing education strategies emphasise the use of psychomotor and cognitive 
elements which focus on developing the ‘head’ (mental) and the ‘hands’ (doing) 
respectively (Anderson & Sosniak, 1994). However, it was argued that corporate 
governance is considerably linked to morals, values and ethics (Arjoon, 2005; Sama 
& Shoaf, 2005). As a result, this study posits that relying solely on psychomotor and 
cognitive elements would not guarantee sound ethical behaviour. The concerns 
undermining corporate governance practice in Nigeria support this position. Thus it 
was proposed that training programmes should intensify attention towards a vital 
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element of Bloom’s Taxonomy i.e. developing the affective domain, which 
concentrates on enhancing the capacity of the heart to engage in internalisation of 
values and the manifestation of a good attitude, among others. This is consistent with 
the first and second contributions of this thesis which posit that the institutional 
awareness of economic actors must be developed to enhance improved corporate 
governance practice. Data have shown that there is an urgent need to improve the 
capacity of operators to internalise the principles of good corporate governance. This 
represents the basis of this contribution. 
 
6.3.6 The Use of QCA in Corporate Governance Scholarship 
This section highlights the contribution of this thesis to the methodology of 
corporate governance research. Various methodological approaches have been 
adopted in this area of scholarship. Whilst these approaches are influenced by the 
study’s objectives and the researcher’s worldview (Holden & Lynch, 2004), the use 
of differing methodologies can potentially generate varying outcomes for related 
studies (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
In this study, a social constructionist philosophy was adopted underpinned by a 
qualitative content analysis (QCA) methodological technique (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; 
Elo et al., 2014). No related study has engaged the use of QCA in undertaking 
corporate governance research in Nigeria, thus the outcomes of this thesis are the 
results of the application of a unique and systematic method (Schreier, 2012) in 
research methodology. This may have accounted for the variations in explaining 
institutional factors in Nigeria, particularly considering the work of Adegbite and 
Nakajima (2011a), as results from the use of the dominant top-down approach are 
inconsistent with the bottom-up approach conceptualised in this study. The QCA 
technique facilitated the systematic generation of themes (main, generic and 
subcategories, operationalised in Chapter Three) influencing the institutional 
environment of corporate governance in Nigeria. 
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6.3.7 Empirical Literature of Corporate Governance in Developing Economies 
This thesis also makes a contribution to the empirical literature on corporate 
governance in developing economies. In these economies, it has been severally noted 
that literature regarding corporate governance is scarce (Berglöf & Claessens, 2006; 
Mangena & Tauringana, 2007). The concern is further intensified with respect to 
empirical (evidence-based) literature (Adegbite et al., 2013).   
It is worth mentioning that the majority of studies on corporate governance in 
developing economies such as Nigeria are substantially undertaken as non-empirical 
(conceptual) studies (for example, see Okike, 2007), whilst a few others have 
employed a large-scale survey-based quantitative approach (for instance, see Okpara, 
2011). Studies using the intrepretivist and qualitative approach are few. Thus, 
evidence-based qualitative research is sparse in many developing economies.   
The aforementioned has implications for the understanding of corporate governance 
globally and, in particular, Nigeria, as the lack of empirical outputs hinders 
governance scholarship in these regions. In view of increasing globalisation, the 
continued lack of evidence-based corporate governance literature means that it may 
be difficult for multinational organisations, for instance, to appropriately 
comprehend the challenges of corporate governance in these economies. This could 
have implications for their (multinational companies) investments in developing 
economies and, subsequently, the global economy. Following the preceding 
observation, a key motivation of this thesis is to contribute knowledge in order to 
address concern regarding the scarcity of empirical literature on corporate 
governance amongst developing economies. 
 
6.4 Thesis Recommendations 
Drawing from the analysis conducted in various sections of the thesis, 
recommendations are proposed. These recommendations are presented as four areas, 
namely government, business environment, regulation and institutional 
reinforcement. 
 229 
 
As a largely public-sector driven economy, the overwhelming influence of the 
Nigerian government suggests that it must be actively committed to promoting good 
corporate governance (Goergen, 2012). This must commence with the government 
and its agencies subjecting themselves to the dictates of corporate governance 
principles (Adegbite, 2012). Ofo (2011) called for a corporate governance audit for 
all government organisations in order to stimulate governance consciousness in such 
organisations. It is also necessary to demarcate the boundary between business and 
government/politics. Many businesses rely on government patronage (Osemeke, 
2011) hence the government is able to exercise undue influence in the operations of 
these companies. In addition, the responsibility of government as a possible agent of 
institutional isomorphism compels that attempts to establish a robust governance 
system must be triggered by the creation of sound governance practices in 
government agencies.   
Another area of recommendation is the creation of an enabling business environment. 
Whilst this significantly relates to government, it has been noted that good corporate 
governance practices are aided by an efficient and functional business environment. 
The government should focus its energies towards building an enabling environment 
in order for the private sector to perform. Interventions are necessary in the areas of 
infrastructure, legal systems and human capacity development, among others. The 
legal institutions must be imbued with the political will to implement policies and 
protect property rights. Building an enabling business environment must also 
incorporate awareness programmes. Key stakeholders such as directors, auditors and 
shareholders must be regularly educated and trained to appreciate developments in 
corporate governance. In addition, the capacity of the various professional bodies to 
discharge their roles effectively must be enhanced. 
The regulation of corporate governance in Nigeria must be amended to adopt a 
largely rules-based stance, at least in the short term. This would necessitate stricter 
penalties for non-compliance. The legal system must also have an increased capacity 
to prosecute fraudulent executives so as to serve as a deterrent to other directors. The 
proposed regulatory regime must allow for speedy resolution of disputes. This may 
entail the creation of a tribunal specifically for that purpose. It is also proposed that 
the use of independent regulatory agencies (preferably foreign organisations) be 
explored. It is assumed that these regulators would be offered independence, which 
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appears to be lacking with the existing regulators. Regulations must also be updated 
to reflect the diversities in culture and ethnicity. As shown previously, failure to 
acknowledge core institutional features in the SEC (2011) Code may have informed 
poor governance practices in the country. The code must reflect the key institutional 
elements which inform practices in the Nigerian business environment, many of 
which are identified in this study. In addition, it is necessary that the concept of co-
regulation, highlighted in Chapter Five, be embraced. A regulatory system which 
creates increased opportunities for both government and the private sector to decide 
and agree applicable regulations could significantly impact the effectiveness and 
efficiency of such regulations for the good of corporate governance in Nigeria.   
Notwithstanding the position advanced in Chapter Five regarding the relevance of 
institutions, institutional discourse appears to dominate a considerable part of this 
thesis. Moreover, as presented in Chapter Four, it was pertinent to explain the 
concerns of corporate governance in Nigeria using three institutional lenses. It is 
therefore imperative that existing institutions be reinforced. Advances must be made 
in political, social and economic institutional domains. Underlying these institutional 
challenges are the harmful effects of corruption. There is an anti-corruption agency 
in Nigeria,57 however Markovska and Adams (2015) observed that the effectiveness 
with which the organisation operated at its inception appears to be dwindling. This 
agency must be strengthened, as corruption has been severally described as the bane 
of Nigeria’s economic progress (Lawal, 2007; Ogbeidi, 2012).  
This study also concluded that economic agents determine corporate governance 
direction in the country. Institutions are intended to act as a check on human 
behaviour and other conditions impeding institutional effectiveness, hence a strategy 
that will ensure the reinforcement of institutions could warrant that individuals are 
subject to institutional dictates. This recommendation is crucial to the emergence of 
good corporate governance in Nigeria, especially in the long term. Furthermore, in 
framing the recommendations for good governance of Nigerian corporations, it is 
necessary to note that this thesis was challenged by some limitations. These 
limitations, and the strategies for minimising their impact on the research outcomes, 
are discussed in the next section.  
                                                 
57
 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). 
 231 
 
6.5 Limitations of Study 
Research undertakings are typically subject to limitations. As this study is not 
different in this regard, it is important that such limitations are acknowledged. While 
it is essential that state that precaution was taken to limit the effect of identified 
limitations on the outcome and integrity of this thesis, it is equally imperative to 
emphasise that not all limitations are completely addressed. 
The first limitation relates to the methodology of the study, with respect to the 
sensitivity of the research area. The corporate governance topic imposes some 
limitations to its investigation in view of the sensitive nature of the issues involved. 
During several interviews it was observed that discussions regarding governance 
practices did not reflect actual practices, as senior executive participants who are 
responsible for corporate governance issues in their organisations would rather not 
expose the failings of corporate governance in their firms. Indeed, some participants 
were only comfortable with their interview taking place away from their office as 
they do not wish it to be known that they are discussing the corporate governance 
issues of their organisations. Such sensitivities had implications for the interviews in 
terms of duration and range and order of questions. The use of semi-structured 
interviews, which allowed for flexibility and variations in the order of questions, 
enabled the researcher to maximise the opportunities presented by the interviewees. 
In addition, despite the time constraints, the use of this data collection technique 
allowed the researcher to probe further for appropriate, rich information where the 
original responses provided were considered inadequate. 
The second limitation is also related to the methodology of the thesis. Whilst the 
study examined governance concerns amongst Nigerian corporations, participants 
were not drawn from all sectors of the Nigerian economy as classified by the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (see Chapter Three). In addition, there is a lack of 
knowledge regarding the size of the population and the population to be investigated. 
The principles underlying corporate governance is relevant to all forms of 
organisations but it is difficult to obtain data representing all the organisation types 
in Nigeria. This raises some concerns regarding the extent of generalising the 
outcomes of this study. However, the majority of corporate governance studies have 
focused on publicly-listed companies to generate their findings. While similar 
approach was adopted in this study, the study participants also comprised consultants 
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who have performed various corporate governance-related consulting roles in the 
sectors not included hence their contributions could be assumed to reflect practices 
in these sectors.   
The third limitation also relates to the study methodology, with respect to the 
interpretation of data to ensure facts and meanings generated from the data are 
trustworthy. Whilst the researcher took necessary precautions to ascertain the 
credibility of the research outcomes, the qualitative nature of the study portends that 
meanings and facts can be subject to variations in interpretations, based on the 
ontological and epistemological preferences of the researcher or the reader. However, 
the methodology adopted in this thesis was justified in Chapter Three, which should 
preserve the authenticity of the study’s outcomes.  
The final limitation relates to the breadth and coverage of the analysis in this study. 
The success of any corporate governance regime is aided by the observance of its 
principles by all forms of business organisations (small, medium and large-scale). In 
Nigeria, the absence of a governance regulation for SMEs has meant that there is a 
high degree of governance abuses in these organisations. Therefore, caution must be 
exercised in making generalisations regarding the state of corporate governance in 
the Nigerian business environment, as this study did not examine governance 
practices amongst Nigerian SMEs. However, whereas Falk and Guenther (2006) 
offered a basis for generalising in qualitative research, arguing that generalisations 
can be made on the basis that study findings have emerged from a rigorous process, 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) emphasised transferability rather than generalisability.    
 
6.6 Areas for Future Research 
In relation to the issues examined in this thesis, the researcher believes that 
channelling efforts into addressing the dearth of sufficient knowledge in the 
following areas will not only enhance the contribution of this thesis, but further 
promote the emergence of good corporate governance practices and scholarship in 
the Nigerian business environment. 
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First, this study indicated that economic agents, rather than deficient institutional 
elements, account for the state of corporate governance in Nigeria. This is an area 
which has not attracted sufficient examination in extant literature. Future studies may 
evaluate the character of such economic agents and offer information regarding how 
such agents emerged in the system. Such studies should also offer knowledge aimed 
at controlling their future emergence, with the eventual objective of limiting their 
influences on institutional frameworks.    
Second, building upon this study, another area for future research relates to the 
impact of governance initiatives on SMEs in developing countries. Dangote Plc, the 
biggest firm on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), commenced business as an 
SME. Summarily, SMEs achieved a relative degree of success despite the prevalence 
of weak governance structures in these firms. The negligence of corporate 
governance in SMEs could be a factor in explaining existing corporate governance 
practice. It is necessary to gain knowledge as to how good governance structures can 
be improved in SMEs as a way to drive consciousness of the concept, promote the 
adoption of sound governance mechanisms in their operations and enhance their 
contribution to the Nigerian economy. 
Third, in connection with this research is the concept of coercive isomorphism in 
developing economies. In corporate governance terms, coercive isomorphism can be 
deemed to entail the ability of a firm (or a few firms) which displays good corporate 
governance to pressurise other firms to comply with and imbibe good corporate 
governance practices. Future studies could offer insight into how isomorphic 
tendencies can become a force for good corporate governance in Nigeria, driven by 
the private sector, whilst restricting the isomorphic propensities of the government 
and its agencies. In relation to the aforementioned, comparative corporate 
governance studies could investigate the isomorphic roles of institutional forces in 
capitalism. 
Lastly, whereas it must be noted that corporate governance literature in Nigeria is 
somewhat scant, it is worth mentioning that corporate governance scholarship in 
Nigeria has generally neglected governance practices in state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). This is particularly worrisome as there are indications that SOEs in Nigeria 
are key contributors to the present state of its corporate governance practices (Okike, 
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2007; Kajola, 2008). Consequently, future studies may evaluate the dynamics of 
corporate governance in SOEs and the influences which obstruct good governance 
behaviour and their economic effect. Such studies could also assess how government 
interference affects the performance of SOEs compared with the performance of 
non-SOEs.     
      
6.7 Concluding Commentary – What Future for Institutions in Nigeria? 
Mainstream empirical studies on the effect of institutions on corporate governance 
have not only demonstrated how relevant institutional elements shape corporate 
governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Filatotchev et al., 2013) but have also linked 
variations in global governance practices to differences in institutional environments 
(Doidge et al., 2007; Judge et al., 2008). However, in this study, it was indicated that 
the conditions underlying institutional frameworks deserve as much attention as 
those channelled towards institutional scholarship. The basis of the argument is that 
the functionality of institutions is significantly determined by the conditions 
underlying those institutions (Sachs, 2003; Przeworski, 2004). Accordingly, the 
variance in the degree of sophistication of these conditions among countries supports 
the emergence of varying institutional outcomes in these countries. Therefore, 
countries are challenged to continually seek to improve the conditions which 
underpin their institutions (Rwegasira, 2000), otherwise the relevance of institutions, 
particularly in certain developing countries, will continually offer a subject for 
debate. 
As a result of the above, there is motivation to question the significance of 
institutions. This thesis takes a view which suggests that institutions do matter, but to 
the extent that underlying conditions are reinforced. As a result, this study agrees 
that existing institutional frameworks must be strengthened if they are to achieve the 
main purpose of acting as a check on the behaviour of economic actors (North, 1990; 
Hodgson, 2006). The achievement of good corporate governance is a journey. A 
sound strategy must recognise the need to address governance challenges both in the 
short term and long term. In the short term, efforts must be devoted to improving the 
conditions, whilst in the long term institutions must be fortified. It must be 
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acknowledged by stakeholders that the objective of developing conditions must be to 
enhance institutional functionality.  
The arguments and positions promoted in this study are intended to enhance 
knowledge regarding the theoretical relevance of some concepts of corporate 
governance on developing economies and, in particular, Nigeria. Indeed, the 
dominant position in the literature suggests that the present state of corporate 
governance in Nigeria is a reflection of the ineffectiveness of existing institutional 
instruments in the country (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011b; Adekoya, 2011). However, 
on the contrary, this thesis reveals that the conditions which underpin the emergence 
of institutional frameworks account for the institutional failure in the country. Whilst 
various conditions were identified in the study, the power and pressure exerted by 
influential economic agents on institutional elements was acknowledged as 
antithetical to good corporate governance practice in the country.  It is therefore 
necessary that initiatives aimed at improving corporate governance practice in 
Nigeria must, at the outset, emphasise how institutions can be reinvigorated to 
ensure that they (institutional elements) are able to control the activities of influential 
economic agents. This process, in relation to the bottom-up approach, must 
commence by establishing policies that compel influential economic actors to 
acknowledge the authority and legitimacy of institutional elements.   
To contribute to the attainment of the preceding objective, an appropriate education 
strategy can be used to create and sustain corporate governance awareness and 
consciousness such that economic actors acknowledge their limits. This study posits 
that since corporate governance is inextricably linked to morals, values and ethics, 
relying solely on psychomotor and cognitive elements may not guarantee sound 
ethical behaviour. Thus it was proposed that educational activities including training 
and seminars should be redirected towards a vital element of Bloom’s Taxonomy i.e. 
developing the affective domain which concentrates on enhancing the capacity of the 
heart to internalise values and the manifestation of a good attitude, among others. 
Whilst the above suggestion is aimed at building principles among operators, it is 
equally important to enhance the capacity of regulators to regulate effectively. A 
major problem of corporate governance regulation in Nigeria is the lack of 
independence of regulators (Adegbite, 2012), as regulators are appointed by the 
government, which means they are ultimately answerable to the government and 
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members of the political class. Consequently, this study recommends the 
appointment of a distinct, independent body to regulate corporate governance in 
Nigeria. The independent body must possess the capacity to insulate itself from the 
political and societal issues challenging the country. A good example of such a body 
could be a reputable foreign agency with expertise in corporate governance matters.   
Whilst the issues raised above may appear daunting, the implications of corporate 
misgovernance compel all stakeholders to embark on this mission. The corporate 
failures of Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat and the global economic recession of 2008, 
among several others, highlight the dangers of corporate misgovernance. In the face 
of increasing globalisation and international competitiveness, the only way Nigeria 
can improve its global presence is to continually develop its governance mechanism 
(Okike, 2007). Improving governance enables a company to lower its risks, enhance 
its public image and public acceptance and, fundamentally, promotes business 
success and perpetuity (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2012). The spate of corporate failures 
witnessed in Nigeria in the last three decades (for example, Cadbury Nigeria Plc, 
Lever Brothers Nigeria Plc) (see Akinpelu, 2011) demands a corporate governance 
renaissance in the country’s business environment. Consequently, as far as Nigerian 
firms are concerned, it is beyond doubt that corporate governance represents the 
future, hence all efforts must be channelled towards the establishment of a sound, 
enduring and resilient corporate governance system in the country.      
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Transparency International (2014) Corruption Perception Index 
Rank Country/Territory CPI 2014 Score 
1 Denmark 92 
2 New Zealand 91 
3 Finland 89 
4 Sweden 87 
5 Norway 86 
5 Switzerland 86 
7 Singapore 84 
8 Netherlands 83 
9 Luxembourg 82 
10 Canada 81 
11 Australia 80 
12 Germany 79 
12 Iceland 79 
14 United Kingdom 78 
15 Belgium 76 
15 Japan 76 
17 Barbados 74 
17 Hong Kong 74 
17 Ireland 74 
17 United States 74 
21 Chile 73 
21 Uruguay 73 
23 Austria 72 
24 Bahamas 71 
25 United Arab Emirates 70 
26 Estonia 69 
26 France 69 
26 Qatar 69 
29 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 67 
30 Bhutan 65 
31 Botswana 63 
31 Cyprus 63 
31 Portugal 63 
31 Puerto Rico 63 
35 Poland 61 
35 Taiwan 61 
37 Israel 60 
37 Spain 60 
39 Dominica 58 
39 Lithuania 58 
39 Slovenia 58 
42 Cape Verde 57 
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43 Korea (South) 55 
43 Latvia 55 
43 Malta 55 
43 Seychelles 55 
47 Costa Rica 54 
47 Hungary 54 
47 Mauritius 54 
50 Georgia 52 
50 Malaysia 52 
50 Samoa 52 
53 Czech Republic 51 
54 Slovakia 50 
55 Bahrain 49 
55 Jordan 49 
55 Lesotho 49 
55 Namibia 49 
55 Rwanda 49 
55 Saudi Arabia 49 
61 Croatia 48 
61 Ghana 48 
63 Cuba 46 
64 Oman 45 
64 The FYR of Macedonia 45 
64 Turkey 45 
67 Kuwait 44 
67 South Africa 44 
69 Brazil 43 
69 Bulgaria 43 
69 Greece 43 
69 Italy 43 
69 Romania 43 
69 Senegal 43 
69 Swaziland 43 
76 Montenegro 42 
76 Sao Tome and Principe 42 
78 Serbia 41 
79 Tunisia 40 
80 Benin 39 
80 Bosnia and Herzegovina 39 
80 El Salvador 39 
80 Mongolia 39 
80 Morocco 39 
85 Burkina Faso 38 
85 India 38 
85 Jamaica 38 
85 Peru 38 
85 Philippines 38 
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85 Sri Lanka 38 
85 Thailand 38 
85 Trinidad and Tobago 38 
85 Zambia 38 
94 Armenia 37 
94 Colombia 37 
94 Egypt 37 
94 Gabon 37 
94 Liberia 37 
94 Panama 37 
100 Algeria 36 
100 China 36 
100 Suriname 36 
103 Bolivia 35 
103 Mexico 35 
103 Moldova 35 
103 Niger 35 
107 Argentina 34 
107 Djibouti 34 
107 Indonesia 34 
110 Albania 33 
110 Ecuador 33 
110 Ethiopia 33 
110 Kosovo 33 
110 Malawi 33 
115 Côte d´Ivoire 32 
115 Dominican Republic 32 
115 Guatemala 32 
115 Mali 32 
119 Belarus 31 
119 Mozambique 31 
119 Sierra Leone 31 
119 Tanzania 31 
119 Vietnam 31 
124 Guyana 30 
124 Mauritania 30 
126 Azerbaijan 29 
126 Gambia 29 
126 Honduras 29 
126 Kazakhstan 29 
126 Nepal 29 
126 Pakistan 29 
126 Togo 29 
133 Madagascar 28 
133 Nicaragua 28 
133 Timor-Leste 28 
136 Cameroon 27 
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136 Iran 27 
136 Kyrgyzstan 27 
136 Lebanon 27 
136 Nigeria 27 
136 Russia 27 
142 Comoros 26 
142 Uganda 26 
142 Ukraine 26 
145 Bangladesh 25 
145 Guinea 25 
145 Kenya 25 
145 Laos 25 
145 Papua New Guinea 25 
150 Central African Republic 24 
150 Paraguay 24 
152 Congo Republic 23 
152 Tajikistan 23 
154 Chad 22 
154 Democratic Republic of the Congo 22 
156 Cambodia 21 
156 Myanmar 21 
156 Zimbabwe 21 
159 Burundi 20 
159 Syria 20 
161 Angola 19 
161 Guinea-Bissau 19 
161 Haiti 19 
161 Venezuela 19 
161 Yemen 19 
166 Eritrea 18 
166 Libya 18 
166 Uzbekistan 18 
169 Turkmenistan 17 
170 Iraq 16 
171 South Sudan 15 
172 Afghanistan 12 
173 Sudan 11 
174 Korea (North) 8 
174 Somalia 8 
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Appendix 2: Interview Guide 
Research Topic: An Assessment of Institutional Influences on Corporate 
Governance in Nigeria: A Multi-Stakeholder Perspective 
1. Interview Background 
a. As a key stakeholder in corporate governance matters in Nigeria, how 
would you assess the present state of corporate governance in Nigeria? 
b. What do you think are the main problems confronting corporate 
governance in Nigeria? 
c. How would you rate corporate governance performance amongst 
Nigerian public companies on a scale of 1 to 10 (1 being very poor and 
10 being very good) 
 
2. SEC Code of Corporate Governance (2003 and 2011) 
a. How would you access the contributions of the SEC codes (both 2003 
and 2011) to the practice of corporate governance in the country? 
b. In your view, do you think that the 2011 code is a significant 
improvement over the 2003 version? 
c. Which newly-introduced provision(s) in the 2011 code are you 
particularly convinced would enhance governance practices among 
Nigerian firms?  
d. What is your view on codes reflecting the key drivers of the institutional 
environment? 
e. Do you think that the 2011 code acknowledges the main institutional 
peculiarities of Nigeria?  
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f. Would you argue that the development and design of the SEC code (2011) 
is informed by the main local institutional influences? 
g. In your opinion, do you think a wholly rules driven regulation or that 
based on principles is what is needed to improve governance among 
Nigerian companies? 
 
3. Pre-Independence Corporate Behaviour 
a. Do you think that behaviour and practices among corporations during the 
pre-independence era have influenced the present state of governance 
behaviour among Nigerian firms? 
b. Can you explain some of these behaviours and influences which is 
evident among Nigerian companies today? 
 
4. Institutional Influences 
a. In your view, do you think that institutional elements impact the 
effectiveness of corporate governance codes in Nigeria? 
b. To what extent do you think that the following institutional factors have 
impacted the practice of corporate governance in the country; 
o Corruption 
o Culture and Ethnicity 
o Extent of Law and Order in the society  
o Religion 
c. If you are given the opportunity, would you pursue the recognition and 
integration of these institutional elements into existing codes? 
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d. Which institutional factor(s) would you want to be incorporated into 
existing codes? 
e. How do you think the impact of the above issues can be minimised to 
enhance governance practice in the country? 
f. In particular, how do you think the problem of corruption in Nigeria can 
be tackled? 
 
5. Governance Scorecard 
a. How do you measure/assess corporate governance in your organisation? 
b. What is your view on the development and introduction of a governance 
measurement tool (Scorecard) to engender governance measurement and 
promote compliance levels among Nigerian firms? 
c. Do you think it can potentially improve governance compliance levels 
among Nigerian corporations? 
 
6. Necessary Reforms 
a. In your opinion, what are the main governance reforms you consider 
necessary to improve corporate governance value in the Nigerian 
business environment? 
 
Thank you. 
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Appendix 3: Sample of a Participant’s Interview Manually Transcribed 
 
What do you think CG is?  
Well, CG has been defined in several ways, but I would say CG is the internal and 
external structures and processes which are applied to ensure that organisations run 
on their feet rather than on their heads. 
 
Can you expatiate on that? 
Yes. The structures and processes put in place to ensure that organisations are run on 
their feet. If you look at the situation in Nigeria, most organisations are not ruin the 
way they are supposed to be run. To that extent, I will say they are running on their 
heads rather than on their feet. Like when an organisation supposed to be running on 
its feet and is now running on its head, a lot of crisis will definitely happen, as it was 
in the case of Oceanic Bank. Oceanic Bank was running on their heads rather than on 
their feet. When an organisation is running on its feet, the rules and regulation are 
applied and obeyed to the letter. And that is not the case. 
 
Sir, in the context of the information you’ve just provided, how would you assess 
the present state of CG in the Nigerian business environment particularly amongst 
publicly listed organisations 
Yes. The CG we are talking about now, we are actually talking in terms of the listed 
companies because they are the ones the 2011 and 2003 codes refer to and 
specifically directed even though organisations outside those ones that are listed are 
expected to comply or adopt those policies spelt out in those codes. Now, for CG to 
work, we must have an example of the 2003 and the 2011 code of CG. That, i will 
call a code that is externally derived. An organisation ought to also have code of 
governance which is internally derived. But from experience, not up to 40%, ok let’s 
say about 40% of the organisations in Nigeria have internally derived codes of CG 
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Publicly-listed organisations? 
Yes. Publicly listed. Not more than 40% have internally derived code of CG. So 
without internally derived code of CG, the externally imposed code like the 2003 and 
2011 will certainly not work because there is no foundation. And for those of us in 
the Christian world, we say if the foundation is weak, what can the righteous do? If a 
listed organisation does not have internally derived code of CG, that is, do you then 
expect that the one that is imposed by SEC will work? Certainly not. So, to that 
extent, I will say the CG practice in Nigeria is at 40%.  
 
You’ve tried to explain the fact that for the SEC code 2003 and 2011 to be effective, 
every organisations need to have, what you referred to as the internally derived or 
generated code. So, as it is, are you …..If you score CG performance in the 
Nigerian business environment at 40%, obviously then there are issues. Sir, from 
your own experience, what are the issues that you consider significant? Why has 
CG not been effective in this system? 
Yes. So many issues. One, corruption. Corruption is a major factor. Every other 
thing that we are discussing, can be discussed in terms of that corruption. Just take 
employment, for instance. Qualified persons are not employed into most positions. 
Most employments in Nigeria are by introduction. I’m the MD here, I have a relation, 
my wife have a relation. Not on the basis of merit. So when you put square pegs in 
round holes, of course you can’t get the desired result. Then, two, the need to show 
favourable financial outcomes to stakeholders. For instance, when listed companies 
prepare and submit accounts to SEC, they show financial statements that have robust 
outcomes that will attract both the existing shareholders and prospective 
shareholders. But when they are submitting the same accounts, for instance, to the 
NDIC, the deposit base is tactically reduced in order not to pay the 1% insurance 
premium. Now, when they are submitting the same accounts to the Federal Inland 
Revenue Service, it is adjusted in such a way that to reduce the tax liability. When 
they are submitting returns also to the State Inland Revenue, the PAYE is reduced. 
The salary is reduced in order to pay a very low tax. Then, most of the organisations 
also engage in tribal issues. A Yoruba MD who is retiring would want a Yoruba man 
to take over from him. If you have an Igbo man at the head, he will want an Igbo 
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man to take over from him. So, in all of this, merit is sacrificed, and CG becomes 
very, very ……… As at today, I don’t read financial statements. I came from the 
private sector as a Chief Accountant. When I remember what we used to do, I don’t 
want to talk about CG because as far as I’m concerned, that 40% is even exaggerated. 
But you cannot blame the public organisations solely because the infrastructures that 
are supposed to be provided on the side of the government are not provided. The 
roads are bad, there is no electricity, and companies pay for all those things. So, in 
order to earn a benefit, they must manipulate. So, the poor state of CG derives from 
poor infrastructure and the unethical attitude of the managers of these companies. 
There is this attitude of I want to be like the other man. You can’t be like the other 
man. These are some of the issues, which I can call the environmental issues 
affecting CG in this country. 
 
The last point you talked about, one can actually relate it to competition.  
Yes. It is unhealthy. Unhealthy competition. The analyst who ought to mediate, 
sometimes are sponsored by those organisations so they are not therefore in a 
position to right that which they should right as a matter of policy. So, if you rely on 
what they write, you will be misled. Many of them are on the payroll of some of 
these companies.  
 
There is an issue I find so difficult to resolve and I’ll like to put the question to you. 
When you started, you talked about the fact that there are several ways of defining 
CG but one clear way of defining it is to ensure that organisations are better 
managed. When that is done, it is expected that all stakeholders including 
shareholders and management should benefit. Why is it that we still find CG 
abuses when the objective of a good CG structure is to ensure that the wealth of 
the organisation is maximised? Why is management not tuned to doing that which 
satisfies shareholders? 
That’s just agency theory. This is agency theory issue. It is pronounced in this matter. 
Most managers we have will want to balance their budget at the expense of the 
owners of the companies. Because they want to do that, they find various excuse. For 
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instance, this code of 2011 we are talking about, for instance, no shareholder should 
be disenfranchised in terms of voting during AGMs. And the venues should be such 
that can be accessible to all. All the venues in Nigeria are either Abuja or Lekki and 
only wealthy shareholders who can influence management virtually attend those 
meetings. All the other small shareholders are usually unable to attend. Because 
these few that attend are in agreement with the management so the management aims 
to satisfy those few at the expense of the larger body of shareholders. So, this is an 
agency theory issue. If we are able to imbibe the stakeholder theory, things would 
have been much better but the average Nigerian manager is not ready for that.   
 
What motivates them? What motivates the average Nigerian manager that you 
talked about? 
Greed. Greed. Nothing more. Wanting to be like the other man. Bank A wants to be 
like Bank B. Oceanic of those days wants to be like UBA. UBA wants to be like 
First Bank. First Bank wants to be like IBTC. That is just the issue. 
 
Sir, even though you’ve mentioned a bit of it but I would really want you to 
expatiate on it. The effectiveness of the SEC codes of 2003 and 2011, there has 
been several arguments talking about how effective the code is and how ineffective 
the code has been. I want to ask you, do you really think the code has contributed 
to the development of CG in Nigeria? 
It has not contributed because the code is, they are just complying. They are just 
complying on the face value. Internally, they are not actually complying. For 
instance, under the 2003 code, you could have a chairman who is also the MD, under 
the 2011, both positions are separated. If I am the chairman, I can no longer be the 
MD but I will bring in a crony to be the MD. It is still the same thing. It has really 
not helped. They are only just complying to maintain their status because they want 
to be seen as complying but if you remove the veil, you’ll discover that they are not 
actually practising CG so it is not contributing to quality of governance. I think there 
is a part of the code that says Auditors, for instance, should report on the strength of 
the internal controls of organisations. But they are not reporting that. They are not 
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reporting on that because nobody wants to fall foul. So, these codes are just on paper, 
they are not contributing to anything as far as I’m concerned. 
 
There are some issues that I have identified which I really want you to examine in 
the context of CG in Nigeria. I call them institutional peculiarities. I listed four of 
them; the extent of law and order, corruption, religion and our culture. Sir, I want 
us to take them one after the other and begin to discuss how exactly these issues 
relate to CG performance in Nigeria. First one is religion. What do you think? 
Has religion affected the way we value CG in this system? 
Religion ought to affect CG positively. But it is not because religion is different from 
spirituality. Spirituality is the fear of God while religion is belonging to one religious 
sect or the other. You are either a Christian or a Moslem. So, religion has not 
affected positively CG rather it has worsened it because if an Hausa/Moslem is in a 
position, he wants the person next to him to be a Muslim. If Christians are in a 
position, he wants another Christian to be next to him irrespective of the level of 
expertise or their education. So, the religion you talked about, the tenets of those 
religions are not internal at best. I see it as a social gathering. People gather to 
identify themselves with a particular religion. Religion has affected CG negatively 
although ordinarily religion ought to affect CG positively but as I said, there is 
spirituality, there is religion. The fact that one belongs to a religion does not make 
you a Christian or a Moslem but if you are spiritual, you have the fear of God. And 
to be spiritual, you must either be a Christian or a Moslem so religion as at today, 
you cannot appoint somebody into a position because of his religion. In fact, the 
traditional religion is even more effective. As it were in those days, you have to 
swear to an oath instead of the bible they swear to in the case of Christians and 
Quran in the case of Moslems 
 
How about our culture? 
Yes. Culture also has effects on CG. You take our country, for instance, the late (….), 
once a lecturer in Unilag, and one of the most brilliant scholars we have ever 
produced, but he is late now, is a Nigerian of Sierra-Leonean descent. He did a study 
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which shows that the Yoruba culture, for instance, can impact CG negatively. For 
instance, if a chief accountant of an organisation is 50 years old and you send a 30 
year old man as an Auditor to that same company where the elderly man is the chief 
accountant, by their culture, the younger accountant is to come and prostrate before 
the accountant. Under that condition, it is not able to ask or be sceptical in the 
conduct of his audit as it would have been if the man he is coming to look at is not a 
Yoruba man. That particular example shows that culture also affects CG. But we 
have what you may now call modern culture. Modern culture which makes people 
clap for their corrupt people when they go out to serve. When people now go to 
serve, their people now believe that it is time to have their own share of the national 
cake. That is what I refer to as the modern culture. With such conditions, you cannot 
expect that organisations will run on their feet because the people that are go to serve 
are looking for ways to balance their pockets and this affects their organisations. The 
culture, whether it is the old culture or this modern culture also affects CG 
negatively. You see, I worked in a company where a contract for N80.5million was 
increased to N482.5million. Look at the magnitude of the increase and the sum of 
N200m was released to kick start the job. And the money was spent. No appreciable 
job was done. That is the type of environment we are talking about. When we were 
now asked to appear before a commission of enquiry to explain how that money was 
spent, the MD simply shot himself dead. August 19, 1991. That is the type of 
environment we have. Just misappropriate the funds because the people involved 
were waiting for him to come so that they can all share in the largesse. So, that is the 
situation so the man shot himself dead as he didn’t have the courage to explain the 
role he played in the sordid affair. 
 
Sometimes, when I ask questions on culture, I always want to look at our culture 
where we come from. The Yoruba example that you cited is absolutely in order but 
I am looking at the second example that you talked about. Our modern culture. 
Our modern culture is not our culture as it were. I am looking at, if you say the 
last 50, 60 years, obviously I want to say maybe my grandparents were a lot more 
compliant when it comes to things like this. The question I tend to ask people is 
what has changed? Why do we have a modern culture that is almost a total 
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negative of what we had before? Because that is where our culture is. Culture 
normally should grow that way.  
Even the 60 years you talked about is too far. I was in Unilag in the 80’s where a 
vendor could put his newspapers on a stand, put stone to protect the newspapers and 
is out doing something else. Those papers were not stolen. People pick their papers 
and dropped the money. But we can no longer run like that. What has happened is 
that our values have been eroded. Those values we learnt on our mother’s knees, 
they have been eroded. The reason is, the need to acquire more wealth. The time a 
family, the mother leaves home at 4.30am, the father leaves home at 4.30am, they 
both return at about 11pm and the child is left under the care of a nanny who is paid 
a pittance and a house girl. Do you expect that these children will be able to learn the 
way they should learn because the scripture says teach a child the way he should 
grow and when he grows, he would deviate from it. That was how we were brought 
up by our parents but these days, children are brought up by housemaids and nannies 
who have little or no stake in the future of the children. So, they grow up with 
limited values. 
 
I also want to ask you this. What you find is, there are suggestions again that 
probably the way the average Nigerian values law and order has also had an 
impact on the way we appreciate or value CG particularly when we compare these 
to citizens of other developed countries. What’s your take on this? The 
performance of CG in this clime has it got to with us as individuals? 
Ehn, not as individuals as you said but with the government in general. Because you 
talk of the rules and regulations, we don’t obey rules and regulations in Nigeria 
because the laws are ineffective. Something happened in 2008. I took an airport taxi 
in California, in San Diego. We got to traffic point at about 1am, there were no cars 
on the road but the driver stopped and obeyed the traffic rule. When I returned, I had 
a programme at Lekki to deliver a paper……….. I was asked to stay in Lagos 
Airport Hotel. A car came in to pick me up at about 5am. The roads were very busy. 
Traffic light showed red. I said let me see what this driver will do. He simply beat 
the traffic but that same person will go to US and obey the rules. That same person 
will go to the US and obey those rules. 
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Why is that? 
Our rules are not effective. Then, the security agencies, the regulators are Nigerians. 
They have been influenced by the environment so they are corrupt. For instance, the 
tax officials. They are the ones who teach you how to avoid tax but in the US or 
China, I don’t think that a tax official in China, for instance, will teach you how to 
evade tax. So, the laws are there, they are obsolete, they are not effective.  
 
I know you’ve talked about this before but I wouldn’t mind if you still shed some 
more light. Corruption and CG in Nigeria. Your view, Sir? 
Yeah. Corruption has eaten deep into everything we do. Corruption has affected 
every part of CG from employment to the publication of the accounts. Every aspect 
of our life. I’ll give you an instance, one of the big banks. I have a cousin who was 
on N25m a year. They brought in someone, a young man, and place him on 
$2million a year. I told my cousin that that $2million is not being earned by that boy. 
It is a way of repatriating some of these money abroad to the private accounts of 
these MDs who appointed that young man in that salary. $2 million to N25 million. 
You see the difference. Can you tell me that that young man was earning $2million? 
No. He may just be earning maybe about N10 million, the balance is going into the 
MDs account. That is an MD who ought to be sympathetic to the affairs of the 
organisation. So, corruption is running through from the man at the gate to the man 
at the top because of greed and the need to be like the other man. He wants to drive 
the car the other man is driving; he wants to build a house in Victoria Island because 
a friend has a house on Victoria Island. It is a very serious matter, very serious 
matter.  
 
I also plan to come up with a scorecard but of course, I need to test the waters. I 
need to be sure that it is something workable. I want to ask you this question. First, 
the idea of a scorecard like a measurement tool for organisations and even for 
regulators too to assess organisations. Do you think it is relevant in our system? 
Secondly, do you think it can actually help CG performance amongst our 
organisations in this country? 
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Yes, as a matter of fact, it should be helpful. But as a matter of curse in Nigeria, it’s 
not going to help. Who does the scoring? Remember the employment for instance. It 
is done in favour of the cronies of the MDs so they are not in a position. An MD is 
not in a position for instance to score his associate very low and the board members 
are not in a position to score the MD lowly because the board members are not there 
because of expertise or experience. They are there at the mercy of the MD. All those 
regulations in the code, that it must be this, it must be that, those things don’t appear 
in Nigeria. The …….. will get to the board because of the influence of the MD. So, 
he is therefore not in a position to score him low so if you come up with a scorecard, 
it will just be there. It will be ritualistic.  
 
Even if it comes from an independent body outside of the organisation? 
Yeah. The independent body, maybe as a volunteer. If it is a volunteer, we may get 
some result but if it is coming from an external auditor, for instance, it is not going 
be effective because SEC is saying they should not retain Auditor for more than 10 
years if an audit firm will have to score the CG status of an organisation, they are not 
in a position to score them very low because if they do, they will be changed. You 
know this CG is compliance by persuasion so they are excused. It is not a law as it 
were so even if the code is saying Auditors should be changed after 10 years, to 
come back after about 7 years, they can change you after 1 year if you are not ready 
to do their bidding and the auditor do not want to lose any client so they won score 
them lowly. But if an independent body is in charge, look they will get clues with 
what is happening in Nigeria. No firm set up in Nigeria today can say ok we are in 
charge of scoring organisations fairly. 
 
I want to ask you a question based on a point that you raised in the course of 
addressing my last question. Which kind of regulatory regime would you prefer for 
CG in Nigeria? Principles-based or rules-based? 
From experience, rules-based code will not work. It has never worked. It is not 
working and may never work. What I believe  and what we do here, we have what 
we call core values here. We teach those core values from BSc to PhD. Those old 
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values; spirituality, capacity building, integrity, responsibility, sacrifice. We teach 
those values in this place. We want the people to be able to internalize these values. 
So, once you are able to internalize these values, these values now represent 
foundation for ethics and standards. That is what we do. If you want CG to be what it 
should be, all our faith for instance in this country should teach values. Those values 
we left behind so many years ago. In-fact, what we teach now are those things called 
the psychomotor and the cognitive that affects the head and the hand.  But the 
affective domain which affects the heart, no university is offering it. This is the only 
university where it is offered. And we call it total man concept. It is a course that is 
taught from 100 level to PhD level. The cognitive domain is taken care of, the 
psychomotor domain is taken care of, then the affective domain – the heart, because 
what you do with your brain and your hand derives from the heart. So, unless we 
internalize these values, CG will never work. If you internalize them, then the 
principles-based become effective. When people are now self-regulated, instead of 
saying you must do this one, you know rules cannot cover everything, but with 
principles you can attend to all issues whether complex or simple.  But rules will 
only be able to attend to simple issues, they may not be able to address complex 
issues but with principles, they can address all issues whether complex or simple. 
And you can only do that if you have internalized the set of codes. 
 
Let me go to the last question. My last question is; Sir, if you have the opportunity 
to reform CG, you have an idea, you want to take CG to a particular level in 
Nigeria, what issues will be topmost on your agenda? 
The curriculum of the universities should be reviewed to take into recognition the 
need to affect the minds of the students. Let me show you something. You see, as an 
Accountant, Nigeria has adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards and 
we have been using code of ethics and these codes have never been obeyed and you 
know before IFRS, the standards were rules-based. IFRS is principles-based. This is 
a paper I just submitted titled “searching for a pathway to priming accountants for 
ethical compliance with international financial reporting standards: the core value 
paradigm.” That is our core value here. This paper has been accepted by the World 
Congress of Accountants. I got the information last Monday. I’m to present this 
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paper at the World Congress of Accountants in Italy, Rome November next year, and 
they have asked me to detail how this paper could be exported in developing 
countries. So that’s what I’m trying to say that these values have to be taught in 
schools so that the affective domain could be affected. Without touching on the 
affective domain, CG will not work. OK, this is the paper. It says the panel is 
interested in the methodology of your research. We will also invite you to describe 
how the Nigerian context could be exported to other developing countries. In Rome, 
Italy 2014.  
 
That’s interesting. But sir, I agree with you considering the fact that it has to do 
with, what you call the affective domain which is an interesting bit. However, I 
look at this as long term. Is there anything you will like to in the short term? 
Yes. What I would have loved to do in the short term is what can be done in China 
but not in Nigeria. Identify a corrupt man and execute. Yes. If we want to strengthen 
our CG, we must find somebody like a former MD and execute. In China, you can’t 
do all those things they did. I talk about a similar issue in 2005 in Nigerian Defence 
Academy. They were asking me whether I want all Nigerians to be killed. I say if 
that will enhance our CG, why not? In this university, if you are found corrupt, you 
don’t have more than 24 hours to remain in this environment, whether you are a 
professor or not. If you are found guilty this morning, you’ll be tried this night and 
by this time tomorrow morning, you are out of this place. That is how this place is 
run. That is what I think we should do. We are too lenient. We condone indiscipline. 
Rules don’t work. If you find a man guilty, you execute him. But we need a strong 
man to bell the cat. So who is that strong man who has not had his fingers in the pie? 
That is the issue. Who is that strong man who has not had his finger in the pie? Who 
will throw the first stone? Jesus Christ said if you have not sinned, you throw the 
first stone. But who is ready to throw the first stone? Nobody.  
 
From what you said now, is there no conflict between the principles-based and 
kind of regulatory framework? If you expect me to operate by principles, and I 
tighten the enforcement mechanism, would there be no conflict? Don’t you think a 
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rules-based would work better if you really think that, I mean I have read papers 
that have suggested that we should try rules-based while some have advocated for 
both of them. But what I am looking at is; another paper has actually argued that 
the main issue affecting CG is the enforcement mechanism. So, if I am looking at 
that, which operational methodology will work for me? Is it principles-based or the 
rules-based in that context? 
Unless the affective domain is touched, the principles-based will not work. Two, 
unless, you have a strong man to enforce the rules-based, it will also not work. So we 
need a very strong man to enforce the rules-based, if we want the rules-based to 
work. Very strong individual. Strong willed individual, if we want the rules-based to 
work. But if we want the principles-based to work, we ought to touch the affective 
domain. People have to see reason why they should behave ethically.  
      
Aside this, you’ve talked about the fact that we need to work on the core values of 
the average Nigerian individuals. You’ve also talked about the fact that we need to 
strengthen our enforcement mechanism, is there any other thing that you will do 
just to promote CG in Nigeria? 
We should have department of ethics in organisations. Ethics is a word they don’t 
want to hear in this country. Nobody wants to hear anything ethics. So every 
organisation should have a department of ethics where ethical issues are dealt with 
right from employment to retirement. But the question is who heads the department 
of ethics? A Nigerian who has not been corrupted? Where do you get him? That is 
the question. If we talk about ethics the way we talk about Arsenal and all those 
things on the television, people will be saying what is this ethics we are talking about? 
How can we comply with these ethics? Check the newspapers in the last one year, 
you won’t see any article on ethics. Nobody is talking about it and without ethics, 
CG will run on its head. There should be little programmes talking about ethics, 
conferences on ethics. These things are not in place. 
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As part of the last question, from your experience, do you really think that people 
out there especially practitioners, top executives particularly, do you think they 
understand or they know enough of CG to start with? 
They do not know enough. All that they know is how do we make profit irrespective 
of whose ox is gored. If they have sufficient knowledge of CG and what lack of it 
can do to the economy, they won’t be doing what they are doing. So, I believe they 
also need to be tutored. Tutored not in Harvard but in African universities where the 
problem resides. Because, some of these issues we have here, we don’t have it 
abroad. There are similar issues but not as pronounced as we have it here because 
our context here is different. They should attend schools here, where the problem is. 
Not going to Harvard or all those schools. You see, they don’t know much about it 
because they are not trained to occupy positions they occupy.  Many of them are 
occupying positions where they exhibit inefficiency. It is everywhere because 
appointments, as I said, are not strictly on merit but most are by introduction.  Do 
you that our graduates here, for instance, don’t talk about unemployment because 
their parents are the ones in charge of the economy so they graduate, they replace 
their parents in their parent’s organisations. Is that how it should be? That is not how 
it should be. Whether the child is qualified or not, he gets into the parent’s 
organisations. But the very brilliant ones out there who have nobody to introduce 
them are suffering unemployment. People rise to positions they are not prepared for. 
In many organisations abroad, it’s not quite like that. People come in as management 
trainee. They identify those that could be good manager and start to train them.  But 
here we don’t. People are not trained to occupy the positions they occupy. Not by 
merit, not by experience, not by qualifications but by introduction.  
 
Interview Notes and Summary 
 SEC Code – Externally derived  Generate internally derived codes of CG  40%  Corruption – employment  Greed 
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 SEC code – not contributed  Religion - not positive  Societal value eroded  Laws are ineffective  Curriculum of universities  Strong regulator  Department of Ethics in every organisation  Without ethics, CG will fail  Awareness is key 
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Appendix 4: Approach Letter to Research Participants 
       Newcastle Business School, 
       Northumbria University, 
       Newcastle 
       United Kingdom 
       June 07, 2013 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
Regulating Corporate Governance in Nigeria: The Embeddedness of 
Institutional Mechanisms  
 
On behalf of myself (Professor Philip Shrives), Dr Karim Sorour and Dr Emmanuel 
Adegbite, I wish to introduce to you - Mr Franklin Nakpodia (BA, MSc), a PhD 
student and Associate Lecturer at the Newcastle Business School, Northumbria 
University, United Kingdom. 
 
Franklin Nakpodia’s PhD is supervised by myself (Professor Philip Shrives)  
(http://www.northumbria.ac.uk/sd/academic/nbs/staff/stafflist/?page=detail&staffid=
27) , Dr. Karim Sorour 
(http://www.northumbria.ac.uk/sd/academic/nbs/staff/stafflist/?page=detail&staffid=
392), both of Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University and Dr 
Emmanuel Adegbite (http://www.dur.ac.uk/business/faculty/staff/profile/?id=10628) 
of Durham University Business School.  
 
Franklin is working on an interesting research on corporate governance practices 
among public corporations in Nigeria. The research aims to contribute not only to 
academic literature but also to the business community particularly in developing 
economies. The research evaluates the importance and procedure for integrating key 
institutions peculiar to Nigeria into its corporate governance regulatory framework. 
A synopsis of the research agenda is attached for your information.  
 
To achieve an important part of his PhD, Franklin will be in Nigeria between July 1, 
2013 and August 9, 2013 for his data collection. Data will be collected through 
interviews. Consequently, we hope to secure an opportunity for an interview with 
yourself and other potential respondents you may wish to provide access to. This 
will enable his research benefit from your wealth of experience on corporate 
governance issues in Nigeria.  
 
Franklin would appreciate if you could indicate your availability (at his email 
address: franklin.nakpodia@northumbria.ac.uk) for an interview during this period, 
upon which he would be happy to provide further information, such as an interview 
guide.  
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As we count on your assistance and co-operation in making this important project a 
success, we should be enormously grateful for your participation. 
 
Thank you again. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
 
 
 
Franklin Nakpodia     Prof Philip Shrives   
PhD Candidate     Professor in Accounting,   
Newcastle Business School    Newcastle Business School  
Northumbria University    Northumbria University   
Newcastle, UK     Newcastle, UK   
 
 
Dr Karim Sorour    Dr Emmanuel Adegbite 
Lecturer in Accounting and Fin. Mgmt, Lecturer in Accounting 
Newcastle Business School   Durham University Business School 
Northumbria University   Durham University 
Newcastle, UK    Durham, UK 
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Appendix 5: Ethics Approval Letter 
 
25th July 2014       
Dear Franklin, 
Faculty of Business and Law Research Ethics Review Panel 
Title: Regulating Corporate Governance in Nigeria: The Embeddedness of Institutional 
Mechanisms. 
Following independent peer review of the above proposal, I am pleased to inform you that 
Faculty approval has been granted on the basis of this proposal and subject to compliance 
with the University policies on ethics and consent and any other policies applicable to your 
individual research.   
All researchers must also notify this office of the following: 
 Any significant changes to the study design;  Any incidents which have an adverse effect on participants, researchers or study 
outcomes;  Any suspension or abandonment of the study; 
 
We wish you well in your research endeavours. 
Best wishes, 
 
Rachel Barr 
On Behalf of the Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
Rachel Barr 
Faculty Support Administrator, Faculty of Business and Law 
T:  +44 (0) 191 243 7494 
E:  r.barr@northumbria.ac.uk 
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Room 330, City Campus East, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 
8ST, United Kingdom 
Appendix 6: Sample of Informed Consent Form for Research Participants 
 
 
Newcastle Business School 
Informed Consent Form for research participants 
 
 
Title of Study: 
 
Regulating Corporate Governance in Nigeria: The 
Embeddedness of Institutional Mechanisms 
Person(s) conducting the research: 
 
Franklin A. Nakpodia 
 Programme of study: 
 
 
PhD 
Address of the researcher for 
correspondence: 
 
 
 
PhD/DBA Research Suite 
Newcastle Business School 
City Campus East 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE1 8ST 
Telephone: 
 
07961911215 
E-mail: 
 
Franklin.nakpodia@northumbria.ac.uk  
Description of the broad nature of the 
research: 
 
 
 
The purpose of the study is to evaluate the impact of 
country-defined institutions on the practice and 
regulation of corporate governance among Nigerian 
public corporations. 
Description of the involvement expected 
of participants including the broad 
nature of questions to be answered or 
events to be observed or activities to be 
undertaken, and the expected time 
commitment: 
 
 
The expected involvement of the research participants 
would be as follows: 
 
An introductory meeting to discuss the nature of the 
research and location for the interview. This might be 
via telephone, email or face-to-face. 
 
An interview of not more than 45 minutes  
 
Participants may decide to participate in only one 
interview, in which case an interview for not more than 
45 minutes will be conducted. They will also be asked 
if they would be willing to take place in a further 
interview to confirm emergent findings 
 
The interviews will be semi-structured, based on the 
participant’s personal capacity and experiences as a 
major stakeholder in corporate governance matters in 
Nigeria. 
 
All information in this study will be anonymised, with 
all names of organizations and people removed. 
 
All data will be kept confidential and the names of 
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participants and any other name contacted during the 
process will also be anonymised. Electronic copy of 
the field notes and other data will be stored securely 
on a password protected network and hard copies will 
also be stored in a locked cupboard. 
  
Hard copies of anonymised field notes may be given 
to the supervision team during analysis for review, but 
it will be returned to the researcher after use. It may 
also be shown to a limited number of researchers 
during seminars/conferences. However, no field note 
would be left with any other person except the 
researcher 
 
The data and the resulting information obtained 
through the research may be reproduced and 
published in various forms and for various audiences 
related to the broad nature of the research i.e. 
conferences, peer reviewed journals, articles, etc. 
Anonymity and confidentiality will be protected at all 
times. 
  
At the end of the project, the researcher would ensure 
that the records are either disposed of securely (this 
may be ‘deleted’ for electronic records, or disposed of 
for recycling in the case of non- confidential paper 
records. All confidential records, including those 
containing personal information would be disposed of 
using confidential waste disposal) or, where required, 
retained in accordance with the retention schedule of 
the University as detailed in the University’s Ethics 
Handbook (completion of project + 5 years. The 
records would then be reviewed for archival value) 
 
Information obtained in this study, including this consent form, will be kept strictly 
confidential (i.e. will not be passed to others) and anonymous (i.e. individuals and 
organisations will not be identified unless this is expressly excluded in the details given 
above). 
 
Data obtained through this research may be reproduced and published in a variety of forms 
and for a variety of audiences related to the broad nature of the research detailed above. It 
will not be used for purposes other than those outlined above without your permission.  
 
Participation is entirely voluntary and participants may withdraw at any time. 
 
By signing this consent form, you are indicating that you fully understand the above 
information and agree to participate in this study on the basis of the above 
information. 
 
Participant’s signature:     Date: 
 
Student’s signature:      Date: 
 
Please keep one copy of this form for your own records 
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Appendix 7: NVivo Extracts from some Key Categories (Coding) of Data 
Appendix 7A: Corruption 
 
<Internals\\Abdullahi Bello\\Abdullahi Bello> - § 2 references coded  [14.89% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 9.35% Coverage 
 
Consider this scenario. A government official is in charge of awarding contracts 
worth billions but his take home pay is about 200,000. When you look at this, there 
is a possibility that the official might engage in corruption because he sees a situation 
where he can enrich someone else. He is likely to explore ways of enriching himself 
as well.  This is what happens to many organisations hence promoting corrupt 
tendencies especially in the public service 
 
Reference 2 - 5.54% Coverage 
 
Theoretically, it is good but whether it is going to work, it is quite difficult to assess. 
The kind of problems we have in the system especially with corruption means that it 
is difficult to implement such documents. In addition, are you sure that the 
stakeholders will even be interested in it, because it can undermine their corrupt 
tendencies 
 
<Internals\\Abel Ajala\\Abel Ajala> - § 2 references coded  [7.11% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.02% Coverage 
 
Corruption affects CG in a negative way. It is rampant in our system even though the 
system has made some progress in apprehending corrupt political officers holders are 
charging them to court, with some convicted 
 
<Internals\\Abubakar Bello\\Abubakar Bello> - § 1 reference coded  [3.01% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.01% Coverage 
 
That is the main factor affecting CG (corruption). Even the institutional frameworks 
expected to offer support for CG is being affected by corruption. The power 
available to the CEO is enormous so they can leverage on the corruption in the 
society to influence decisions in their personal favour.  
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<Internals\\Albert Owolabi\\Albert Owolabi> - § 5 references coded  [2.06% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.33% Coverage 
 
Let me start with corruption. All over the world, Nigeria is tagged notorious.  
 
Reference 2 - 0.35% Coverage 
 
What corruption and fraud has done is to narrow down the conscience of our people  
 
Reference 3 - 0.38% Coverage 
 
Corruption is here and I am saying that more and more people are keying in to it, 
painfully 
 
Reference 5 - 0.38% Coverage 
 
So corruption has really dealt seriously, not just on the economy, but also on the 
culture 
 
<Internals\\Biodun Adedipe\\Biodun Adedipe> - § 1 reference coded  [1.17% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.17% Coverage 
 
As for corruption, it is a major problem in our environment.  
 
<Internals\\Chris Ogbechie\\Chris Ogbechie> - § 5 references coded  [18.88% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 3.63% Coverage 
 
Government is the biggest player in this economy. But to get business from 
government, I must bribe. Bribery is against the tenets of CG. If bribery is an issue 
that is not condoned by an organisation, then it will not play in the government 
sector. You cannot get into the pool without getting wet. This would possibly create 
disadvantages in the short term but it might not be the same in the long term, because 
the government business is not steady. So, people have to believe in CG philosophy, 
and not because a code stipulates that you must do it. 
 
Reference 3 - 7.49% Coverage 
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Corruption affects CG because it is what conflict of interest is all about. Personally, I 
believe there is a correlation between conflict of interest and level of greed, and there 
is a correlation between level of greed and corruption. If you have a director who is 
hungry (if your level of greed is high, then you are hungry), you will engage in 
corruption.  
 
<Internals\\Doyin Adegbulugbe\\Doyin Adegbulugbe> - § 1 reference coded  [7.38% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 7.38% Coverage 
 
Definitely, Yes. Corruption is the way and manner people behave negatively which 
affects their way of life generally. If you relate that to CG in Nigeria, I will say yes. 
For instance, when Board appointments are made, are they made on merit or on 
some other factors that border on corruption? We have instances where Board 
members are bribed to get things done.  
 
<Internals\\Effiong Esu\\Effiong Esu> - § 1 reference coded  [0.26% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.26% Coverage 
 
Corruption is not peculiar, is all over. It all depends on the magnitude 
 
<Internals\\Eghes Eyieyen\\Eghes Eyieyen> - § 5 references coded  [4.98% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.48% Coverage 
 
Corporate is the collection of individuals. I think it is, although this is debatable, but 
I think there is nothing like corporate corruption. I think it is corrupt individuals 
within the corporation. If you change a CEO, if there was a culture of corruption and 
you change the leadership, and the leadership is a leadership of people who are 
committed to righteousness, committed to integrity, you have changed the corporate 
culture just by changing the leadership. So, this issue of corporate corruption just 
means that the company has corporate leaders. It is just like people say Nigeria is 
corrupt. Nigeria is not corrupt, it is the leaders that are corrupt. 
 
Reference 2 - 0.65% Coverage 
 
If you check the leadership and you put in people that are not corrupt in the 
leadership, Nigeria will not be corrupt anymore. I don’t know if you get my point so 
it is the behaviour and the orientation of the human beings in the company that is 
making them either corrupt or not corrupt.  
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Reference 3 - 0.35% Coverage 
 
So, it is the human beings really that determine the culture and the behaviour and I 
think that the issue of corporate corruption is a function of the people. 
 
Reference 5 - 1.10% Coverage 
 
Mahatma Gandhi said something. There is enough for everyone’s need but the world 
does not have enough for anyone’s greed, for one man’s greed. Because it is 
insatiable, you cannot satisfy it. So, motive. Another thing that must be present is 
opportunity. Do you have the chance to steal? No matter how greedy you are, if you 
don’t see the chance to steal, you can never steal. So the opportunity to steal….. If 
you are not where they are issuing contract or doing anything, you cannot steal. 
 
<Internals\\Emmanuel Adegbite\\Emmanuel Adegbite> - § 2 references coded  [9.46% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.81% Coverage 
 
A significant player here is corporate corruption and the regulation is very lax and 
ineffective 
 
<Internals\\Femi Obembe\\Femi Obembe> - § 4 references coded  [2.06% Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 0.65% Coverage 
 
Corruption is what has brought Nigeria to where we are today. With corruption, we 
don’t have effective investment. We don’t have effective allocation of resources. 
Corruption will allocate resources towards a selfish end, selfish interest.  
 
Reference 3 - 0.41% Coverage 
 
So, corruption is a serious issue both within the companies and even outside the 
companies. So, except we do something about corruption, we cannot move 
 
Reference 4 - 0.47% Coverage 
 
The message is that here we welcome corruption. Here, corruption thrives. And as 
long as we have that kind of system, it is going to be affecting negatively CG in the 
firms 
 
<Internals\\Francis Iyoha\\Francis Iyoha> - § 4 references coded  [2.26% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.52% Coverage 
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Yes. So many issues. One, corruption. Corruption is a major factor. Every other 
thing that we are discussing, can be discussed in terms of that corruption 
 
Reference 3 - 0.30% Coverage 
 
Corruption has eaten deep into everything we do. Corruption has affected every part 
of CG  
 
<Internals\\Ifeanyi Ukoha\\Ifeanyi Ukoha> - § 2 references coded  [4.26% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.43% Coverage 
 
I think it’s the whole crux of….I mean I could it is the biggest problem in Nigeria. 
There is corruption everywhere but in Nigeria, it is paralysing. So, it is actually a 
major…..the fact that you can get your way through and you know, it just permeates 
all aspects of our life. You know that if you commit a traffic offence, the policeman 
wants money. You know that if you go against the….what do they do at SEC to 
make sure that those sorts of things don’t happen. Yes, corruption is…..infact, it 
should be No. 1. 
 
<Internals\\Kenneth Amaeshi\\Kenneth Amaeshi> - § 1 reference coded  [1.89% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.89% Coverage 
 
Corruption is one of the main problems in Nigeria. CG alone is unable to address the 
problem.  Corruption continues to undermine CG as long it is continues to permeate 
the system. 
 
<Internals\\Nat Ofo\\Nat Ofo> - § 1 reference coded  [3.92% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.92% Coverage 
 
If the regulator is corrupt, how would CG be enforced? We know what should be 
done but those things that should be done restrain us, so you will rather do it the 
other way. But if the regulator is also doing the wrong way, then he is not 
compelling you to do the right thing. 
 
<Internals\\Nwachukwu Idoko\\Nwachukwu Idoko> - § 2 references coded  [9.53% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 2.00% Coverage 
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The effect of institutionalised corruption will not necessarily allow for the practice of 
good CG. 
 
Reference 2 - 7.53% Coverage 
 
Corruption is embedded in our system and it affects the performance of CG in the 
country. It is prevalent in Nigerian organisations. It also affects governance per se.  
 
<Internals\\Odaye Jerry\\Odaye Jerry> - § 1 reference coded  [1.20% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.20% Coverage 
 
Enforcement is also very poor, occasioned by corruption.  
 
<Internals\\Olayinka Moses\\Olayinka Moses> - § 1 reference coded  [6.65% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 6.65% Coverage 
 
Sure. CG is suffering from induced corruption from the whole society. One major 
problem with weak CG structure is insider dealings. Corruption has a cultural 
undertone, when people claim it is our turn. So, a father who becomes an MD of a 
bank asks the son to incorporate 2-3 companies in different names, which are 
responsible for all the contracts and projects in the bank. People offer juicy positions 
to friends and relations just to defraud an organisation. 
 
<Internals\\Shittu Bello\\Shittu Bello> - § 2 references coded  [15.11% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 10.90% Coverage 
 
Corruption is the mother of all because when there is a high level of corruption, 
criminals get exit, they can get away from their corrupt activities through the legal 
process. Corruption is the major issue and it is very high in our system. These factors 
are interrelated. If there is a good legal system, strong law enforcement agents and 
what we can call model governance (if the people at the top serve as model to the 
followers), corruption can be easily tackled. All these factors can be deemed as 
promoters of bad CG in Nigeria.  
 
Appendix 7B: Culture 
 
<Internals\\Abdullahi Bello\\Abdullahi Bello> - § 3 references coded  [9.85% 
Coverage] 
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Reference 2 - 3.81% Coverage 
 
Maybe the problem of the code is that it failed to integrate our own culture because it 
was imported from abroad so people will not identify with it. My personal culture is 
likely to guide me more than any other code that is imposed on me 
 
Reference 3 - 4.60% Coverage 
 
Politicians are part of the society. I don’t really think they believe in the codes 
because oftentimes, it does not address or recognise our local cultural peculiarities.  
 
<Internals\\Abubakar Bello\\Abubakar Bello> - § 4 references coded  [6.34% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 3 - 2.88% Coverage 
 
It does and my answer to this is similar to what I said in terms of religion. There is a 
tendency for a CEO to patronise his people, engage in policies that may not be 
necessarily in the interest of the corporation but just to favour his ethnic or cultural 
affiliations. 
 
Reference 4 - 2.25% Coverage 
 
The society is divided along ethnic lines and the political system has not helped in 
bridging the ethnic divide. Positions held by individuals are usually not based on 
competence but rather on where you are from. 
 
<Internals\\Adah Arojogboye\\Adah Arojogboye> - § 2 references coded  [8.19% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 4.02% Coverage 
 
Culture still plays a very significant role in all that we do but our code gives clear 
instruction as per CG. However, our culture requires that we respect our elders so 
challenging an MD, for instance, might be difficult to pursue. 
 
<Internals\\Adamu Sambo\\Adamu Sambo> - § 4 references coded  [11.39% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.29% Coverage 
 
Well, by my own opinion, I don’t think it is a matter of culture. Our culture has no 
input in modern management. If our culture has input in modern management, I can 
assure you that things would have been better. 
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Reference 4 - 1.53% Coverage 
 
So, you find out that, if anything, culture has had a negative impact because it 
condones criminality, it condones corporate misgovernance in other to enable those 
who are doing it to make as much resources as possible to finance their expensive 
life.  
 
<Internals\\Albert Owolabi\\Albert Owolabi> - § 6 references coded  [5.13% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 5 - 0.62% Coverage 
 
It is happening. There are organisations that are really known for their cultural stand. 
Best practices, so to say, and they don’t compromise it.  
 
<Internals\\Biodun Adedipe\\Biodun Adedipe> - § 2 references coded  [4.56% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 2.37% Coverage 
 
Let’s take culture first. There is a common perception that our culture does not 
support CG but I take an exception to that view.  
 
Reference 2 - 2.18% Coverage 
 
So, the culture can be shaped by leadership and the existence of rules that are 
enforced.  
 
<Internals\\Chris Ogbechie\\Chris Ogbechie> - § 3 references coded  [7.19% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 3 - 1.30% Coverage 
 
Another problem which is cultural is that we respect age. We defer to age. We defer 
to authority. For instance, if you have a traditional ruler as the chairman of a Board, 
would you argue with him? 
 
<Internals\\Effiong Esu\\Effiong Esu> - § 3 references coded  [1.58% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.57% Coverage 
 
To some extent. You can’t really divorce culture from the way people do their things 
even though, the whole idea, the corporate form is not indigenous to us. 
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<Internals\\Eghes Eyieyen\\Eghes Eyieyen> - § 14 references coded  [13.30% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 2.32% Coverage 
 
But, maybe there is but I would rather look at it as culture. For instance, you see that 
there is a difference between how the Japanese culture has influenced how business 
is done, and the discipline of business, their commitment to contract, and all that. In 
our culture, for instance, in certain cultures, owing (debt) is not a shameful thing. But 
a Japanese man can go and commit hara kiri (suicide) because of that. You know, 
they have a great sense of honour in their culture. This is not so, because the African 
culture is also diverse.  
 
Reference 2 - 1.02% Coverage 
 
Bringing it to CG, you know our culture is very patriarchal and it is also monarchical 
in terms of Kabiyesi syndrome. For example, it is not just amongst the Yorubas, 
where in African culture, a society where monarchy is in place. The tendency is that 
the monarch is…..the belief is that the monarch is almost a god. Infact, in some 
places, they are seen as god in the flesh and then they are unquestionable. Infact, 
Kabiyesi means unquestionable in Yoruba 
 
Reference 3 - 0.63% Coverage 
 
Now, when that mentality is brought into a corporate setting, you find that the 
chairman or the CEO can have a superiority complex or even a god-complex such 
that the person is unable to even obey CG codes because culturally, he as the CEO or 
he as the chairman sees himself as god 
 
Reference 4 - 0.90% Coverage 
 
I mean look at the breaches we are talking about in the banking system. Those CEOs 
were virtually gods to themselves. They became demi gods that even the internal 
auditor cannot even suggest anything, even their fellow directors. They are not able 
to speak to them because they come from a paradigm where the head person, the 
leader is god, is infallible, he never makes mistakes, he knows everything. 
 
Reference 5 - 1.78% Coverage 
 
So, there is no doubt that culture affects CG because the belief system will 
determine…..a CEO will not feel any need to subject……Because even when you 
have a council of Obas or a Kings council in a monarchical system, they are advisory. 
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For the king, they are just advisers. He is not obliged to do what they want so you 
find that that cultural thing for some is like, I started the business, I am the pioneer 
CEO. Even when he doesn’t control the shares, the person is almost…… 
 
Reference 14 - 0.96% Coverage 
 
So, I think the negative cultural influences or even if there are negative religious 
influences, those things can be eliminated when people are helped to see that CG is a 
good thing and it is value-adding. So, it is education, enlightenment. And that 
education involves also training. It is exposure training on CG for the operators and 
people who are involved. So, I think it is really a question of education and 
enlightenment.  
 
<Internals\\Emmanuel Adegbite\\Emmanuel Adegbite> - § 1 reference coded  [11.02% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 11.02% Coverage 
 
With respect to culture, you cannot separate people from their culture. But if a 
particular culture seems to conflict with general notions of CG, it is important to 
probably have a supervisor like we have it in Japan. There are positive and negatives 
influences of our culture with regard to CG. Another aspect of Nigerian culture 
which I have an issue with is the respect for elders. It might be difficult to question 
the action of elders, which could lead to unchecked perpetration of bad practices. 
Even though this issue is evident in many societies, it is quite worse in Nigeria. 
 
<Internals\\Femi Obembe\\Femi Obembe> - § 4 references coded  [4.29% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 2.11% Coverage 
 
When I was growing up in those days, when I was in secondary school, I was doing 
Government and those kinds of things. We did traditional political institutions. We 
were told that Yoruba system is a system which is democratic, a system of rule of 
law. There is the king, there is the chief and all that. They gave us that picture. So, I 
had that in mind that that culture is a democratic culture but now, having grown up 
and seeing what is happening in the environment, I cast my mind back to the olden 
days, I found out that our Obas in those days were not guided by any rule of law. If 
they go round the streets and they see a very pretty lady and say today you have 
become my wife, they can convert anybody’s property. The king is revered as 
someone who can do and undo. 
 
<Internals\\Francis Iyoha\\Francis Iyoha> - § 5 references coded  [6.11% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.75% Coverage 
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Then, most of the organisations also engage in tribal issues. A Yoruba MD who is 
retiring would want a Yoruba man to take over from him. If you have an Igbo man at 
the head, he will want an Igbo man to take over from him.  
 
Reference 2 - 0.12% Coverage 
 
Yes. Culture also has effects on CG. 
 
Reference 3 - 1.99% Coverage 
 
He did a study which shows that the Yoruba culture, for instance, can impact CG 
negatively. For instance, if a chief accountant of an organisation is 50 years old and 
you send a 30 year old man as an Auditor to that same company where the elderly 
man is the chief accountant, by their culture, the younger accountant is to come and 
prostrate before the accountant. Under that condition, it is not able to ask or be 
sceptical in the conduct of his audit as it would have been if the man he is coming to 
look at is not a Yoruba man. That particular example shows that culture also affects 
CG. 
 
<Internals\\Ifeanyi Ukoha\\Ifeanyi Ukoha> - § 2 references coded  [6.40% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.75% Coverage 
 
I think culture is a very significant influence because many cultures in Nigeria, you 
will have to respect your elders. Your elders don’t do any wrong and there is this 
belief that whoever has money, who is putting the money on the table is the one that 
calls the shot. So, you find that culture permeates everything we do.  
<Internals\\Kenneth Amaeshi\\Kenneth Amaeshi> - § 2 references coded  [7.02% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.89% Coverage 
 
Our culture undermines CG. We have a culture of nepotism. Our culture has a 
tendency to corrupt. When you do things the proper way, you become a wicked man. 
People are expected to lower standards. Our culture generally has not moved us far 
as a nation. It is questionable if the way we do things is good enough for us as 
individuals, or our firms or even the country.  
 
<Internals\\Nat Ofo\\Nat Ofo> - § 2 references coded  [8.45% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.17% Coverage 
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Culture has an influence on CG. Our culture influences a lot of things, even during 
discussions in the board meetings where elders are respected. Members take sides 
with elders whose positions on some issues are well known.  
 
<Internals\\Nwachukwu Idoko\\Nwachukwu Idoko> - § 1 reference coded  [8.13% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 8.13% Coverage 
 
How about culture? 
To some extent, yes. There is always a tendency to place confidence on who you 
trust by relating with people you know or you can identify with. In the developed 
societies, they have overgrown the influence of ethnicity and culture in the way they 
do their things. In these countries, they are interested in engaging experts rather than 
basing their decisions on any other criterion.     
 
<Internals\\Opeyemi Agbaje\\Opeyemi Agbaje> - § 3 references coded  [13.20% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 2.17% Coverage 
 
Our culture is a negative factor for CG in Nigeria. It is not necessarily our original 
culture but we have elements of what we have developed into our culture that 
impedes CG and one of them is lack of culture of accountability.  
 
Reference 3 - 5.77% Coverage 
 
There are elements of culture that are positive which may restrain criminal behaviour. 
But I can say that the average Nigerian, culturally, will be adverse to outright 
criminality. He will like to do things he can explain to his conscience.  
Appendix 7C: Government (Political System) 
 
<Internals\\Abdullahi Bello\\Abdullahi Bello> - § 5 references coded  [21.14% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 9.35% Coverage 
 
It is very difficult to do business in Nigeria without involving some government 
agencies. You have to deal with government.  
 
Reference 3 - 1.36% Coverage 
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Like I said, the problem with CG in Nigeria is the issue of government excessive 
interference.  
 
Reference 5 - 3.73% Coverage 
 
It is also necessary that the economic base of the country is well diversified to ensure 
that there is less dependence on the government. Many people are too dependent on 
the government to earn a living. It does not bode well for CG. 
 
<Internals\\Abel Ajala\\Abel Ajala> - § 1 reference coded  [0.47% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.47% Coverage 
 
Poor leadership from government.  
 
<Internals\\Biodun Adedipe\\Biodun Adedipe> - § 4 references coded  [6.31% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.73% Coverage 
 
They look out for leadership. Nigerians generally, once we see the right leadership, 
we follow. 
 
Reference 2 - 2.18% Coverage 
 
So, the culture can be shaped by leadership and the existence of rules that are 
enforced. People say the average Nigerian is a cheat but then, they can be compliant. 
The average Nigerian is more committed to doing what is right when the 
environment provided by the leadership is right. 
 
<Internals\\Chris Ogbechie\\Chris Ogbechie> - § 3 references coded  [8.66% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.63% Coverage 
 
Government is the biggest player in this economy. But to get business from 
government, I must bribe. Bribery is against the tenets of CG. If bribery is an issue 
that is not condoned by an organisation, then it will not play in the government 
sector. You cannot get into the pool without getting wet.  
<Internals\\Francis Iyoha\\Francis Iyoha> - § 2 references coded  [1.83% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.97% Coverage 
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When I remember what we used to do, I don’t want to talk about CG because as far 
as I’m concerned, that 40% is even exaggerated. But you cannot blame the public 
organisations solely because the infrastructure that are supposed to be provided on 
the side of the government are not provided 
 
<Internals\\Ifeanyi Ukoha\\Ifeanyi Ukoha> - § 1 reference coded  [0.84% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.84% Coverage 
 
And of course, a good leader. We need a President who is not corrupt because as you 
have seen, corruption is a major issue.  
 
<Internals\\Nwachukwu Idoko\\Nwachukwu Idoko> - § 2 references coded  [9.07% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 7.53% Coverage 
 
That is the big problem. Corruption is embedded in our system and it affects the 
performance of CG in the country. It is prevalent in Nigerian organisations. It also 
affects governance per se. if government is able to tackle corruption, then other 
institutions like corporate organisations will follow suit. This is the factor that has 
affected CG the most in this country.  
 
Reference 2 - 1.54% Coverage 
 
Government must also be made to buy into CG, and the use of the scorecard.  
 
<Internals\\Odaye Jerry\\Odaye Jerry> - § 2 references coded  [12.97% Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 5.61% Coverage 
 
Ensure that the powers that be in Nigeria buy into CG. I will also review the present 
code more regularly. There is also the need to enlighten and educate the people 
regarding the benefits of CG. It is also important that CG is taught in our various 
universities.  
 
<Internals\\Olayinka Moses\\Olayinka Moses> - § 1 reference coded  [2.68% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 2.68% Coverage 
 
The political structure of the country is also another issue. If the head of Board is a 
politician, it might be difficult to check their activities in view of the influence they 
wield. 
 302 
 
Appendix 7D: The Individual 
 
<Internals\\Abdullahi Bello\\Abdullahi Bello> - § 4 references coded  [10.90% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 5.04% Coverage 
 
For companies, they are usually influenced by the personal desires and decisions of 
their MDs. In management, for instance, it is the personal interest of those behind 
management that informs what decisions are taken. So, organisational culture is 
reflective of the individual or individuals behind an organisation. 
 
Reference 4 - 2.23% Coverage 
 
The average Nigerian is trustworthy but once he realises that there is an opportunity 
to be taken advantage of, CG becomes less important.  
 
<Internals\\Abubakar Bello\\Abubakar Bello> - § 5 references coded  [13.10% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.81% Coverage 
 
Even though many institutions how have some CG structures, the institutional 
frameworks are still very weak such that individual managers in corporations still 
have significant influence and power in deciding the fate of organisations. The 
checks and balances that is supposed to be provided by CG frameworks is just 
documented and kept somewhere in the firms 
 
Reference 2 - 3.32% Coverage 
 
Not much has improved because the observance in practice is nothing to be excited 
about. For instance, despite the presence of the code, we recently had the case of 
many banks failing in the system in 2008, because certain individuals did not act in 
line with CG codes as far as their institutions were concerned. 
 
Reference 4 - 1.53% Coverage 
 
The power available to the CEO is enormous so they can leverage on the corruption 
in the society to influence decisions in their personal favour 
 
Reference 5 - 1.23% Coverage 
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I will also look at undue influence to ensure that the fate of an organisation is not 
decided by a single individual 
 
<Internals\\Adah Arojogboye\\Adah Arojogboye> - § 3 references coded  [10.73% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.78% Coverage 
 
It baffles us as regulators why companies don’t see the benefit of complying with 
CG requirements. This problem is dependent on the individuals running an 
organisation. Some individuals don’t necessarily believe in it. 
 
Reference 2 - 2.43% Coverage 
 
The get-rich-quick syndrome has further pulled us back from where we want to be. 
People do what they like and all this is about corruption. 
 
<Internals\\Adamu Sambo\\Adamu Sambo> - § 5 references coded  [17.04% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 2.53% Coverage 
 
And in Nigeria in particular, we have the problem of the individual. The people who 
are running the organisation determines whether the code or the rules and the laws 
for running the corporate entities are being followed very well or not.  
 
Reference 2 - 7.11% Coverage 
 
Because individuals take their interest far ahead of the interest of the corporate entity 
and most of the corporate misgovernance that we have in Nigeria are basically 
caused by that. The failure of the banks, if you look at it critically, you find out that 
it is individuals that caused it. It is not the system. Because somebody somewhere 
will want to make that he makes those things in his own way, contrary to the 
governance method that have been set aside for him.  
 
Reference 3 - 2.02% Coverage 
 
So, basically, as you rightly asked, the cause of non-performance or non-adherence 
to CG is basically not because the documentation for the code of CG is very difficult 
to adhere to but individuals put their own personal interest far above the corporate 
interest and basically, it is the major contributing factor to this problem.   
 
Reference 5 - 2.61% Coverage 
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And everything, whether you like it or not, it is individualised. The institutions are 
inanimate objects by themselves. Isn’t it? Who run them? Who give them life? It is 
human beings that are managers so whichever we you look at it, it is the individual 
and he determines whatever that happens.  
 
<Internals\\Albert Owolabi\\Albert Owolabi> - § 6 references coded  [5.16% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.18% Coverage 
 
 don’t. I want to look at it more from the angle that it is the individual who have been 
assigned this opportunity, who have been assigned these roles, that have chosen to 
cut corners more often for their own selfish advantage than for the ultimate benefit of 
their home offices.  
 
Reference 2 - 0.54% Coverage 
 
But when you now bring in the issue of religion, I would want to argue, and rightly 
too, that it is more of an individual thing 
 
Reference 3 - 1.46% Coverage 
 
And that is what is decimating our future. It is not that religion is indeed influencing 
the practice of CG, No. It is still the issue of the individual who occupy certain 
positions over a period of time. Who elect, on their own volition, to go in that 
direction they have chosen. And usually, most of the time, it is usually for self-
protection 
 
<Internals\\Biodun Adedipe\\Biodun Adedipe> - § 4 references coded  [6.39% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 2.65% Coverage 
 
These are entities saddled with the responsibility for enforcing those CG 
requirements. The enforcement thus should not depend on individual but the system 
should be so strong that it would not matter who is there. We still have issues where 
sanctions are only applied depending on the character and clout of the person who is 
at the leadership.  
 
Reference 2 - 0.90% Coverage 
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The average Nigerian is more committed to doing what is right when the 
environment provided by the leadership is right 
 
<Internals\\Effiong Esu\\Effiong Esu> - § 4 references coded  [2.05% Coverage] 
 
Reference 3 - 0.70% Coverage 
 
Because invariably, at the end of the day, these are the people that will actually 
implement and most of them know, they know the workings of the system and they 
know how to subvert the system 
 
<Internals\\Eghes Eyieyen\\Eghes Eyieyen> - § 14 references coded  [9.06% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 1.48% Coverage 
 
Corporate is the collection of individuals. I think it is, although this is debatable, but 
I think there is nothing like corporate corruption. I think it is corrupt individuals 
within the corporation. If you change a CEO, if there was a culture of corruption and 
you change the leadership, and the leadership is a leadership of people who are 
committed to righteousness, committed to integrity, you have changed the corporate 
culture just by changing the leadership. So, this issue of corporate corruption just 
means that the company has corporate leaders. It is just like people say Nigeria is 
corrupt. Nigeria is not corrupt, it is the leaders that are corrupt. 
 
Reference 3 - 0.65% Coverage 
 
If you check the leadership and you put in people that are not corrupt in the 
leadership, Nigeria will not be corrupt anymore. I don’t know if you get my point so 
it is the behaviour and the orientation of the human beings in the company that is 
making them either corrupt or not corrupt.  
 
Reference 4 - 0.31% Coverage 
 
So, it is the people that form the culture of a place. So, it is not the other way round. 
The culture will change if you change the people.  
 
Reference 6 - 0.35% Coverage 
 
So, it is the human beings really that determine the culture and the behaviour and I 
think that the issue of corporate corruption is a function of the people. 
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Reference 12 - 0.29% Coverage 
 
even children when you tell them to do something; the tendency is for them to see 
how does it benefit them. You know, self-interest 
 
<Internals\\Femi Obembe\\Femi Obembe> - § 6 references coded  [3.83% Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 0.35% Coverage 
 
We are not naturally people that obey laws. Naturally, I’ve seen it. We come from an 
environment that breeds a culture of impunity 
 
Reference 6 - 0.53% Coverage 
 
Sure. There is this managerial theory, you know, empire building. Power. We are all 
human beings. You have been made a corporate executive. You want to show that 
you are a very important person.  
 
<Internals\\Francis Iyoha\\Francis Iyoha> - § 7 references coded  [4.10% Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 0.77% Coverage 
 
Greed. Greed. Nothing more. Wanting to be like the other man. Bank A wants to be 
like Bank B. Oceanic of those days wants to be like UBA. UBA wants to be like 
First Bank. First Bank wants to be like IBTC. That is just the issue. 
 
Reference 7 - 1.12% Coverage 
 
So, corruption is running through from the man at the gate to the man at the top 
because of greed and the need to be like the other man. He wants to drive the car the 
other man is driving; he wants to build a house in Victoria Island because a friend 
has a house on Victoria Island. It is a very serious matter, very serious matter 
 
<Internals\\Kenneth Amaeshi\\Kenneth Amaeshi> - § 2 references coded  [3.98% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.26% Coverage 
 
The idea of personality-led firms. Many Nigerian organisations are built around 
individuals and it is still evident. Except for the likes of Union bank, first bank that 
are faceless, most other organisations can be connected to an individual. These 
individuals have powers to do and undo with respect to CG.  
 
<Internals\\Olayinka Moses\\Olayinka Moses> - § 2 references coded  [6.83% 
Coverage] 
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Reference 1 - 5.11% Coverage 
 
Based on all I see, I can’t find real CG. We still have so much insider dealings, one-
man decision-making even though there is a sitting board. For instance, the case 
between Cecelia Ibru and the old Oceanic Bank. So many decisions were taking 
outside the board. CG is aimed at ensuring that certain rules and guidelines are 
applied in decision-making.  
 
<Internals\\Raymond Ihyembe\\Raymond Ihyembe> - § 1 reference coded  [4.89% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 4.89% Coverage 
 
The goals of both the managers and the shareholders are not different i.e. 
maximising stakeholder value, but greed and personal interest drives these CG 
infractions. People forget that the prestige one can get by being a member of a 
successful company is more valuable, and can add value to him as a person. 
 
<Internals\\Shittu Bello\\Shittu Bello> - § 3 references coded  [14.27% Coverage] 
 
Reference 3 - 7.36% Coverage 
 
 The problem is that some people are self-centred, they don’t care whether other 
people’s interests are taken care of or not, as long as their own interest is enhanced. 
For instance, a CEO knows that he should protect the assets of his organisation, he 
should do transactions at arms-length, etc. But you realise that the same CEO floats a 
company and seeks contracts from the same organisation. You cannot say that 
person is ignorant; it is just a willingness to cheat and take advantage of his/her 
position. 
 
Appendix 7E: Legal System 
 
<Internals\\Abel Ajala\\Abel Ajala> - § 2 references coded  [12.48% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.84% Coverage 
 
Our laws are ineffective. But the laws and its enforcement are changing. People are 
gradually realising that you can’t go away with crimes committed. It is also 
important for people to know the rules, as this is an issue. However, it is important to 
punish law offenders. 
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<Internals\\Abubakar Bello\\Abubakar Bello> - § 3 references coded  [3.01% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.77% Coverage 
 
The levels of observance and compliance with laws are typically very low. 
 
Reference 2 - 1.53% Coverage 
 
This is because there is no stringent framework for compliance and enforcement. 
There is also little or consequences for violation of CG codes.  
 
<Internals\\Adah Arojogboye\\Adah Arojogboye> - § 1 reference coded  [4.16% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 4.16% Coverage 
 
Generally, we circumvent. We are Nigerians. It is very un-Nigerian to comply with 
rules. Our culture does not really allow us to comply. We like to do things our way. 
Things such as the rule of law, compliance, etc. are quite alien to us.   
 
<Internals\\Adamu Sambo\\Adamu Sambo> - § 6 references coded  [16.64% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 4 - 5.70% Coverage 
 
The problem we have is this, obeying law and order in Nigeria is a problem. Problem 
in the sense that when a lot of people, when individuals who are running corporate 
organisations commit crime, instances abound whereby you see a kind of….i 
wouldn’t say compromise but leniency on the part of regulatory institutions, because 
of relationships.  
 
Reference 6 - 0.60% Coverage 
 
Penalty for CG violations should be punitive enough (serious sanction) to dissuade 
offenders 
 
<Internals\\Albert Owolabi\\Albert Owolabi> - § 7 references coded  [4.55% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.30% Coverage 
 
Yes. To a large extent, it does. Because we have a very weak judiciary 
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Reference 2 - 0.36% Coverage 
 
They are still at the mercy of the strand of the judiciary that is extremely corrupt. 
 
<Internals\\Chris Ogbechie\\Chris Ogbechie> - § 5 references coded  [8.06% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 3 - 1.24% Coverage 
 
In the Nigerian context, we do not have a high level of adoption. We have laws but 
we don’t have enforcement mechanisms. We have laws but its interpretation is 
dependent on who is at the top. 
 
<Internals\\Effiong Esu\\Effiong Esu> - § 4 references coded  [2.28% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.50% Coverage 
 
The key thing is the laws are there. The rules are there but the major challenge we 
have is on the aspect of enforcement and compliance.  
 
Reference 4 - 0.96% Coverage 
 
The regular courts, you see them, everybody knows, a man knows he stole but the 
court will now say there is no evidence. There is no evidence to get decision, our 
hands are tied, there is no evidence, legal evidence to get this man, to say that the 
man is guilty. 
 
<Internals\\Eghes Eyieyen\\Eghes Eyieyen> - § 4 references coded  [3.79% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 1.15% Coverage 
 
You know, Bernard Madoff is in jail right now. Look at Murdoch. Look at how the 
system has been affected. Today, madam (Mrs. Ibru) went to spend 6 months in the 
hospital. Yes, on the law, she is supposed to be an ex-convict but she really didn’t go 
to jail. And tomorrow, Jonathan (the President) can forgive her afterall they’ve give 
pardon to Alamiyesegha and she didn’t even do as much as Alamiyesigha. So, you 
find that the system itself can undermine CG when there is no rule of law or when 
there is corruption. 
 
Reference 3 - 0.67% Coverage 
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But corruption is not a Nigerian thing, it is a human thing. The difference between 
corruption in Nigeria and abroad is that, like I said, is the rule of law. If they catch 
you abroad, there is no begging but here, they can catch and you use the money to 
bail yourself out or to bribe yourself out. 
 
<Internals\\Emmanuel Adegbite\\Emmanuel Adegbite> - § 5 references coded  
[13.63% Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 1.83% Coverage 
 
A significant player here is corporate corruption and the regulation is very lax and 
ineffective. 
 
Reference 3 - 1.77% Coverage 
 
A mandatory code is more useful in an environment where the institutional 
mechanisms are weak. 
 
Reference 4 - 1.32% Coverage 
 
How do you expect companies to comply where there is no force of law?  
 
Reference 5 - 5.66% Coverage 
 
I see rules-based as a quick fix. Principles-based are they best and more sustainable 
but it takes a long time for its results to lead to real change in behaviour. For instance, 
we can argue that the banks in Nigeria have the best CG practices because the CBN 
code 2006 is essentially rules-based.  
 
<Internals\\Femi Obembe\\Femi Obembe> - § 9 references coded  [7.56% Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 0.89% Coverage 
 
Especially, we have weak property rights protection. So if you have an environment 
that is weak in terms of property rights protection, what we are saying here is that to 
bring your property here is risk. The government can decide to misappropriate your 
property and you many go to court and you may not be able to get justice. 
 
Reference 4 - 0.57% Coverage 
 
So, what that means is that we need to see how we can get the CG system to work 
but I have said that the CG system, irrespective of any code you design will not work 
except the legal environment is effective. 
 
Reference 6 - 0.34% Coverage 
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We don’t like to respect law. Law in this country is for the poor people. But the big 
people, you know, the law is not for them. 
 
Reference 7 - 0.35% Coverage 
 
We are not naturally people that obey laws. Naturally, I’ve seen it. We come from an 
environment that breeds a culture of impunity 
 
<Internals\\Francis Iyoha\\Francis Iyoha> - § 2 references coded  [0.89% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.67% Coverage 
 
Because you talk of the rules and regulations, we don’t obey rules and regulations in 
Nigeria because the laws are ineffective.  
 
Reference 2 - 0.21% Coverage 
 
We are too lenient. We condone indiscipline. Rules don’t work.  
 
<Internals\\Ifeanyi Ukoha\\Ifeanyi Ukoha> - § 5 references coded  [5.32% Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 0.40% Coverage 
 
You find that the respect for the law is actually diminishing 
 
Reference 3 - 0.84% Coverage 
 
There is a belief that law can be bought. You could be doing wrong but make sure 
you have enough money and that kind of thing. 
 
Reference 5 - 0.36% Coverage 
 
So, laws are not a deterrent 
 
<Internals\\Nwachukwu Idoko\\Nwachukwu Idoko> - § 3 references coded  [13.39% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 6.55% Coverage 
 
However, until there is a law which makes room for those who break rules to be 
punished, then the code becomes ineffective. Is there any sanction for any person 
who does not comply? And if there are sanctions, how many people have been 
brought to book? 
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Reference 2 - 2.46% Coverage 
 
If the code is not backed by law and the judiciary that you have to punish offenders, 
then the code will be non-effective.  
 
<Internals\\Olayinka Moses\\Olayinka Moses> - § 2 references coded  [3.95% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 2.23% Coverage 
 
Absence of strict legislation. No laws. Regulation is a very important factor. As long 
as reporting remains voluntary, there will continue to be problems.  
 
Reference 2 - 1.71% Coverage 
 
Nigeria is not law-friendly hence one general law may provide the opportunity to 
avoid or break the law altogether.   
 
<Internals\\Opeyemi Agbaje\\Opeyemi Agbaje> - § 5 references coded  [13.02% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 1.20% Coverage 
 
A maximalist code will erode the whole essence of entrepreneurial decision-making 
and also subvert the interest of the business 
 
Reference 3 - 4.75% Coverage 
 
This is important because the absence of an environment of law and order in the 
country supports impunity. Anybody who violates CG codes will assume that there 
will be no consequences for it because of the general weaknesses in making people 
pay for their crimes. People here, compared to people in the UK and US, and would 
not consider what if they are caught. The absence of law and order encourages 
impunity in our system and it is a contributor to why CG standards are not as high as 
expected.    
 
Reference 4 - 3.59% Coverage 
 
We have what I call a “jo-jo” culture so a guy commits but he is not sent to jail. He 
begs to resign and go. Thus, there is no deterrence for the next person but we forget 
that that is why people are sent to jail, so that other people will appreciate the 
consequences of committing a fraud. So when people commit a fraud, it generally 
ends with begging and possibly resignation.  
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Reference 5 - 0.41% Coverage 
  There is no deterrence for CG infractions 
 
<Internals\\Shittu Bello\\Shittu Bello> - § 4 references coded  [13.82% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 4.07% Coverage 
 
Rule of law supposed to be a correction, the antidote but people still violate. The 
problem is that sanctions have not really acted as a deterrent in some cases. Another 
problem is that there is a lengthy process of getting justice. Cases are delayed and 
not determined speedily. 
 
Reference 3 - 2.01% Coverage 
 
We must strengthen our legal system to ensure that offenders are not protected or 
take advantage of the inefficiencies in the legal system. 
 
Appendix 7F: Whistle-Blowing 
 
<Internals\\Abel Ajala\\Abel Ajala> - § 1 reference coded  [0.64% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.64% Coverage 
 
There must be whistle-blowers in the system.  
 
<Internals\\Abubakar Bello\\Abubakar Bello> - § 1 reference coded  [2.34% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 2.34% Coverage 
 
I will also pursue capacity building and implement whistle-blowing such that 
regulators will ensure that there is always an avenue for whistle-blowing such that 
any employees, under protection, can escalate CG infractions 
 
<Internals\\Eghes Eyieyen\\Eghes Eyieyen> - § 8 references coded  [6.44% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 2 - 0.15% Coverage 
 
What I will want to do is that I want to see a whistle-blower law 
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Reference 3 - 0.30% Coverage 
 
We need a whistle-blowing law that ensures that whistle-blowers are protected. 
Today, we don’t have any such thing. You are on your own 
 
Reference 4 - 0.61% Coverage 
 
Even in America, there is a witness protection program in the US where they 
actually physically relocate you if they need to provide…..Infact, sometimes if you 
watch some films, they even give you a new identity, new name because you have 
helped the system catch a criminal. 
 
 
Reference 6 - 1.71% Coverage 
 
We need a system that protects whistle-blowers, that encourages whistle-blowers to 
come forward and to protect whistle-blowers. CG without a whistle-blower 
protection will be superfluous because then you are mainly relying on the good 
naturedness or the morality of the operators. 
 
Reference 7 - 0.67% Coverage 
 
that also requires some kind of enforcement because if a whistle-blower, there must 
be an authority the whistle-blower is blowing to, who he knows. That is why people 
don’t do whistle-blowing because who are you going to report to? Police? What are 
they going to do? So, it is like, what is the point?  
 
Reference 8 - 0.92% Coverage 
 
So, the reforms I will like to see is strengthening the whistle-blower Act or, in fact 
not strengthen as there is none right now. Enact a whistle-blower law that includes a 
whistle-blower protection and then strengthen the institutions: the judiciary, the 
security agencies, so that the police can…..because somebody even blows the 
whistle, like I said, and the police doesn’t act on it, CG will still collapse.  
 
<Internals\\Emmanuel Adegbite\\Emmanuel Adegbite> - § 1 reference coded  [0.87% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.87% Coverage 
 
Whistle-blowing is not encouraged in Nigeria.  
 
<Internals\\Odaye Jerry\\Odaye Jerry> - § 2 references coded  [2.21% Coverage] 
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Reference 1 - 1.58% Coverage 
 
For instance, the issue of whistle-blowing was included in the present one (SEC 
Code, 2011). 
 
<Internals\\Olayinka Moses\\Olayinka Moses> - § 1 reference coded  [1.71% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.71% Coverage 
 
There must be the employment of whistle-blowers who have been educated 
regarding their role and available protection.   
 
<Internals\\Raymond Ihyembe\\Raymond Ihyembe> - § 1 reference coded  [5.73% 
Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 5.73% Coverage 
 
Ethnicity also impacts the way we practice CG because I have seen a Board of a 
quoted company where all the members are from a particular ethnic block. In this 
organisation, the whistle-blowing mechanism was shut down because they now see 
themselves as a single body. In this country, there is that element of tribe and it 
affects everything we do, including CG. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
